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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines political and social thought in dystopian fiction of the 
mid-twentieth century. It focuses on works by four authors: Yevgeny 
Zamyatin’s We (1924), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), and John Wyndham’s postwar novels 
(especially The Day of the Triffids (1951), The Kraken Wakes (1953) and 
The Chrysalids (1955)).   
 
The central concern of this thesis is how political and social ideas are 
developed within a literary mode which evolved as response to both literary 
concerns and political ideas, including on the one hand literary utopias, 
science fiction, satire, and literary modernism; and on the other hand 
modernity, social Darwinism, apocalypse, war, and changes in gender roles 
in the broader culture. It is argued that the narrative structures of these 
novels are crucial in enabling them to perform such critical tasks. These texts 
use fictionality to enact self-reflexive critiques of the disasters of their age 
that both acknowledge their own emergence from the post-Enlightenment 
tradition in the history of political ideas, and criticise the failings of this very 
tradition of which they are part. The work of a variety of critical theorists, 
including Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Hannah Arendt and 
Raymond Williams inform this analysis. This thesis aims to demonstrate how 
comparative readings of critical theory and literature can reveal their mutually 
interactive significance as cultural reactions to historical events. 
 
Dystopian fictions of the mid-twentieth century are both important documents 
in cultural history, and valuable literary examples of the development and 
diffusion of a plurality of modernisms within popular fiction. 
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Dystopian Fiction: Some Theoretical and Historical 
Perspectives 
 
AND YOU MAY ASK YOURSELF, 
‘WELL, HOW DID I GET HERE?’ 
 
-TALKING HEADS 
 
The Significance of Dystopia 
 
Dystopian fiction is a mode of narrative prose. Between 1920 and 1960 its 
expressions were characterised in a number of specific ways. Such texts 
were entangled in, and responded directly to, a complex and intricate web of 
material historical conditions, intellectual and cultural currents and dramatic 
social change. From the aftermath of the First World War to the close of the 
postwar era political structures were challenged, overturned and re-thought; 
the modern nation-state expanded and evolved in an unprecedentedly 
urgent fashion. This thesis is concerned with works written by authors who 
were born into rigidly stratified societies around the turn of the twentieth 
century. During the course of their writing careers, however, they would 
witness total war, revolutions, the Great Depression and extraordinary 
advances in science including the discovery of the double-helix structure of 
DNA and the development of atomic bombs. 
 
To engage with this world in flux, dystopian fiction absorbed a range of 
experimental techniques from literary modernism, deploying them in a genre 
that held genuinely popular appeal. These texts are significant not only as 
documents in cultural and intellectual history, but also within literary studies 
as an example of a genre engaged with the plurality of literary modernisms 
that negotiate and situate themselves within cultures regarded as non-elite or 
popular. 
 
A number of formal features characterised the genre in this period. Typically, 
such dystopian fictions began in medias res, with the narrative focusing upon 
  Stock 10     
  
the growing self-awareness and consciousness of an individual protagonist 
or small group of individuals who begin to rebel against prevailing conditions. 
As a general rule these were novels of ideas engaged in forms of critique in 
which satire played an important role. As such, dystopian fiction developed 
from a (post-)Enlightenment tradition that ran through the Victorian era and 
into the work of writers like H. G. Wells. However, like contemporaneous 
critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, and 
scholars of political thought like Hannah Arendt, dystopian authors were self-
consciously critical of the very conditions and assumptions of the post-
Enlightenment tradition from which they emerged. An important related 
aspect of dystopian literature was its reaction against specific trends in the 
history of literary utopias, especially as found in the works of Wells. 
Dystopian criticism of literary utopias does not in and of itself imply that it is 
orientated towards anti-utopian thought. Rather it points to dystopian fiction 
as being, in Tom Moylan’s term, “largely the product of the terrors of the 
twentieth century.”1 A contention of this thesis is that at its best dystopian 
fiction from this era presents an idea of individuality in which moral and/or 
political autonomy are retained, whilst also attempting to think through some 
of the implications of these traumas. A cultural history of dystopian fiction 
should therefore seek to reflect upon not only what the terrors of the 
twentieth century can tell us about dystopia, but additionally what dystopian 
fictions in turn have to say about the terrors which were conditions of their 
own production. A broader implication is that dystopian fiction can tell us 
much about the changing nature and value of social experience. However, 
such fiction does not discuss social experience as a static, reified, neatly 
conceptualised whole, but as a process, an evolving part of present, lived 
experience or a “structure of feeling” in Raymond Williams’s term, which he 
defined as 
specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling 
against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical 
consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-relating continuity… a 
social experience which is still in process, often indeed not yet recognized as 
social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in 
                                            
1 Tom Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia ed. Paul 
Smith (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), xi. 
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analysis (though rarely otherwise) has its emergent, connecting, and dominant 
characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies.2 
 
Dystopian fiction grappled with moral, social and political problems in these 
terms, by viewing them not only in relation to their past but also to a future 
which paradoxically both construes and resists the idea of historical 
necessity. At a time when humanist values were threatened, and in many 
cases looked to be breaking down entirely, dystopian authors as post-
Enlightenment thinkers offered a critique of the intellectual, cultural and 
political heritage which had led to such a state of affairs, consciously 
embedded in the very Enlightenment values which they were critically 
analysing. Dystopian fiction of the mid-twentieth century was timely, 
reflecting the social conditions of its production in terms of the prevalent 
social anxieties and cultural outlooks. 
 
Dystopia in Contemporary usage 
 
‘Dystopia’ is a word with increasing cultural currency. In recent years, it has 
been used almost interchangeably with ‘Orwellian’ in popular and media 
discourse as an indicator of a nightmarish future. This interchangeability is 
itself significant, but it is also interesting to note the changes in use here: the 
first well-known use of the word “dystopians” in the 1860s by J.S. Mill was as 
a critical and satirical device.3 After ninety years of very infrequent use, it 
started to be deployed to denote a literary genre. ‘Dystopia’ has recently 
begun to be employed as a term indicating any set of conditions significantly 
worse than they have been either in the past or are in the present time – be 
these in fiction or in empirical reality.4 Indeed, it seems that often the word 
                                            
2 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), 132 emphasis in 
original. 
3 See below, 56-7. 
4 See, for example, Simon Hoggart, "Britain Goes From Dystopia to Arcadia in Six Months," 
Simon Hoggart’s Sketch. Guardian 30 November 2010. Online ed. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/30/simon-hoggarts-sketch-george-
osborne?INTCMP=SRCH>, 1 June 2011; Paul Mason, “Decaying US City Proves Hard to 
Turn Around,” 2010, Web Page, BBC Radio 4, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9139226.stm>, 
3 December 2010 (featuring the subheading “American Dystopia”); and Jan Moir, "What 
Kind of Sick Society Has Jack Tweed as a Pin-Up - and What Kind of Girl Wants to Sleep 
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‘dystopia’ is chosen to express conditions that appear fictitious because they 
are, to quote Mill, “too bad to be practicable” and yet nonetheless are 
entering empirical reality.5 An example of this usage can be found in the 
opening chapter of Francis Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future: 
Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002), which contrasts the 
roles of technology in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World. According to Fukuyama, the technology of 
“telescreens” in Orwell’s novel already exists in the form of PCs and the 
Internet. But far from being nefarious in its effects, Fukuyama claims 
(anachronistically) that such technology has facilitated a democratising 
advance which has helped to bring about the end of Soviet Communism. 
Having used dystopian fiction to explain one set of socio-political changes 
brought about by cultural-technological advance, he then turns to Brave New 
World to look at a future set of challenges that we are only beginning to 
encounter. For Fukuyama, while the biotechnological advances in Huxley’s 
World State have produced humans who are supposedly “happy and 
healthy,” these characters 
have ceased to be human beings. They no longer struggle, aspire, love, feel 
pain, make difficult moral choices, have families, or do any of the things that 
we traditionally associate with being human. They no longer have the 
characteristics that give us human dignity.6 
 
The socialist attempts to “modify” humans socially have, Fukuyama argues, 
all failed. But the scientific ability to “modify” ourselves physically, 
emotionally and mentally still threatens Fukuyama’s avowedly Aristotelian 
notions of ‘human nature’ and the humanist tradition. 
 
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to pick apart this polemical 
argument. It is pertinent to note, however, that it demonstrates that twentieth-
                                                                                                                           
with Him?," Daily Mail 28 April 2010. Online ed. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-
1269335/What-kind-sick-society-Jack-Tweed-pin-up.html>, 1 June 2011. (“he seems to 
thrive in his carefully cultivated dystopia of party drugs, booze, violence and loveless sex”). 
The word ‘dystopia’ was first used in a scholarly context in Glenn Negley and J. Max Patrick 
eds. The Quest for Utopia: An Anthology of Imaginary Societies (New York: Henry 
Schuman, 1952), 298. 
5 Hansard Commons 12 Mar. 1868, vol. 190, c. 1517. See below, 56-7. 
6 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution (New York: Farrar, 2002), 4-6. 
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century dystopian fiction continues to have much to say about the most 
fundamental questions surrounding the human condition and the concept of 
human nature today, and looks set to continue to do so well into the future. 
That the date 1984 has long since passed is from this perspective irrelevant 
– dystopian fiction is not so narrowly or empirically predictive. Rather, it is the 
questions, the socio-political, psychological and philosophical critiques which 
these books undertake that continue to make them not just important 
historical documents but vital and living texts. The legacy of Yevgeny 
Zamyatin, George Orwell, Aldous Huxley, John Wyndham and others is not 
just in the continued production of dystopian fiction but in the epistemological 
terms of debate surrounding the future: they continue to give us tools to 
question the future, how we get there and what it will look like. Yet, as I will 
argue below, dystopian fiction does this in a unique way that differentiates it 
from utopian fiction, science fiction and non-fiction. 
 
Cultural History 
 
This thesis is concerned with the cultural history of dystopia. While the genre 
has a long pre-history with roots stretching back to the mythic, prophetic and 
apocalyptic writings of antiquity, Moylan traces the development of the genre 
in the novel form back to the early twentieth century when it was 
characterised by specific formal narrative and thematic concerns.7 Indeed, 
the present tendency, most easily observable in the popular press, to view 
future conditions as dystopian often makes explicit or implicit reference to 
literary texts and narratives in order to do so. The commonplace adjective 
‘Orwellian’, for example, usually indicates a social injustice or nefarious 
political action that is in some way comparable to conditions in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (or more rarely Animal Farm). 
 
                                            
7 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky xi-xiii. Likewise, for M. Keith Booker, “Yevgeny 
Zamyatin’s We [(1924) is] often considered to be the first genuine modern dystopian text”. 
M. Keith Booker, The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature: Fiction as Social Criticism, 
Contributions to the Study of Science Fiction and Fantasy 58 (Westport, CT: Greenwood P, 
1994), 25. 
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Meanwhile, in much of the standard literary scholarship on the genre, 
‘Dystopia’ is frequently presented as the creation of a (fictional) world 
considerably worse than the author’s present. A salient presupposition of 
such interpretations is that authorial intent may be discovered and assessed 
accurately. The more rigorous or precise of these interpretations, including 
those of Lyman Tower Sargent and Darko Suvin, differentiate between a 
dystopian mode and an ‘anti-utopian’ mode that categorically rejects the 
utopian tradition in its entirety, while broader (and usually more conservative) 
accounts like Karl Popper’s do not.8 Dystopian fiction tends to have a more 
ambivalent or ambiguous relationship than anti-utopian thought does with 
utopian thought. 
 
A major consequence of an interpretation of ‘dystopia’ centred on the socio-
political features of a storyworld is a strong emphasis on formal aspects of 
the text.9 Gregory Claeys, for example, maintains that a dystopia must be 
“broad[ly]… feasible” in the terms of the context in which it is produced, 
without any “utterly unrealistic features dominat[ing] the narrative,” and that it 
should be “cast principally in fictional form.”10 This is quite a wide definition, 
whose principal advantage is that the ‘feasibility’ test stops dystopia from 
being conflated with some science fiction. It also acknowledges the centrality 
of narrative to the genre, although Claeys does not develop this implication 
as far as he might. It is important to clarify that Claeys indicates that 
‘feasibility’ denotes a dystopia being “based on the extrapolation of some 
existing trend.” Greater elaboration would be useful here to prevent the 
emergence of distracting arguments over what might be possible in any 
fictional far future. Moreover, while Claeys’s conception is helpful in 
                                            
8 Thus, Sargent argues, “it is not always possible to be certain of an author’s intention… 
intention is a factor that a scholar has to take into account, but it does not provide a basis for 
characterizing a genre.” Lyman Tower Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited," 
Utopian Studies 5.1 (1994), 6; "Theses on Dystopia 2001," Dark Horizons: Science Fiction 
and the Dystopian Imagination eds. Raffella Baccolini and Tom Moylan (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 189; Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 5th ed., vol. 1 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 157. 
9 This in turn implies that dystopias are properly narrative aesthetic texts such as novels, 
films, plays, and graphic novels. 
10 Gregory Claeys, "The Origins of Dystopia: Wells, Huxley and Orwell," The Cambridge 
Companion to Utopian Literature ed. Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 
109. 
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suggesting a literary dimension, it does not address problems of authorial 
intent fully, or offer a narrative of the historical development of the dystopian 
genre. Other critics meanwhile, such as Suvin, have focused on narrower 
formal categories. For reasons I will outline below formal theories like Suvin’s 
can be problematic, tending to be primarily political rather than aesthetic. 
 
An account of the relations between ideology, form and historical context is a 
necessary framework for any critical understanding of dystopian texts and 
each of these may be regarded as separable for analytic purposes. 
However, I shall argue that it is important to resist the temptation to privilege 
any one of these hermeneutic categories above the others. A critique or 
exposition of the ideological content of dystopian work is valuable for many 
reasons – for example, it permits questioning of how the author viewed the 
social and the political, and may give insight into her or his aesthetic values. 
But without grounding such a critique in the historical context of the text it 
can easily become polemic. Likewise, investigating the historical milieu in 
which a dystopian novel is written without attention to its formal construction 
would overlook the interactive relationship between the two. As form and 
ideology are important concerns for a full understanding of dystopian fiction, 
neither can be adequately engaged without a grasp of the wider cultural and 
intellectual history that underpins and contextualises individual works in the 
genre. Accordingly, the conception of dystopia to be presented here will take 
account of both historical and formal aesthetic mediation.  
 
‘Modernist’ Dystopias? 
 
The works upon which I will focus were written between the end of World 
War I and the end of the 1950s and, to a greater or lesser extent, in the 
shadow of new types of literary writing that would later be grouped together 
and known as modernism (and which have recently been re-assessed more 
inclusively as ‘modernisms’).11 As “an artistic attempt to capture [the] sense 
of fragmentation and alienation” of “the modern condition,” modernism(s) 
                                            
11 Peter Nicholls, Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1995). 
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dealt with a world of uncertainty. Such writing was characterised by 
“deliberation on art and the artist, the attempted narrative registration of 
consciousness,” as well as “experiment and innovation.”12 One of the 
consequences of the recent explosion in scholarly interest in alternative 
modernisms, however, is the recognition that modernist experiment was not 
simply narrowly technical but also involved a revolution in approaches to 
epistemology, metaphysical questions about mind, concepts of political order 
and sociological constructions of selfhood. Over the past twenty-five years or 
so, literary critics have recognised that modernist writers were not simply 
engaged in the kind of solipsistic ‘inward turn’ assumed by critics such as the 
Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukács, but, like their nineteenth century realist 
forebears, they were deeply concerned with social and political realities.13 
Similarly, as homogenised conceptualisations of modernism have broken 
down, it has become apparent that the over-simplified dualism 
realism/modernism can no longer stand. 
 
In dystopian fiction of this period, experimentation is pervasive both on the 
narrative level and in terms of the “range of literary language” that “widened 
extraordinarily” in literary modernism.14 The experimental diary style and 
imagery of Zamyatin’s We, for instance, records the fracturing of D-503’s 
sense of self. Indeed, Zamyatin’s ‘Neo-realist’ aesthetic can be seen as 
absorbing modernism and thereby collapsing the Lukácsian 
modernism/realism dichotomy. To declare oneself a ‘modernist’ in early 
Soviet Russia was to court danger: the Communist Party had been 
suspicious of modernism long before Socialist Realism became doctrinally 
enshrined, not least because in the pre-modernist mid-nineteenth century 
                                            
12 Peter Brooker, "Early Modernism," The Cambridge Companion to the Modernist Novel, 
ed. Morag Shiach (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007). Cambridge Collections Online, 04 
June 2011 <DOI: 10.1017/CCOL052185444X.003>, 45; Chris Snipp-Walmsley, 
"Postmodernism," Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. Patricia Waugh (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2006), 409-10. 
13 Georg Lukács “Realism in the Balance” in Ernst Bloch et al, Aesthetics and Politics ed. 
Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1980) 36. One of the earliest works in the trend against 
Lukács’s hypostatized dualism of realism and modernism is Alex Zwerdling’s Virginia Woolf 
and the Real World (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1986), which explores the social and 
political thought in Woolf’s fiction. 
14 Robert Martin Adams, "What Was Modernism?" Hudson Review 31 (1978), 27. 
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Marx and Engels had championed “authentic realism.”15 Zamyatin’s labelling 
could be viewed from this perspective as a political move by an avant-garde 
writer who did not want to be associated with supposedly ‘bourgeois’ 
modernism. 
 
The influence of literary modernism is plain to see in Brave New World too, 
where the montage narrative technique that Huxley called “counterpoint” is 
used to capture the fragmentation and relentless pace of subjective 
experience at the narrative level. Similarly, an exploration of the limits and 
plasticity of human identity and subjectivity underpins Nineteen Eighty-Four; 
questions of authorship and fictionality surround both the lengthy political 
pamphlet “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism”, and “The 
Principles of Newspeak” appendix, which resists narrative closure. While 
less formally experimental, Wyndham’s postwar novels frequently use 
modernist tropes and themes: the telepathic child narrator of The Chysalids, 
for example, calls into question modern Western assumptions about the 
integral boundaries of selfhood and the nature of language and 
communication, and the ironic inversion of Wellsian symbols including the 
green comets in The Day of the Triffids plays on modernist concerns with 
cosmopolitan cities. 
 
In order to differentiate these texts from dystopias of other periods without 
either arbitrarily defining ‘dystopia’ as such to indicate solely this era, or 
coining another neologism based on the suffix ‘–topia’, I will term these 
works of the early-mid twentieth century ‘modernistic dystopias’. I want to 
emphasize the innovative new ways of thinking about the human mind and 
conceptions of the self which these texts explore, their lack of stable or 
certain endings, and their concern with memory and the loss of a more 
perfect past. The term ‘modernistic dystopias’, while grammatically slightly 
clumsy, is chosen in place of ‘modernist dystopias’ as the latter term could 
be open to at least two challenges. Firstly, while Orwell’s and particularly 
Wyndham’s novels may belong to the same ‘structure of feeling’ as those of 
                                            
15 Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin 
and Adorno (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1982) 26. 
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Zamyatin and Huxley, it may be more accurate to see them as fully 
embodying the legacies of modernism rather than being strictly ‘modernist’. 
Secondly (and consequentially), it would stretch the usual periodisation of 
modernism to a point that might limit it conceptually. By using the adjectival 
form ‘modernistic’ I imply a subtle distinction, approaching these texts in the 
spirit of Laura Marcus’s argument that in recent scholarship, “the ‘realisms’ of 
many mid-twentieth century writers and beyond are beginning to look not 
only more interesting and more complex, but closer to the ‘modernisms’ that 
they are conventionally held to have displaced.”16 
 
Literary Antecedents 
 
Strong dystopian tendencies can certainly be found in pre-twentieth century 
texts including, for example, Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau. But the 
early twentieth century witnessed changes in both narrative structure and 
thematic concerns of such literature. For Moylan, E.M. Forster’s The 
Machine Stops (1909) is “one of the first instances of dystopian narrative.”17 
It contains many characteristics that came to define dystopian writing later in 
the twentieth century. This short story opens in medias res. Its protagonist is 
Vashti, a woman whose son becomes disillusioned with the society he lives 
in, and seeks a way out of the slowly degenerating underground machine-
world in which they live, thereby challenging social structures. Satire is a 
major feature, and (here through techniques including free indirect 
discourse) the tale engages in a forthright critique of political and cultural 
thought. The narrator informs the reader that Vashti 
had studied the civilization that had immediately preceded her own – the 
civilization that had mistaken the functions of the system, and had used it for 
bringing people to things, instead of for bringing things to people. Those funny 
old days, when men went for change of air instead of changing the air in their 
rooms!18 
 
                                            
16 Laura Marcus, "The Legacies of Modernism," The Cambridge Companion to the 
Modernist Novel, ed. Morag Shiach (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2007). Cambridge 
Collections Online, <DOI: 10.1017/CCOL052185444X.006>, 5 June 2011, 82. 
17 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky xv. 
18 E.M. Forster, Collected Short Stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), 115. 
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Here the satire is Janus-faced: the “system” of universal transportation in the 
future-as-past is attacked for reducing geographical and cultural particularity 
to the lowest common denominator, while Vashti’s own society is satirised by 
comparison to a past in which “the system” did the bidding of men who were 
still autonomous from the machine. Although she avers that “there [i]s 
nothing mysterious” about the communication system, subterranean living 
has made her agoraphobic.19 The trip across the surface world represents a 
link to an unknown and unknowable past. 
 
The loss of memory and history is a recurring theme. Yet while the future 
setting of the narrative shared by all dystopian fiction is present, Forster’s 
text, in contrast to the later novels which this thesis examines, does not 
concern itself quite so much with a point in time between the author’s 
present and the “temporal level of narrative” (the point in the future at which 
the story is set).20 While this future-as-history is frequently hinted at, it is not 
developed as far as in later dystopian fiction. 
 
The Machine Stops also sits on the very cusp of modernism. Some 
characteristics of modernist literary writing can already be found here; free 
indirect speech is used in novel ways, the narrative is concerned with time 
and memory, and, with the “re-establishment of religion” (in which the 
Machine is “worshipped as divine”), Forster satirises religious urges.21 Yet at 
the same time, it is also very much an Edwardian story that looks backwards 
toward nineteenth-century naturalism. The sense of boredom experienced by 
the youthful character Kuno, and the satirical preoccupation of his mother 
Vashti with ideas as far removed from empirical experience as possible 
(“‘[l]et your ideas be second-hand, and if possible tenth-hand, for then they 
will be far removed from that disturbing element – direct observation’”),22 
place it of an age with novels like G.K.Chesterton’s The Napoleon of Notting 
Hill (1904). Fears of degeneration constitute a major thematic concern, and 
                                            
19 Forster, Collected Short Stories 115. 
20 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithica, 
NY: Cornell UP, 1980), 48. Dystopian narrative strategies are discussed below in Genette’s 
terms on pages 31 and 60-1. 
21 Forster, Collected Short Stories 136-7. 
22 Forster, Collected Short Stories 135. 
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this ties in to wider fin de siècle anxieties about the English working class 
(particularly in the aftermath of the failure to recruit sufficient physically fit 
volunteers during the Boer War).23 In this regard, Forster seems to draw on 
Wells’s The Time Machine (1895) in which humanity has split into two races 
– the child-like, effeminate surface-dwelling “Eloi” and the animal, predatory 
“Morlocks” who live underground. But in The Machine Stops, by contrast, all 
known humans live underground in individual isolated cells within “the 
Machine”. In this society, “it was a demerit to be muscular. Each infant was 
examined at birth and all who promised undue strength were destroyed.”24 
However, the protagonist’s son Kuno begins to exercise. Eventually he gains 
the strength to illegally visit the earth’s surface, where he discovers that it, 
too, is populated by some sort of humanity, living in a pre-machine state. 
Kuno’s questioning of the basis of his society is then a turning away from 
introspection and towards nature and man as a physical, animal being. Like 
Joseph Conrad’s Marlow, Kuno experiences a primal urge to visit man’s 
Heart of Darkness, but, unlike the jungle-explorer, Kuno finds a place not just 
of increased vitality but of light, beauty and human dignity. The implication of 
the survival of surface-dwellers is that this is a more physically healthy, 
robust state, “untainted” by the atomization and reliance on technology that 
imprisons and finally kills those underground. 
 
At the end of the story, when the machine suffers an irrevocable breakdown, 
Kuno and his mother weep together over the disappearance of an erotically 
charged, masculine ideal of humanity: 
Man, the flower of all flesh, the noblest of all creatures made visible, man who 
had once made god in his image, and had mirrored his strength on the 
constellations, beautiful naked man was dying, strangled in the garments that 
he had woven.25 
 
                                            
23 Arnold White found that in Manchester, during the first ten months of hostilities (1901), 
among 11,000 volunteers, 8,000 were “physically unfit” for service and a further 1,800 had 
insufficient chest size or “muscular power” to serve. Quoted in Carl Chinn, Poverty Amidst 
Prosperity: the Urban Poor in England, 1834-1914 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1995), 
114. 
24 Forster, Collected Short Stories 124. 
25 Forster, Collected Short Stories 145. 
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The real crime of the machine society is revealed to be the sin against flesh, 
the sin of turning the body into “white pap” by covering it not with the 
enriching garments made from “culture” and “self-denial” but with 
“colourless” ideas and over-reliance upon machine production. By re-
affirming their commitment to the ideals of youth and robust physical strength 
Kuno and Vashti’s deaths are valorised. As Kuno declares, “we die, but we 
have recaptured life, as it was in Wessex, when Aelfrid overthrew the 
Danes.”26 To die in the death of the Machine is to have lived, or more 
accurately to have helped to re-invigorate life itself. It signals a return to 
empirical sense experience and romanticised princely virtues of the medieval 
period, and away from mechanism and idealist philosophy. 
 
Ironically, however, the mass deaths themselves remain abstract. “[T]he 
bodies of the dead” over which Vashti crawls toward Kuno are not described. 
There is no sense of futility attached to these deaths – “Humanity has learnt 
its lesson” and the humans in the “honeycomb” structure of the broken city 
are only symbolic, given historical significance by being a part of this great 
dramatic ending.27 This links The Machine Stops to nineteenth-century war 
literature in which, Daniel Pick argues, war became “an end in itself” as it “is 
capable of defining precisely what it is to be human, because it involves 
giving up the supreme ‘self-interest’, life itself.”28 
 
Forster’s glorification of individual deaths amid flames and explosions, which 
ascribe to them a greater cultural death, evoke militarism. The 
mechanisation of the Great War increased cultural anxieties surrounding 
mechanical mass production that are already present here. But the mixture 
of homoerotic and Oedipal imagery in these final passages, as well as the 
valorisation of the collapse of a civilisation, belongs to an age of innocence 
before the mechanised slaughter of World War I. 
 
                                            
26 Forster, Collected Short Stories 146. 
27 Forster, Collected Short Stories 145-6. 
28 Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in The Modern Age (New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1993), 15. 
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In contrast, the works examined in this thesis from Zamyatin’s We onwards 
were written in the knowledge of millions having been slain in European 
theatres of mechanised conflict. Although there is arguably an arbitrary 
element to describing them as modernistic while leaving out Forster’s 1909 
story from their ranks, it may be justified by the pre-War naivety of the final 
pages of The Machine Stops. The experience of living through World War I, 
in spite of (or perhaps because of) the fact that none of the authors I focus 
on directly participated in it, causes a decisive sea change in dystopian 
writing, and a new mode that is only embryonic in Forster’s 1909 story 
emerges after the War.29 It is this new, modernistic mode of writing, part of 
wider post-1914 cultural and ideological shifts, which this thesis focuses 
upon. 
 
The role of H. G. Wells, who was emblematic of the wider growth of idealistic 
and utopian thinking before WWI, was key to these preliminary moves of 
Forster and others towards writing dystopian fiction. All four of the authors I 
look at considered themselves in some way post-Wellsian, and his influence 
is clear even if often negative. 
 
However, this does not mean that dystopia as a literary genre is the binary 
opposite of utopia. Since dystopia emerged on one level as a reaction to 
utopian fictions and ideas, it is not possible to fully understand dystopia 
without reference to the utopian tradition. Yet to think of dystopia, and 
specifically dystopian fiction, as only a reaction to (or against) utopia would 
be a narrow and restrictive understanding. There are both concrete historical 
events and intellectual traditions that have shaped dystopia which mark it out 
as a unique phenomenon. But within utopian studies, the relation of dystopia 
to utopian thought and fictions has at times overshadowed these discrete, 
unique aspects. The first task of the remainder of this chapter is, then, to 
assess how scholars have dealt with dystopia both as a concept and as a 
                                            
29 Yevgeny Zamyatin’s contribution to the Tsarist Russian war effort was to help design and 
supervise the building of ships for Russia in Britain. Aldous Huxley was at Balliol College, 
Oxford when war broke out, but he was exempted from war work as he was partially 
sighted. Both John Wyndham (née John Wyndham Parkes Lucas Beynon Harris) and 
George Orwell (Eric Blair) were born in 1903 and were therefore too young to participate. 
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literary mode through a critical survey of the field of utopian studies. This will 
demonstrate and critique the extent to which conceptions of dystopia have 
relied upon binary oppositions with utopian thought. The second task is to 
theorise how a cultural history of what I term modernistic dystopian fiction 
both fits in with – and at times challenges – existing knowledge. This 
approach will serve as a new means by which to explore the specific terrain 
of modernistic dystopian fiction. 
 
Problematising Dystopia 
 
The term dystopia is cited as first appearing in 1747, when it was coined “by 
Henry Lewis Younge in his Utopia or Apollo’s Golden Days (Dublin: Ptd. By 
George Faulkner) spelled as “dustopia” used as a clear negative contrast to 
utopia.”30 Conceptualising dystopia as “a clear negative contrast” may 
appear intuitively to be workable, but in reality it only shifts the problem of 
definition back onto an understanding of utopia, which is also a frequently 
disputed term. 
 
Utopian ideas pre-date the term “Utopia” itself, coined by Sir Thomas More’s 
1516 text of that name. The word is formed from the Greek words ouk (not) 
and topos (place), with “the suffix ia, indicating a place.”31 But utopia (no-
place) is also a homophonic play on eu+topos, meaning “good place”. 
More’s work is part (imaginary) travel literature and part political philosophy 
in the form of a dialogue. 
 
Sargent, a political scientist, first produced his taxonomy of utopian forms in 
his seminal essay “The Three Faces of Utopianism” (1967). He has 
periodically updated this conception, but maintains that utopianism is “social 
dreaming” at base.  Sargent contends that, 
                                            
30 Lyman Tower Sargent, citing Deirdre Ni Chuanacháin, “Re: dystopia.” Email to the author, 
15 July 2009. Sargent alludes to this early use in his Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 4. 
31 Fátima Vieira, "The Concept of Utopia," The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, 
ed. Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 4. 
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utopianism has been expressed in three different forms, each with many 
variants – utopian literature, which includes two fundamental traditions – which 
I call body utopias or utopias of sensual gratification and city utopias or utopias 
of human contrivance; communitarianism; and utopian social theory. It is 
essential that we keep them distinct but not deny the existence of any of the 
three.32 
 
In practice, it may be more difficult to keep these separate than Sargent 
allows. Many literary utopias are expressly written as social theory. For 
example, although their literary status is significant, the later utopias of Wells 
tend to subsume literary and aesthetic concerns beneath political discussion, 
while the works of Bellamy and Morris led directly to the creation of political 
movements. Dystopian fiction was caught up in this conflict of the aesthetic 
and the political, expressing a strong narrative thrust that contrasts sharply to 
the descriptive qualities of many literary utopias. 
 
Sargent’s focus upon the ideational content of utopias is perhaps a means 
for him as a political scientist to emphasize the political analysis of utopias as 
his primary concern. However, this focus upon ideational content as a fixed 
“thing” tends to diminish the importance of the form in which literary utopias 
are presented. It is significant in this respect that More’s Utopia is in dialogic 
form, which recalls the Socratic model as performed in Plato’s proto-utopian 
The Republic. Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that “the dialogical aspect of 
Plato’s writing is essentially tied up with his conception of truth, rationality 
and knowledge.”33 In other words, the dialogic form is inseparable from the 
models of rationality and knowledge which Plato presents. As Patricia 
Waugh puts it,  
from Plato’s Republic to More’s Utopia and Morris’s News From Nowhere, the 
acclaimed literary utopianists have built into their fictions an interrogation of 
epistemology which seeks to discover appropriate models of knowledge as 
vehicles for the construction of the good society.34 
                                            
32 Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited," 4. 
33 Kristin Gjesdal, Gadamer and the Legacy of German Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2009), 32. 
34 Patricia Waugh, "Utopias and Utopianism: Political Science, Aesthetic Indeterminancy and 
the Legacy of Thomas More," Utopias, eds. Françoise Le Saux and Neil Thomas, Durham 
Modern Languages Series (Durham: U of Durham, 2000), 6. 
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Literary utopias are not simply an exposition or blueprint for a planned 
society – they represent a processual exploration, a “thinking through” of 
ideas. Literary utopias are not just an organization of social life, but a self-
reflexive organizing. This aspect of process, of “thinking about” and “telling 
about” within a formal structure is a significant part of what makes such texts 
literary. This is worth emphasising in the context of a discussion about the 
possibility of theorising dystopia because a defining characteristic of 
“dystopia” in any medium is that it is a narrative form. “Dys-topia” is not just a 
“bad place”, but one in which bad things happen in the life of a central 
character. However, dialogue frequently plays an active role too – the 
confrontation between Mustapha Mond and John Savage in Brave New 
World or O’Brien and Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four are key 
elements in the development of both novels. There is a complex formal inter-
relationship between dystopian and utopian literature. 
 
Krishan Kumar, who uses the term “anti-utopia” in place of dystopia to signal 
what he sees as its purely negative, antithetical role, does stress that the 
“interdependent” relationship between utopia and “anti-utopia” is “not 
symmetrical or equal. The anti-utopia is formed by utopia, and feeds 
parasitically on it.”35 It is interesting, given that Kumar approaches Utopian 
Studies as a sociologist, that unlike fellow social scientist Lyman Tower 
Sargent he does not separate the “faces” of utopia for analytic purposes. 
Quite the reverse: the same analysis is brought to bear on utopian theory, 
communitarianism/intentional communities and literature. Likewise, Kumar 
argues that dystopian literature is part of the broader “anti-utopian” tradition 
of thought which opposes the very idea of utopia – usually by interpreting 
‘utopian thought’ to mean nothing more than political blueprints for radically 
changed societies.36 Thus “Anti-utopia”, Kumar continues, “draws its material 
                                            
35 Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 100. 
36 Peter Firchow criticises Kumar on precisely the grounds that as a sociologist his 
understanding of the ‘literariness’ of literary utopias and dystopias is weak. Yet Firchow’s 
own analysis is highly polemical and in insisting on the absolute and exclusive importance of 
“literary” qualities of utopian and dystopian fiction he falls victim to the reverse problem of 
denigrating the importance of political and social ideas in such fiction. Dystopias like 
Orwell’s are often politically engaged at a sophisticated level. Firchow’s refusal to discuss 
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from utopia and reassembles it in a manner that denies the affirmation of 
utopia. It is the mirror-image of utopia – but a distorted image, seen in a 
cracked mirror.”37 This is to conflate two discrete phenomena. Just because 
dystopian fiction and anti-utopian thought are both not utopian, it does not 
follow that they are the same, or that the former must express the sentiments 
of the latter. Furthermore, dystopian literature has a different relationship to 
existing reality than utopian theory or literature. Utopian writing may be 
wholly unrealistic – if Karl Popper and other anti-utopians are to be believed 
it must necessarily be so (although Popper himself admits that this in and of 
itself is no reason to criticise it).38 But a dystopia must be “feasible” in the 
sense of being “based on the extrapolation of some existing trend,” in 
Claeys’s words.  As Chris Ferns states, 
Unlike the traditional utopia, dystopian fiction posits a society which – however 
outlandish – is clearly extrapolated from that which exists. Where utopian fiction 
stresses the difference of the society it depicts, and rarely indicates how such 
an alternative might be created, the dystopian writer presents the nightmare 
future as a possible destination of present society.39 
 
Dystopian fiction can express utopian sentiments in a variety of ways. But in 
offering a critique of present-day conditions othered into a fictional future 
setting it necessarily focuses upon much that is not utopian too. The 
recognisable elements of ‘thirties or ‘forties London in Brave New World and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four respectively offer proof of Ferns’s point. More 
generally, such elements also indicate that the modern state is an important 
locus of critique in dystopian literature. 
 
One important achievement of Kumar’s definition, however, is that it 
recognises that what Sargent terms the other two “faces” of utopianism – 
namely communitarianism and utopian social theory – are highly relevant to 
                                                                                                                           
political content and motivation betrays a lack of self-reflection upon his own New Criticism 
approach to literary analysis. Peter Edgerly Firchow, Modern Utopian Fictions from H. G. 
Wells to Iris Murdoch (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic UP of America, 2007), 15-16. 
37 Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times 100. 
38 See Karl Popper, The Open Society, vol. 1, chapter 9, “Aestheticism, Perfectionism, 
Utopianism”, here 161. 
39 Claeys, "The Origins of Dystopia," 109; Chris Ferns, Narrating Utopia: Ideology, Gender, 
Form in Utopian Literature, ed. David Seed (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 1999), 107. 
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the understanding of utopian and dystopian fiction, having both directly and 
indirectly influenced it. Some dystopian fiction has been written directly 
against attempts to implement social dreams. For example, Katherine 
Burdekine’s Swastika Night responds directly to the pseudo-mythologies and 
misogyny of Nazism. Other dystopian fiction, meanwhile, has been a source 
of utopian theory, such as Adorno’s essay “Huxley and Utopia”, which 
examines Huxley’s Brave New World.40 Moreover, attempts to define and 
conceptualise dystopia have mainly come from scholars with an interest in 
utopian ideas as well as dystopian fiction. 
 
Utopian theory I: Bloch and Adorno 
 
Utopia as a form of theoretical discourse is largely a twentieth-century 
development. The seminal text of this tradition is Ernst Bloch’s Geist der 
Utopie (1918, republished 1923), translated as The Spirit of Utopia, which, 
together with his vast Das Princip Hoffnung (1959) has become an 
increasingly important source for leftwing utopian studies scholarship 
today.41 Bloch’s methodology has proved attractive to utopian theorists 
because he puts the longing for utopia at the heart of human experience. 
Distinguishing between “concrete” (meaning “anticipatory”) and “abstract” (or 
“compensatory”) elements, for Bloch “the task is to reveal and recover the 
anticipatory essence from the dross of contingent and compensatory 
elements in which utopia is dressed up in particular historical 
circumstances.”42 In the “hermeneutic sense” that he treats utopia, it 
becomes “a way of thinking and of reading.”43 In his own day Bloch 
influenced both Adorno and Walter Benjamin. 
 
At the heart of Bloch’s theory is the “utopian function,” an ever-present 
psychological category that is also a social force. According to Moylan, Bloch 
                                            
40 See chapter 3 below, especially 120-3 and 135-6. 
41 Freedman notes that “Bloch’s title is in fact untranslatable into idiomatic English” and 
suggests “The Hope Principle” as the best possible rendering. Carl Freedman, Critical 
Theory and Science Fiction (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2000), 62. 
42 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1990), 88. 
43 Freedman, Critical Theory and Science Fiction 62, 63. 
  Stock 28     
  
Understands the utopian function as a dynamic social force that both motivates 
ideologies and carries human aspirations beyond their encapsulation within 
ideologies, and he understands that such aspirations can be enlisted long after 
their particular historical moment in the further movement of human 
emancipation.44 
 
The utopian function can be perceived throughout history in both “concrete” 
and “abstract” forms – from the God of Moses who led the Tribes of Israel to 
the Promised Land, to the Communist Manifesto. As Ruth Levitas has 
pointed out, this implies “both that it is part of human nature and that 
therefore it is only the form in which it is expressed which will be historically 
variable… There is no reason to suppose that this is the case.”45 
 
The utopian function is not always recognised. Bloch laments the “blindness 
of all traditional philosophy to the future and its unique dimensions,” and, in 
common with existential philosophers, he denounces “philosophies and 
ideologies, like Platonic anamnesis, [that are] stubbornly fixated on the past, 
on childhood and origins.”46 Geist der Utopie was written before any of the 
modernistic dystopias discussed in this thesis. However, Bloch here seems 
to anticipate some of the objections that Marxist theorists including Suvin 
and Adorno would later make to such dystopias, in particular Nineteen 
Eighty-Four and Brave New World. These dystopias project forwards to look 
backwards, turning today’s future into the day after tomorrow’s past.47 In an 
important sense then, they are indeed “fixated… on childhood and origins.” A 
more sympathetic view, however, might point to the value of the 
consciousness-raising powers of dystopias as warnings. Furthermore, 
utopian longing is frequently the motivational drive behind dystopian 
protagonists’ continued rebellion against their conditions. Bloch himself 
                                            
44 Tom Moylan, "Bloch Against Bloch: The Theological Reception of Das Prinzip Hoffnung 
and The Liberation of the Utopian Function," Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, eds. 
Jamie Owen Daniel and Tom Moylan (London: Verso, 1997), 113. 
45 Levitas, The Concept of Utopia 183. 
46 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: the Desire Called Utopia and Other 
Science Fictions (London: Verso, 2005), 6-7. 
47 See Genette, Narrative Discourse 40 & 62; and see below, 31. 
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therefore later recognised the value of what he termed “negative utopias.”48 
But in contrast to non-Marxist dystopian fiction, Bloch aims to show how 
utopian longing connects to the Marxist metahistorical narrative. 
 
Bloch’s position is further complicated by his desire to toe the Communist 
Party line during the Stalinist era. Bloch saw the Soviet Union as a concrete 
example of a utopia, which for many years he stubbornly refused to criticise 
even when his own methodology should perhaps have led him to do so.49 
Adorno, in a friendly and jovial conversation with Bloch about utopianism 
recorded for radio broadcast in the 1960s, tactfully did not touch on the 
subject of the Soviet Union. The most interesting point raised in this 
discussion was perhaps Bloch’s assertion that from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries onward, the topos of utopia moved out of space and 
into time. This denied the existence of utopia in the present but at the same 
time made utopia more of a possibility as a place that “could be there if we 
could only do something for it.”50 The modern utopian narrative is thereby 
linked with the Enlightenment belief in Progress. Such an idea was key not 
only to the development of Marx’s philosophy of history, but also to optimistic 
Victorian beliefs in scientific and technological advance leading to a future 
characterised by increasing standards of living, as well as a worldview which 
perceived colonialism as a ‘moral’ mission. Yet the very “evident possibility of 
fulfillment” of these beliefs co-existed with the “just as evident” contradictory 
belief in the “impossibility of fulfillment”, and so people were compelled “to 
identify themselves with this impossibility and to make this impossibility into 
their own affair. In other words, to use Freud, they ‘identify themselves with 
the aggressor’ and say that this should not be”, even while knowing that “it is 
precisely this that should be.” In this situation, “negative utopia[s]” express a 
longing in the direction of utopia, in effect affirming precisely that which they 
deny.51 
                                            
48 Ernst Bloch, "Something's Missing: A Discussion Between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. 
Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing," trans. Jack Zipes and Frank 
Mecklenburg, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT P, 1988), 5. 
49 See Moylan, "Bloch Against Bloch," 108-112. 
50 Bloch, "Something's Missing," 3. 
51 Bloch, "Something's Missing," 4-5 emphasis in original. 
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Although Bloch and Adorno were in almost complete agreement on this 
occasion, elsewhere Adorno more rigorously refused “to submit himself to 
the discipline of one of the parties claiming to speak for the oppressed,” 
believing this would compromise him as an intellectual: 
His refusal to compromise grew out of a characteristically Western Marxist 
insistence on the utopian potential of modern society, which prevented him from 
ever confusing any actually existing socialist regime with the genuine realization 
of the socialist dream.52 
 
As a Marxist, Adorno maintained a radical hope for the future, but as a critical 
theorist he was ruthless in his criticism of the present. His theoretical stance 
was grounded in his concept of the “negative dialectic”, by which the Marxist-
Hegelian means of historical movement and progress was forever construed 
and then denied. As Fredric Jameson explains, “a negative dialectic has no 
choice but to affirm the notion and value of an ultimate synthesis, while 
negating its possibility and reality in every concrete case that comes before 
it.”53 
 
Utopia, for Adorno, exists in a most delicate and precious state. To touch 
utopia is to break it, but to deny it would be an act of the worst cynicism. 
There is no fixed content of utopia, not even freedom. More accurately, 
perhaps, we cannot know what ‘freedom’ would mean in a radically 
transformed utopian society. To conceptualise (say) the meaning of freedom 
in utopia from our present, compromised vantage point, is a move toward 
reification. For Adorno, that which is reified cannot be a truly transformed 
society; it still exists within the conceptual realm of the present capitalist 
totality and is therefore tarnished by it. Adorno’s complex position is not 
without conceptual problems and issues of consistency. These issues will be 
more fully explored in chapter three in relation to his essay on Brave New 
World, which he criticised on the grounds that it failed to escape the 
ideological underpinnings of the capitalist totality that it sought to attack. 
                                            
52 Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1984), 16 emphasis added. 
53 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971), 56. 
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Here, it is sufficient to state that to ask what utopia is, for Adorno, is in fact 
the wrong question. Starting from his conception of the negative dialectic, he 
argued that utopia can only be approached in the negative: we only know 
true utopia through what it is not, through false utopia. “Utopia is essentially 
in the determined negation… of that which merely is, and concretizing itself 
as something false, it always points at the same time to what should be.”54 
From this perspective, literary utopias, as critical documents, are predestined 
to failure (in Adorno’s terms), but it is precisely the nature of this failure that 
makes them so important. 
 
Dystopian literature represents a problematic area for Marxist utopian 
theorists such as Adorno. Dystopia uses a proleptic narrative strategy, a 
“flashforward” by which the contemporary world is ‘othered’ into a future that 
is both a continuation of current trends and entails considerably more 
oppressive power relations than the present totality.55 Such futures inherently 
question the Marxian philosophy of history by envisioning a more oppressive 
world to come. At the same time they look not further forward towards a 
radically utopian future, but, via the narrative techniques that structuralist 
theorist Gérard Genette called “analepses” and “paralipses”, backwards 
towards the contemporary reader’s own near-future-as-past. Genette termed 
analepses “any evocation after the fact of an event that took place earlier 
than the point in the story where we are at any given moment.” Meanwhile, 
“Paralipses” refer to the gaps formed “by the omission of one of the 
constituent elements of a situation in a period that the narrative does 
generally cover… Here the narrative does not skip over a moment of time, as 
in an ellipsis, but it sidesteps a given element.”56 References to the past, 
such as the fragmented history lesson given to students by Mustapha Mond 
in chapter three of Brave New World, employ precisely these techniques to 
construct a partial, satirical and oblique narrative that internally (to the 
students) functions as history, but externally (to the reader) functions as 
prophecy or warning. 
                                            
54 Adorno, quoted in Bloch, "Something's Missing," 12. 
55 David Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 192. 
56 Genette, Narrative Discourse 40, 51-2. 
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Utopian Theory II: Suvin and Williams 
 
For others on the Left, including Suvin and Williams, theorising the 
relationship of utopia, dystopia and science fiction has been crucial to forming 
a politically acceptable basis from which to explore these genres critically. 
Both of these theorists approach the question of definition formally, but while 
Williams’s approach is centred on the transformative aspect of 
utopian/dystopian texts as that which differentiates them from science fiction, 
Suvin sees far less of a clear line between the modes of SF and 
utopia/dystopia. Indeed, over the years he has come to see ‘utopia’ as an 
umbrella term under which dystopia and much science fiction may be 
subsumed and in which perfection need not feature, arguing in his “Theses 
on Dystopia 2001” that “utopian fiction is, today and retrospectively, both an 
independent aunt and a dependent daughter of sf.” He continues, 
Utopia will be defined as the construction of a particular community where 
socio-political institutions, norms, and relationships between people are 
organized according to a radically different principle than in the author’s 
community; this construction is based on estrangement arising out of an 
alternative historical hypothesis; it is created by social classes interested in 
otherness and change. 
 
Furthermore, he insists that we must 
Abandon the meaning and horizon of utopianism as automatically entailing 
radically better relationships. More perfect relationships have to be proved (or 
disproved) for each particular case or type of texts. Confusing radical otherness 
and radically greater perfection leads to muddle: incommunicability or wilful 
obscurantism.57 
 
Thus utopia has for Suvin not only abandoned the concern with space in 
favour of a vaguer “alternative historical hypothesis”; it has also abandoned 
the ‘eu’ or ‘good’ of utopia in favour of merely “different”.58  Like dystopia, 
                                            
57 Suvin, "Theses on Dystopia 2001," 188 emphasis in original. 
58 This represents a change of position from his 1970s definition of utopia: “The verbal 
construction of a particular quasi-human community where socio-political institutions, norms 
and individual relationships are organized to a more perfect principle than in the author’s 
community, this construction being based on estrangement arising out of an alternative 
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‘eutopia’ is now just a subtype of “utopia”. The difference between them is 
simply that eutopia is a community organized according to a “radically more 
perfect” principle, while dystopia is organized according to a “radically less 
perfect” principle. Roger Luckhurst has criticised Suvin’s formalist approach 
to SF as “a profoundly prescriptive and judgemental formulation”, which is 
“not historical but political – cognitive estrangement arises from Suvin’s 
particular take on Marxism.”59 The same charge could be levelled at Suvin’s 
definition of the utopian modes: because it relies upon, and is created by, 
“social classes interested in otherness and change”, utopia becomes a more 
politically orientated and partisan term. Furthermore, whilst the term “social 
class” implies group input, historically most literary utopias have been written 
by single individuals.60 The individual author must therefore become 
representative of a class, one moreover which is interested in “otherness and 
change.” It is noteworthy too that while it is “social classes” that are 
supposedly interested in change, they operate not upon society but upon 
“communities”. This idea presupposes a high level of class-consciousness 
and class unity. 
 
The political thrust of Suvin’s argument is made clear in his conception of 
dystopia, which he splits into the ideal types of “simple dystopia” and “anti-
utopia”: 
Anti-Utopia finally turns out to be a dystopia, but one explicitly designed to refute 
a currently proposed eutopia. It is a pretended eutopia – a community whose 
hegemonic principles pretend to its being more perfectly organized than any 
thinkable alternative, while our representative ‘camera eye’ and value-monger 
finds out it is significantly less perfect than an alternative, a polemic nightmare. 
                                                                                                                           
historical hypothesis.” Studies in the Literary Imagination, 6 (1973) 132; quoted in Lyman 
Tower Sargent, British and American Utopian Literature 1516-1975: An Annotated 
Bibliography (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall, 1979), xvi. This definition is closest to what Suvin calls 
“eutopia” in his “Theses on Dystopia 2001”. 
59 Roger Luckhurst, Science Fiction (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 7-8. 
60 Furthermore, if the “author’s own community” is taken as the standard by which to judge 
whether her/his fictional “community” is utopian or dystopian, then how are critics to assess 
dystopian texts where the notion of “community” is absent or subverted? In Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the undermining of community values isolates and atomizes 
characters while simultaneously destabilising individual identities. More satirically, in 
Huxley’s Brave New World the state motto “Community, Identity, Stability” points with irony 
to the disappearance of precisely these values on the personal level. 
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‘Simple’ Dystopia (so-called to avoid inventing yet another prefix to topia) is a 
straightforward dystopia, that is, one which is not also an anti-utopia.61 
 
Suvin seems almost to be suggesting here that the difference between anti-
utopia and dystopia can be reduced to the formal distinction between 
subjective and objective standpoints respectively. In other words, it is the 
position of the narrator that is the key. The narrow subjectivity of an anti-
utopia is merely satirical; it is highly unlikely if not structurally impossible for 
such a narrative to be ‘progressive’ or ‘revolutionary’ rather than reactionary. 
The “polemic nightmare” is a horror world, but precisely as an individual’s 
subjective nightmare it cannot correspond to objective social reality. The 
problems with Suvin’s definition all come sharply into focus with his 
polemical suggestion that “the intertext of anti-utopia has historically been 
anti-socialism, as socialism was the strongest ‘currently proposed’ eutopia 
ca. 1915-1975”. He follows this, for good measure, with the proposition that 
“all the poorer followers of Zamyatin” – excluding though Zamyatin himself – 
“from Ayn Rand and George Orwell on” are “examples of proximity to anti-
utopia” as ideal type.62 
 
Like Suvin, Raymond Williams had an ambivalent attitude to Orwell’s work.  
As Andrew Milner has shown, Williams’s attitude towards Orwell and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four evolved over his career.63 His most systematic 
evaluation of utopia and dystopia was contained in an essay entitled “Utopia 
and Science Fiction”, which like Suvin’s work looked at utopia within the 
contextual frame of SF. Beginning with an idea that desire is key to 
understanding utopia, but that such desire must be on some level realisable, 
Williams concentrated on the transformative aspects of texts. In doing so he 
put forward four categories of transformed fictional societies as ideal types, 
                                            
61 Suvin, "Theses on Dystopia 2001," 189. 
62 Suvin, "Theses on Dystopia 2001," 189. 
63 Milner identifies three phases in Williams’s attitudes towards SF in general, and Nineteen 
Eighty-Four in particular. Williams moved from calling it “putropian” in a 1956 essay to “what 
appears to be a more evenhanded account” in George Orwell (1971), which criticised it for a 
perceived “failure of experience” in his “pessimism about human capacity”. Finally, in the 
1984 afterword to George Orwell (2nd ed.) he “combined a developed understanding of the 
novel’s workings as a text with an expanded sense of its sociopolitical and intertextual 
contexts.” Andrew Milner, "Utopia and Science Fiction in Raymond Williams," Science 
Fiction Studies 30 (2003), 202, 206. 
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in a discussion in which he sought to differentiate between SF as a whole 
and utopia/dystopia as a related, but not identical, mode. These categories 
each had correlative negative types, “commonly expressed as ‘dystopia’”, 
which led to the following schema: 
 
Positive transformation Negative transformation 
1. The Paradise – [which simply exists 
elsewhere] 
2. The externally altered world – [in 
which a new kind of life is] made 
possible by an unlooked-for natural 
event. 
3. The willed transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The technological transformation 
 
1. The Hell – a more wretched kind of 
life… existing elsewhere; 
2. The externally altered world, in which a 
new but less happy kind of life has been 
brought about by an unlooked-for 
uncontrolled natural event. 
3. The willed transformation, in which a new but 
less happy kind of life has been brought about 
by social degeneration, by the emergence or 
re-emergence of harmful kinds of social order, 
or by the unforeseen yet disastrous 
consequences of an effort at social 
improvement; 
4. The technological transformation, in which the 
conditions of life have been worsened by 
technical development.64 
 
Using this schema, Williams set about trying to uncover a definition of utopia 
and dystopia by interrogating how these transformations occur. Thus he 
finds number (1) in both instances reveals very few utopian or dystopian 
traits, as it is “commonly beyond the conditions of any imaginable ordinary 
human and worldly life.” Going further than Claeys’s and Ferns’s positions, 
Williams here posits that both dystopia and utopia must be “feasible”, or 
adhere to a certain type of realism: in contrast to Sargent’s position, Eden 
and Cockaigne are for Williams only “latently utopian”. From a cultural 
materialist position, Williams makes clear that utopia and dystopia are not 
about the dealings of deities in human affairs, but rather about human 
agency and human possibilities. Hence (3) “The Willed Transformation is the 
characteristic utopian or dystopian mode, in the strict sense”, while the 
                                            
64 Raymond Williams, "Utopia and Science Fiction," Science Fiction: A Critical Guide, ed. 
Patrick Parrinder (London: Longman, 1979), 52. 
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externally altered world (2) “typically… either falls short of or goes beyond 
the utopian or dystopian mode… the common emphasis is on human 
limitation or indeed human powerlessness: the event saves or destroys us, 
and we are its objects.” This mode (2) can be SF though, as it is often 
construed, related or foretold in the “context of increased scientific 
understanding of natural events.”65 
 
Williams’s study of utopia – and particularly dystopia – is grounded in 
material historical circumstance. While he does not directly apply his notion 
of ‘structures of feeling’ in this essay, his discussion of Brave New World, 
which he describes as emerging from the “black amalgam” of the 1930s and 
as a response to both Wells’s and Morris’s utopian texts, indicates his 
awareness of the historical specificity of the genre.66 Elsewhere, he did 
comment that Nineteen Eighty-Four was interesting precisely (and only) in 
that it belonged to a “structure of feeling.”67 
 
Finally, the technological transformation (4) “only becomes utopian or 
dystopian, in the strict sense, when it is used as an image of consequence to 
function, socially, as conscious desire or conscious warning.”68 Thus while 
Williams begins with a focus on transformations that concentrates on 
narrative structure, this is then turned back upon itself as a concern, like 
Suvin’s, with the ‘otherness’ or defamiliarized aspect of the text. Political 
judgements are again brought to bear over and above properly aesthetic 
concerns. Furthermore, and despite Williams’s historical awareness, 
narrative is not explored here as an unveiling process so much as the way in 
which description of an alternative (future) world is stretched over a short 
period of time. In other words, the focus is on the background as foreground, 
upon the social and political relations of the fictional world rather than the 
interaction of the central characters with that world. This therefore overlooks 
                                            
65 Williams, "Utopia and Science Fiction," 54. 
66 Williams, "Utopia and Science Fiction," 60. This is explored in greater detail in chaper 3 
below, 131-4. 
67 Raymond Williams, "Science Fiction," Science Fiction Studies 15 (1988). 
68 Williams, "Utopia and Science Fiction," 55. 
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the importance of the narrative structure and techniques employed by the 
authors to achieve these effects of (amongst other things) ‘otherness’. 
 
Utopian theory III: Jameson, Moylan and Wegner 
 
One implication of Suvin’s Marxist formalism and Williams’s cultural 
materialism, then, is that utopias are more significant in their descriptions of 
social, economic and political mechanisms than in the transformed human 
relations which provide building blocks for the narrative element of literary 
utopias. Jameson spells this position out when he argues that “the Utopian 
text does not tell a story at all; it describes a mechanism or even a kind of 
machine, it furnishes a blueprint rather than lingering human relations that 
might be found in a Utopian condition.”69 Notwithstanding his Marxist 
background, this conception is superficially similar to that of anti-utopians like 
Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin. However, unlike such liberal thinkers, 
Jameson sees utopian planning in a positive light, arguing that the utopian 
author is like the inventor in his garden tool shed: an eccentric, slightly 
obsessive individual, to whom “the social or historical moment” has offered 
itself,  
To be read in terms of causes, or problems and solutions, questions and 
answers. It must have reached a level of shaped complexity that seems to 
foreground some fundamental ill, and that tempts the social theorist into 
producing an overview organized around a specific theme.70 
 
The “social theorist” and author of utopian fiction are here collapsed into one 
category, linked by their utopian desire. The major split in utopian thought 
occurs then not between literary and theoretical, but rather between an overt 
tradition “intent on the realization of the Utopian program” and “an obscure 
yet omnipresent Utopian impulse finding its way to the surface in a variety of 
                                            
69 Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 56. More recently, 
Jameson qualified this image, characterizing the “blueprints” which Utopias seem to offer as 
“maps and plans to be read negatively, as what is to be accomplished after the demolitions 
and the removals, and in the absence of all those lesser evils the liberals believed to be 
inherent in human nature.” Archaeologies of the Future 12. 
70 Jameson, Archaeologies of the future 13-14. 
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covert expressions and practices.”71 The task of the literary utopia, then, is to 
tap into the ever existent “Utopian impulse”. For a literary utopia to strike a 
chord, for it to reach out and meet “collective recognition”, it must shape itself 
around and adequately represent existing “Utopian raw material”, as it were, 
drawn from the world at large.72 
 
Jameson’s emphasis is on a holistic view of utopia that recognizes what he 
earlier referred to in Seeds of Time as an open-ended (and finally 
productive) contradiction within its definition. Jameson contrasts the 
struggling contradiction of the Marxist dialectic (which eventual results in 
synthesis) with the closed either/or nature of a (neo-)Kantian antinomy. The 
latter, Jameson notes, presents mutually exclusive alternatives between the 
revolutionary praxis of utopian planning and the (in Blochian terms) 
“compensatory” nature of capitalist utopian longing.73 
 
Jameson’s idea is just as apt to describe the dependence upon historical 
specificity that is key to understanding dystopian texts too. Indeed, the 
implications for the conceptualisation of dystopia are perhaps more important 
and far-reaching than his more orthodox understanding of utopia. In a brief 
discussion in Seeds of Time (1994), cautioning against the simple 
deployment of utopia and dystopia as binary opposites, he compares the 
relation of the two terms to Gilles Deleuze’s argument that sadism and 
masochism are “not opposites and in reality have nothing to do with each 
other.” The masochist seeks something fundamentally different to that which 
is offered by the sadist, and likewise 
                                            
71 Jameson, Archaeologies of the future 3. 
72 Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future 13. 
73 Jameson, The Seeds of Time 1-2. A similar but subtly (and importantly) different point is 
put forward in Slavov Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2006), 7 and 9-11 
passim: Like Jameson, he contrasts Kant’s unproductive, oppositional antinomy against 
Hegel’s finally productive, struggling/conflicting dialectic. However, he also collapses 
Hegel’s dialectic in upon itself, so that thesis and antithesis can be seen as a single 
struggling (Lacanian) split subject ($). This differentiation between the Kantian antinomy and 
the Hegelian dialectic subsequently underpins much of his ontological discussion of Kant 
and Hegel (20-36). Elsewhere Žižek claims that both his and Jameson’s interpretation of the 
Kantian antinomy as irreducible is drawn from Kojin Karitani’s Transcritique. On Kant and 
Marx (Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2003). See Slavov Žižek, "The Parallax View," New Left 
Review 25 (2004), 121. 
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The pleasures of the nightmare – evil monks, gulags, police states – have little 
to do with the butterfly temperament of great Utopians like Fourier, who are 
probably not intent on pleasures at all but rather on some other form of 
gratification.74 
 
However, the relation between utopia and dystopia is more complicated than 
this constellation of pleasures and desires suggests because, Jameson 
proposes, they are different at the formal, narrative and structural levels: 
Dystopia is generally a narrative, which happens to a specific subject or 
character, whereas the Utopian text is mostly nonnarrative and, I would like to 
say, somehow without a subject-position, although to be sure a tourist-observer 
flickers through its pages and more than a few anecdotes are disengaged.75 
 
Andrew Milner takes issue with this argument, as Jameson presented it in the 
New Left Review in 2004,76 by pointing to narrative strategies such as “sexual 
romance… the distant view of utopia from its extremities… the external threat 
to utopia, and so on,” which can be found in a variety of texts from Morris and 
Bellamy, through to Marge Piercy, Iain M. Banks, Ursula Le Guin and Kim 
Stanley Robinson. Milner therefore argues that one can distinguish between 
the “non-fictional utopias of political philosophy proper” and those fictional 
utopias, in the form of novels and films, which “must work as art and 
entertainment”.77 While this is an important criticism, it is worth noting that 
such utopian fictions frequently work as political philosophy too. Indeed, 
techniques of the novel form such as the multiplicity of voices it permits could 
make it preferable to a political-philosophical text as a means of presenting 
utopian ideas. Additionally, while Jameson was less cautious in his 2004 
article, in Seeds of Time and Archaeologies of the Future he added qualifiers 
to his observations on utopian nonnarrative form.78 
 
                                            
74 Jameson, The Seeds of Time 55; see also Moylan’s summary of Jameson’s position in 
Scraps of the Untainted Sky 140-1. 
75 Jameson, The Seeds of Time 55-6. 
76 Fredric Jameson, "The Politics of Utopia," New Left Review 25 (2004), 35-54. 
77 Andrew Milner, "Framing Catastrophe: The Problem of Ending in Dystopian Fiction," 
Monash University Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies Seminar, Monash 
University, Australia, 21 September 2005. <http://arts.monash.edu.au/cclcs/research/ 
papers/framing-catastrophe.pdf>, 20 January 2009. 
78 Jameson, The Seeds of Time 55-60 passim; Jameson, Archaeologies of the future 12; 
and see above, n. 69. 
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For this reason, as well as the issue of feasibility as outlined above by 
Claeys, a text like Wells’s The Time Machine should not be designated a 
dystopia: despite the Traveller’s dangerous escapades, it is essentially a tour 
of a radically different society by a tourist-observer. While Wells’s The Island 
of Doctor Moreau (1896) does not pass Claeys’s test, it comes much closer 
to Jameson’s criteria. Despite the traditional utopian narrative framing of the 
journey to, and return from, a far away place (in time or space), the narrative 
upon the island centres not upon systematic accounting of the various 
different aspects of life there, but on the gradual violent disintegration of 
Moreau’s community of inhuman beings. However, a strict application of 
Jameson’s schema would discount this novel too, as the protagonist’s moral 
abhorrence of the island community (as Dr. Moreau is keen to point out to 
him) is a result of his socialisation in Victorian London. Edward Prendick is 
not of Moreau’s island, he is a visitor who does not belong there – his 
disillusion is not the awakening moral rebellion of a native (one of Dr. 
Moreau’s animal-men) but a result of his conformism to the values of 
contemporary English society. 
 
Tom Moylan’s work in utopianism can be seen as an attempt to synthesize 
Suvin’s formalism with the emphasis upon narrative strategies of Jameson. In 
doing so, he is conscious of both Brecht’s influence upon the former and 
Bloch’s and Adorno’s influence upon the latter. The concern with narrative 
strategies also places him close to Raffaella Baccolini, with whom Moylan 
has co-edited books on utopian and dystopian themes.79 
 
Placing Suvin’s polemicism within its historical and institutional context, 
Moylan contends that in the early 1970s, scholarly criticism of SF was 
limited, with “New Criticism and canonical literary studies” performing “an 
elitist elevation of some SF to the status of ‘serious literature’, usually 
interpreted with criteria appropriate for the realist or modernist novel”, while 
“unreflexive populist reading[s]” saw “all SF as paraliterature, but… did not 
                                            
79 Tom Moylan and Raffaella Baccolini, eds., Utopia Method Vision: the Use Value of Social 
Dreaming (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007); Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan, eds., Dark 
Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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make the distinctions required to comprehend SF’s social production and 
consumption.” Moylan therefore accepted and even applauded the political 
aspect of Suvin’s intervention because his “[a]nalysis of SF in its own terms, 
his identification of ‘the interaction of estrangement and cognition’ and ‘an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment’, 
shifted SF scholarship beyond” contemporaneous limited approaches.80 
 
Yet Moylan acknowledges that it was only with Jameson’s intervention in the 
1990s, as detailed above, that the concept of dystopia was addressed in 
specific terms. Drawing upon Jameson’s turn to the narrative strategies of 
dystopia as defining features of the literary genre, in Scraps of the Untainted 
Sky Tom Moylan affirmed the tendency of dystopia to start in medias res, 
without the journey that has frequently characterised literary utopias, and 
with a protagonist consequently not a visitor to the imagined topos but rather 
a citizen of that very polis. However, he argued that because of this, 
“cognitive estrangement is at first forestalled by the immediacy, the 
normality, of the location.”81 For the novels discussed in this thesis, this 
position is not tenable: Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, for instance, famously 
opens “[i]t was a bright cold day in April and the clocks were just striking 
thirteen.”82 As the discussion of Nineteen Eighty-Four in chapter four will 
show, this “thirteen” serves the function of estranging the reader, and alerting 
her/him to the idea that something is both seriously different and amiss in the 
fictional realm into which she/he is embarking. Likewise, John Wyndham’s 
The Chrysalids begins “[w]hen I was quite small I would sometimes dream of 
a city – which was strange because it began before I even knew what a city 
was.”83 Estrangement is similarly immediate in Huxley’s Brave New World, 
which starts with an ironic and satirical fragment: “[a] squat grey building of 
only thirty-four stories.”84 
                                            
80 Tom Moylan, "Look Into the Dark: On Dystopia and the Novum," Learning From Other 
Worlds: Estrangement, Cognition and the Politics of Science Fction and Utopia, ed. Patrick 
Parrinder (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2000), 52. 
81 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, 148. 
82 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1989), 3 emphasis added. 
83 John Wyndham, The Chrysalids (London: Penguin, 1958), 5. 
84 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited (New York: Harper-
Perennial, 2005), 15 emphasis added. 
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While estrangement of some kind is present from the opening of many 
literary dystopias, “cognitive estrangement” seems unnecessary and 
cumbersome as a critical tool as well as being objectionable as an 
instrument of political polemic in critical reading. ‘Estranged’ though 
dystopian fiction certainly is through the proleptic strategy that it employs, the 
positivist and empiricist conceptions of science upon which “cognitive 
estrangement” lie are not necessarily present in dystopian fiction. Nor is the 
presence or absence of such qualities useful grounds for making value 
judgements about literary works. Because of Moylan’s insistence upon 
cognitive estrangement and the role of the novum as conceptual apparatus, 
Luckhurst contends that he falls into the same trap as Suvin, adhering to a 
“prescriptive political agenda” which “contracts the genre to a chosen few 
texts, and has contempt for the majority of the field.”85 While Moylan’s 
approach is openly political, this criticism does seem a little harsh. Unlike 
Suvin, Moylan treats texts from which he ideologically distances himself such 
as Nineteen Eighty-Four with a degree of nuance and reasonableness 
lacking in Suvin’s comparison of Orwell with Ayn Rand. Moylan’s categories 
are overtly political and therefore do express an exclusionary tendency, but 
they are not as radical or sweeping as those of Darko Suvin. 
 
Furthermore, Moylan’s concern with narrative strategy remains valuable. 
Following Baccolini, Moylan contends that “The typical narrative structure of 
the dystopia”, presents “an alienated character’s refusal of the dominant 
society”. Through this refusal, which stems from the protagonist’s growing 
awareness of the dystopian nature of their society, she or he counters the 
narrative of the hegemonic order. The “action [then] leads to a climactic 
event that does or does not challenge or change the society.”86 Language is 
a particularly frequent site of contestation in this challenge. Moreover, 
Moylan notes, 
an important result of the reappropriation of language by the dystopian misfits 
and rebels is the reconstitution of empowering memory. With the past 
                                            
85 Luckhurst, Science Fiction 10. 
86 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky 147, 148. 
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suppressed and the present reduced to the empirica of daily life, dystopian 
subjects usually lose all recollection of the way things were before the new 
order, but by regaining language they also recover the ability to draw on the 
alternative truths of the past and ‘speak back’ to hegemonic power.87 
 
While this is not a contentious claim, there is some danger here of 
subsuming history under “memory”. As will be argued in chapter four in a 
discussion of the interrogation of Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it is 
not merely subjective, individual memory – which as O’Brien proves is both 
manipulable and fallible – but the collective values of history in social and 
cultural terms which the dystopian narrative contests. In Brave New World 
only the World Controller Mustapha Mond has access to a historical narrative 
that is compatible with the structural and methodological demands of history 
as a discipline in the humanities. John Savage, in contrast, relies upon a 
religiously and romantically tainted vision of the past as nostalgia. The 
analeptic presentation of fragments of “History” by Mond to the group of 
students in chapter three of the novel plays a key narrative role, linked both 
to didactic content and dystopian form.88 
 
To Moylan, it is the ending of the dystopian novel, more than the content of 
its anachronic (that is, proleptic and analeptic) strategies that most 
characterise it as a genre. Indeed, for Moylan only such works that carry a 
persistent “openness” or space in which resistance and opposition is still 
possible really achieve the status of ‘dystopia’. He designates rightwing texts 
like Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, ‘anti-utopias’ because they literally reject 
the concept of utopia as inherently tyrannical. However, this seems to 
compromise Moylan’s discussion of narrative strategy. It stands in contrast to 
Jameson’s concept of the anti-utopia as a sort of hellish blueprint that 
criticises the very idea of utopianism by re-producing realised utopias as 
terrible places. Such an anti-utopia would have to mimic too the structure of 
a literary utopia, with the concomitant features of the visitor seeing the utopia 
from an estranged perspective; the framing journey; and a detailed, careful 
                                            
87 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky 149. 
88 The historical context of Brave New World is examined below in chapter 3, 123-34. On 
Mond’s ‘history lesson’ see below, 137-8 and 140-1. 
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examination of the institutions of such a society. It also leads Moylan, who is 
most interested in contemporary literature, to proliferate the categories of 
utopian literature. As well as the utopia, the “classical” dystopia, and the anti-
utopia, he details the more contemporary and radically open categories of 
“critical utopia” and “critical dystopia”, whose content is more ambiguous but 
whose stance is open to utopian longing. As these historically situated 
categories apply only to more contemporary novels it is beyond the scope of 
the present discussion to question whether, if one rejects the political 
premises of Moylan’s work, these extra categories are superfluous or helpful. 
 
Philip Wegner builds on Moylan’s theory of dystopia by looking at the 
emergence of the genre. Beginning with a brief discussion of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, Wegner quotes a letter from George Orwell to his publisher 
Fredric Warburg sent in May 1947 about the novel he was then writing: “this 
is a novel about the future – that is, it is in a sense a fantasy, but in the form 
of a naturalistic novel. That is what makes it a difficult job – of course as a 
book of anticipations it would be comparatively simple to write.”89 Noting the 
influence of naturalist Victorian writers like George Gissing upon Orwell, 
Wegner argues that dystopia represents the dialectical synthesis of the 
“asphyxiating historical closure” of Victorian naturalism and the utopian 
optimism of Morris and Bellamy.90 
 
However, Orwell’s use of the term “anticipations” could be taken as an 
allusion to H. G. Wells’s 1901 work of that name. Wells’s influence hangs 
over not just Orwell but the whole genre of dystopia in the twentieth century. 
Yet his literary career does not fit the pattern of Wegner’s dialectic – either 
chronologically or thematically. Wells rose to fame with the publication of his 
                                            
89 George Orwell, The Complete Works of George Orwell, ed. Peter Davison, vol. 19 
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1998) 149, quoted in Philip E. Wegner, "Where the 
Prospective Horizon Is Omitted: Naturalism and Dystopia in Fight Club and Ghost Dog," 
Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination, eds. Raffaella Baccolini and 
Tom Moylan (New York: Routledge, 2003), 172. Wegner quotes the American 1968 
Harcourt edition of The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, eds. 
Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. 4, 329-30. 
90 Interestingly, this dialectic mirrors Yevgeny Zamyatin’s conception about his “Neo-
Realism” as the dialectical synthesis of nineteenth century Realism and turn-of-the-century 
(Russian) Symbolism. See below, 68-73. 
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early ‘scientific romances’ including The Time Machine (1895), The Island of 
Doctor Moreau (1896) and The War of the Worlds (1898). These novels tend 
to look askance at the future, expressing the post-Darwinian degeneration 
fears of the late Victorians. Whether or not one chooses to term these 
‘dystopias’ (and most critics would concur that they do not fully fit this genre), 
they certainly explore some dystopian themes and influenced later dystopian 
writers like Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley. Wells’s (generally less 
commercially successful) pre-twentieth century naturalist fiction is not as well 
known. It was in the early 1900s, around the time he wrote utopian texts 
such as A Modern Utopia (1905) and In the Days of the Comet (1906), that 
he also had artistic and commercial breakthroughs in his naturalist fiction 
with popular novels like Kipps (1905) and Ann Veronica (1909). But from the 
end of the Great War he concentrated increasingly on a mix of non-fiction 
and utopian literature. 
 
Wegner’s historical inaccuracy with regard to Wells’s career lessens the 
force of his argument. He does, however, perceive a salient pattern that 
haunt[s] the tradition of dystopian writing throughout the twentieth century: 
desirous of a radical change of affairs but unable to imagine any mechanism 
or agency by which such a change might come about, these dystopias 
oscillate between the radical openness of Utopia and the asphyxiating closure 
of naturalism.91 
Dystopias throughout the twentieth century were timely fiction. As a politically 
engaged, socially aware mode, some of its most significant writers were 
keen to employ the ‘logical’ fantasising of Wells – to build from a fantastic 
premise a logical chain of consequences. The concern with exploring the 
limits of some of the worst excesses and terrors of the twentieth century, and 
with extrapolating events from shifting social and political relations, entailed a 
substantially different practice to the social dreaming of literary utopias. If, as 
Chris Ferns suggests, “Unlike the traditional utopia, dystopian fiction posits a 
society which – however outlandish – is clearly extrapolated from that which 
exists,” then the existing economic structures, social and political institutions 
of the twentieth century arguably had little to offer the dystopian writer by 
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way of “radical openness.”92 In such circumstances, it could be ‘utopian’ 
enough simply to demonstrate that, in the words of Leonard Cohen, “There is 
a crack in everything/That’s how the light gets in.”93 So, for instance, the 
didactic message of Nineteen Eighty-Four was, Orwell declared in a U.S. 
press release dictated to (and edited by) Warburg, “don’t let it happen. It 
depends on you.”94 While Orwell passionately believed in what he termed 
“democratic Socialism”, his political focus was first on avoiding further 
catastrophes in the present era. 
 
Historicising Dystopia 
 
An important narrative strategy of dystopian fiction is the text’s answer to the 
analeptic question ‘how did we get here?’ Having established that the 
fictional world in which the novel opens is a ‘dys-topia’ in the literal sense of 
bad-place, and at a point in the future, the question of origins hangs darkly 
over the texts. But what of the origins of dystopia itself? If Wegner’s 
dialectical origin of nineteenth century naturalism (thesis) and fin-de-siècle 
utopianism (antithesis) is, as argued above, insufficient, then what are the 
origins of the genre? 
 
As a politically engaged literary genre that characteristically produces novels 
of ideas, a good basis for assessing the origins and development of dystopia 
can likely be established by examination of the broad intellectual and cultural 
background from which it emerges. In terms of intellectual history, dystopia 
may be perceived as following the post-Enlightenment tradition of critique 
and satire. The legacy of the Enlightenment in dystopian fiction manifests in 
several ways. At the formal level, the use of fiction to critique social and 
political relations was widely practised during the “Republic of Letters”. 
Indeed, the rise of the novel occurred more or less concomitantly with the 
growth of Enlightenment thought. In ideational terms, dystopian authors 
adopted specific values professed by Enlightenment thinkers. However, they 
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also critiqued the very tradition of which these values were part. As chapter 
two will show, for example, Zamyatin’s invocation of individual freedom in 
We is used to critique the moral ideas of thinkers including Kant. Hence, like 
the Frankfurt School scholars Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, 
dystopian authors seemed to be well aware of the mood of optimism and 
confidence in a humanitarian future that characterised the Enlightenment, 
but while they admired many of the ideas and ideals of Enlightenment 
thought, they also perceived many of its flaws and contradictions. 
 
To approach the issue from another angle, if The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951) was Hannah Arendt’s attempt to understand how Europe could give 
birth to the Enlightenment and the Rights of Man as well as a “brutally 
murderous” form of politics like totalitarianism, then dystopian authors also 
took this task in hand using techniques of the novel form.95 As novels of 
ideas they were mediated through the utopian literary tradition, for which H. 
G. Wells acted as a lightning rod to the authors principally examined in this 
thesis as both a target of satire and a literary influence. 
 
The Limits of Enlightenment 
 
Wells also provides a key link between modernistic dystopias and the 
Enlightenment. His commitment to the idea of a ‘World State’ was in effect a 
desire to bring about the End of History; the age of the World State is an age 
when nature and mankind alike are subdued and perfectly ordered. As the 
twentieth century progressed, his ideas – which had been calmly discussed 
in early works like A Modern Utopia (1905) – became more frantically 
repeated in response to desperate political and social conditions. The more 
he focused on the End of History, the more his own social and political 
context becomes relevant to understanding his utopian work. 
 
This situation is also true of the beginning of the Enlightenment. On the one 
hand the social context of Enlightenment thinkers, as well as the political 
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context in which they wrote, was of crucial importance to the ideas that they 
produced. On the other, from the early 1600s philosophers attempted to limit 
the influence of the social and political context of production on the content 
of their work. For Steven Toulmin, the nature of what was acceptable as 
legitimate philosophical reasoning fundamentally changed from the 1600s 
onwards. This change in both the style and content of philosophical debate 
reflected a shift from a practical model to a theoretical conception of 
philosophy. 
From 1630 on, the focus of philosophical inquiries has ignored the particular, 
concrete, timely and local details of everyday human affairs: instead, it has 
shifted to a higher, stratospheric plane, on which nature and ethics conform to 
abstract, timeless, general, and universal theories.96 
 
Ironically, however, this very change was itself a response to a traumatic 
series of events that had engulfed the whole of Europe, and as such could 
not be more topical. Descartes’s quest for certainty in reason can be seen as 
a response to religious and political crisis: the Discourse on Method was 
written in the middle of the bloody and brutal Thirty Years’ War, at a time 
when religious uncertainty had deep-seated political ramifications. Indeed, 
“the 17th-century founders of modern science and philosophy had theological 
commitments which shaped their whole enterprise.”97 Sixteenth century 
humanist Michel de Montaigne had rhetorically asked ‘Que sçais-je?’ starting 
his philosophy from an assumption that much was unknowable, which made 
religious toleration a more feasible position to uphold. But such uncertainty 
had not prevented religious war. The quest for religious certainty through 
philosophy was a quest for an exclusive truth, a truth which by its very nature 
precluded alternatives. 
If uncertainty, ambiguity, and the acceptance of pluralism led, in practice, only 
to an intensification of the religious war, the time had come to discover some 
rational method for demonstrating the essential correctness or incorrectness of 
philosophical, scientific, or theological doctrines.98 
  
                                            
96 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free P, 
1990), 35. 
97 Toulmin, Cosmopolis 37. 
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The dystopian opposition to discourses of certainty – in particular the political 
discourses of meta-narratives of history – are in the first instance an 
opposition to a long-standing tendency which began in proto-Enlightenment 
philosophy and became normative with the rise of the scientific paradigm. 
For all that later philosophers and scientists argued against Descartes he 
helped to set an agenda, to put in place methodologies in scientific, 
philosophical and theological debate. Essentially, when he declared “cogito 
ergo sum”, Descartes rephrased the old question about the (Aristotelian) 
animal soul, turning it into “an inquiry into animal intelligence, since to the 
author of cogito ergo sum the word ‘soul’ spelled reason.”99 The Cartesian 
dichotomy, splitting the rational freedom of the mind from the causal 
mechanics of the body, had diverse and wide-ranging implications for the 
practice of philosophy and science. By the time that “the Cartesian division… 
was endorsed and continued by Isaac Newton, [it] ceased to be of concern 
to natural philosophers alone. From then on, it played a major role in social 
and political thought as well.”100 The power of Descartes’s argument was felt 
not directly in visible political and social changes, but in the setting of the 
agenda, the terms of debate. From this also, however, stemmed ideological 
power – for soon his model of rationality became paradigmatic so that the 
persuasive success of an argument came more and more to be seen in its 
adherence to rationalism.101 The optimism of a reasonable, thinking mind 
ruling over the body (except during states of passion) was to become an 
essential belief for the Enlightenment ideal of Progress and discussion of the 
soul, reason, and the nature of man took place – particularly in the French 
Enlightenment – in expressly Cartesian terms. Within the diverse strands of 
the Enlightenment, the tendency to see mankind as a thinking entity standing 
rationally outside and separate from nature, like the view of the (rational) 
                                            
99 Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast Machine to Man Machine: Animal soul in French 
Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie, 2nd ed. (New York: Octagon, 1968), xxiv-xxv. Diderot 
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known as soul… the other known as body.” Denis Diderot, "Man [Homme]," trans. Nelly S. 
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Online Translation Project (Michigan, MI: U of Michigan) <http://hdl.handle.net/ 
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Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974). See especially 21-5. 
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mind as separate from the material (animal) body, was almost universally 
accepted. The primacy of reason was essential to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
account of the state and the general will. Equally, Denis Diderot argued in 
D’Alembert’s Dream that the brain rules over the body like a despotic ruler 
governs his state.102 This dualist separation occurs along Cartesian lines, but 
the religious consequences of Descartes’s formulation is absent – Diderot 
believed in no deity. While he was drawn towards the anti-Newtonian and 
anti-Cartesian idea that the Universe is self-animating, for Diderot “the 
Cartesian criterion that what was true could be formulated in clear distinct 
notions… remained valid.”103 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, meanwhile, 
attempted to counter the Cartesian dualism through his appeal to the 
possibility of self-animation inherent in living matter, but his account of 
natural law relied on the primacy of reason, an inconsistency he was not able 
to overcome.104 Ironically, then, Descartes’s philosophy even helped to make 
possible the very eighteenth century materialism which undermined the 
certainty of the pre-existing Catholic conception of the universe.105 
 
Yet even the overthrow of the “certainties” Descartes believed in only led to 
more attempts to find universalizable laws describing both the nature of man 
and of the natural world. The philosophes, no less than Descartes himself or 
indeed any other of the diverse and heterogeneous thinkers of the 
Enlightenment, were students of the methodology of Francis Bacon (“the 
father of experimental philosophy” in the words of his admirer Voltaire),106 
who wrote, “Human knowledge and human power meet in one, for where the 
cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded 
                                            
102 Denis Diderot, Rameau's Nephew/D'Alembert's Dream, trans. Leonard Tancock (London: 
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103 John Hope Mason, The Irresistible Diderot (London: Quartet Books, 1982), 12. 
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must be obeyed.”107 The new science was concerned from the very 
beginning with the mastery of nature and while Bacon still accepted the rule 
of nature over man for the time being, The New Atlantis (1626), his vision of 
the scientific and technological possibilities of the future, showed mankind as 
master of his own destiny. Indeed, the escape from nature into civilization is 
a recurrent theme in utopias. For Lewis Mumford, the city itself represented 
the first utopia for this very reason.108 If the city is man’s attempt to leave 
behind nature (and it is certainly presented as such by both Zamyatin in We 
and Huxley in Brave New World), to carve out his own realm and refuge from 
nature’s power, then it is specifically modern to export this thinking beyond 
the city walls, through the suburbs and from there across every land and 
sea. The older aim of escaping from nature still acknowledged the power of 
nature: the walled city is a bulwark, a topos with defined boundaries. Even 
after Bacon, Swift’s satirical utopias in Gulliver’s Travels (1726; amended 
1735) are still found in a distant land where we are not. But in the eighteenth 
century, as Bloch pointed out, the topos of utopia moved out of space and 
into time.109 Thus utopia was no longer somewhere foreign, but represented 
a possibility in one’s own future. In accordance with the Enlightenment 
tradition it became a more generalised, universalised place that discounted 
localism. The aim was no longer to fabricate a refuge, a space outside 
nature, but to overcome the power of nature entirely. Ultimately, by the 
nineteenth century it was so thoroughly subjugated that “enlightened” 
governments began to create national parks, refuges and reserves for 
nature, not for man.110 
 
For Arendt, “the notion of man as lord of the earth is characteristic of the 
modern age,” and implicitly secular, being in direct contradiction to the “spirit 
                                            
107 Francis Bacon, “The New Science” in Kramnick, The Portable Enlightenment Reader 39. 
108 Cited in Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times 5-6. 
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of the Bible.”111 From this viewpoint, Kant’s Enlightenment motto Sapere 
Aude! (Dare to know) is the call of a Prometheus: he who dares to know will 
not just emerge from his “self-incurred immaturity” (in some translations 
“tutelage”) into independence, but will also gain mastery over nature and the 
vast numbers of unenlightened people.112 Adorno and Horkheimer note that 
it was Bacon himself who acknowledged that “knowledge is power”. They 
therefore slightly facetiously point to the work of the Marquis de Sade as an 
example of “‘understanding without the guidance of another person’: that is, 
the bourgeois individual freed from tutelage.” In Sade’s Juliette, they 
contend, the systematic deployment of every sexual possibility, “reveals a[n] 
organization of life as a whole which is deprived of any substantial goal” in 
much the same way as the structures of Kant’s socio-political thought.113 His 
bid to construct morality from a priori principles of reason, in which God 
formed the cornerstone by which “moral action and natural law can entirely 
converge,” was a clear attempt to turn ethics into a system of universalizable 
rational judgement.114 Kant’s categorical imperative in its first formation 
prescribes a deontological ethics in which being consistently rational is the 
ultimate value (“I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will 
that my maxim should become universal law”) over and above what might (in 
today’s language) be labelled humanitarian concerns on a case-by-case 
basis.115 In other words, rather than serving substantive humanitarian goals, 
rationality becomes instrumental – a means serving only itself.116 In their 
different ways, and with quite separate aims in mind, both Arendt, and 
Horkheimer and Adorno make a common point: the Enlightenment failed to 
recognise that Kantian reason and social domination are intimately entwined 
                                            
111 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998), 139, n. 
3. 
112 “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” in Immanuel Kant, Political 
Writings trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 
54. “Unmündigkeit” is translated as “tutelage” in, for example, Kramnick’s translation of the 
essay in Kramnick, The Portable Enlightenment Reader 1-7 (here 1). 
113 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment 88. 
114 Douglas Burnham, An Introduction to Kant's Critique of Judgement (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2000), 25. 
115 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 67. 
116 This was perhaps what Nietzsche was referring to when he declared that “the categorical 
imperative gives off a whiff of cruelty…” Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, 
trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) II §6, 47. 
  Stock 53     
  
and even mutually reinforcing.117 With the eclipse of substantive rationality 
by instrumental rationality, means become ends in themselves. Such 
rationality, which has no normative referent but itself, is not so much immoral 
as amoral. The question ‘is this morally just?’ could henceforth be replaced 
by the formulation ‘is it rational?’ 
 
The problem with Enlightenment rationalism, Horkheimer and Adorno 
contended, is that it can (and did) so easily become an end in itself, in which 
the human costs involved in the means were ignored. The quest for certainty 
and the emphasis on reason over emotions and rhetoric can easily lead to 
the narrowing and even shutting down of debate rather than opening it out. 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, “[t]he program of the Enlightenment 
was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the 
substitution of knowledge for fancy.”118 From as early a thinker as Bacon, 
however, the quest of “the human mind… to hold sway over disenchanted 
nature” was a quest for power that would hold sway over people as well. Just 
as knowledge of nature was a means to control nature so too, Adorno and 
Horkheimer argued, did this knowledge change relations between men. 
“Technology is the essence of this knowledge” and “[p]ower and knowledge 
are synonymous.”119 In the words of Orwell’s O’Brien, “[t]he real power, the 
power we have to fight for night and day, is not power over things, but over 
men.”120 Adorno and Horkheimer assert that natural philosophy, which they 
see as emblematic of the Enlightenment, had been channelled into the 
dominance of men over mankind. From the start it was evident that the 
rationality upon which it was based was being narrowed into an instrumental 
means. Bernstein explains that such “instrumental” or “subsumptive” 
rationality, 
disregards the intrinsic properties of things, those properties that give each 
thing its sensuous, social and historical particularity, for the sake of the goals 
and purposes of the subject… such a rationality must treat unlike (unequal) 
                                            
117 For a discussion of the problems inherent in Kant’s political thought in a post-totalitarian 
world, see Hans Reiss, Postscript, Political Writings by Kant, 264-8. 
118 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 3. 
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things as like (equal), and subsume objects under (the unreflexive drives of) 
subjects.  Subsumption, then, is domination in the conceptual realm.121 
 
If subsumption is identified with the ideal of reason per se, “the possibility of 
cognition of the particular in its own right” is lost. The true ends of 
“enlightened rationality… become occluded.”122 The problems of human 
living, as Arendt suggests, are reduced to matters of technique.123 Meaning 
is replaced by utility; everything is done ‘in order to’ achieve something else 
without any principle on which to base this utilitarian framework ever arising. 
For when rationalism is applied universally, everything 
must be of some use, that is, must lend itself as an instrument to achieve 
something else, [and so] meaning itself can appear only as an end, as an ‘end 
in itself’ which actually is either a tautology applying to all ends or a 
contradiction in terms. For an end, once it is attained, ceases to be an end and 
loses its capacity to guide and justify the choice of means, to organize and 
produce them.124 
 
Rather than serving specific and humanitarian goals, rationality “becomes its 
own end, and thereby turns against the true aims of Enlightenment: freedom 
and happiness.”125 Despite the clear differences between Arendt’s analysis 
of totalitarianism and that of Horkheimer and Adorno, on this point they are 
closely aligned. Arendt, for instance, observes that Kant’s third formulation of 
the categorical imperative, that human beings must always be treated as 
ends in themselves and never means, leads to paradox. His intention, Arendt 
tells us, was first of all to “relegate the means-end category to its proper 
place and prevent its use in the field of political action” but he was 
nevertheless unable to free his formula from the “tenets of the utilitarianism 
of his time.” If man is established as the “supreme end” then it permits him to 
subject the whole of nature, “that is, to degrade nature and the world into 
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mere means, robbing both of their independent dignity.”126 Hence man, as 
the only thing capable of standing outside the endless chain of means and 
ends, becomes lord and master of all things. 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno likewise point to men “renouncing any claim to 
meaning” in the march towards “modern science” (which they position as the 
keystone of instrumentalism in Enlightenment thought).127 But for them this is 
also an indicator of the attempt by science to sublate metaphysical problems, 
and reduce them all to the quest of finding a suitable formulaic or algebraic 
expression. “To the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, 
and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion.” Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
presupposition is that the Enlightenment wished to leave no corner hidden in 
shadow – that in the process of illumination all illusion had to be unmasked, 
all matter shown to conform to clear and distinct ideas. The success of the 
Enlightenment on this front enabled mankind (they ignore the cultural and 
geographical specificity of the Enlightenment) to live at the centre of a 
disillusioned universe, so that “from now on, matter would at last be 
mastered without any illusion of ruling or inherent powers, of hidden 
qualities. For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of 
computation and utility is suspect.”128 
 
From Victorian Values to Victory Mansions 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s rather stronger words point to a substantially 
similar understanding to Arendt of the tendency to place utility at the forefront 
of judgement. The utilitarian imperatives which according to Arendt, Kant 
tried but was unable to escape, were regarded as virtues in another 
ascendant strain of thought. Jeremy Bentham, “the father of English 
utilitarianism”, orientated his rigid philosophy around a single doctrine – the 
formula of the “‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.’” In so doing he 
literally attempted to complete by application of the “utilitarian formula” what 
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Horkheimer and Adorno saw as the great perversion of the Enlightenment as 
discussed above – to make every sphere amenable to “computation and 
utility.”  In Bentham’s utilitarian conception, happiness “could be expressed 
by a calculus of pleasure and pain, a calculus that could only be arrived at 
rationally, analytically.”129 For Arendt a central failure of all such liberal 
theories of politics were that they did not distinguish between the interests of 
the polis and the sum of the interests of the individuals who constituted it: 
“public life takes on the deceptive aspect of a total of private interests as 
though these interests could create a new quality through sheer addition.”130 
 
It is interesting to note that Bentham numbered among his neologisms 
“cacotopia”, used in a discussion of the “filth” of endemic political corruption 
in his 1817 Plan of Parliamentary Reform in the Form of a Catechism: “As a 
match for Utopia, suppose a Cacotopia discovered and described – would 
not filth in this shape be a ‘fundamental feature’ in it?”131 Bentham on a 
number of occasions in this work uses “Utopia” to mean something 
unrealistic or unattainable, and contrasts his own ideas as being radical yet 
practicable. On the other hand, he links “Cacotopia” to literary utopias – 
designating them as descriptions of a miserable political order elsewhere 
that resemble exactly the existing British political order of the day, a satirical 
‘other’ place resembling exactly the here and now. 
 
The utilitarian idea of Cacotopia becomes more revealing when contrasted 
with the first utilitarian use of the term ‘dystopia[n]’ in 1868 when, during a 
Commons debate on Irish Land Tithes, John Stuart Mill quipped that the 
Conservative Government “ought… to be called dys-topians, or cacotopians” 
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because “what they appear[ed] to favour [was] too bad to be practicable”.132 
The significance to dystopian studies of this early appearance of the term is 
that Mill’s use reveals his wider post-Enlightenment beliefs and his Victorian 
values, while at the same time demonstrating, albeit in simplified form, the 
interplay of critique and satire which would later become the hallmark of the 
literary dystopia. Thus the epithet “dys-topian” here signifies both an 
unrealistic or unsustainable aim, and a (misplaced) desire to implement eu-
topia. Meanwhile, by invoking “cacotopian”, Mill recalls Bentham, his father 
James Mill’s great friend, who as a bachelor with no children of his own had 
taken a deep interest in the education of “his chief disciple’s eldest son.”133 
 
The Conservative Government’s supposedly “equitable” measure, as Mill 
saw it, was to take a situation that was unjust for some in Ireland and make 
the injustice universal rather than improving the situation for those already 
suffering. Casting it in these terms was a satirical, Swiftian move. Mill loads 
the term “dys-topians” here with a sense of absurdity that the literary 
dystopia retained in the twentieth century. However, while Mill believed there 
to be an eventual inevitability to “progress” that would solve the problems of 
governing Ireland someday, in literary dystopias a state of affairs “too bad to 
be practicable” may nonetheless be established and maintained (as was, it is 
pertinent to note, British colonialism). When, for example, Orwell’s O’Brien 
sneers, “if you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a 
human face – for ever,” he imagines a society sustained by the energy of 
violent hatred alone.134 Yet in the context of a brutal torture scene this 
statement – for O’Brien at least – is wholly believable. Meanwhile, dystopian 
fictions set further into the future such as Burdekin’s Swastika Night, 
Zamyatin’s We and Huxley’s Brave New World all present apparently stable 
societies that have, at the moment the novels all open in medias res, already 
been in place for at least a hundred years. 
                                            
132 Hansard Commons 12 Mar. 1868, vol. 190, c. 1517. Before the Irish Church 
Disestablishment Act 1869, all Irish subjects were required to pay tithes to the established, 
Anglican Church in Ireland, who only represented a minority of the people of Ireland. Mill 
demanded better treatment for the Irish Catholics – but only to ensure that they would offer 
no dissent to British colonial rule. 
133 Himmelfarb, in Mill, On Liberty 11. 
134 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 280. 
  Stock 58     
  
 
When viewed in the context of the rest of his speech, the Conservatives’ 
apparently untenable position is one in which Mill also, ironically, finds 
himself. His address is suffused with a tension between his avowed belief in 
the universalizable laws of science claimed to be objective (and extended to 
political economy) on the one hand, and a Victorian moral belief in Empire on 
the other. While Mill believed that the British State was in need of reform, he 
also maintained that the aims of British colonialism were morally correct and 
just. In the same speech he promotes the universal “truth” of the mission of 
colonialism: “I maintain that there is no country under Heaven which it is not 
possible to govern, and to govern in such a way that it shall be contented.”135 
Despite arguing that all knowledge is built out of inductive reasoning from the 
observation of empirical reality, Mill searched for a totalised system of laws 
in every field he studied, government no less than ethics:136 material 
progress, as part of a liberal meta-narrative, appears here as a historical 
necessity. The easy manner with which he brushes aside the Irish Famine 
(“[w]e certainly saved many lives—though there were probably a greater 
number that we could not save—and for that we are entitled to all credit”) 
demonstrates an attitude in which government, as an activity, is an abstract 
intellectual challenge.137 The brutal concrete reality of British colonialism is 
masked by Mill’s sense of duty to govern. 
 
One of the strengths of dystopian fiction is its ability to show the human 
consequences of the imposition of grand narratives built upon impersonal 
and abstract ideas. Mill’s self-confidence in his utilitarian ideals rests on 
wider (post-)Enlightenment assumptions about Progress and the possibilities 
of science. Dystopias of the mid-twentieth century sought to critique some of 
these assumptions by creating a narrative framework around individual 
characters such as Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Winston Smith, Brave New 
World’s John Savage and Helmholtz Watson, or The Chrysalids’ David. Their 
rebellions are characterized not just by the assertion of alternative “rational” 
                                            
135 Hansard Commons 12 Mar. 1868, vol. 190, c. 1523. 
136 Alan Ryan, The philosophy of John Stuart Mill (London: Macmillan, 1970), xi-xii. Ryan 
quotes Mill’s diary of 1854 in support of this claim. 
137 Hansard Commons 12 Mar. 1868, vol. 190, c. 1521. 
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ideas, or alternative models of rationality itself, but rather in terms of 
subjectivity and affect. 
 
These texts, then, resist narratives of instrumental rationality precisely 
through an insistence upon affective morality as central to an understanding 
of human nature. In doing so, dystopian fiction also stands in contrast to the 
utopian literary tradition, and most overtly to the literary utopias of Wells.  In 
Orwell’s highly charged essay “Wells, Hitler and the World State” (1941) he 
rhetorically asked if it were “not a sort of parricide for a person of my age 
(thirty-eight) to find fault with H. G. Wells? Thinking people who were born 
about the beginning of this century are in some sense Wells’s own creation.” 
Nevertheless, Orwell was blunt in his criticism, arguing that “just the 
singleness of mind, the one-sided imagination that made him seem like an 
inspired prophet in the Edwardian age, make him a shallow, inadequate 
thinker now.”138 Orwell saw Wells as an internationalist “nineteenth-century 
Liberal” – in contrast, it should be noted, to Zamyatin, for whom Wells was 
“of course, a socialist” albeit one not affiliated with any formal party.139 
 
Wells’s utopian literature generally followed the traditional formal layout of 
the genre. Howsoever the journey to the utopia occurs, the same narrative 
takes place: the visitor (usually from London and invariably male) is shown 
around a rationalist World State and just as in, say, Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward, he discusses with an interlocutor the social, economic, political 
make-up of the society. These are precisely the sorts of texts that Jameson 
had in mind, then, when he claimed – as noted above – that “the Utopian text 
does not tell a story at all; it describes a mechanism or even a kind of 
machine, it furnishes a blueprint…”140 Through its close adherence to 
generic conventions, Wells’s utopian fiction consciously inscribes itself within 
                                            
138 George Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 12, 539. Shortly afterwards, Wells became a 
personal acquaintance of Orwell’s. The diaries of an observer of their first meeting recall the 
elderly Wells taking Orwell to task over this essay. Half a year later his rather curter 
rejoinder to another Orwell essay on his fiction was “read my early works you shit.” Quoted 
in D. J. Taylor, Orwell: The Life (London: Vintage, 2004), 305. 
139 Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 12, 539; Yevgeny Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic: Essays by 
Yevgeny Zamyatin, trans. Mirra Ginsburg, ed. Mirra Ginsburg (Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 
1970), 268. 
140 Jameson, The Seeds of Time, 56. See above, 37. 
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a literary tradition which, for authors of modernistic dystopias, he came to 
represent. 
 
Dystopia, as Jameson again notes, was not in formal terms directly opposed 
to literary utopias. Orwell and the other dystopian authors may commit “a 
sort of parricide” by criticising Wellsian utopianism in their dystopian novels, 
but in doing so they provide an ironic commentary upon such “Edwardian” 
thinking. The historical necessity and inevitability of Wells’s project, which 
leads Orwell to call him a “nineteenth-century liberal”, is precisely that which 
leads him to lump Wells’s ideology together with the sense of destiny 
common to Stalinism, Nazism and Burnham’s Managerial Revolution in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. As he comments in a 1941 essay arguing against the 
post-Enlightenment liberal-Wellsian idea of Progress (and in a rather 
Adornian turn of phrase) “[m]odern Germany is far more scientific than 
England, and far more barbarous.”141 
 
Dystopian fiction of the early-mid twentieth century was not the antinomy of 
utopian literature, but rather struggled with a particular development in 
utopian literature that in turn occurred in response to Enlightenment thought. 
This is namely the move, as outlined above (described by Adorno and 
Bloch), of the topos of utopia out of space and into time. As Bloch made 
clear, this brought utopia closer to becoming a reality than it had ever been 
before. It thereby raised the stakes; expectation was high. Dystopias 
intervened in the utopian tradition, providing a literary structure of fiction to 
critique the demands of utopias-as-future-worlds and to call into question the 
sense of inevitability which visions of ‘Progress’ entailed. The narrative 
strategy by which dystopias achieved this was prolepsis – projecting 
forwards into an alternatively construed future that denied the basis of 
progress. Dystopian analepses, meanwhile, usually look backwards over an 
only partially-revealed past, in which truth and reliability of historical 
commentary are questioned. This partial past is, however, (at least 
substantially) in the contemporary reader’s own future. The dystopia must 
                                            
141 Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 12, 170. 
  Stock 61     
  
therefore be seen as orientated towards the future-as-past. This 
experimental and unusual characteristic of dystopian fiction in the early-mid 
twentieth century is one of the elements that mark it out as modernistic 
prose. 
 
The chapters in this thesis are ordered chronologically by author. Each 
chapter deals with a different author’s dystopian work, assessing their literary 
role within the cultural history of dystopian fiction. An understanding based 
on Gennette’s structuralist framework of proleptic-analepses underpins the 
narrative strategies of these texts, while key themes of both modernity and 
literary modernism tie the texts together as dystopias. Discussions of, for 
instance, various strands of political thought, gender issues and cultural 
developments of the early-mid twentieth century appear in each chapter, but 
in each case these themes are approached in specific ways tailored to the 
different perspectives of the authors. Chapter two analyses Yevgeny 
Zamyatin’s We as a “Neorealist” satire in which modernist experimentation is 
mingled with a profound concern with regimentation and order in modern life. 
An exploration of Zamyatin’s ambiguous figure of the “heretic” opens up a 
discussion in which Kantian and Hegelian models of rationality and aesthetic 
judgement are called into question, and (modern) notions of selfhood are 
destabililsed. Picking up on this latter issue, chapter three approaches 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World by critiquing Adorno’s essay on the novel 
and the relationship between “high” culture, “mass” culture, and happiness 
presented in both of these texts. Assessing the novel within its political, 
scientific and literary context, I then investigate how satire mingles with 
serious engagement with a wide range of thinkers in the novel, including 
Vilfredo Pareto, John B. Watson and Sigmund Freud. Chapter four returns 
once more to questions of rationality, modernity, nature and metaphysics 
with relation to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. The novel’s focus on 
the nature of the self, on epistemological belief structures and moral 
autonomy is stressed as being important to the text as a dystopian novel. In 
chapter five I examine how John Wyndham, a reluctant SF writer and more 
overtly a literary descendant of Wells than Orwell or Huxley, began to move 
the dystopian genre in new directions by emphasising the importance of 
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apocalypse and SF themes to the dystopian anachronic framework. 
Biological and postwar political themes often interact savagely in his fiction 
as the human condition within the modern state is analysed through the 
dissolution and breakdown of this environment. 
 
The dystopian future seems almost invariably to lie beyond a terrible war, 
apocalypse or catastrophe. As will be argued in chapter five, the choice 
between these three paths of war, apocalypse and catastrophe is significant, 
and while the strategy chosen can include some element of overlap, these 
three different strands should not be collapsed into each other. Thus while 
dystopia involves some element of a failure in utopian thought to address the 
dangerous aspects of utopian thinking, it also lies beyond a terrible future 
event that dwarfs even the terrors of the twentieth century. 
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A Modern Dystopia: Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We as Post-
Enlightenment Critique and Satire 
 
Yevgeny Zamyatin prided himself on being a heretic. To be such a figure 
was, to him, an artistic ideal as much as a political statement. Yet like the 
dialectic at the centre of his theoretical and philosophical thought, he was 
heretical only while simultaneously critically engaged with a well-established 
intellectual tradition. His novel We, completed in 1921 but only ever 
published outside Russia and in translation in his lifetime (including one 
unauthorised re-translation into Russian), is set in the distant future, 
centuries after a catastrophic 200-years war. We is the diary of D-503, 
citizen of the authoritarian, rationally administered One State. He is chief 
builder of the “Integral” – a spaceship made from the toughened glass that is 
the principal building material of the entire polis. The city is “girdled” by a 
“Green Wall” of this glass, separating it from the natural world beyond. The 
diary records the fracturing of D-503’s supposedly “mathematical” collectivist 
social values and the development of an individual self, a disease doctors 
call “growing a soul”, as he falls in love with the rebel “Number” (citizen) I-
330 who leads a tribe living in nature beyond the Green Wall. After some 
revolutionary successes, her plot to commandeer the Integral to overthrow 
the state is uncovered. D-503 undergoes a surgical operation to remove his 
imagination and gives up I-330, who is put to death. 
 
This chapter begins with a biographical discussion of Yevgeny Zamyatin, 
focusing on the elements of his life most relevant to the creation and 
reception of We. The novel is then analysed within its historical and literary 
context as a “Neorealist” satire, with particular attention given to the key 
characteristics of this literary movement. Zamyatin was also indebted to 
other literary developments, in addition to the new medium of cinema as a 
way of viewing the world. Yet embedded as he was in wider literary 
movements, Zamyatin’s critical work is characterised by the central 
importance of the heretic, an anomolous and problematic figure with both 
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religious connotations and Nietzchean overtones. A discussion of whether or 
not such a heretic exists in the ambiguous text of We here leads into an 
examination of metafiction in the novel. The chapter then develops by 
exploring the manner in which a specific model of rationality is opposed to 
emotional life in the One State. This separation of emotional and rational 
faculties in man derives, it will be suggested, from Zamyatin’s reading (as a 
left-Hegelian) of Kant. Indeed, We contains a persistent and multi-faceted 
engagement with Nietzsche and Kant, particularly with their theories of 
aesthetics and judgement. Elaborating on this theme with reference to the 
central image of the Integral spacecraft, the argument then proceeds by 
turning towards Zamyatin’s construction of his protagonist’s sense of self. 
This analysis is positioned within a wider discourse about the condition of 
modern man in We, and the realisation (and failure) of Enlightenment ideals 
– in particular the implementation of utilitarian doctrines – in the One State. 
Zamyatin’s interest in the work of H. G. Wells is important to this persistant 
critique of modernity, in which the industrial landscapes of Edwardian 
England and political developments in Russia are linked together with 
extraordinary imagination, ambiguity and wit. 
 
Zamyatin’s Life and Work 
 
The available biographical information of Yevgeny Zamyatin is modest and 
patchy. Alex M. Shane’s 1968 literary biography relied largely on three 
sketches the author composed in the 1920s, which were later published in 
the translator Mirra Ginsburg’s collection of Zamyatin’s essays, and totalled 
together less than eleven pages.1 
  
Yevgeny Zamyatin (1884-1937) was born in the provincial town of Lebedyan, 
some two hundred miles south of Moscow. His father was a teacher at the 
local Progymnasium, his mother a piano teacher. In his autobiographical 
                                            
1 Alex M. Shane, The Life and Works of Evgenij Zamjatin (Berkley, CA: U of California P, 
1968); Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 3-14. 
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articles he treats his provincial childhood as largely grey and dull, although 
he drew on his life there for many of his early stories.2 
 
Zamyatin studied Naval Architecture in St. Petersberg. There, he became 
embroiled in the 1905 Revolution. “In those years,” he wrote in 1929, “being 
a Bolshevik meant following the line of greatest resistance, and I was a 
Bolshevik at that time.”3 He was arrested and imprisoned until spring 1906, 
then exiled to his hometown. He surreptitiously re-entered St. Petersberg 
and remained there illegally, frequently moving district, until he was exiled 
again in 1911. Still working as a naval architect, by this time he was also 
publishing fiction including A Provincial Tale. He was permitted legal re-entry 
to St. Petersberg in 1913. When his novella At the World’s End was 
published, the issue of Zavety in which it appeared was confiscated.  
Zamyatin and the editors were later tried and acquitted.4 
 
In 1916 Zamyatin left Russia for Britain, where he was to supervise building 
icebreakers as part of Imperial Russia’s attempt to open up a northern route 
circumventing Germany’s naval blockade. This was a key moment in his 
literary development. In England, Zamyatin lived in Jesmond, a bourgeois 
suburb of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. He designed and supervised the building of 
several icebreakers, including the St Alexandr Nevskii (later renamed Lenin), 
at Swan Hunters Shipyard, Wallsend. He also oversaw construction in 
Glasgow, Sunderland and South Shields. During his stay he “looked at 
ruined castles, listened to the dull thud of bombs dropped by German 
zeppelins, and wrote Islanders.”5 Many images and themes from Islanders 
later found their way into We. Zamyatin’s tale A Fisher of Men also dates 
from around this time. Alan Myers’s studies of Zamyatin’s time in England 
are rich both in biographical information and possible sources for his fiction, 
although some of the links he tries to establish are tenuous. His evidence 
                                            
2 Shane, The Life and Works of Evgenij Zamjatin 8. 
3 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 10. 
4 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 12-13. 
5 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 4. 
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also suggests that Zamyatin tended to talk up his encounters with 
zeppelins.6 
 
Scholarship on Zamyatin has been most prolific in America. Although Cold 
War era American scholarship on Zamyatin (in which his opposition to 
Bolshevism tends to be over-emphasised) should be approached with 
caution, the quality of American research on We has often been high. 
Surprisingly, it is U.S. studies of his fiction set in England that frequently do 
not match this level. Specifically, the setting of the novels seems not to have 
merited American investigation. While, for instance, Christopher Collins’s 
Jungian reading of We is a detailed and interesting discussion, his comment 
that Islanders is set in “the fictional English city Jesmond” betrays an 
ignorance which prevents him unlocking the precision (and hence the full 
force) of the satirical content of Zamyatin’s novella.7 Worse is E. J. Brown, 
who claims that “The literary method and the basic thematic content of 
Islanders is developed further in We, where the rigid patterns of London life 
have become the utopian laws of a state of the twenty-ninth century.”8 The 
distinction (here conflated) between Newcastle and London is important 
because it adds a provincial element to Zamyatin’s English satire, which is 
not present in We. However, as Myers has shown, the northern industrial 
landscape, which Zamyatin had observed over a long period, is an 
inspiration for the physical setting of the novel. Geographical and temporal 
accuracy is important to any reading of We that takes into account the 
utilisation of, and commentary upon, contemporary conditions. This cannot 
be said of Owen Ulph’s claim that, “weathering the sulky fogs of the London 
                                            
6 Alan Myers, "Evgenii Zamiatin in Newcastle," Slavonic and East European Review 68 
(1990); Alan Myers, "Zamiatin in Newcastle: The Green Wall and The Pink Ticket," Slavonic 
and East European Review 71 (1993). Myers’s argument that the quarter-mile long glazed 
sheds in which the ships were built is a source for the architecture in We seems sensible, 
the suggestion that the pink tickets by which sex is regulated in the One State could be 
based on pink clocking-in cards in the Wallsend docks seems less likely. 
7 Christopher Collins, Evgenij Zamjatin: An Interpretive Study, Slavistic Printings and 
Reprintings, ed. C. H. Van Schooneveld (The Hague, Neth.: Mouton, 1973), 29. 
8 E.J. Brown, “Brave New World”, “1984” and “We”: An Essay on Anti-Utopia, Ardis Essay 
Series (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1976). 
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Dockyards, [Zamyatin] directed the construction of icebreakers.”9 The 
London Dockyards did not hold a large shipbuilding industry. 
 
Zamyatin returned to Russia from England during the October Revolution. 
He threw himself into early Soviet literary life and worked in both the House 
of Writers and the Petrograd House of Arts, writing many of his finest short 
stories, as well as translating and staging King Lear with Blok, and serving 
on various literary committees.10 While all publishing was impeded by paper 
shortages, from 1918 onwards Zamyatin took on a huge amount of editing 
work that was prepared for publication, including the World Literature series.  
At this point, 
The necessary stimulus for My [the Russian transliteration of We] undoubtedly 
came from Zamjatin’s editorial work in 1919 on translations of H. G. Wells’s 
sociofantastic novels and perhaps from acquaintance with some works by 
Anatole France as well. Apparently My was written in 1920, but Zamjatin spent 
considerable time polishing and revising it the following year.11 
 
By the time he was ready to submit We for publication, Zamyatin was 
already viewed suspiciously by Bolsheviks. Indeed, he had a minor scrape 
with Cheka, the Soviet State security service, in 1919. They arrested him 
again in 1922. He had published a number of essays that were not only 
philosophically heretical to Bolshevik doctrine, but had rather inconveniently 
drawn attention to the paucity of literary output from the Proletcult 
organization, a powerful rival to the Petrograd section of the All-Russian 
Union of Writers (VSP) which he had helped to establish: “[t]he Proletcult art 
is, thus far, a step back, to the 1860s”, he declared.12  
 
Zamyatin gave a number of public readings of We, but despite the high 
regard with which he was held in the VSP it was clear that the satirical 
likeness of certain aspects of the Benefactor’s regime in the novel to the 
Bolshevik project were too close for comfort for it to be published in Russia. 
                                            
9 Owen Ulph, "I-330: Reconsiderations on the Sex of Satan," Zamyatin's We: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Gary Kern (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1988), 80. 
10 Shane, The Life and Works of Evgenij Zamjatin 25-35. 
11 Shane, The Life and Works of Evgenij Zamjatin 37-8. 
12 “I am afraid” (1921) in Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 56. 
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Alexander Voronsky praised Zamyatin as a “master of the word. His 
language is fresh, original and exact”, but nevertheless denounced We as 
narrowly individualistic, a “lampoon” on existing socialism by a scared man 
who had lost touch with his epoch: “[t]o oppose grass, human wilfulness, and 
people covered with hair to communism means not to understand the 
essence of the question,” he argued, while admitting that “the artistic aspects 
of the novel are excellent.”13 
 
Gregory Zilboorg had begun translating “My” in 1922; We appeared in New 
York in 1924. It was subsequently translated into French, as Nous Autres, as 
well as Czech. When an émigré publisher re-translated the work without 
Zamyatin’s permission from the Czech into Russian in 1929, Zamyatin was 
viciously denounced, denied access to all publishing outlets and forced to 
resign from the Petrograd VSP. His fledgling career as a dramatist was 
wrecked. Only through Gorky’s intervention and his own daring letter to 
Stalin was he granted permission to leave the Soviet Union. His career and 
his health faded in Paris until his death in 1937. 
 
Zamyatin as Neorealist 
 
Zamyatin was acutely aware of, and frequently reflective upon, the literary 
context in which he wrote. However, his conception of Russian literary 
movements was quite idiosyncratic. At the time he was writing We, Zamyatin 
saw himself as a “Neorealist.” For Zamyatin, Neorealism as a movement was 
only explicable with reference to its literary origins, although within these 
explanations he tended to make reference only to Russian literature. In this 
context, he saw Neo-Realism as a synthesis of late nineteenth-century 
Realism and early twentieth-century Symbolism. The art of Realists like 
Gorky, and particularly Chekhov, “consisted of reflecting in a tiny splinter of a 
mirror – a book or a story – the truest and most vivid piece of the earth.” Man 
was at the centre of this world, the only being capable of occupying the focus 
of their lens, for all intents and purposes treated as a god, according to 
                                            
13 Alexander Voronsky, "Evgeny Zamyatin," Zamyatin's We: A Collection of Critical Essays 
25, 45, 46. 
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Zamyatin. Realism “depicted the apparent reality, visible to the naked eye”, 
which for the Realists was man and earth. “In Chekhov’s work the art of 
portraying life, of portraying the earth, attained its highest point.”14 
 
Zamyatin believed that with no greater achievement possible within the 
Realist mode, writers like “Fyodor Sologub, Andrey Bely, Gippius, Blok, 
Bryusov, Balmont, Andreyev, Chulkov, Vyacheslav Ivanov, Minsky, Voloshin” 
reacted by creating Symbolism.15 This is a neat conceptualisation, but one 
that skirts over the more complex historical context and literary tensions 
between these writers. In its first expressions in the 1890s Russian 
Symbolism in fact had “close links with Paris”, with Bryusov in particular 
taking inspiration from Rimbaud and Mallarmé, and publishing a translation 
of Verlaine’s Romances sur Paroles. Meanwhile, younger writers including 
“Blok and Vyacheslav Ivanov as well as Bely distanced themselves from 
Bryusov and Balmont. Blok… condemned Bryusov as decadent”, a move 
that echoed many previous dismissals of French Symbolism in Western 
Europe, particularly by conservative figures.16 
 
By concentrating on Symbolism as a Russian movement, Zamyatin argued 
that Symbolism represented both Realism’s antithesis, and a shift in literary 
ideas analogous to the technological leap from trains to aeroplanes. Like 
early flight, he argued, Symbolism was clumsy and experimental at times. 
But it looked at the world from a different perspective, moved more rapidly 
and in new directions as a reaction against the constraints and 
overdevelopment of Realism.  Zamyatin’s belief was that the faster “tempos 
of modern life do not tolerate the ‘slow, horse-and-buggy descriptions’ of 
nineteenth-century Realism. The age demands that syntax become ‘elliptical, 
volatile,’ and the image must also convey ‘quickness of motion.’”17 
 
                                            
14 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 36, 42, 36. 
15 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 37. 
16 René Wellek, "The Term and Concept of Symbolism in Literary History," New Literary 
History 1.2 (1970), 261-2. 
17 Quoted in Milton Ehre, "Zamyatin's Aesthetics," Zamyatin's We: A Collection of Critical 
Essays 133. 
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Russian Symbolism not only responded to the increased speed of the 
twentieth century, it also produced grim, universally symbolised pictures of 
life reflecting an industrial, mass age. To Zamyatin, who consistently adopted 
technological metaphors to describe aesthetic changes, the Russian 
Symbolists looked at details not as if reflecting the apparent reality of life with 
the most perfect mimesis as Chekhov had done, but as if using an x-ray 
machine. He characterized their approach as being like an x-ray image of a 
skeleton; the anatomical and technologically sophisticated photograph which 
was both a symbol of life and a symbol of death. The Russian Symbolists’ 
most valuable contribution, to Zamyatin’s mind, was their concentration on 
form and on the sounds of words. To fit the complex emotional states about 
which they were writing, the Symbolists successfully “created a science of 
verbal music.”18 
 
In Zamyatin’s schema, the sublation (Aufheben) of this dialectical struggle 
between Realism and Symbolism was what he termed “Neorealism”, or 
“synthesism”. “The material of the Neorealists”, he explained, 
is the same as that of the Realists: life, earth, rock, everything that has weight 
and dimensions. But, while they use this material, the Neorealists do primarily 
what the Symbolists sought to do; they create generalizations and symbols.19 
 
Neorealism employed images as if using a microscope, which were more 
‘real’ precisely because thus magnified they appeared estranged and alien. 
Characterised by irony, a satirically Swiftian smile at the world and the “use 
of the method of Impressionism; clarity and sharp, often exaggerated, 
vividness of colors; use of the village, the backwoods, as the scene of 
action”, Neorealism, Zamyatin asserted, contrasted with Symbolism’s 
concentration on the bustling novelty of industrial cities. However, both 
movements used “broad, abstract generalizations – achieved by depiction of 
everyday trifles; terseness of language; ‘showing’ rather than ‘telling about’; 
use of folk and local speech; use of verbal music.”20 
 
                                            
18 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 39. 
19 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 44. 
20 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 48. 
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The diary form of We is exceptionally well suited to the depiction of 
“everyday trifles” and D-503 is assiduous, even obsessive, in his recording of 
trivia. We learn not only what he eats, for example, but how (fifty chews per 
mouthful); the weather is a recurrent theme even though it is never extreme 
(something, it is tempting to suggest, that could be a satirical reflection on 
the author’s time in England); and at one point D- notices an inkblot next to 
his name on U’s sheet of paper. Each of these trifles, however, is highly 
charged and exists within a tightly controlled, and expertly deployed, 
extended schema of imagery: the weather is not merely pathetic fallacy but a 
device by which the totality of the One State’s power over nature is tested – 
as fog, clouds and wind pass over the Green Wall, the outer world brings the 
scent of “yellow honey pollen… of some unknown flowers” with it, which 
“interferes to some extent with the flow of logical thought.”21 The inkblot on 
U’s paper by D-’s name recalls an earlier “everyday trifle” in which D- 
recollected crying as a child because he got an inkblot on his “unif”. The 
inkblot indicates irrationality and carelessness, but also D-’s childishness, 
and U’s relation to him as a surrogate mother. It is D-503’s failure to be 
“good”, and a perfectly rational “number”. 
 
We utilises a defamiliarizing process by virtue of being placed in the distant 
future. Its “local speech” is more localised in time than in space. For Patrick 
Parrinder, “the future consciousness, and even the future language” of We 
are its “most radical conceptions” and “it is Zamyatin's imagination of these 
conditions – his revelation of the future through its writings – that establishes 
We as a uniquely modernist work of science fiction.”22 As Kern elaborates, 
Zamyatin achieves this futurity of language through a number of intelligently 
crafted techniques. His syntax is highly idiosyncratic, eliminating many 
grammatical parts of written language, as well as eschewing lengthy 
                                            
21 Yevgeny Zamyatin, We, trans. Mirra Ginsburg (New York: EOS HarperCollins, 1999), 3. 
There are a variety of translations available of We. As Ginsburg’s translations of Zamyatin’s 
essays are referred to extensively in this chapter, for the sake of consistency I also use her 
translation of We throughout (unless otherwise indicated). I also follow her transliterations of 
Russian names and terms (except in quotations where original spellings are retained). 
22 Patrick Parrinder, "Imagining the Future: Zamyatin and Wells," Science Fiction Studies 1 
(1973), 20. 
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sentences containing multiple subordinate clauses. Using this technique, 
Kern claims, Zamyatin 
Sought to reproduce what he called ‘thought language’ (myslennyi iazyk) – the 
speed language of ‘pieces, fragments and additions.’ The reader is thus given 
only the guidelines to the action: faced with incomplete sentences 
(aposiopesis), changes of construction (anacoluthon) and bare allusions, he is 
forced to fill the missing links, to think, and, in a sense, to create with the 
author.23 
 
The combination of the proleptic future setting and prose laden with 
aposiopesis and anacoluthon (for example: “But now… Yes, precisely: I feel 
some alien speck in my brain, like the finest eyelash in the eye”)24 has a 
defamiliarizing effect. The concept of defamiliarization, as developed by 
Victor Shklovsky, was premised on the idea that “art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the 
stone stony.”25 Through a variety of techniques including, but not limited to, 
“wordplay, deliberately roughened rhythm, or figures of speech”, the writer 
arrests the “automatism” of perception and forces the reader to be aware of 
each individual word.26 While the two disagreed politically, Zamyatin’s prose 
clearly drew on Shklovsky’s theory.27 We is a text that forces the reader to 
actively fill in gaps, and prevents her or him from digesting any part of it 
automatically and without reflection. The pace and use of irregular pauses 
and ellipses stand in sharp contrast against each other, reinforcing the bright 
confusing clash of colours. Although Zamyatin sometimes described his work 
and that of other Neorealists as “impressionistic,” Ehre’s argument that 
“impressionism” is the wrong word to describe the Neorealist project appears 
sound (although post-impressionism may be closer). The brightness of the 
colours used in We, their lack of subtlety in hue or tone, adds weight to his 
                                            
23 Gary Kern, "Zamyatin's Stylization," Zamyatin's We: A Collection of Critical Essays 120. 
24 Zamyatin, We, 32-3 ellipsis in original. 
25 Victor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Russian 
Formalist Criticism, eds. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Regents Critics Series (Lincoln, 
NE: U of Nebraska P, 1965), 12. 
26 Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Introduction, "Art as Technique," by Shklovsky, 5. 
27 Shklovsky’s review of We condemned Zamyatin’s “one-sided ability” and with pointed 
irony threw Zamyatin’s image of the freedom of the aeroplane back at him, referring to him 
as a plane that had reached its “ceiling”. Victor Shklovsky, "Yevgeny Zamyatin's Ceiling," 
Zamyatin's We: A Collection of Critical Essays 49-50. 
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suggestion that “it is a similar solidity that Picasso and Braque, looking back 
to Cézanne, were working for in the Cubist experiments.”28 The Cubists, 
after all, as German Expressionist Ludwig Meidner put it, were modern 
artists who were “the contemporaries of the engineer.”29 While Zamyatin 
presents D-503’s devotion to geometric forms as representative of his 
devotion to the alien and terrifying values of the One State, it is not certain 
that he does not also share with D-503 an aesthetic appreciation for such 
forms as, for example, the Integral: “a graceful, elongated ellipsoid made of 
our glass – as eternal as gold, as flexible as steel.”30 These forms, 
particularly the Integral, are not often described as cold or static. There is 
genuine admiration for the ship-like vessel being constructed at the heart of 
a mechanical, humanised dance. 
 
Cinema 
 
The (post-)impressionistic style and fast movement is not only characteristic 
of Neorealism, but also of the new medium of cinema. Tim Armstrong cites 
an American newspaper, which in 1896 described the new cinema as 
“Electricity in its application to the arts.”31 Given Zamyatin’s insistence that 
new prose should reflect the ever-increasing, electrified pace of modern life, 
cinematic imagery appears as practically a sine qua non. On the Day of 
Unanimity, the satirical episode in which the supposedly “democratic” 
election of the Benefactor by a unanimous public vote is disrupted by 
thousands of the Mephi voting against him, the cinematic quality is 
emphasized with the image of “thousands of silently screaming mouths, as 
on some monstrous movie screen.” 32 This is followed by a repetition of the 
                                            
28 Ehre, "Zamyatin's Aesthetics," 133. 
29 Ludwig Meidner, "Instructions for Painting Pictures of the Metropolis," Art In Theory 1900-
2000: An Anthology of Changing ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2003), 170. 
30 Zamyatin, We, 82. 
31 Quoted in Tim Armstrong, Modernism, Technology and the Body: A Cultural Study 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 222. 
32 Zamyatin, We, 144. 
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word “screen” in each of the following two paragraphs to underline the 
comparison with cinema.33 
 
Cinema was expanding at a phenomenally rapid rate during Zamyatin’s stay 
in Britain.34 In the Russian context, meanwhile, Russell notes that “the visual 
distortions and defamiliarizations in We anticipate by a few years the work of 
Russian constructivist photographers and avant-garde film directors of the 
1920s.”35 Zamyatin believed that in cinema “the most important thing is 
motion, motion at any cost.”36 Flicking between images of isolated body parts 
and monumental buildings, between the individual and cityscapes, in We the 
elimination of grammatical parts of speech, as described above by Gary 
Kern, is replaced in part by the grammar of cinema.37 
 
As a writer obsessed by the tension between opposites, Zamyatin frequently 
alternated between the microscopic and the telescopic, or panoramic.38 In 
the Second Entry of his diary, D-503 records meeting O-90 for a walk. “[S]he 
looks exactly like her name[…] carved in the round, all of her, with that pink 
O, her mouth, open to meet every word I say. And also, that round, plump 
fold in her wrist, like a baby’s.”39 Linking the shape of the name “O-90” with 
her body shape creates a memorable visual impression that Zamyatin can 
rely on every time she subsequently appears in the text. To reinforce the 
theme, the tight focus on mouth and wrist act as a synecdoche for her 
                                            
33 Robert Russell, Zamiatin's “We”, Critical Studies in Russian Literature (London: Bristol 
Classical Press, 2000), 95. 
34 “There were approximately 1,600 cinemas in Britain in 1910. Further expansion brought 
them to a total of perhaps 3,500 by 1916.” Dean Rapp, "Sex in the Cinema: War, Moral 
Panic, and the British Film Industry, 1906-1918," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies 34 (2002), 422, n.3. 
35 Russell, Zamiatin's “We” 109. 
36 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 291. 
37 Interestingly, Zamyatin’s description of the (Russian) Symbolists’ “surgical” approach to 
writing as contrasting to the essentially romantic view which the Realists held is congruent 
with Walter Benjamin’s comparison of painter and cinematographer in his essay “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”: “magician and surgeon compare to painter 
and cameraman. The painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the 
cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.” Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry 
Zorn, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico, 1999), 227. 
38 Kern, "Zamyatin's Stylization," 125. 
39 Zamyatin, We, 4. 
  Stock 75     
  
character and physical appearance.40 D- ‘reads’ the features of O-’s body 
and character as open, softly rounded, innocently honest and unblemished. 
When she does not live up to this identity – as when, for example, she reacts 
negatively to his decision (never acted upon) to inform the Guardians about 
I-330’s illegal activities – he becomes angry. In the congruence between the 
shape of her name (“O”) and the shape of (the details of) her body, the body 
is literally turned into writing in D-503’s diary, to be read by him. This 
“heightened readability of the body”, its intensely visual meaning, has a 
cinematic quality.41 Following these ‘shots’ (full-length portrait, close-ups of 
mouth and wrist) D- and O- go down into the street. D-503’s cinematic gaze 
moves across the scene: “[t]he avenue was full[…] The numbers marched in 
even ranks, four abreast, ecstatically stepping in time to the music”.42 The 
description places D-503 as separate from the marching ranks, like a wide-
angled shot panning across the street from above. It is entirely fitting with D-
503’s ideal of the citizens of the One State as being efficient as machines 
that he views them as if through a lens. As Walter Benjamin put it, “mass 
reproduction is aided especially by the reproduction of masses.”43 By 
identifying himself with a camera viewpoint, D-503 stresses both his 
“mechanical” nature and his belief of himself as an objective, rational 
recorder of daily life, while simultaneously representing the crowd as an 
expression of the ideology of the One State in action. 
 
Robert Russell notes that the eye of D-503 is on several occasions 
analogous to that of a camera lens selecting, for example, “the beautiful 
patterns of synchronized movement” in the construction site of the Integral.44 
Zamyatin’s anticipation of Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov in the scene in the 
Fifteenth Entry to which Russell refers is remarkable. In his 1922 “WE: 
Variant of a Manifesto”, Vertov exclaimed, “saws dancing at a sawmill 
convey to us a joy more intimate and intelligible than that on human dance 
floors.” “The new man” whom Vertov wanted as his future “gratifying” 
                                            
40 On the importance of synecdoche in We, see Eliot Borenstein, "The Plural Self: Zamjatin's 
We and the Logic of Synecdoche," The Slavic and East European Journal 40 (1996). 
41 Armstrong, Modernism, Technology and the Body 227. 
42 Zamyatin, We 5. 
43 Benjamin, Illuminations 243, n. 21. 
44 Russell, Zamiatin's “We” 77. 
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subject, would be “free from unwieldiness and clumsiness, will have the light, 
precise movements of machines.”45 Such are the many men “turning like the 
levers of a single huge machine” in the construction of the Integral.46 This 
pointed prophetic accuracy, based only upon the continued trajectories of 
Soviet art of many media, makes the text all the more satirically biting. 
 
Vertov and Zamyatin shared an obsession with movement: in Vertov’s 
seminal Man With a Movie Camera (1929), shots are edited together at an 
incessantly lively pace. However, the theoretical underpinning of the two 
differed substantially. While both grounded their work dialectically, Vertov 
ultimately aimed to reflect the Bolshevik conception of the ‘reality’ of the new 
‘Soviet paradise’. His development of montage techniques, which required 
“the geometrical extract of movement through an exciting succession of 
images”, were intended only to valorise “electric man.”47 In other words, he 
followed the orthodox Bolshevist aesthetic of rationalised, mechanised 
labour. 
  
The application of this aesthetic was exemplified in the literary world by 
Aleksei Gastev, a labour organiser, metalworker and author of Shockwork 
Poetry. “Work in all its manifestations was sacred for Gastev… Taking labor 
as a raw material, [he believed] the new specialist will transform it into a 
thing of harmony and beauty.”48 For Gastev, Patricia Carden argues, the 
improvement of labour conditions, and the efficiencies that capitalist thinkers 
such as Henry Ford and Frederick Winslow Taylor had instituted, could lead 
to work being not only more productive, but also less frustrating and 
ultimately fulfilling. “He sees technology as the means to an honorable life in 
which not just a few in the privileged occupations, but every member of 
society will be joined in productive and fulfilling labor.” But to Zamyatin, the 
anonymity and subordination of life to rationalized impersonal systems was 
an evil. Moreover, humanity was incapable of holding to such systems. 
                                            
45 Dziga Vertov, Kino-eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, trans. Kevin O'Brien, ed. Annette 
Michelson (Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1984), 7-8. 
46 Zamyatin, We 82. 
47 Vertov, Kino-eye 8. 
48 Patricia Carden, "Utopia and Anti-Utopia: Aleksei Gastev and Evgeny Zamyatin," Russian 
Review 46 (1987), 6. 
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Zamyatin was influenced by Dostoyevsky’s Notes from Underground, in 
which the Underground Man declares that “the whole human enterprise 
seems indeed to consist in man’s proving to himself every moment that he is 
a man and not a sprig!” Thus, the Underground Man declares, “man needs 
only independent wanting,” needs only to follow his own whims and wants; if 
mankind lived in the most rational and harmonious “gingerbread” cockaigne 
imaginable, the invention of “destruction and chaos” would still be 
inevitable.49 Hence, Carden argues that “it is as though Zamyatin issues a 
challenge to the Gastevs of his generation: Your love of beauty, your 
capacity for philosophy, can only lead you ultimately to the irrational, the 
non-machine, if you are not to betray it.”50 
 
Heretics 
 
To Zamyatin himself, such a challenge was easy to accept. As a naval 
architect, his designs had to be streamlined and efficient. As a writer, he 
prided himself on being a heretic, a naysayer stubbornly opposed to 
literature that treated men as nameless appendages to modern machinery, 
slightly less efficient tools of industrial production than the plant which they 
tended in dull repetition. The heretic’s calling was precisely to prevent the 
smooth functioning of the chain of endless reproduction and repetition.   
The world is kept alive only by heretics: the heretic Christ, the heretic 
Copernicus, the heretic Tolstoy. Our symbol of faith is heresy: tomorrow is 
inevitably heresy to today, which has turned into a pillar of salt, and to 
yesterday, which has scattered to dust.51 
 
Heretics create tension, provoke responses, and ultimately must sacrifice 
themselves to the tomorrow that they bring into existence. Heretics are the 
compelling, dissatisfied outsiders of society. Ironically, however, the 
elevation of the historical agency of individual heretics represented a tension 
within Zamyatin’s own philosophy, which also held that history progressed 
                                            
49 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa 
Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 1993), 31, 26, 30-1. 
50 Carden, "Utopia and Anti-Utopia," 12. 
51 “Tomorrow” in Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic, 51. 
  Stock 78     
  
according to more structured dialectical change. The valorisation of 
individual charismatic heretics, rhetorically reified until they appear to 
possess quasi-fantastical abilities and visions, seems to undermine 
Zamyatin’s insistence elsewhere on the framework of Hegelian dialectics in 
historical (and artistic) change, in which artists and political actors are merely 
representative of broader movements and structures. In Russia, Voronsky 
was one of the first to point this out, while in the West both Andrew Barratt 
and Victoria Rooney have tried to unpick this seemingly elitist and 
inconsistent element of Zamyatin’s worldview.52 
 
This issue of elitism is linked to Zamyatin’s fashionable flirtation with the 
ideas of Nietzsche. Rooney in particular has criticised Zamyatin for peddling 
what she sees as a vulgar and superficial interpretation of Nietzsche’s ideas 
that attempted to tie the eternal recurrence to his own more Hegelian 
framework. She finds Zamyatin’s separation of the creative individual from 
the “masses” elitist and dogmatic. The force of her argument is reduced by 
her misapplication of the label “Marxist” to Zamyatin – a point which Russell 
criticises. Zamyatin was once, as she asserts, a member of the Bolshevik 
Party, but only in his student days, years before the October Revolution.53 If 
the heretic, as Rooney intimates, is a politicized form of the Nietzschean 
Übermensch, and (as she also appears to suggest) heretics are for Zamyatin 
the primary agents of historical change, then Zamyatin cannot be thought of 
as Marxist, especially not in the crude, historically determinist sense she 
seems to intend. This would rather be closer to the ‘Great Man’ view of 
history associated with Whig historians. Her conflation of Darwinism and the 
social Darwinism of philosophers such as Herbert Spencer also detracts 
from her thesis. Notwithstanding these problems, she is correct to flag up the 
issue of elitism in Zamyatin’s thought. He did indeed privilege the creative 
artist and the creative scientist. He felt that among these elite practitioners 
                                            
52 Voronsky, "Evgeny Zamyatin," 45; Andrew Barratt, "Revolution as Collusion: The Heretic 
and the Slave in Zamyatin's My," The Slavic and East European Review 62 (1984); Victoria 
Rooney, "Nietzschean Elements in Zamyatin's Ideology: A Study of his Essays," The 
Modern Language Review 81 (1986). 
53 Rooney, "Nietzschean Elements in Zamyatin's Ideology," 675; Russell, Zamiatin's “We” 
33. 
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were heretics able to look at the world anew and see things in a fresh light, 
to see a new relation between contemporary forces. 
 
Moreover, there is something uncanny about the endless repetition of 
faceless crowds in We. Almost all the main characters of the novel are 
members of a cultured and educated elite: D-503 is the chief 
builder/mathematician, S-4711 a guardian, I-330 a classical pianist (among 
other things), R-13 is a state poet and even U is a school teacher. 
Significantly, only O-90’s job is never mentioned. She goes to live with the 
Mephi, creatures of every colour who only ever behave as a crowd, whether 
protesting at the Day of Unanimity or celebrating the breach of the Green 
Wall. As Barratt points out, Zamyatin’s conception of heresy, 
rests on a profoundly undemocratic conception of mankind (a point which is 
inevitably overlooked by those who stress his humanism). The heretic's 
function is to inject into the historical process the iconoclastic element without 
which the dialectic of progress would fail to operate.54 
 
Zamyatin’s conception of heresy is then seemingly inconsistent with his 
belief that the pattern of the Hegelian dialectic is the driving force of history, 
unless the heretic is viewed as both an Übermensch (a figure who, 
“embracing the moral as well as the immoral side… is valuable in himself, in 
the richness of his individuality”), as well as a politician performing the 
socially useful function of historical actor (which Nietzsche’s Übermensch did 
not).55 If Zamyatin’s heretic can be rescued from the charge of inconsistency, 
it is through his insistence that heretics must focus not on the near future, but 
on the far future; not on such narrow political acts as (say) the collectivization 
of farms, but on a different historical epoch altogether. The heretic cannot be 
a political strategist. Perhaps this is one reason why I-330’s revolution is 
destined to fail. She is not an artist, merely an agitator. It is D-503, seemingly 
an innocent fly caught in her web, who is in reality (and whatever his doubts) 
the true artist. Furthermore, it is through the creative act of propagation, of D- 
agreeing to have a child with O-90, that the novel is left critically open at its 
                                            
54 Barratt, "Revolution as Collusion," 353. 
55 Rooney, "Nietzschean Elements in Zamyatin's Ideology," 681. 
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end, allowing a radical element of hope to remain. His son or daughter will 
grow up with the Mephi beyond the Green Wall, the progeny of irrational and 
rational forces in creative tension. For Barratt, the failure in We of I-330 to 
fully convert D-503 to her cause is evidence of a profoundly pessimistic 
insight that “revolutionaries and slaves are incapable of making common 
cause together.”56 But if D-503 is merely a “slave” then this complicates the 
picture of the heretic as a creative and artistic force. Though I-330 is an 
agent of change and a muse to D-503, it is finally he who, as both builder 
and writer, is the creative artist in spite of himself. She creates chaos, he 
creates form. 
 
Metafiction 
 
D-503’s failure to act in a truly revolutionary manner exposes the difficulties 
of attaining the status of heretic. Zamyatin indicated in his essay “Scythians” 
that Christ on the cross is properly a heretic and “spiritual revolutionary”, but 
D-503 does not willingly sacrifice himself.57 Indeed, for Richard Gregg, D-
503’s decision is an ironic inversion of Christ’s: rather than die for the 
freedom of mankind, he lives to ensure their continued slavery.58 From the 
start of the novel it is clear that writing is something intensely personal and 
important for D-503; he feels like a pregnant woman becoming aware of the 
“pulse of a new, still tiny, still blind little human being” within herself. The 
alienating aspect of artistic production, of being conscious of the production 
of the diary as a consciously willed act – in other words in separating the 
creative experience of artistic labour from the final fruit of one’s labour as 
something apart and detached from oneself – is an emotionally charged 
experience. The diary, writes D-, “is I, and at the same time, not I. And for 
many long months it will be necessary to nourish it with my own life, my own 
blood, then tear it painfully from myself and lay it at the feet of the One 
State.”59 
                                            
56 Barratt, "Revolution as Collusion," 355. 
57 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic 21-33, here 22. 
58 Richard A Gregg, "Two Adams and Eve in the Crystal Palace: Dostoevsky, the Bible, and 
We," Slavic Review 24 (1965), 687. 
59 Zamyatin, We 2. 
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The text of We had a remarkable life of its own once it left its author’s hands, 
not only appearing in translation without Zamyatin’s permission, but then 
subsequently being partially responsible for the denunciation of Zamyatin in 
the late 1920s. D-503’s writings have unintended consequences within the 
fictional realm of the novel itself too: when O-90 is read to from them she 
cries, and when U reads them she discovers the Mephi plan to commandeer 
the Integral spaceship and informs the authorities. Within the text, the diary, 
this thing that “is I, and at the same time, not I”, in its very conception stands 
as an individual unit against its own title of “We”, and works against its 
fictional creator. Hence D-503 characteristically sets out to be a 
“mathematical” recording instrument of daily life but becomes a novelist, an 
adventure-story writer. 
 
The plot of the novel slides away from D-503 gradually, just as his rationality 
and socialised model of self fragments and slips from his grasp. D-503 often 
finds time to reflect on the process of writing, and from this information we 
can on occasion glean something of Zamyatin’s own attitude towards the 
artistic process that is reflective of his wider philosophy. D-503’s penchant 
for addressing his imaginary audience directly (“you, the unknown readers to 
whom the Integral will bring my notes”) has a defamiliarizing effect, 
reminding the reader that not only the content of the novel but its premise too 
is fantastic.60 This prevents what, as alluded to above, Shklovsky termed the 
“automatism of perception.”61 But this technique also draws attention to the 
artfulness of the diary; D-503 is not only an adventure-story writer but a 
writer exploring and experimenting with the process of writing. Zamyatin 
turns the traditional pattern of the ‘scientific romance’ (as Wells termed his 
early works) on its head: instead of someone like “The Time Traveller” in 
Wells’s The Time Machine coming back from the future to the present to 
relate future events, D-503 is a writer from the (proleptic) future writing 
(analeptically) as if his readers are from the past (our present). This is why 
D-503 comments: 
                                            
60 Zamyatin, We 10. 
61 Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," 12-13. 
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I am confident you will not judge me too severely. I am confident you will 
understand that it is far more difficult for me to write than it has been for any 
other author in the history of mankind. Some wrote for their contemporaries; 
others for their descendants. But no one has ever written for ancestors, or for 
beings similar to his primitive, remote ancestors.62 
 
D-503 is ironically deceiving himself: the “troubling X” which he ascribes to 
his readers is already just as much within himself. In a move characteristic of 
Zamyatin, he here brings together science and literature. D-503 is (by 
analogy) attempting to write a text that stands outside of the normal human 
perception of time as linear, and sees it as something relative, perceived 
differently according to one’s viewpoint. In structuralist terms, D- is an 
“intradiegetic-homodiegetic” narrator (he lives within the ‘storyworld’ and tells 
a story in which he is a central character), but he constantly strives – and 
fails – to achieve a camera-eye ‘objectivity’ that somehow negates the 
subjectivity of space and time.63 Zamyatin is, in other words, writing with 
awareness of Einstein’s general theory of relativity and trying to find a way to 
develop its implications in relation to fiction.64 D-503 writes anachronically 
‘back in time’, to historical beings that he, as a member of the flight crew of 
the Integral, believes he will meet in his own future. The Newtonian theories 
of space, which D-503 venerates as something sacred, are in conflict with 
his own avowed mission to write for beings of the past living in his own near 
future. The “mathematical certainty” on which he builds his worldview thus 
stands in stark contradiction to his own creative process. 
 
The metafictional hereby intersects with the psychological development of 
character. Putting pen to paper, putting part of himself into his work (“it is I, 
and, at the same time, not I”), without him realising it D-503’s notes are an 
important agent of both historical and personal change. Unlike the building of 
the Integral, which is a joint project involving constant collaboration, the 
writing of the diary is an intensely personal activity necessitating his 
                                            
62 Zamyatin, We, 23. 
63 Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative, 66-67. 
64 An excellent discussion on the engagement with Einstein and general relativity in We and 
early Soviet society can be found in W.J. Leatherbarrow, "Einstein and the Art of Yevgeny 
Zamyatin," The Modern Language Review 82 (1987). 
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withdrawal from social life and a turn to self. In an age of mass socialisation, 
in which “individual consciousness is merely a sickness”, and where “the 
natural path from nonentity to greatness is to forget that you are a gram and 
feel yourself instead a millionth of a ton”, the diary form with which D-503 
naively chooses to express himself is inherently rebellious.65 Furthermore, 
writing, the imagination and doubt are all clearly linked by Zamyatin, all three 
working against the formulaic “happiness” of the One State. “Can it be true 
that I once felt – or imagined that I felt – all this?” D-503 rhetorically asks on 
the penultimate page, after he has had his imagination removed by surgery. 
The removal of his imagination has removed his doubts about the One State 
and his own identity. This is underlined by the final topic, “I Am Certain.” The 
heading relates to his final assertion that “Reason must prevail”; the One 
State will crush the rebellion completely.66 But it also recalls his assertion in 
the Eleventh Entry that “knowledge, absolutely sure of its infallibility, is faith.” 
There is nothing ‘scientific’ (in the Newtonian sense D- intends) about such 
faith. At this earlier point in the text, seeing his “steel-gray eyes” as if for the 
first time in the mirror, D- comments “and there, behind this steel … it turns 
out I have never known what is there.”67 D-503 only begins to gain such 
insight through social upheaval and personal drama, by developing a soul 
and falling in love. What he finds is a fragmented self, desperate to cling to 
the certainty of the One State sense of identity, but equally and paradoxically 
craving “madness”, love, uniqueness and sensuous, deliciously painful 
experiences of disruption and change. The certainty of faith, the final topic 
heading seems to indicate, is linked to a pathological lack of imagination. 
Only the “humanoid tractors” herding the terrified individuals towards the 
operating rooms have total faith in the ideals of the One State, coupled with 
zero imagination. Hence the writing of fiction is connected to empathy, 
imagination, love, a desire for change and a multilayered, complex model of 
self. This nexus is not causal, but related in more subtle and uncertain ways. 
Opposed to this, a scientifically-induced lack of imagination causes the writer 
to fail to make links between superficially unrelated phenomena (the 
                                            
65 Zamyatin, We 128, 115. It is significant, given that Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is 
consciously inspired by We, that Winston Smith’s first rebellious act is to write a diary. 
66 Zamyatin, We 231-2. 
67 Zamyatin, We 59. 
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auditorium where D- is taken for his operation, for example, is the same one 
to which he was summoned to hear I-330 play Scriabin on the piano at the 
start of the novel, but he cannot put his finger on why it is familiar). Zamyatin 
thus appears to end the novel with the polemical suggestion that any attempt 
by a mechanical and vulgar writer to report the One State uncritically, 
unambiguously and without imagination would be doomed to artistic failure. 
 
The Rational and the Emotional 
 
The plot of We is complicated by a sense of desperate ambiguity throughout. 
It is impossible to know whether I-330 really ever loves D-503, for instance, 
or, as is hinted more than once, if she is merely using him to gain access to 
the Integral. Characters’ motivations slip between the frequent ellipses and 
dashes in the text: the narrator, D-503, fails to understand either his own 
psychic life or that of others (“this is precisely why – precisely why I…”).68 
Indeed, it is the aim of One State to keep its citizens completely ignorant of 
the emotional content of the self. The State is premised upon a totalising 
model of rationality from which emotional considerations are excluded as 
something unworthy, animal-like and unsanitary. The One State seeks to 
control the populace by regulating its behaviour, narrowing their citizens’ 
emotional spectrum to preclude unpredictable passions. By withholding from 
the populace knowledge of emotions like anger, jealousy, and pain, the State 
hopes to maintain happiness as a constant. The first logical consequence of 
the narrator’s total emotional illiteracy is, paradoxically, a lucidly described 
incomprehension of the mental lives of others. Russell argues that in a world 
of transparent glass, “The opaqueness of the body is used throughout We as 
a metaphor for the mysterious, unknowable quality within each person.”69 In 
addition, there are also two other important opaque objects in the One State. 
The first is the Ancient House, whose shuttered windows are more than once 
compared to human eyes, open or closed to the outside world. The second 
is the paper upon which D-503 writes his diary. Through this device the 
metafictional is cleverly linked to the psychical exploration of the main 
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characters, which is central to the text. Like the novel’s characters, whose 
names are all symbolic letters, the text both demands to be read and resists 
interpretation. This shared opacity of the diary-novel as work of art and the 
human body is comically brought together in the Twenty-Eighth Entry, when 
S-4711, the One State “guardian” who has been spying on D-503 throughout 
the narrative, bursts into his room (the naïve D-, unlike his readership, does 
not yet admit to himself any suspicion that S- is a double agent for the 
Mephi). The only place in his glass room where D- can hide the diary is 
beneath himself on the glass chair on which he sits. On blank paper in front 
of him, in order not to look suspicious, he writes 
‘The Benefactor is the most perfect disinfection, essential to mankind, and 
therefore in the organism of the One State no peristalsis…’ With a jumping pen I 
squeezed out this utter nonsense, bending ever lower over the table, while in 
my head there was a crazy hammering, and with my back I heard the door 
handle click […] My whole being throbbed and pulsed in that (fortunately 
untransparent) part of my body which covered the manuscript.70 
 
As Russell points out, S notices immediately that this writing is “somewhat 
ambiguous”. “The ‘detritus’ flushed out by the Benefactor is, in fact, D-‘s 
entire subconscious, which gives rise to the diary.”71 What appears as waste 
is in fact most valuable, while the apparently inoffensive and ideologically 
pure image of the Benefactor is “utter nonsense.” The diary, it should be 
remembered, was originally intended to be literally a digest of the One State, 
“to record what I see and think, or, to be more exact, what we think.”72 In 
other words, this “utter nonsense” is the sort of drivel that D-503 originally 
intended to subject his readers to throughout the diary, a paean to a sterile 
and boringly ‘happy’ existence. But from the beginning of the novel, when, as 
noted above, D-503 compares himself as writer to a pregnant woman, it is 
clear that other psychological motivations are at work.73 This being so, there 
is an ironic and rather Rabelaisian inversion in D-’s actions as he sits on his 
diary. The diary is new life, creative, and D- protects it like a bird sitting on its 
nest because it is an “anguished – perhaps most precious – piece of myself.” 
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The digestive image which D-503 “squeeze[s] out” in order not to get in 
trouble with the State, on the other hand, in its literal and most puerile, 
scatological sense, acts as a most dismissive judgement upon the crass 
mechanistic literature which Zamyatin felt was increasingly prevalent and 
ascendant in Revolutionary Russia, most importantly among the Proletcult 
Bolshevik writers. 
 
The diary does not, then, represent an anal fixation but is rather a new life, 
opaquely human in its emotions, desires and thoughts, becoming ever more 
complex and interesting to attempt to read. The metafictional theme carried 
through the work implores us to study D-’s psyche in the opposition he 
voices between (his model of) rationality and emotions. In particular, through 
the device of an x-ray operation to exorcise the faculty of the imagination, the 
question is posed as to where the imagination fits into the make up of the life 
of the mind. 
 
Kant, Hegel and the Faculties of the Mind 
 
The One State model of rationality clearly excludes the faculties of the 
emotions and of the imagination. The latter is consistently linked with 
“irrational” emotions, and apparently non-causal associations. If D-503 reifies 
rationality and emotional life into a false binary opposition, then Zamyatin’s 
presentation of the life of the mind nevertheless implies that these elements 
can be analysed as different faculties. 
 
While much work has been done on the influence of Hegel’s dialectic upon 
Zamyatin’s thought, little critical attention has been given to the place of Kant 
in his philosophy. Two reasons can explain this. Firstly, Zamyatin’s concept 
of change was quite clearly and directly underpinned by the Hegelian 
dialectic.74 Secondly, although he is referenced several times in We, Kant is 
not discussed in the main corpus of essays to which most critics have first 
turned in their discussions of the novel. Yet it is the very presence of an 
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otherwise overlooked thinker in the text who is directly referenced on several 
occasions that should draw our attention to his role. In a novel in which so 
much effort is spent upon the formal elegance and beauty of the prose, it is 
significant that for Kant an idea properly meant a rational concept, and “when 
a rational concept is given a concrete expression, it appears as an ideal of 
beauty.” In other words, it is not concepts themselves that are beautiful, but 
their individual expressions in the phenomenal world. More precisely, “a 
judgment of the kind ‘x is beautiful’ is not a judgment regarding the properties 
of an object ‘x’ at all. It is a judgment about the feeling that the contemplation 
of this object induces in us.” Beauty is thus for Kant both a reflexive 
judgement and an ideal of the imagination.75 
 
Applied to We, the significance of formal and aesthetic qualities and 
techniques (including imagery, expression, use of voice, character and irony) 
is elevated through their continual interaction with theoretical and intellectual 
concerns. D-503’s idea of the beautiful is not really Kantian. When, for 
instance, he anthropomorphizes the machines “dancing’” as they build the 
Integral in the Second Entry (“I saw the whole beauty of this grandiose 
ballet”), he does not have an aesthetic experience of the beautiful in Kantian 
terms. Whilst his reaction to the experience is a subjective judgement 
capable of being universalised, the scene has a clearly recognisable external 
purpose (constructing the Integral), and, as the builder, D-’s view cannot be 
construed as disinterested. Furthermore, having aestheticised so elegantly 
this moment of industrial construction, his judgement (“why is this beautiful? 
Why is dance beautiful? Answer: because it is unfree motion”) is reductive 
and utilitarian.76 He attempts to capture the whole of the experience in a 
more Hegelian fashion, whereby the philosophical concept generated by this 
discussion is more important than the subjective experience itself, adding 
“the whole profound meaning of dance lies precisely in absolute, esthetic 
subordination, in ideal unfreedom.” The philosophical ambiguity by which D-
503 undermines the very precision of his own argument here does not in 
itself commit Zamyatin to either philosophical position – as the passage 
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continues, there is no indication as to whether the author favours a more 
Kantian or a more Hegelian perspective: 
If it is true that our forebears abandoned themselves to dance at the most 
exalted moments of their lives (religious mysteries, military parades), it means 
only one thing: the instinct of unfreedom is organically inherent in man from 
time immemorial, and we, in our present life, are only consciously…77 
 
The discussion is left ambiguously open by the characteristic ellipsis at the 
end of the passage. While it could be that the combination of the terms 
“abandoned” and “exalted moments” with “religious mysteries, military 
parades” is intended to demonstrate the absurdity of D-503’s argument, he is 
also unintentionally linking the One State to the most “exalted moments” of 
non-rational societies of the past. One other possibility is that this passage is 
making reference to the “Apollonian-Dionysiac duality”, which Nietzsche 
believed to underpin the “continuous evolution” of art.78 The formal nature of 
the dances to which D-503 here refers with their “unfree” movement, most 
rigidly in military parades, would bring it under the banner of the Apollonian. 
However, the “exalted” nature of chorus dances, as “rites of redemption, of 
glorious transfiguration” also demonstrate the profound influence of the 
Dionysian.79 D-’s suggestion that “the instinct of unfreedom is organically 
inherent in man from time immemorial” is therefore an ironic inversion of 
Nietzsche’s description of the Apollonian Greek who, feeling himself for the 
first time under the influence of Dionysian symbolic forces, “realize[s], with a 
shudder… that his Apollonian consciousness was but a thin veil hiding from 
him the whole Dionysiac realm.”80 
 
Zamyatin’s engagement with Kant is coloured by both Nietzsche and by his 
position as a left-Hegelian. Yet Kant remained an important touchstone for 
Zamyatin by allowing him to modify Hegel’s elevation of philosophy above 
art, which he could not accept. This grounding in idealism is characteristic of 
Zamyatin’s debt to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought in 
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general. His concentration on dialectical change and aesthetics, together 
with his argument that historically specific models of both rationality and the 
self inherently posit a (false) opposition between emotions and reason, are 
all generated with direct references to Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant 
and Newton. In addition, they make many indirect references to Hegel and 
other nineteenth century post-Enlightenment thinkers whose work followed 
on from that tradition. 
 
As argued above in chapter one, the mode of critique so favoured in the 
Enlightenment was renewed by critical theorists in the twentieth century even 
when they sought to criticise the very ideas and processes of Enlightenment 
thought. Zamyatin’s conception of the Enlightenment as a period and an 
intellectual movement shared similarities with others who approached their 
work from otherwise radically different angles. For Hans-Georg Gadamer, for 
instance, the Enlightenment represents “the conquest of mythos by logos.”81 
Zamyatin’s We, no less than the discussion of Odysseus and the sirens in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, illustrates this 
interpretation poignantly.82 In the ceremonies of the One State, for example, 
the “Benefactor” who rules the city has as prescribed a role to play as the 
passive spectators like D-503, or the skimpily clad females who surround 
him, offering garlands of flowers. In the image of the Benefactor, “still wet 
with spray” from the “liquefied” prisoner he has just killed, we see not only 
the executioner, but also the alpha male in front of “the flushed faces of ten 
female numbers, lips parted with excitement.” He is a “high priest” and a 
phallic symbol of power owing to his “great destiny”, and yet he can do 
nothing but be “the instrument, the resultant of a hundred thousand wills”. It 
is the “numbers” who demand this sacrificial murder as a vicarious sexual 
thrill.83  
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Dialectics 
 
Zamyatin’s epistemological approach to art and aesthetics was, his essays 
make clear, based on Hegelian dialectics. But contrary to Beehler’s and 
Rooney’s analyses, Zamyatin was no dogmatic Hegelian. In We (Zamyatin’s 
interpretation of) Hegel is tested, and on numerous occasions found wanting. 
The Hegelian dialectic – in which Zamyatin does seem to believe – is 
manoeuvred into place as one pillar of a philosophy that owes much not 
only, as Rooney and Beehler point out, to Nietzsche, but also to Kant.84 
Indeed, it could not be otherwise. For Zamyatin, literature was a “wife”, a 
vocation, a love that made life worth living.85 Hegel’s philosophy was thus 
profoundly problematic, as he had famously argued that art in modernity was 
a reflection of the absolute and, as Gjesdal puts it, was “surpassed by 
religion and, ultimately, philosophy.”86 Zamyatin, like Gadamer, therefore 
used Kant to modify his Hegelianism. Kant insisted “that the experience of 
art can never be fully exhausted by conceptual (philosophical) means.”87 It is 
through Kant that art is once more veiled in We, and as the story progresses 
becomes “opaque” like the character of I-330, whose eyelids lower “like 
shades”, so that he only sees “two eerily dark windows, and within, such a 
mysterious alien life.”88 The explosive, life-affirming imagery of colour and 
nature, the celebratory poetic power of the text, is an object lesson in Kant’s 
belief that although aesthetic judgements “do not themselves contribute a 
whit to the knowledge of things, they still belong to the faculty of 
knowledge.”89 The profusion of such opulent, impressionistic imagery in We 
demonstrates (rather than merely arguing for) the power of aesthetic 
comprehension. For Kant, this power is the imagination, which “can be 
shown to contribute to the interpretation, as well as to the constitution, of 
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experience.”90 Even in his essays, arguing for the Hegelian dialectic as the 
motor powering the development of art, Zamyatin clearly considers the 
poetic effect of the imagery he employs: 
+,–,– – 
These are the three schools in art, and there are no others. Affirmation, 
negation, and synthesis – the negation of the negation. The syllogism is 
closed, the circle completed. Over it arises a new circle – new and yet the 
same. And out of these circles the spiral of art, holding up the sky.91 
 
The dialectic is here thrust forward not merely as creed but as a creative 
force, and it is precisely through the addition of a creative image, that of a 
“spiral of art, holding up the sky” that what can appear as dogmatic assertion 
is in fact grounded in an aesthetic sensibility above all else. What begins as 
negative and closed (“there are no others”) becomes a moment of vital 
importance, powerfully free and universal. It is a closed structure which 
rather than being oppressive or dictatorial allows for almost unlimited 
movement under “the sky.” The phrasing of Zamyatin’s assertion also 
suggests that Rooney’s use of the term “Marxist” to describe Zamyatin is 
inaccurate.92 Based on this unequivocal statement, his understanding of 
dialectics should be more precisely seen as idealist: beginning with the 
conceptual apparatus of dialectics and applying it to concrete situations. 
Opposing Marx, it is a heaven-down approach, not earth-upwards.93 The 
greatest point of disparity, however, between Marx’s dialectical materialism 
and Zamyatin’s own philosophy (of both history and art) is that while Marx 
looked forwards to Communism as the End of History when the class 
struggle would cease, Zamyatin denied the possibility of an end to struggle 
as such. To him there could not be a Hegelian Absolute Ideal - revolution is 
unending. 
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In Zamyatin’s philosophy, the universe is polarised between two forces: 
Entropy and Revolution. “Entropy tends towards a state of rest or death, 
Revolution towards a state of movement and life.”94 Through ceaseless 
struggle and the originality of heretics the tendency towards entropy, stasis 
and banality is resisted. In practical terms, this meant that relatively soon 
after the October Revolution he began to oppose its direction. For Zamyatin, 
neither the historical Bolshevik Revolution, nor the orthodoxies of artistic 
agencies like the slavishly pro-Bolshevik Proletcult could endure forever. 
Against Bolshevism’s position, he averred that to stake a claim to the final 
Revolution is to make the nonsensical claim that “this is the highest number”. 
As I-330 says to D-503 in We: “There is no final [revolution]. Revolutions are 
infinite. The final one is for children: children are frightened by infinity, and 
it’s important that children sleep peacefully at night…”95 If the Bolsheviks 
believed they could stem or channel the flow of the very dialectical historical 
process that brought them to power, they were mistaken. They might sleep 
soundly in the short term, but someday they would have to grow up. 
 
Hegelian Themes and the Integral 
 
The Hegelian content of We encompasses more than merely the dialectic. 
The influence of Hegelian ideas in the novel can be observed in the 
interactions of D-503 and I-330. This is apparent from D-’s self-image during 
their first meeting, when he shows her his “hairy, shaggy hands… An ape’s 
hands” of which he is ashamed.96 On first glance this could appear to be 
compatible with Hegel’s claim that “precisely because he knows he is an 
animal, [man] ceases to be an animal.”97 However, the point is only made 
(and underlined) by D-’s attempts to deny in himself what he knows may 
apply more generally only too well (“even in our time the wild, apelike echo 
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still occasionally rises from somewhere below, from some shaggy depth”).98 
D-503 is so frantic to escape his animal origins that he literally splits his 
identity in two in order to protect the “rational” side of his identity from 
contamination by this alien, animal other. Thus when in the Tenth Entry, D-’s 
sexual desire, always allied in the narrative’s schema with the animal, is 
irrepressibly expressed, he writes: 
“I became glass.  I saw – within myself. 
There were two of me. The former one, D-503, number D-503, and the 
other…” 
 
While I-330 is fully human, an opaque woman able to lower her eyelids like 
blinds and prevent anyone from seeing within herself, D-503 is transparent 
“glass”, open like a book and split between the utilitarian “rational” “number” 
(citizen) and the “irrational”, lustful and jealous “avatar” with “hairy paws.”99 
These hands to which he ashamedly draws attention are a part of himself 
that he does not want to recognise, that he wishes to cut off. To D-503, most 
assuredly, Hegel’s thesis that “the real is the rational and the rational is the 
real” is taken at face value: his “unknown planetary readers” are not to 
remain unknown; everything – universally – can and therefore must be 
integrated into the One State system by the successful mission of the 
Integral.100 
 
The One State argument in favour of the Integral contains, however, a logical 
absurdity: there is no “must” – in fact there is no reason at all within the ratio 
of a State wishing to end imagination to build a spaceship. The stated aim 
(for which there is oddly very little planning – this is not to be systematic 
exploration) is to find inhabited planets and make the inhabitants “divinely 
rational.” This is a justification, but not an explanation. There is no practical 
utility to the stated aim unless it serves a political purpose within the One 
State. After all, if no one has been beyond the Green Wall since the “Two 
Hundred Years War”, as the reader is informed in the analeptic passage that 
begins the third entry, there is undoubtedly a danger to the State in 
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permitting a space vehicle full of citizens to see uncharted and unknown 
areas of the home planet, as well as the unpredictable dangers of meeting 
non-rational beings. 
 
The One State concept of happiness is essentially an absence of privation, 
an absence of want or desire – hence, for instance, the lex sexualis: “Each 
number has a right to any other number, as to a sexual commodity.”101 There 
is no imperative and no privation driving space exploration. Having spent 
centuries consolidating the withdrawal of humanity from nature by gathering 
the populace within a green city wall that is completely sealed from the 
outside, the idea of pioneering a mission over the wall, climbing through the 
freedom of the sky to interact with a non-rational universe is contrary to the 
raison d’être of the One State. As D- states 
The entire history of mankind, insofar as we know it, is the history of transition 
from nomadic to increasingly settled forms of existence. And does it not follow 
that the most settled form (ours) is at the same time the most perfect (ours)?102 
 
The obvious retort to D-503’s rhetorical question is that he neither proves 
that historical transition entails “progress” towards “perfection” nor that the 
most settled form must be the most perfect. As the reader soon discovers, 
this is not even a particularly settled form of society. But even if we do take 
D-503’s argument at face value, it only begs the question as to why this 
“most settled” society is building spaceships to explore regions beyond all 
knowledge. If one judges the Integral by its avowed purpose of exploration 
then rather than being that which “integrates” everything it touches, bringing 
everything into the same unified field of mathematical happiness, the Integral 
is in fact a sower of dissonance, a site of insurrection and a symbol of one of 
the central tensions of life in the One State. 
 
The Integral is, then, an ironic figure. The irony extends, as Collins notes, 
even to its name because by balancing creative design and rational 
production the Integral “represents a balance of thrust and containment” like 
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an integrated psyche.103 But while in the psyche the presence of both the 
rational and the irrational is healthy, the attack of the One State on its 
citizens’ imaginations (which D-503 treats reductively as a synonym for the 
irrational) represents a gross inconsistency on the part of the One State and 
is itself therefore a non-rational action. The “unknown beings on other 
planets, who may still be living in the primitive condition of freedom”, 
addressed by D-503 as “you, pink-cheeked, full-bodied Venusians, and you, 
Uranians, sooty as blacksmiths” are hypothetical products of his imagination. 
Indeed, unlike the narrators of space novels such as Wells’s The First Men in 
the Moon (1901), D-503 as narrator of We offers no empirical knowledge of 
the creatures that he imagines live on other planets. Ironically, his readers 
are entirely “imaginative” in every sense. It is both part of the satirical 
purpose of the novel that the State promotes creative, imaginative work like 
D-’s diary (which despite its author’s avowed intentions works to undermine 
the State), and an element that imbues the text with radically open 
hopefulness. The tension created by the State’s irrational pursuit of two 
contrary aims – an increase in individual creativity (albeit in the service of the 
State) and the exorcising of the imagination – creates the very cleft through 
which the Mephi can attack. 
 
The Power of Love 
 
The dichotomy symbolized by the Integral – simultaneously demanding 
creativity and condemning imagination – is ultimately a reflection of the 
processes occurring within D-503 himself, particularly in his social 
interactions. It is as though the spaceship represents D-503’s socialized self, 
a respectable citizen of the One State, while the explosive fuel within him 
propelling him is his irrepressible emotions, and particularly the violent 
passions he suffers as a jealous atavistic lover. In a move that links 
Immanuel Kant’s utilitarian view of marriage with a critique of the preaching 
of what might be described as ‘free love’ in certain novels of H. G. Wells 
(who was himself notoriously promiscuous), the pink tickets allow the citizens 
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of the One State to access any other number as a sexual product.104 
Specifically, Wells’s A Modern Utopia (1905) and In The Days of the Comet 
(1906) both contain, in their utopian states, procedures that allow either for 
marriage to be easily dissolved, or for polygamy to be practiced. In the latter 
novel, despite the misgivings of the framing-narrator, the ‘free love’ of the 
post-Change society is valorised when the reader looks out of the window at 
the “splendid nearer prospect of that dreamland city.”105 The changes in 
personal morality and sexual mores are reflective of the change in mankind 
that sees its ‘baser’ instincts towards sexual possession (linked to 
aggression, competition, and warmongering) overtaken by the more 
reasonable systems of rebuilding, re-educating and harmonious communal 
living. Zamyatin’s suggestion seems to be that even in such an apparently 
harmonious world, there is “under this cool quiet glass something violent, 
blood-red, shaggy.”106 
 
The theme of free love is not only Wellsian, however, but topical within early 
Soviet society. In the 1920s the Soviet Union had mixed attitudes towards 
‘free love’. In major cities, and especially within the universities of Petrograd 
and Moscow, sexual liberation – for which many read ‘free love’ – was simply 
another side of political liberation. According to Sheila Fitzpatrick,  
Soldiers demobilized from the Red Army brought back a casual macho attitude 
toward sex which younger brothers worked hard to imitate. Younger sisters 
absorbed Soviet teaching on the emancipation of women, including 
emancipation from the bonds of bourgeois marriage and the traditional passive 
role. The Soviet government legalized divorce and abortion, secularized 
marriage, gave de facto marriage the same legal status as registered 
marriage, and tried to remove the social stigma from unmarried mothers and 
their children.107 
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For comic and satirical writers including Zamyatin, Pilnyak, Malyshkin and 
Kataev, the effects of these legal changes on social mores, and in particular 
the theme of free love, were a natural choice of target for humorous 
writing.108 As Fitzpatrick makes clear, whatever the less riotous reality of 
student life, in literature they were often portrayed as startlingly promiscuous 
and decadent. Commissar for Social Welfare Aleksandra Kollontai achieved 
notoriety for her declaration in 1921 that “[t]he sexual act must be seen not 
as something shameful and sinful but as something which is as natural as 
the other needs of [a] healthy organism, such as hunger or thirst.”109 
Although probably made too late to have a direct effect on the writing of the 
novel, this comment was typical of a view of sexual equality that held some 
currency at the time. To be clear, “the authorities – most of the old 
Bolsheviks” saw “too much sexual activity” as “a distraction from the 
Revolution.”110 Yet given Wells’s influence on Zamyatin and the freedom 
which he accorded to sexual expression, the theme of promiscuity was 
especially fitting for We. 
 
The “pink tickets” system is not merely light-hearted relief, nor simply an 
expression of the lengths to which the One State will intrude into private life, 
completely dismantling the private sphere. A darker side of the ticket system 
is revealed by the historical context of early Soviet society, where abortion 
rates were high.111 Contraception is not mentioned in We and a 
contemporary Russian reader could well be imagined to read between the 
lines when promiscuity is normalised and the State places tight restrictions 
on who may beget children. Far from normalising children born out of 
wedlock, the One State abolishes all familial relations and takes charge of 
child rearing, as well as the biological processes of breeding. 
 
In so doing, and in common with later dystopias including Huxley’s Brave 
New World and Wyndham’s The Chrysalids, Zamyatin’s We deals 
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extensively with man’s place in the biological world. We was written at a time 
in the history of biology when Darwinism was far from universally accepted 
as the basis of evolutionary theory. The turn of the century had seen the “re-
discovery” of Mendelian genetics, which seemed for a time to repudiate 
Darwinism completely. Geneticists increasingly looked to explain individual 
characteristics, rather than species formation, during what Peter Bowler has 
termed the “revolt against morphology.”112 Only from the late 1920s did 
Mendelian genetics and Darwinism begin to be synthesised. Zamyatin’s 
interest in Darwin therefore reveals more than simply a passing interest in 
biology. D-503’s atavistic “shaggy” hands, the hairy tribes beyond the Green 
Wall (whose differences to the One State population can in large part be 
explained with reference to their different geographical as well as social 
situations) point to the influence of the theories of Darwin, and his student T. 
H. Huxley – who in turn taught H. G. Wells during the mid-1880s.113 
 
D-503 comments on “the ancients” thus: “Isn’t it ridiculous: to know 
agriculture, poultry-breeding, fish-breeding […] yet fail to go on to the 
ultimate step of this logical ladder – child-breeding; fail to establish such a 
thing as our Maternal and Paternal norms.”114 Such was the basis of 
eugenics, growing steadily in the interwar period as an area of scientific 
interest across a range of political ideologies, from conservatives who 
worried about national degeneration, to socialists like Jack London and H. G. 
Wells. In A Modern Utopia (1905) Wells had argued against eugenics, noting 
State breeding of the population was a reasonable proposal for Plato to make, 
in view of the biological knowledge of his time and the purely tentative nature 
of his metaphysics; but from anyone in the days after Darwin, it is 
preposterous.115 
 
By the time of Men Like Gods (1923), however, Wells’s utopians speak of 
having had “eugenic beginnings”, of “a new and surer decision in the choice 
                                            
112 Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 3rd ed. (Berkeley, CA: U of California 
P, 2003), 226. 
113 The differences between Darwinism proper and the socio-biological views of T. H. Huxley 
are discussed in greater detail in chapter 5 below, 250-4. 
114 Zamyatin, We 13-14. 
115 H. G. Wells, A Modern Utopia, ed. Gregory Clays and Patrick Parrinder (London: 
Penguin, 2005) 125-6. 
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of parents, of an increasing certainty in the science of heredity.”116 Eugenics 
here represented the “ultimate step” of conquering nature by making even 
the biological process of reproduction (as distinguished from the act itself) 
subordinate to self-conscious human will. As such, the practice of eugenics 
is a logical step not only from pedigree breeding in domesticated animals (as 
D-503 claims), but, in addition, from sealing the city off from the realm of 
nature by means of a (supposedly) impenetrable wall. The ‘domesticated’ 
citizens have tightly proscribed boundaries of behaviour, like well-trained 
(and well bred) dogs. These “rational” beings should behave unexpectedly 
only in the event of a physical malfunction, as in a mechanical device. As D- 
puts it, 
Man ceased to be a wild animal only when he built the first wall.  Man ceased 
to be a savage only when we had built the Green Wall, when we had isolated 
our perfect mechanical world from the irrational, hideous world of trees, birds, 
animals…117 
 
For mankind to cut themselves off completely from this “hideous” and 
“irrational” world would require the removal of the characteristics enabling 
humans to survive in such conditions: either through natural selection, 
artificial selection, or surgical mutilation. Only by being unable to go back can 
the One State ensure that its citizens do not wish to go back. But just as the 
Table of Hours only extends to twenty-two hours of the day, so the One 
State is unable to make mankind a completely rationalised, urbanised being, 
alienated from its own “natural” nature. D-503 momentarily recognizes this 
when he sees an animal through the Green Wall and is struck with the 
question “What if he, this yellow-eyed creature, in his disorderly, filthy mound 
of leaves, in his uncomputed life, is happier than we are?”118 In other words, 
even D- begins to question the premises of the utilitarian notion of the One 
State’s rationally planned happiness. D- quickly dismisses this idea as 
“absurd” but it underlines the scale of the problem that the One State faces 
in trying to turn humanity away from the Green Wall and face forever the 
phallic accumulator tower at the geographical centre of the One State. 
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The Techniques of Taylorism 
 
At first, D-503 celebrates the very blankness of his infant mind, which he 
dutifully opened to the childhood teachings and indoctrination of the One 
State. But as he is led astray and starts to question the values of the One 
State, the issue is raised as to whether his mind ever really was a Lockean 
Tabula rasa. It seems more accurate to suggest that the One State used 
certain methodical techniques to overcome his spontaneous, unpredictable 
individuality and to order his behaviour according to regularised patterns. 
Two techniques in particular make the State's omniscience possible: on the 
one hand, the implementation of the “Table of Hours” maps out to the minute 
how each “number” (citizen) will spend their day; while on the other, every 
aspect of life is subjugated to the scientific management principles of 
Frederick Winslow Taylor. 
 
The One State reduces human life to mathematically manageable numbers. 
To operate efficiently, this requires the application of scientific management 
to every area of life. As children are not private property, but educated by 
State machines, every “number” is imbued from birth with the mantra 
developed by early twentieth-century American industrial entrepreneur and 
theorist Frederick Winslow Taylor of “one best way.” Zamyatin subjects 
Taylor’s methods to polemic and satirical criticism. He does not mention, for 
example, that while Taylor’s efficiency drives could be ruthless he also 
frequently sought higher wages and better conditions for workers. Taylor’s 
methods called for time and motion studies for individual workers to get each 
working on a task to which they were physically and mentally suited, and “to 
develop each individual man to his highest state of efficiency and 
prosperity.”119 By contrast, Zamyatin uses him as a straw man to argue 
against “unfree” movement. The “fifty chews per mouthful” of petroleum food 
(literally, McCarthy notes, turning the One State citizens into machines run 
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on fuel) takes this to an absurd conclusion.120 Notwithstanding its focus on 
individual workers, the Taylor method of scientific management treated each 
worker as a quantifiable part of the industrial production process, like any 
machine. Through quantified experiments including “time and motion” 
studies, Taylorism worked to determine the “one best way” in which a worker 
could make the least movements possible and maximise efficiency, and 
therefore output. 
 
For Zamyatin, attacking Taylor served a useful satirical means by which to 
attack Lenin, who saw Taylorism as “a way to modernize archaic Russian 
industry after the Revolution; Taylorism's good, he believed, could be 
embraced, its evil expunged.”121 In the One State, the total social application 
of Taylorism establishes a rational, empirical constant which can be used to 
determine behaviour in any given circumstance. By establishing a 
technology of technique in every part of life, the whole of the citizenry can be 
treated as an amalgamation of equal and identical parts, conforming always 
to easily manageable, unified norms. 
 
To Zamyatin, uniform conformity was a problem of modernity in general, but 
one that he had seen most prominently in England. As Edwards, Alan Myers 
and others have pointed out, there is much overlap in both themes and 
imagery between We and the satirical anti-English novella Islanders that 
Zamyatin wrote while living in suburban Newcastle.122 In a letter to his wife, 
Zamyatin complained: 
…All the streets, all the houses are identical, do you understand me, - 
completely identical, like the grain barns in Petersburg near the Aleksandr 
Nevskii monastery. When we went past, I asked: 'What are those 
storehouses?' -'They're houses that people live in.' . . . Next day it turned out 
to be possible to go to London; it was about a six-hour journey. And the very 
same, identical barn-like towns flashed by, shorn to the same zero number. 
                                            
120 Patrick A. McCarthy, "Zamyatin and the Nightmare of Technology," Science Fiction 
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What a terrible lack of imagination.123 
 
In Islanders the narrator calls the ability of the parishioners of Jesmond, 
leaving church one Sunday “to find their own houses among the thousands 
of identical houses produced by the factory,” a “miracle.”124 Banal, orderly 
ranks in which “originality is unquestionably criminal” were common to 
England and the Bolshevik Party membership alike.125 What further amazed 
Zamyatin was the pride the English seemingly took in conforming to a dull, 
dutiful existence. The lack of architectural imagination was to him a reflection 
upon English society, including the literary establishment (with only a few 
notable exceptions like Wells). 
 
Conformity was a symptom of a rationalised, bureaucratic society. To 
Zamyatin the demands of the imperial Great War and the methods of 
industrial production were catalysts for creating an ever more rationally 
administered English society, in which man was trapped by both social 
mores and the economic mode of production. In the vast shipyards on the 
Tyne where Zamyatin worked, he saw in action the rationalised production of 
warships. His own icebreakers completed what Francis Bacon had, exactly 
three hundred years earlier, hinted was the purpose of his New Science: to 
conquer nature.126 In the One State, D-503 can boast (although he is 
subsequently proved wrong) “we’ve channelled all the elemental forces – 
there can be no catastrophes.”127 Every element of life is subsumed to 
utilitarian imperatives. 
 
The citizens of the One State are taught to see themselves as part of a 
‘divine’ polis, which is also a “perfect mechanical world” of “humanized 
machines, perfect men.”128 Consequentially, the One State philosophy 
asserts that “the natural path from nonentity to greatness is to forget that you 
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are a gram and feel yourself instead a millionth of a ton.”129 This materialist 
use of images of mass and motion, derived from natural philosophers like 
Newton, to describe institutions and practices in the social and political 
realms is a technique that was much used during the Enlightenment. It is 
typically found in materialist texts such as La Mettrie’s Man Machine, 
Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy, and even pornography like 
John Cleland’s Fanny Hill. At its most extreme, to La Mettrie man was a 
machine who merely had “a few more cog wheels and springs than in the 
most perfect animals, [and a] brain proportionately nearer the heart so it 
receives more blood.”130 In a sense, materialism was the logical 
consequence when, as Margaret Jacobs puts it, “nature [was] abstractly 
mechanized and bodies in motion [were] made wholly sufficient.”131 
 
In recalling such materialist works, however, Zamyatin demonstrates the gap 
between the Enlightenment ideal of freedom and the Benthamite utilitarian 
happiness of the One State. In a moment of obedient thought, in which D-
503 sees himself as a synecdoche for the whole of the One State, he writes 
of “antiquity” (the twentieth century): “How could [the ancients] write whole 
libraries of books about some Kant yet scarcely notice Taylor – that prophet 
who was able to see ten centuries ahead?”132 The satirical comparison is 
significant when one considers the practical formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative given by Kant in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: “Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end.”133 While Taylor viewed humans as more or less efficient 
machines, Kant’s approach to philosophy – particularly of the mind – was 
most un-mechanical. As a transcendental idealist he opposed both pure 
rationalism and pure empiricism.134 
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The extended Taylor system of scientific management establishes within the 
Numbers internal regulators like an engine’s governors, mechanisms that 
are supposed to prevent the individual from experiencing love or developing 
a soul. Freud described the super-ego as the mechanism by which 
civilisation “obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for 
aggression by weakening and disarming it and setting up an agency within 
him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.”135 The One State 
goes a stage further; the “garrison” which it sets up in the individual does not 
just passively observe the individual's actions, but sets him to task and 
regulates each moving muscle. Under such conditions, based upon a 
satirical extrapolation of an existing theory as applied in contemporary 
conditions, Zamyatin drew attention to the potential for the total loss of 
ethical self-autonomy in a mass industrial society. 
 
The sense of horror and confusion that this situation generates is highlighted 
by the ambiguous, at times contradictory, manner in which the novel 
engages with Kant’s ethical theory. Thus in acting out the ideology of the 
One State D-503 strives to behave according to the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative: “act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”136 This is 
the very meaning of D-503’s attempted orthodoxy. He reads in the State 
Gazette: “everyone who feels capable of doing so must compose… works 
extolling the beauty and the grandeur of the One State.” In response, he 
writes the diary that forms We. He will “merely attempt”, he declares, “to 
record what I see and think, or, to be more exact what we think […] will it not 
be, of itself, and regardless of my will or skill, a poem? It will. I believe, I 
know it.”137 Moving from the particular to the general, D- interprets the One 
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State command to apply to him as a constitutive unit of the citizenry and wills 
that his personal record reflect a universalized consciousness. 
 
This consciousness is free from any truly ethical demands towards an ‘other’, 
however. It recognizes no individual within the mass of other numbers, no 
empathetic sense of shared humanity between one single person and the 
next. D-503 describes the citizens of the One State marching together during 
a leisure hour as “[t]housands of feet raining down in time, a million-footed 
leviathan”. The term “leviathan” could well be a reference to Hobbes, but 
here it is not a sovereign power that towers over D- as an individual, but 
rather the citizenry as an overwhelming mass.138 Indeed, this endless torrent 
of numbers is completely undifferentiated, while in contrast the unique nature 
of the human eye is used as a symbol over 160 times in the novel.139 When 
“a dozen or so” Numbers die in an industrial accident during the testing of 
the Integral, D-503 feels pride that the other workers barely notice because 
the dead represent “less than one hundred-millionth part of the population of 
the One State; practically considered, it is an infinitesimal of the third 
order.”140 That the rebellion is ethical, as well as being aligned to 
individuality, is underlined when by contrast I-330 stakes the success of the 
revolution on gaining control of the Integral’s test flight in an attempt to 
prevent twelve of the Mephi in the hands of the One State from being 
executed.141 Thus I-330 is overjoyed when she learns that D-503 interceded 
to protect a woman from being harmed who was protesting against the 
violent treatment of prisoners. She believes that D-503 has become a 
humanitarian rebel. The irony of which only the reader of D-’s diary is aware, 
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as Barratt notes, is that D- only acted because he mistook the woman for I-
330. “In her own mistaken belief that D- has become a rebel, she supplies 
him with the very reward he most desires: the 'fearless hero' receives a 
protestation of 'love' from the 'grateful heroine'.” The two thus “collude” in a 
game of mutual self-deception destined to a tragic conclusion.142 
 
After she leads him astray through blackmail, D- seems to I- to begin to act 
as a self-autonomous ethical agent, while in reality he never abandons his 
“mathematical-moral” utilitarianism. The conflict dramatizes opposing 
ideologies as well as desires, ideas as well as interests. I-330 does not 
ultimately want to coerce D-503, but to convert him to her cause.143 She 
demands all or nothing, to choose between the freedom of the Mephi or the 
happiness of the One State. 
 
But this is a very particular conception of happiness – the unfree happiness 
of Eden, a life of unending stasis and uniformity. The “happiness” of the One 
State is the happiness discovered by Nietzsche’s “Ultimate Men.”144 In 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche, with an eye firmly on the English utilitarian 
tradition, wrote: “Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman 
does that.”145 Influenced by Nietzsche, Zamyatin saw utilitarianism as an 
English “disease”, linking the late Enlightenment and early nineteenth 
century to inhuman aspects of the rationalisation of industry with modern 
production methods. To reinforce this, the architecture of the One State is 
avowedly Benthamite, the product of “philosophical-mathematical thought” 
as D- puts it.146 The whole city is a unified glistening tribute to the 
“nonfreedom” of stasis, of “[i]nseparable two times two.”147 As in Bentham's 
Panoptican – which he coincidentally conceived while visiting White Russia – 
the primary concern of this non-aesthetic of control is to discipline the 
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inhabitants by placing them on permanent display to the state.148 But while 
Bentham’s panoptican also entailed the punishment of isolation and was 
intended to prevent communication between prisoners as far as possible, the 
utilitarian aim of the One State is to ensure “mathematical happiness”. Far 
from isolation, the One State wants to create atomized individuals who see 
themselves as members of a vast and endless mass of “numbers”. Thus, D-
503 comments: 
seven o’clock, time to get up. On the right and the left through the glass walls I 
see myself, my room, my clothes, my movements – repeated a thousand 
times over. This is bracing: you feel yourself a part of a great, powerful, single 
entity.149 
 
D-503 lives as if surrounded by mirrors, seeing his own actions replicated by 
thousands of others. This is seductively narcissistic; as collectivised man the 
Number (citizen) is “immense, powerful.” Yet simultaneously the glass 
dominates and isolates him by delineating a limit: to quote Lacan on the 
mirror-stage, it is “that which cannot be crossed.”150 D- feels empowered by 
that which in reality subjugates him. 
 
In contradistinction, the citizen of the One State is made to feel isolated and 
powerless when divorced from the social body, like a “human finger cut 
off”.151 When D- calls I-330’s plan to start a revolution “absurd” it is because 
he takes the unchanging nature of the One State for granted. Even an attack 
by a small group cannot, in his mind, hope to have any permanent effect on 
the organism as a whole. The paradox of the drive for the creative cargo of 
the Integral, as stated above, is that it opens the possibility of difference, of 
an alternate space and way of life to the present. Even a life portrayed as 
inferior still shows that difference is possible. The One State appears not to 
have realized the potential problems it may face in encouraging creativity, 
and social dreaming. It is little wonder that they act quickly to reverse the 
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rebellious forces they unleash in their own citizenry by removing the 
dangerous imaginations of their populous. 
 
Utopia  
 
Despite the commitment to the value of social dreaming in We, and while it 
can productively be read as a hopeful and open-ended text, Yevgeny 
Zamyatin did not see himself as utopian. Writing about utopia in an essay on 
H. G. Wells in the mid-1920s, Zamyatin forthrightly asserted, 
There are two generic and invariable features that characterize utopias. One is 
content: the authors of utopias paint what they consider to be ideal 
societies[…] The other feature, organically growing out of the content, is to be 
found in the form: a utopia is always static; it is always descriptive, and has no, 
or almost no, plot dynamics.152 
 
In the present day, scholars in the field of utopian studies including Sargent, 
Vieira and Moylan have refuted the charge that utopias are “ideal societies”. 
They point to Sir Thomas More’s Utopia (which Zamyatin also references in 
this context) as one of many utopias which are not ideal, but which are 
significantly better than the author’s own.153 That Zamyatin views utopia in 
this less nuanced way is perhaps an expression of his opposition to 
Marxism-Leninism as an official State ideology. The USSR projected a 
detailed image of its future as an ideal society built upon industry, 
electrification and (what would by the mid-1920s become known as) 
constructivist architecture. This put it far from the radically open-ended 
philosophy of Marx, who refused to be drawn on the content of 
communism.154 As already noted, Zamyatin’s conception of the Hegelian 
dialectic admitted no final revolution. 
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Interestingly, We does not adhere to Zamyatin’s (flawed) characteristic of the 
content of utopias: it may be a close approximation to the ideal which D-503, 
in his loyalty to the One State envisions, but he also makes clear that “even 
we have not yet found an absolute, precise solution to the problem of 
happiness.”155 Nevertheless, Zamyatin weaves an intertext with myths of 
paradise through the novel. As Gregg noted, “just as Adam, the servant and 
mortal replica of Jehovah, once labored for his Maker in the fields of Eden, 
so D-503, the dedicated architect, labors to improve the ‘glass paradise’… of 
the Well-Doer.”156 In this reading, I-330 is seen as the temptress, D-503’s 
Eve, while S-4711 becomes the serpent in the garden, leading I-330 astray. 
Given that she is a leader of the Mephi (deriving from the name of the 
Faustian demon Mephistopheles), however, this reading seems to ascribe 
insufficient agency to her as a forceful character. Moreover, it abstracts D- 
and I- from their social context. Owen Ulph’s assessment of I-330’s character 
may be closer. Ulph insists that she is not merely a femme fatale, but 
actually an incarnation of Satan, possessing a “dialectic duality – siren and 
revolutionary.”157 
 
Zamyatin’s second point about utopias, relating to form, is strikingly similar to 
Jameson’s comment in The Seeds of Time that “dystopia is generally a 
narrative, which happens to a specific subject or character, whereas the 
Utopian text is mostly nonnarrative.”158 As noted above in chapter one, 
Jameson here sees utopian fiction as allied to travel literature and as a type 
of “blueprint” for a “machine” (an anti-utopia, for Jameson, would therefore 
more closely resemble the machine of Kafka’s In The Penal Colony than a 
dystopia like Nineteen Eighty-Four). A machine is from this perspective not 
organic – it consists of a fixed set of inter-related parts that make up an 
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Well-Doer”. 
157 Ulph, "I-330: Reconsiderations on the Sex of Satan," 82. 
158 Jameson, The Seeds of Time, 55-6. 
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externally knowable and describable totality. Whilst Jameson does not see 
the content of utopia as necessarily ideal in the manner that Zamyatin did, an 
inexorable consequence of a mechanical view of utopia is that it represents 
an End to History, finality – a view that Jameson reiterates more forcefully in 
Archaeologies of the Future (2005).159 
 
Zamyatin went far further than Jameson, however, calling utopia “sugary 
pink.” This slightly confusing and simplistic conception mistakes what more 
precisely might be termed cockaigne or arcadia (not just “ideal” but Edenic) 
with the more general category of utopia. He therefore claims that Wells’s 
only utopia is Men like Gods, leading to an absurd categorization where, for 
instance, A Modern Utopia (1905) does not qualify as a utopia. 
 
We as Synthesis  
 
Drawing on Zamyatin’s essay on Wells, William Hutchings argues that 
Wells’s In the Days of the Comet is “an essentially static and retrospective 
account of actions and conflicts that occurred in the narrator's distant past 
and are now recollected in the relative tranquility of old age.” By contrast, 
Zamyatin’s use of the diary form, while making it more like (utopian) travel 
literature, also “deliberately avoids the leisurely pace of most reminiscences 
– a pace that is manifestly inappropriate in the newly heralded age of 
dynamic speed.”160 Whereas Wells’s novel ends with the narrative framing of 
the unnamed reader of Willie’s transcript looking out of the window at the 
transformed and completed world of tomorrow, the diary of D-503 ends as it 
starts, in medias res, with a question mark over whether the One State will 
succeed in crushing the rebellion. 
 
The problems in Zamyatin’s argument on utopia could then justifiably be 
overcome by seeing them as a clash of opinion over terminology rather than 
concepts. Wells’s sociofantastic novels, Zamyatin argues, are “almost solely 
                                            
159 Jameson, Archaeologies of the future, 7. 
160 William Hutchings, "Structure and Design in a Soviet Dystopia: H. G. Wells, 
Constructivism, and Yevgeny Zamyatin's 'We'," Journal of Modern Literature 9 (1981-1982), 
83 emphasis added. 
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instruments for exposing defects of the existing social order, rather than 
building a picture of a future paradise” and as such are to be regarded as 
“social tracts in the form of novels.” The genealogy of these works therefore 
includes Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726; amended 1735), and Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton’s The Coming Race (1871), but only in terms of the “approach 
to the theme – not the theme itself, and not the literary methods 
employed.”161 If, following Sargent rather than Zamyatin, we may place the 
aforementioned novels of Swift and Bulwar-Lytton along with Wells’s 
sociofantastic novels in the literary category of utopia, then We should also 
be seen in this light. However, one further distinction of Zamyatin’s should be 
borne in mind: he regards the “sugary pink”, “ideal” utopias as “bear[ing] a + 
sign” whereas most of Wells’s “social fantasies bear the – sign.”162 Around 
the time he wrote the essay on Wells, Zamyatin also wrote “On Synthetism”, 
already quoted above: 
+,–,– – 
These are the three schools in art, and there are no others. Affirmation, 
negation, and synthesis – the negation of the negation.163 
 
If utopia represents the thesis and Wells’s social fantasies the antithesis, 
then Zamyatin, who was a passionate advocate for a dialectical model of 
change and development, may well have regarded We as the synthesis, the 
negation of the negation.164 Such a reading would see the novel as a critique 
of the present othered proleptically into a supposedly ideal distant future, but 
using this very distance to create irony and satire. 
                                            
161 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic, 286, 287. 
162 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic, 286. 
163 Zamyatin, A Soviet Heretic, 81. See above, 91. 
164 This use of mathematical symbols as metaphor may itself (consciously or unconsciously) 
be drawn from Wells. “Individual liberty in a community is not, as mathematicians would say, 
always of the same sign” Wells, A Modern Utopia, 29; cf. Zamyatin, We, 80, where, in a 
passage offering a biting satire of Cheka, D-503 contrasts the “Operational Section” of the 
One State to the Catholic Inquisition: “one has a + sign, the other a –.” 
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The Gilded Chains of Brave New World 
 
BECAUSE THEY ALL WANT TO LAND US IN HELL. ALL, WITHOUT EXCEPTION. LENIN AND 
MUSSOLINI, MACDONALD AND BALDWIN. ALL EQUALLY ANXIOUS TO TAKE US TO HELL 
AND ONLY SQUABBLING ABOUT THE MEANS OF TAKING US. 
 
-ALDOUS HUXLEY 
Point Counter Point (1928) 
 
 
Brave New World is a novel of three societies. The first, at the level of the 
proleptic narrative frame, is the dystopian World State. The novel opens in a 
future that has seen the victory of applied materialist science, engineering 
and technology, superficially catering for all human needs and desires. While 
the World State is stable and prosperous, the uniform happiness of its 
citizens is manifestly false, and almost barbaric. Marx’s famous analysis of 
the industrial workman as existing in an inverted relationship to industrial 
plant, as an appendage to the machine for which he works, is in Huxley’s 
World State carried to its logical end: babies are now carried to term not 
viviparously but “with a faint humming of machinery” along a conveyor belt, 
at precisely “thirty-three centimetres an hour” in the “red darkness” of a 
factory.1 
 
The second society is that of “Malpais”, the New Mexico Savage Reservation 
where John the Savage grows up and enjoys an ambivalent but loving 
relationship with his mother, the beta-minus Brave New Worlder Linda. This 
enclave within the World State is a closed, anachronistic society, which 
practices magic and bloody, penitent ritual. It is an intentionally Lawrentian 
primitive tribe which has absorbed elements of Christianity into its 
hybridisation of Native American religious practices. Religion is at the heart 
of this society just as science is the pneumatic blood pump of the World 
                                            
1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore, ed. 
David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), 10; Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New 
World Revisited 62. 
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State. Life in Malpais (literally “bad country”) is an unhappy, ignorant hand-
to-mouth existence. 
 
These two future societies of science and new-age mythological religion are 
juxtaposed in Brave New World, and in some respects they are remarkably 
similar. After all, both must try to cater for human needs which, for Huxley, 
are universal. The primitive drums of Malpais comfort Lenina Crowne 
because of their proximity to the music of her own society. Yet John the 
Savage, with the benefit of a little education, discovers Shakespeare and 
tragedy, embodying the residual survival of “high” culture that falls between 
the gaps of both societies. He becomes a noble savage, his knowledge of 
“culture” changing him into a truly tragic outsider (in both Malpais and 
London) and (anti)hero. 
 
The third society is the ever present and always denied past – Huxley’s 
present. Brave New World is fully understandable only when seen within its 
historical context. It is a critique and satire of the early 1930s as much as a 
book about possible futures. This ‘ancient’ society can still understand 
tragedy – which is incomprehensible in the World State – but in it, Huxley 
believes, culture is under threat from technology. 1930s society has access 
to the foundations of the scientific knowledge which could eventually 
transform it into Brave New World. In chapter three, Mustapha Mond regales 
students with a satirical ‘world history’ of the transformation of twentieth 
century life into the World State. There is a serious question lurking within 
the proleptic-analepses of barbed fragments like “liberalism, of course, was 
dead of anthrax, but all the same you couldn’t do things by force”, a question 
implied, but never spoken: is Brave New World inevitable?2 
 
Theodor Adorno, in his essay “Huxley and Utopia”, regarded the novel as a 
serious prophecy. Picking apart the system of needs and false needs 
generated by the World State, he saw at the heart of Huxley’s novel a false 
dichotomy between a brutish, uncivilized happiness and “higher” culture. 
                                            
2 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 54. 
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Through this opposition, culture necessarily entails unhappiness. This is an 
important criticism, which will be explored below. It raises the question of 
what “need” can be said to constitute in a future where privation, feeling, and 
most forms of suffering seem (on the surface) to have been eliminated and 
only pleasurable sensations remain. Nevertheless, Adorno’s criticisms about 
the (false) opposition of happiness and culture should not detract from or 
obscure the essential value of Brave New World. It is the very confusion of 
ideas, steeped in the confusion of Huxley’s own world, which makes the 
novel so important. Given his family background and the circles in which he 
mixed, it is unsurprising that Huxley was well versed both the political and 
the scientific debates of his day. The impossible contradictions of Brave New 
World point to contemporary dilemmas and debates between figures such as 
J. B. S. Haldane and Bertrand Russell, both of whom Huxley knew well. (In 
Brave New World their argument is explored in the context of the scientific 
prophecies and avowedly utopian political ideals of H. G. Wells, who was 
also an acquaintance of Huxley.) Furthermore, the popularising work of 
Huxley’s brother Julian helped shape the very terms of public scientific 
discourse. 
 
A discussion of these competing models of futurology below will lead on to 
an examination of social, aesthetic and finally psychological aspects of the 
novel, beginning with the influence of Italian social theorist Vilfredo Pareto on 
Huxley’s thought. Pareto provides significant help in uncovering Huxley’s 
sociological beliefs, but as is typical for Huxley – particularly within the 
context of Brave New World – he is treated not seriously but satirically. 
Satire is even more important when looking at Huxley’s critique of mass 
entertainment: his treatment of “low-brow” “feelies” as artistic linear 
descendents of the consciously “high-brow” Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk is 
exemplary in this respect. Finally, the role of the psychoanalytical theories of 
both Freud and Watson in Brave New World will be considered. Huxley 
treats their work as jostling against each other in a sceptical but highly 
interested manner, seeing them as mutually reinforcing each other’s most 
troubling conclusions. 
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Skirting between the advancing dogmatic forces of Fascism and 
Communism, Huxley imagined a future society in which the victory of 
science, and in particular applied biology and psychology, was complete. 
Such a state would be capable of complete control and psychological 
manipulation to the extent that dissent would not only be impossible, but 
actually unthinkable. The extinction of creative, independent, and 
autonomous thinking people is the darkest fear voiced in Brave New World. 
 
Need and False Needs 
 
The central theme of Huxley’s Brave New World, Adorno believes, is “what 
becomes of human beings when they no longer know need.”3 The novel 
describes a world in which all of the social and economic problems of the 
early 1930s have been solved through technology and a radical restructuring 
of society from the individual upwards. The novel opens with a detailed 
description of the in vitro cloning processes by which reproduction takes 
place, which utilizes eugenics (the science of selectively breeding humans to 
increase the occurrence of desirable heritable characteristics and thereby to 
“improve the stock”) to create those destined for the highest places in the 
social hierarchy.4 Meanwhile, other embryos are produced in groups of up to 
ninety-six identical twins through “Bokanovsky’s process.” At “decantation” 
(no one suffers the psychological “trauma” of birth anymore), these test-tube 
babies become members of less individualised lower social classes. As the 
“delta” or “epsilon semi-moron” foetus develops, it is given doses of alcohol 
and other toxic chemicals to restrict brain and/or physical development. The 
World State thus produces precise numbers of workers, specialised for every 
job imaginable, to order; their lives are both socially and economically 
predetermined from the moment of conception. Added to this, as chapter two 
details, a variety of “neo-Pavlovian”, behaviorist and “hypnopaedic” 
                                            
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. S. Weber & S. Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1967), 
99. 
4 “eugenics, n.” New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd ed. Mac OS X application; “eugenic, 
adj. and n.”; OED Online, March 2011. Oxford UP, <http://oed.com/view/Entry/64958?rskey 
=FATYqK&result=4&isAdvanced=false>, 1 June 2011. 
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conditioning is used to fully socialise the children – who are all raised in 
gigantic nurseries or “hatcheries”. 
 
The World State has replaced the family with state child (re)production and 
communal care. The twentieth-century home is described as having “No air, 
no space; an understerilized prison; darkness, disease, and smells… And 
home was as squalid psychically as physically.”5 In contrast, the World State 
enjoys complete sterile harmony – always cheerful and with no almost 
surprises possible. Overpopulation, unsanitary housing, economic recession, 
unemployment, disease, famine and old age are unknown. “Feeling lurks in 
that interval of time between desire and its consummation”, warns the World 
Controller, Mustapha Mond. “Shorten that interval, break down all those old 
unnecessary barriers.”6 The key to preventing social unrest in Huxley’s 
dystopian future is to prevent the arising of unconsummated desire. 
 
Everyone, no matter what their position in society, has access to almost 
every kind of luxury good they could want, but only because the State is able 
to control what each caste desires. Hence, the Director of the London 
Hatcheries declares, “We condition the masses to hate the country… But 
simultaneously we condition them to love all country sports.” The “masses” 
spend a large chunk of their wages regularly visiting the countryside, but only 
to “consume manufactured articles as well as transport”.7 Alphas, who have 
access to helicopters for personal use, are additionally conditioned to want 
exotic holidays abroad in expensive hotels, where nothing is “foreign” or 
different from home: all the luxuries and conveniences of London are 
gathered under one roof. It is neither market capitalism nor Bolshevik 
Communism that has prevailed to create this bounteous society, but a 
peculiar form of highly managed state capitalism, which keeps supply and 
demand in a static equilibrium through a totalitarian grip upon the population. 
Brave New World is able to meet all needs by controlling exactly what needs 
exist. More accurately, need has been replaced by the infantilism and 
                                            
5 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 43. 
6 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 49. 
7 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 31. 
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eroticism of desire.8 The State does this by creating and stimulating desires, 
and so conditioning the population that every such desire becomes a 
psychological necessity. The taped “hypnopaedic” voices which whisper in 
every sleeping child’s ear each time they go to bed ensure that adults will 
“never put off till to-morrow the fun you can have today” as Lenina gravely 
tells Bernard Marx, a hypnopaedic specialist, whose retort is “[t]wo hundred 
repetitions, twice a week from fourteen to sixteen and a half.”9 At the 
linguistic level, the possibility of even articulating an insatiable need 
becomes impossible: “want” ceases to be expressive of “need” (as in the 
phrase “in want of a good night’s sleep”) and assumes the role solely of 
expressing desire (as in the phrase “I want to have her”). Because desire is 
centrally stimulated and controlled by the World State, it is limited to that 
which can be more or less immediately obtained. The emotional and 
psychological problems of twentieth-century life have not been solved so 
much as negated. 
 
In his Vanity Fair column in 1929, Huxley stated that “good art” existed to 
satisfy “fundamental needs of the human spirit… such as the desire for 
beauty, for heightened experience, for knowledge of reality and also for 
escape from reality.” But all of these needs can be superficially satisfied by 
“swindlers” who “mimi[c]… the sublimest creations.” In a consciously elitist 
passage, Huxley asserts that the London music-hall audiences of the late 
1920s lack a “certain artistic sensibility”, and therefore readily lap up such 
superficial satisfaction indiscriminately.10 This tendency is extrapolated in 
Brave New World, where faith, hope and the consoling function of art have 
disappeared because gratification is immediate. If gratification is ever 
delayed or denied, then the drug “soma” negates the original need or desire 
by making the individual forget about it. When human beings are denied 
need or what Mustapha Mond calls the “right to be unhappy” the result, in the 
                                            
8 “Infantile” and “infantility” are words which Huxley puts into the mouths of Bernard Marx 
(93), the Director of the Hatchery (96) and Mustapha Mond (200) to signify that Brave New 
Worlders are emotionally and intellectually undeveloped in their wants and needs. 
9 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 92. 
10 “Art and the Critic” in Aldous Huxley, Complete Essays, eds. Robert S. Baker and James 
Sexton, vol. 3: 1930-35 (Chicago, Il: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 17-18. 
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World State, is a regression to easily manipulable, puerile and erotically 
motivated wants – in other words, false needs.11 
 
The problem with this system of false needs, as Adorno points out, is that “in 
his critique of false needs Huxley preserves the idea of the objectivity of 
happiness.”12 The falsely created needs of Brave New World leave the 
characters of the novel in some indefinable way unsatisfied, a feeling that 
they can only repress with more soma. Huxley’s World State is a society 
made possible through totalitarian psychological conditioning devices such 
as hypnopaedia, but to create sufficient dramatic tension to drive the 
narrative of the novel he has to give his characters psyches that have 
resisted in some way the totality of this conditioning. Many of the characters’ 
psyches indeed show signs of an imminent and perhaps even dangerous 
unravelling: Bernard likes solitude, monogamy and being unconventional; 
Lenina resents, and is psychologically damaged by, her constant submission 
to the convention of promiscuity; Helmholtz is a free-thinking and voluntarily 
ascetic individual; Henry Forster is troubled by the turning of corpses into 
fertilizer; and even Mustapha Mond recognises the demonstrable falseness 
of the values on which he runs society. Huxley has created a totality which is 
not a totality; his nightmare “perfected” world is something far less than 
“perfect” because its intelligentsia constantly resist its reproduction.   
 
Huxley continually stresses, through frequent references to Shakespeare, 
that the cultural ideal of happiness in his imagined society is false, shallow 
and unfulfilling. The World State may have succeeded in creating the desire 
to be conventional, but for the Alphas the culture offered by conventional 
society is patently not enough. As the intellectual elite they require more than 
cheap, mass-produced commercial culture can offer them. What they need, 
as John Savage puts it, is “something with tears for a change. Nothing costs 
enough here.”13 Unfortunately, tragedy has no meaning in the World State. 
“To make a tragedy the artist must isolate a single element out of the totality 
                                            
11 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited, 215. 
12 Adorno, Prisms, 110. 
13 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited, 214. 
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of human experience and use that exclusively as his material”, Huxley 
believed.14 Such elements would include familial and sexual jealousies, 
loyalties, and rivalries. It is the dubious accomplishment of the World State to 
have rendered this material unavailable. Helmholtz, for example, an 
intelligent and unusually unorthodox Brave New Worlder, laughs despite 
himself at Juliet’s unenviable situation in act three, scene five of Romeo and 
Juliet, in which Capulet and Lady Capulet try to persuade her to marry Paris: 
The mother and father (grotesque obscenity) forcing the daughter to have some 
one she didn’t want! And the idiotic girl not saying that she was having some 
one else whom (for the moment, at any rate) she preferred! In its smutty 
absurdity the situation was irresistibly comical.15 
 
Helmholtz’s laughter is a satirical device: Huxley’s parentheses demonstrate 
the breadth of the cultural gap between his intended 1930s readership and 
his vision of a future society in which need is unknown. His rather darker 
implication is that the virtues and range of emotions embodied in the play are 
also constructs which may be attacked by consumer culture. Helmholtz does 
not appreciate the familial pressures which Juliet is subjected to, and there is 
something quite horrific in the idea that such ties could be so undermined 
that dramatic tension of this kind would cease to be meaningful, becoming 
merely ridiculous. Monogamy, chastity, honour, traditional patriarchy, sorrow, 
self-sacrifice – such ideas are so foreign to Helmholtz, so “insane [and] 
excruciating”, that what Huxley sees as their poignancy is lost. Insane and 
excruciating as they are, this almost unbearable intensity of feeling 
constitutes man as a feeling, complex being. Citizens of the World State no 
longer have the receptors, as it were, for tragedy. In a world full to 
overflowing with the irrelevant distractions of consumerism, the “distilled” and 
“chemically pure” tragic forms of art have lost their “power to act upon us 
quickly and intensely,” as the characters are so wholly socialised that they 
are unable to imagine alternative social codes of behaviour.16 
 
                                            
14 “Tragedy and the Whole Truth” in Huxley, Complete Essays 54. 
15 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 168. 
16 “Tragedy and the Whole Truth” in Huxley, Complete Essays 54. 
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The significance of the scene in which John Savage reads Romeo and Juliet 
to Helmholtz Watson is to demonstrate that although both are intelligent and 
emotional men, socialisation has had lasting effects upon them. John’s 
upbringing takes place in a family environment. His relationship with his 
mother (who blames him, in place of his father, for her misfortune), together 
with the stilted parody of John’s Oedipal relationship with Popé, his mother’s 
lover, serves as the basis for a thorough appreciation of tragedy. Helmholtz 
Watson, meanwhile, has no family. He is the model of success in World 
State terms. The payoff for his ‘civilised’ upbringing is ruthless social 
suppression of all the emotional outlets where the tragic could be 
experienced. In a society “without need”, an act of self-sacrifice such as that 
of Shakespeare’s Juliet would be incomprehensible because, as Krishan 
Kumar puts it, “tragedy needs suffering and social instability.”17 
 
Kumar sees Mustapha Mond as playing the role of the Grand Inquisitor from 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, but in Huxley’s World State good 
and evil have no Christian reference point. This highlights a profound 
problem in the intellectual and moral landscape of the novel, which Adorno 
was quick to pick up on: in the World State, “what is, is right,” and “you can 
carry at least half your mortality about in a bottle.”18 For Adorno, the 
Christian metaphysics of the Savage’s position (that salvation is possible 
only through suffering) is untenable, and suffering has become “an absurd 
end in itself.”19 In answer to Mond’s admiration for the World State, John 
Savage can only offer a vision of some mythical golden age comprising the 
values of Shakespearean literature, suffering, Christian meaning and 
individualism – an England that has never existed. 
 
To readers acquainted with Huxley’s oeuvre, this is perhaps not surprising. 
The Savage’s position, with which Huxley appears to side, is a wistfully 
nostalgic vision, cherry-picked like Huxley’s own political views from a myriad 
of different and often contradictory ideas. He held, for instance, that 
                                            
17 Kumar, Utopia and anti-Utopia in Modern Times 261. 
18 Adorno, Prisms, 101; Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 213. 
19 Adorno, Prisms, 107. 
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“progress, objectively considered, is a reality”, because “human life is, on the 
average [sic], longer, healthier, safer, and more convenient than it was” and 
felt that the crisis of the ‘thirties was “due, in the last resort, to the fact that 
science has been applied to human affairs, but not applied adequately or 
consistently.”20 At the same time, though, he argued that “All the resources 
of science are applied in order that imbecility may flourish and vulgarity cover 
the whole earth.” The application of science as the basis of the technologies 
providing “mass culture”, as he terms it, are for Huxley being driven through 
commercial pressure to supplying only the “lowest” forms of entertainment: 
Machinery makes culture possible but does not necessarily produce it among 
those who do not want to have it… machinery makes it possible for the 
capitalists who control it to impose whatever ideas and art forms they please on 
the mass of humanity.21 
 
The “mass of humanity” are thus kept happy, but happiness (as Brave New 
World makes clear) is for Huxley not a suitable goal for civilization. There is 
“a correlation”, he wrote in September 1931, 
between the present popularity of the ideal of happiness and the rise of mass 
production. The pursuit of goodness, truth, and beauty sets no wheels turning, 
employs no labor. Whereas the ideal of happiness is a most valuable stimulus to 
production.22 
 
The pursuit of infantile happiness, catering to the lowest common 
denominator, is an economic imperative that places a bar against (high) 
“culture”. Adorno’s assessment was that Huxley 
believes that by demonstrating the worthlessness of subjective happiness 
according to the criteria of traditional culture he has shown that happiness as 
such is worthless… A society which wants nothing but happiness, according to 
Huxley, moves inexorably into insanity, into mechanized bestiality. But Lenina’s 
overzealous defensiveness betrays insecurity, the suspicion that her kind of 
happiness is distorted by contradictions, that it is not happiness even by its own 
definition… The holes in the vicious circles which Huxley draws with so much 
care are due not to inadequacies in his imaginative construction but to the 
conception of a happiness subjectively consummate but objectively absurd. If 
                                            
20 “The Reality of Progress” in Huxley, Complete Essays 339; “Science and Civilisation” in 
Huxley, Complete Essays 148. 
21 “The Outlook for American Culture” in Huxley, Complete Essays 188, 190. 
22 “Ideals and the Machine Tool” in Huxley, Complete Essays 294-5. 
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his critique of subjective happiness is valid, then his idea of a hypostatized 
objective happiness removed from the claims of humanity must be ideological. 
The source of untruth is the separation of subjective and objective, which has 
been reified to a rigid alternative.23 
 
Huxley’s juxtaposition of a nostalgic, false “golden age” of high culture and 
the gross infantile consumer culture forced unceasingly upon the population 
of the World State is a crude dichotomy indeed. For Adorno, the limitations 
and contradictions of the latter are obvious even without the hackneyed 
Shakespeare quotations taken from the former, quotations which have been 
stripped of their social and historical context and rendered down into bite-
size chunks. Similarly, Huxley’s presentation of an objectively meaningful 
culture as the polar opposite of the doctrinal, subjective happiness of the 
State is a false opposition. If it really was a dichotomy, how could Helmholtz 
find the Shakespeare which the Savage reads to him so satisfying and 
meaningful? 
 
At the heart of Adorno’s criticism of Huxley is the notion that his novel 
contributes to the very totality it seeks to negate. He sees Huxley’s book as 
an ideologically committed work in the pejorative Marxist sense, one that not 
only offers a warning of the potential impact of the triumphs of science, 
technology and engineering on human life, but that also serves to reinforce 
the dominant capitalist ideology (which precludes any alternative). Adorno 
reads Brave New World as a “negative utopia” which fails because the 
cracks in characters’ psychological health, as much as the static nature of 
the State, are overt.24 To the theorist of utopian longing, Brave New World 
demonstrates an eye for detail in observation of the twentieth-century 
capitalist totality, but its view of the future shatters utopian hope through its 
crude opposition of the “barbarism of happiness and culture as the 
objectively higher condition that entails unhappiness.”25 Moreover, this crude 
binary opposition is, in Adorno’s view, an example of the very sort of 
categorising, systematising, instrumental rationality that characterised the 
                                            
23 Adorno, Prisms 111. 
24 Adorno, Prisms 114. 
25 Adorno, Prisms 112; Ferns, Narrating Utopia 124-5 & 247, n.11. 
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non-linear development of Europe from the intellectual background of the 
Enlightenment to the modern, brutal, late-capitalist totality of the mid-
twentieth century. 
 
Adorno, looking at Huxley’s work from the point of view of a critical theorist, 
and interested primarily in explicating his own ideas on utopia, thus saw 
Huxley’s future society as an unsuccessful creation. But the theorist of 
utopian longing clearly has a different set of values to the writer of utopian 
satire. Huxley began writing Brave New World, he claimed in a personal 
letter, as a response to “the horror of the Wellsian Utopia.”26 Although 
Huxley’s novel may have evolved from this declared intention to 
subsequently encompass many wider topical concerns, there is an element, 
as Krishan Kumar has suggested, of all dystopian fiction being “a case of 
Wells contra Wells.”27 Brave New World, as such a work, was deeply 
embedded in its literary and historical context. While Adorno convincingly 
undermines Huxley’s opposition of culture and happiness, Brave New World 
remains valuable precisely because it was constituted in the particular 
historical circumstances that it reflects. Huxley might well be impinged on all 
sides by the forces he seeks to criticise, but eloquently and with humour he 
elucidates the complex constellation of social fears and anxieties prevalent in 
his epoch. 
 
The Historical Context 
 
“A book about the future,” Huxley reminded his readers in his 1946 preface 
to Brave New World, “can interest us only if its prophecies look as though 
they might conceivably come true.”28 Huxley’s great achievement was to 
synthesize into a future society many disparate and contradictory ideas from 
his own, a confusing cacophony that reflected the dangers and fears of the 
modern world. Huxley wrote Brave New World during 1931, shortly after 
completing a tour of the industrial heartlands of England. It was a more low-
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key affair than Orwell’s famous trip a few years later, which produced The 
Road to Wigan Pier, yet nonetheless extensive in scope. He visited major 
industrial sites, including coalmines in County Durham, Derbyshire and 
Nottinghamshire, and the ICI chemical works at Billingham. “When Huxley 
returned to Sanary to write his utopian novel the sights and sounds and 
smells of modern industrial society in a depression were fully in his 
consciousness.”29 Huxley was impressed by the shear scale and the 
functional aesthetic of ICI, terming it a “vast cooperative work of art”.30 He 
was surprised by the eloquence and intelligence of some of the miners he 
met. In Whitechapel, a young, “highly cultured and intelligent” kosher 
slaughterer took him aback: in a rag merchants’ living room, while the 
hostesses played Bach preludes and sang Schubert, the schochet gave 
Huxley an erudite Marxist analysis of D.H. Lawrence.31 This did not 
completely break through his class prejudices, however. None of Huxley’s 
working class guides around industrial England are named. They remain 
“alien”, something “other”. He compares the growth of Middlesbrough to that 
of fungus or “staphylococcus in a test-tube of chicken broth”. His horror of 
the sight of vast numbers of unemployed men is even more revealing: 
Crowds of unemployed men… fill the streets… with their slow interminable 
procession. Dead men walking, walking from nowhere in particular to nowhere 
else, aimlessly and in silence… no ghost could be quite so terrifying as these 
spectres of flesh and blood who walk the streets of our northern cities.32 
 
One can already see the slightly less-than-human description of the “Epsilon-
Minus Semi-Morons” of Brave New World in this passage. The unnamed 
“small simian creature” dressed in black who operates the lift in the London 
Hatcheries, for example, repeatedly cries the word “Roof!” like a barking dog 
on seeing daylight, before descending back into “the twilight of his own 
habitual stupor.”33 All such “lower caste” members look almost exactly the 
same due to the “Bokanovsky” process: short, physically adapted to manual 
labour but mentally stunted. While in real life Huxley met members of the 
                                            
29 Nicholas Murray, Aldous Huxley: An English Intellectual (London: Abacus, 2003) 248. 
30 “Sight Seeing in Alien Englands” in Huxley, Complete Essays 277. 
31 “Greater and Lesser London” in Huxley, Complete Essays 300-1. 
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working class who attended his miners’ institute lectures, sang Schubert, 
read Lawrence and possessed an “extraordinary strength and vitality, a 
passion for higher things”, such individuals have been eradicated from Brave 
New World. It is therefore tempting to conclude with John Carey that Huxley, 
along with other modernist literary writers, based his art on the principle of 
“the exclusion of the masses, the defeat of their power, the removal of their 
literacy, the denial of their humanity.”34 Carey reads Brave New World as a 
savage attack upon mass culture and a proclamation of the superiority of 
individual feeling and high culture. Beginning with a quotation from an article 
Huxley wrote on his industrial tour, which decries the fact that the only 
solutions offered to mass unemployment during the depression, such as 
Communism, would be worse, Carey polemically argues that the “genesis” of 
the novel was to “show that, bad as mass misery is, mass happiness would 
be worse.”35 
 
This charge ignores the historical context and the content of the political 
“solutions” on offer in 1932. Soviet Communism, for example, was becoming 
increasingly unattractive by this time. Stalin’s dictatorial dominance, the strict 
“regimentation” of the workforce, and State trials of former leaders who had 
fallen out of favour were all well reported in the West.36 Huxley viewed 
Communism as being essentially a “religious” faith. In 1931, in an essay on 
Soviet propaganda in education, he declared,  
[C]ommunism is the religion of this world; its heaven is here and, in future time, 
its High God in Proletarian Society. It has its dogmatic theology – a fine old-
fashioned nineteenth-century materialism. It can boast its inquisitors at home, its 
persecuted martyrs abroad. It has its ceremonial rites…37 
 
In October 1932 Huxley repeated this assessment in his play Now More 
Than Ever. In it, a Communist character at Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park, 
addressing the theme of revolution, cries “it’s a religion, it’s a man’s whole 
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life, it’s the reason why he exists…”38 As with Christianity in earlier centuries, 
Communism also had a strict code of censorship relating to art. In July 1932, 
in a short article on – significantly – Zamyatin’s view of the future of Soviet 
theatre (which had appeared in Le Mois), Huxley derided the fact that a “new 
Shakespeare” in Russia would have “no drama” to base a tragedy on, and 
would be reduced to “themes of farce and knockabout. Themes of pure 
fantasy and romance… Highly moral, tragic themes showing the sad fate 
which overtakes the individual if he fails to do his duty towards the state.”39 
 
Meanwhile, the other “solution” Huxley has in mind is the one offered by 
Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. Huxley had met Mosley in Paris 
and lived in Italy under Mussolini’s dictatorship. His opposition to this sort of 
plan was based on his own lived experience. Huxley mercilessly caricatures 
Mosley throughout his 1928 novel Point Counter Point with the character 
Everard Webley (a far more impressive and enthralling figure than Mosley 
himself), who is finally brutally murdered. This seems to confirm Huxley’s 
firm opposition to Mosley’s militarism and power-hunger.40 An alternative 
reading to Carey’s is, therefore, that Brave New World satirises not just the 
consumerist ideals of mass leisure, but also the supposedly ‘mass’ 
ideologies of Soviet Communism and Fascism, which offered only false 
consciousness and art that was thinly veiled political propaganda. 
 
In his essays from the North of England, Huxley expresses sympathy and 
pity for the unemployed (notwithstanding his tendency to fail to see them as 
individuals). Despite his apprehensions about the dangers of both 
Communism and Fascism, he was willing to sacrifice his own ideals of liberty 
and more laissez-faire government to “the most careful and systematic 
national planning”, for which his friend John Maynard Keynes argued. In this 
spirit, Huxley declared: “we must either plan or else go under.” To “go under” 
could mean “economic breakdown, revolution, and a final Communist 
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triumph”, which meant that Huxley was willing to consider even methods 
based on “unconstitutionally” applied “force”.41 
 
Writing during the Depression, with liberal democracy across Europe in 
danger of breakdown, Huxley shared with many of his contemporaries in the 
British intelligentsia a sense of foreboding and a fear that “such liberal ideals 
as free trade, free press, unbiased education, either already belong to the 
past or soon will do so.”42 Rather than choose between the forces of 
Fascism and Communism in which to place his future society, Huxley looked 
past immediate battles for political power and beyond the chilling ideals both 
ideologies offered. He saw a future in which technology and science had 
created the conditions for man to escape from nature entirely. Huxley wanted 
to go further than any political, social and economic revolution, to 
demonstrate what a “really revolutionary revolution”, of the sort envisaged by 
the Marquis de Sade, but enacted by scientists, would look like.43 He shared 
the belief of Bertrand Russell, who argued that “in consequence of scientific 
inventions which facilitate centralization and propaganda, groups become 
more organized, more disciplined, more group-conscious, and more docile to 
leaders.”44 Thus “the theme of Brave New World is not the advancement of 
science as such; it is the advancement of science as it affects human 
individuals.”45 In point of fact, the individuals in Brave New World are mostly 
scientists, but aside from Helmholtz Watson, Mustapha Mond and Bernard 
Marx, they tend towards being technocrats rather than scientific visionaries 
capable of seeing the wider picture of how science is transformed into public 
policy. Huxley’s friends Robert Nichols and Maurice Browne had in 1928 
written a play exploring the political consequences of the discovery of 
nuclear fission by a young, naïve but brilliant physicist who exclaims, “I have 
no position. I am a scientist – that is simply a mind, the Mind of Man, if you 
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like.”46 But the Kantian ideal of the disinterested scientist as a voice of 
reason is replaced in Brave New World by uninterested and apathetic 
scientists. Furthermore, in this polity science has enabled the processes of 
centralization and propaganda to be taken so far that the individual has 
almost ceased to exist below the upper hierarchy of Alphas and Betas. 
Through “Bokanovsky’s Process” of “embryo budding”, even the individual’s 
body may be replicated a hundred times in his co-workers, so that no one 
can recognise him except as part of a mass. 
 
Not only does Brave New World arise, therefore, from the confusion of 
competing political systems of the early 1930s, but from competing models 
of scientific knowledge and advancement. Huxley had an insatiable general 
interest in science, and biology in particular, which he had hoped to pursue 
as a career until partial blindness made this impossible.47 He was thus 
exceptionally well versed in scientific discourse for a non-scientist, as his 
writing shows from Crome Yellow (1921) onwards. Huxley’s fears 
surrounding the future of science came from his familiarity with this 
discourse. The influences of his brother Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell and 
his Oxford friend J.B.S Haldane can all be seen in the scientific discussions 
which pepper Aldous Huxley’s inter-war works. Huxley was aware of 
Haldane’s views about the future of science long before the latter published 
Daedalus, or Science and the Future (1923) and Russell replied with Icarus, 
or the Future of Science the following year. While Nicholas Murray sees in 
the character of Crome Yellow’s Mr. Scogan “Bertrand Russell (with shades 
of Mencken or Norman Douglas)”, Peter Firchow looks more towards J. B. S. 
Haldane as the model, arguing that “the chances are extremely good that 
Aldous Huxley knew about the essentials of what was to become Daedalus 
by 1921 at the latest.”48 Firchow’s argument is persuasive but he risks 
reducing Scogan to simply a fictionalized Haldane, when in fact both 
Scogan’s views and the repeated expressions of these ideas in Brave New 
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World owe a debt to other individuals too – including Russell, but more 
importantly Wells. Scogan argues that in the future, “in vast state incubators, 
rows upon rows of gravid bottles will supply the world with the population it 
requires”, which can be seen clearly enough in the London Hatchery of 
Brave New World; but Haldane also prophesizes that mankind will discover 
how to keep ovaries alive outside the female body, and in his future 
“ectogenesis” will be “universal.”49 Later on in the text of Crome Yellow, 
Scogan asserts that Wellsian “men of intelligence must combine, must 
conspire, and seize power from the imbeciles and maniacs who now direct 
us. They must found the Rational State.” Having done so, they will utilise 
psychology and conditioning on an unimaginable scale to separate humans 
into different “species” from childhood onwards, preparing them for their 
stations in later life.50 Eugenics and conditioning were seen as possibilities 
by both Haldane and Russell, but while Haldane was optimistic about these 
processes, Russell warned that if governments began to sterilize those “not 
desirable as parents”, “in the end, there will be a tendency to include all who 
fail to pass the usual school examinations” and the population’s average 
intelligence may increase at the expense of individual exceptional 
intelligence. Positive eugenics, meanwhile (the “increasing [of] desired 
types”), could also have unintended consequences, Russell warns. Its 
achievement might not be implemented as scientists intend, once it “is 
handed over to the average citizen… it would not be the types desired by 
present-day eugenists [sic] that would be increased, but rather the types 
desired by the average official.”51 
 
Thus Scogan can be seen to point openly and ambiguously to the debate 
between Russell and Haldane, in which Wells’s visions were also present. 
As Haldane put it, “The very mention of the future suggests him,” and yet 
“considered as a serious prophet, as opposed to a fantastic romancer, 
[Wells] is singularly modest”. Moreover, Haldane viewed Wells as being “a 
generation behind the time” and failing to focus sufficiently on biology in his 
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Anticipations (1901).52 Nevertheless, and despite his pledge to be as 
conservative and realistic as Wells in his predictions, Haldane’s own 
economic prophecy went beyond even Wells’s plea for World Government 
and predicted a Bellamy-like utopian future in which the demand for “stable 
and regular production” by companies could lead to a situation where 
“capitalism itself may demand that the control of certain key industries be 
handed over to the workers in those industries simply in order to reduce the 
number of sporadic strikes in them.”53 Huxley rejected this vision, which 
eschews the laws of supply and demand. In order to imagine a world whose 
motto is “COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY”, he would have to use – in a 
somewhat satirically transformed manner – Wells’s idea of the World State.54 
 
The scientific prophecies of Brave New World are, then, steeped in an 
ongoing debate which Huxley himself had been engaged with for over a 
decade. Huxley was also aware of the wider scientific context in which his 
two acquaintances wrote: the epistemological debate that the general 
acceptance of Einstein’s general theory of relativity had re-ignited in science 
– that of materialism versus vitalism.55 If Brave New World was, as has been 
indicated, Huxley’s vision of a Sadian “really revolutionary revolution” then it 
did not, for all that, follow the Marquis de Sade’s materialism. As Huxley was 
so fond of irony and satire (not to mention frequent Pyrrhonic touches), it is 
not always apparent to the reader unacquainted with this debate that Huxley 
sided firmly with the vitalists, believing that life could not be explained by 
reference to matter alone, and must be endowed with a vital principle, 
something that could perhaps be called more spiritual. The mechanical 
metaphors of the Enlightenment, of automata, springs and cogs, bodies in 
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space and matter in motion, were not enough to explain the animation of life 
to Huxley. 
 
Brave New World engages with science and politics at a time of turmoil, and 
with modernist aesthetics and the ascendancy of mass media forms like the 
‘talkies’ during a period of far-reaching social and cultural change. It is little 
surprise that with this multitude of competing ideas, the novel at times 
becomes confused. In chapter three of the novel, for instance, the Director of 
the hatchery informs students about the repressive dictates of twentieth 
century sexuality, and compares it to their own liberated encouragement of 
children to engage freely in erotic play. In this parody of Freudian 
psychology, the implication is that through hedonism the taboos surrounding 
sexuality have been negated.56 Immediately, however, the authority figure of 
Mustapha Mond enters the scene,  
And his voice sent a strange thrill quivering along their diaphragms. ‘Try to 
realize what it was like to have a viviparous mother.’ 
That smutty word again. But none of them dreamed, this time, of smiling.57 
 
What can this “strange thrill” be but the taboo associated with “smutty” 
sexual subjects? In his ironic reversal of sexual and familial mores, it is 
impossible to know whether Huxley intended to show the drawbacks of the 
separation of reproduction and sexual intercourse (the Freudian distinction 
between the “mature” reproductive function and “regressive” tendency of 
sex), whether he was arguing that rules and taboos governing sexuality are 
ubiquitous and unavoidable, or if the presence of this authority/father figure 
presenting the adolescents with a taboo from which they are supposedly 
liberated is simply an oversight. 
 
The novel is similarly ambiguous, even confused, in the political realm. 
Indeed, Raymond Williams, placing Brave New World in the context of two 
other dystopias (Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We and George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four) argued that: 
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Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) projects a black amalgam of Wellsian 
rationality and the names and phrases of revolutionary socialism, in a specific 
context of mobile and affluent corporate capitalism. This sounds and is 
confused, but the confusion is significant; it is the authentic confusion of two 
generations of science fiction itself, in its dystopian mode.58  
 
Whilst Adorno could not forgive Huxley for the confusing and self-
contradictory messages of Brave New World, Williams situates the novel 
historically within the early 1930s, and thereby shows it as an expression of 
its age. However, like Adorno, he chooses to read Huxley’s novel primarily as 
a sketch of a future society, seeing little comedy in the sexual and 
consumerist excesses of the World State such as the subversion of Anglican 
Christianity, and paying only lip-service to the satirical side of the novel. 
 
Although a black comedy because of its all-too-real prophecy, Brave New 
World is also the culmination and apotheosis of Huxley’s satirical writing, 
which stretched back to his first novel Crome Yellow. The characters and 
setting of this work so closely resembled and caricatured real-life visitors to 
Garsington Manor in Oxfordshire, home of Philip and Lady Ottoline Morrell, 
that the latter, who had been very hospitable to Huxley, was at first “horrified” 
by her transformation into the character Priscilla Wimbush.59 
 
Huxley’s previous works, together with the few extant letters he sent while 
writing Brave New World in which he mentions the novel in progress, point to 
many of the contradictions in the “black amalgam” of Brave New World being 
both intentional and satirical. Opposite each other stand the idealist, vain but 
rebellious (Bernard) Marx and the thoughtless, conformist Lenin(a); an 
oversexed child named (Polly) Trotsky (the ‘Polly’ perhaps a reference to 
Robinson Crusoe’s parrot, whom he vainly taught to endlessly repeat his 
name) and the god-like figure of Ford, who is sometimes conflated with 
Freud. For Christopher Hitchens, this borrowing of names is “stodgy and 
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heavy rather than ironic.”60 Huxley’s conglomeration of famous names is 
symptomatic of his “plague-on-all-your-houses approach” to satire, but it goes 
beyond the placing of names of historical figures in an alternate and silly 
context.61 On the contrary, the inclusion of these clashing figures as 
influences on the society of Huxley’s World State satirises on different levels: 
it shows how radical ideas can be rendered down through moderation, how 
capitalism can commodify and envelop an idea that is seemingly oppositional 
to the conceptual framework of capitalism. Huxley’s future society is 
premised upon a synthesis of disparate, competing ideas, and in this specific 
sense the novel is deeply realistic: the ranges of ideas that influence history 
are inevitably contradictory. At the same time, the inequalities of the caste 
hierarchy and the sustained oppression of all citizens of the World State 
serve to demonstrate that, although contradictory, the forces driving history 
are neither solely economic nor moving along a Marxist dialectical pattern. 
This thereby demonstrates the limits of teleological views of history, 
conflating grand narratives to reveal their ontological similarities as 
epistemological viewpoints. For Huxley, then, ‘abstract’ theories are bound to 
have unintended consequences when implemented in the ‘real’ world. Given 
the sceptical interplay of ideas which characterises the narrative of Brave 
New World, the use of the names of nineteenth and twentieth-century figures 
in this context is also unusually revealing of the premises from which Huxley 
writes. As such, this satirical move is significant in illuminating Huxley’s 
epistemological beliefs. The juxtaposition of these characters reveals 
something about Huxley’s view of history in which ‘Great Men’ and 
psychological factors interacted with socio-economic forces of change. 
Huxley’s World State is the child of twentieth-century actors upon the world 
stage, the weird bastard offspring of state socialism and mass capitalism, the 
synthesis of the different production methods and ideals of Lenin, Ford, 
Alfred Mond (Chairman of ICI), the behaviorist psychologist John B. Watson 
and many others. The children of Brave New World are named for their 
society’s forefathers, the ‘great’ men whose names have become 
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synonymous with the movements, companies and states they led. Rather 
than cry victory for any one of the potential future ways of life that these men 
represented, Huxley created a fictional world-order stamped with the 
birthmark of the chaotic and contradictory world of the 1930s. 
 
Vilfredo Pareto 
 
Huxley’s reading of Vilfredo Pareto may have influenced his belief that 
neither Fascism nor Communism would ultimately and forever be adopted 
worldwide.62 An anti-socialist and early supporter of Mussolini (he died 
shortly before the dictator consolidated his power), Pareto laid out an 
empirical, hermetic system in his Treatise on General Sociology, which 
sought to explain how circulating elites controlled society. Pareto was 
concerned with the past several decades of misrule and corruption in unified 
Italy. A gifted mathematician, economist and former engineer, he wanted to 
raise the analysis of society to scientific enquiry, to subject it to the 
“objective” standards of his logico-experimental method. 
 
At the heart of Pareto’s theory are the concepts of logical and non-logical (as 
distinct from illogical) action. “Man as seen by Pareto is at the same time 
unreasonable and reasoning. Men rarely behave in a logical manner, but 
they always try to convince their fellows that they do.”63 Pareto 
conceptualised the strategies by which men attempted to make non-logical 
practices appear logical. Religion was one such strategy. In the subjective 
context of Malpais society, for instance, it appears to John and the other 
savages that the penitent rites of flagellation are logical. In reality, however, 
there is no causal link between the rites and their supposed effects, and they 
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are therefore objectively non-logical. “For an action to be logical, the means-
end relation in objective reality must correspond to the means-end relation in 
the mind of the actor.”64 Many of the practices of the State in Brave New 
World aimed at stability are, by this definition, logical. The suppression of 
John Savage’s rebellion at the hospital by use of soma gas, for instance, is a 
logical action in that, both in objective reality and in the policemen’s minds, 
the deployment of soma functions as a quick and efficient means to the end 
of restoring order. However, such a theory reduces all of mankind’s actions 
into the two narrowly-defined categories of logical and non-logical. 
 
This sort of systemic, instrumental use of reason is precisely what Adorno 
finds execrable in Brave New World – the placing of ideas as reified things 
into binary, antithetical categories when the ideas are not, in themselves, 
polar opposites. Adorno’s earnest critique, however, does not – as has 
already been suggested – engage with the satirical, Pyrrhonic side of the 
novel. Huxley may have employed Pareto’s narrow categories because, 
despite finding large parts of Pareto’s theories valuable, he also enjoyed 
satirising other parts as containing reductionist, pseudo-scientific concepts. 
 
When John Savage is brought before Mustapha Mond, for instance, he 
refers to the denouement of King Lear and asks the controller whether the 
“pleasant vices” of Brave New World degrade man. “Degrade him from what 
position?” Mond replies. “As a happy, hardworking goods-consuming citizen 
he’s perfect. Of course, if you choose some other standard than ours, then 
perhaps you might say he was degraded. But you’ve got to stick to one set of 
postulates.”65 
 
In his analysis of Brave New World, Adorno took issue with this separation of 
postulates: “[i]n this image of the two sets of postulates, exhibited like 
finished products between which one must choose, relativism is apparent. 
The question of truth dissolves into an ‘if-then’ relation.”66 However, Adorno 
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quoted only the three sentences above, and not the sentence that followed: 
“You can’t play Electro-magnetic Golf according to the rules of Centrifugal 
Bumble-puppy.” The self-satirizing tone of Mond’s argument was therefore 
lost. Also lost was Pareto as the target of the satire, which the gentle 
reference to non-logical rules seems to imply. Truth has indeed become a 
relative and non-scientific, non-empirical, normative value. Yet this has 
happened as a result of Mond’s enforcement of narrow categories of logic. 
As the trivialising final sentence implies, argument according to such 
categorisation will only get so far in analysing human behaviour in King Lear. 
 
Pareto believed that the social scientist’s task was to elaborate the 
“sentiments most frequently present in the human consciousness,” which he 
termed “residues”, of which “theories were the ‘derivations’.” Pareto 
“discovered some fifty-two residues, which he broke down into six classes.” 
The first two of these classes, however, were where most political conduct 
resided.67 
 
Class I was termed “instinct for combinations”. “The Italian word, 
combinazione, connotes a range of meanings suggesting shrewdness and 
wit, as well as the usual English sense of the term.” This “intellectual and 
imaginative attribute,” was, Pareto believed, “employed equally by the 
scientist using the logico-experimental method, the poet in his creative 
fantasy, and the schemer playing on the sentiments of others.” Those who 
belonged to this group ruled by guile, and could be “mercantile, materialistic, 
innovatory.”68 In Brave New World, Helmholtz Watson would belong to this 
category as a poet and fantasist, as would Bernard Marx through his cunning 
schemes to bed women and to force his boss at the Hatchery to resign. 
 
Pareto’s Class II was called the “persistence of aggregates”. This was a 
“Conservative tendency, which held on to conventional ways of seeing the 
                                            
67 Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought 109; Richard Bellamy, Modern Italian Social 
Theory: Ideology and Politics From Pareto to the Present (Cambridge: Polity, 1987) 27. 
68 Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley: Contempt and Compassion for the Masses 1920-36 
(London: Faber, 1994) x. 
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world and resisted the establishment of new combinations.”69 As political 
leaders, such actors were “bureaucratic, idealistic, conservative”, and more 
likely to rule by force.70 In Brave New World, this category includes the 
director of Hatcheries and the Arch Community Songster. 
 
Despite the presence of both classes in Brave New World, there is no 
chance of any circulation within the elite. History, by the time of Brave New 
World, has been rather unkind to Pareto: the all-powerful elite of the World 
State represent an amalgamation of both classes.71 The dictatorship has 
achieved the stability of a society dominated by Pareto’s bureaucratic Class 
II, the “persistence of aggregates”, but the requisite “economic and mental 
stagnation” which normally accompanies such an elite is actually diffuse 
throughout society, so that the very weakness of this class becomes a 
strength within the World State.72 Moreover, the character of Mustapha 
Mond inhabits both classes, assuring his stability. He has the guile and fox-
like cunning of the “instinct for combinations” class, and the stabilising 
conservative views of the “persistence of aggregates” class. Thus whilst he 
speaks with ironic wit, gives up science for power, risks keeping forbidden 
books in his safe, and quickly orders out riot police to put down the 
commotion caused by John Savage at the hospital, those same riot police 
deploy soma vapour rather than truncheons. Likewise, in his taboo history 
lesson to the students, he cautions “government’s an affair of sitting, not 
hitting. You rule with the brains and the buttocks, never with the fist.”73 The 
supposed stability that came from a government willing to use force, Mond 
tells the students, had resulted in massacres at museums. Only with the 
employment of psychology and eugenics had the distinctions between the 
different types of ruling classes defined by Pareto been finally negated. In 
Brave New World, “biological engineering and social conditioning have 
ensured that history’s ‘graveyard of aristocracies’ is as much a thing of the 
                                            
69 Bellamy, Modern Italian Social Theory 27. 
70 Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley x. 
71 See also Martin Kessler, "Power and the Perfect State," Political Science Quarterly 72 
(1957), 567-8. Kessler argues that both Huxley’s and Orwell’s “distopias” [sic] effectively 
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72 Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley 143. 
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past as The Tempest, darned socks and viviparous mothers.”74 Beyond 
Fascism and Communism, with Liberalism long since “dead of anthrax”, 
natural science and psychological manipulation have rendered Pareto’s 
social-scientific theory obsolete. Huxley keenly endorsed much of what 
Pareto had to say and saw him as a scientist, a “prodigious debunker” and a 
“realist”, who avoided Germanic “gratuitous metaphysical entities” and was 
“perfectly aware of the limitations of the scientific method, yet perfectly aware 
of his rights.”75 Such was Huxley’s pyrrhonic sense of humour (and his 
determination to remain detached and sceptical) that he chose to satirise 
ideas which he believed useful and truthful. While in an essay entitled 
“Pareto and Society” Huxley argued that in the West in the 1930s, 
“[s]keptical and humane cunning is no match for fanatical force,” it is by 
cunning, conditioning and what might be termed the “soft violence” of 
policemen who carry soma gas that the order in Brave New World is 
stabilised.76 The narrow, reductionist categorizing of human actions – 
ironically one of the weakest aspects of Pareto’s theory – is satirically all that 
remains of the theories which Huxley admired. Despite Pareto’s predictions, 
in Brave New World a perfect balance is found to keep one elite in power 
and maintain unchanging social conditions.77 
 
The “Feelies” and Synesthesia 
 
Notwithstanding this subtle and nuanced treatment of contemporary political 
thought in Brave New World as a novel of ideas, Adorno criticised the text for 
developing what he perceived as “a caricature of the men of today” in place 
of three-dimensional characters.78 For June Deery, the two-dimensional 
characters in Brave New World are entirely “appropriate; rather than being 
an artistic weakness, they illustrate Huxley’s essential point that technology 
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leads to a soulless conformity.”79 Moreover, the characters in Brave New 
World are not only “soulless”; they are also, appropriately, cognitively vacant. 
They live in an overstimulated world of sensation and simulation, of “colour 
organs” and the “feelies”, and are properly products of such an oversaturated 
culture. “Art”, such as it is in the World State, is merely mimesis, a re-
presentation of an already crude and vulgar reality. As the Assistant 
Predestinator at the Hatchery tells Henry Foster, “I hear the new [feely] at the 
Alhambra is first-rate. There’s a love scene on a bearskin rug; they say it’s 
marvellous. Every hair of the bear reproduced. The most amazing tactual 
effects.”80 When Lenina and John Savage later go to watch this feely, 
entitled “THREE WEEKS IN A HELICOPTER”, John is taken aback when 
suddenly, dazzlingly and incomparably more solid-looking than they would have 
seemed in actual flesh and blood, far more real than reality, there stood the 
stereoscopic images, locked in one another’s arms, of a gigantic negro and a 
golden-haired young brachycephalic Beta-Plus female.81 
 
The draw of the feelies, the “marvel” to which the crowds flock, and which 
brings Lenina “fine shuddering roads of anxiety and pleasure across her 
skin” is the synthetic representation of reality (literally a re-presentation, in 
the sense of presenting reality back to the audience) using “tactual effects”. 
By making them “more solid-looking than they would have seemed in actual 
flesh and blood” the actors become impenetrable, hollow shells, “far more 
real than reality”. As such, they are without any artistic significance or 
meaning in Huxley’s schema. Typically, for Huxley, biological discourse is 
utilised to satirise the shallowness of the show: the narrator’s synopsis 
satirises eugenic obsessions by focusing upon physical description. This 
reveals gender and racial prejudices in the eugenic description of the film’s 
main characters, which in turn emphasises the objectification of the 
characters as mere hollow animal specimens. The “gigantic negro” fulfils 
every negative racial stereotype of black males, while the “brachycephalic” 
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Zamyatin’s We and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Notwithstanding this, a question 
remains as to why the New Mexicans also lack depth. June Deery, Aldous Huxley and the 
Mysticism of Science (London: Macmillan, 1996) 34. 
80 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 41 emphasis added. 
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blonde is likewise viewed through the prism of a discriminatory racial and 
gender model. The only difference between the two is that she acts in 
accordance with accepted sexual mores, whilst he, as a racial ‘degenerate’, 
acts against them.82 
 
The use of the term “brachycephalic”, which properly belongs to nineteenth-
century anthropology, in this context hints at nineteenth century racial 
beliefs, which reached their most grandiose artistic expression in the work of 
Richard Wagner. There are, moreover, a number of similarities between the 
aesthetic of the “feelies” and that of Wagner’s oeuvre. The assault upon all 
five senses by the spectacle seems to draw on the idea of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk – Richard Wagner’s term for a fully-synthesised or 
integrated “total” work of art. For Wagner this meant an opera integrating the 
elements of music, theatrical elements and elaborate visual design into a 
spectacular experience. The feely, which includes not only “stereoscopic” 
vision, singing and tactile effects, but “SYNCHRONIZED SCENT-ORGAN 
ACCOMPANIMENT”, is an exact re-presentation of reality that is in fact nothing 
like reality, a spectacular which, for all its ideologically-charged and didactic 
messages, contains no meaning beyond the mere sensory experience. The 
experience, which bombards the audience’s every sense simultaneously, is 
thus “synesthetic” – the stimulation of each sense is supposed to affect the 
other senses. 
 
There is a certain irony here in Huxley’s choice of satirical target, and not just 
because he went on to be a writer for MGM Studios in the 1940s. In his 
novels, Huxley himself used techniques which he laid out in Point Counter 
Point through the notebook of his character Philip Quarles as being a 
“musicalization [sic] of fiction. Not in the symbolist way, by subordinating 
sense to sound… But on a large scale, in the construction.”83 An excellent 
example of this can be found in chapter three of Brave New World, where 
the scene shifts regularly between the lawn of the Hatchery and Conditioning 
Centre, where the D.H.C and Mustapha Mond are discussing history with 
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students, to the male and the female dressing rooms where several 
conversations are taking place concomitantly. The scene changes gradually 
accelerate towards a climax in which single lines and half-sentences are 
interpolated.84 “The abrupt transitions are easy enough. All you need is a 
sufficiency of characters and parallel, contrapuntal plots.”85 The denouement 
of this chapter comes as Mustapha Mond moves from history to the present, 
where “such is progress…the old men have no time, no leisure from 
pleasure, not a moment to sit down and think”, and this cognitively vacant 
world is finally contrasted, like the dying strings of a symphonic movement, 
with a return to the conveyors of the Hatchery where the foetuses move 
“[s]lowly, majestically, with a faint humming of machinery” in their tubes: “in 
the red darkness glinted innumerable rubies” – precious, mass-produced 
jewels in devilish light – a quietly dissonant image of colour, reining-in the 
narrative tempo and bringing to an end a frantically contrapuntal chapter.86 
 
There is a difference, however, between Huxley’s “musicalization”, which 
took inspiration from the structure of classical music, and the synesthesia, 
both of Wagner and of the feelies. Ultimately Huxley does not contradict 
himself here, as he is not approaching the task “in the symbolist way, by 
subordinating sense to sound.” Ideational integrity, the “sense” or meaning of 
the contrasting and juxtaposed ideas, remain in Huxley’s work in a dominant 
position over interest in the technique itself. “Musicalization”, in the final 
analysis, is a metaphor to explain a method of prose construction that 
remains nothing more than prose, while synesthesia attempts to produce an 
affect whereby an impression on one sense influences the sensation of 
another. 
 
Wagner’s interest in synesthesia influenced the impressionists’ and 
symbolists’ interests in synesthetic process in art from the 1880s onwards. In 
psychology, meanwhile, which saw a concomitant rise in interest in 
synesthesia, the 1920s saw the first “laboratory experiments with synesthetic 
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subjects” to try to establish the basis of the process by which synesthesia 
was experienced.87 In the early twentieth century, the Wagnerian position 
had been attacked by American behaviorists and “European associationistic 
[sic] psychology”, who had put forwards the “modularity thesis” of 
synesthesia, which “claimed that synesthetic perception was the product of 
the conditioning of mental associations of sensory elements.” However, in 
1931 the Wagner-influenced strand of synesthetic theory seemed to enjoy a 
partial vindication when Karl Zietz, following a series of experiments, 
“concluded that sensations of color and sound are part of an indivisible 
Gestalt perception in which the auditory and visual perceptions mutually 
influence each other.”88 
 
It is quite possible that Aldous Huxley was aware of this debate given his 
general interest in psychology. It is certainly unsurprising that Wagner should 
be a target for Huxley’s satire. He had little time for the “ceaseless torrent” of 
Wagner’s music, calling him “a sad vulgarian”, whose work, “because it is 
always speaking”, and hence “very poor in silence”, “says” far less than the 
music of Beethoven or Mozart (who, by contrast, for Huxley were more 
significant as they came “nearest to expressing the inexpressible”).89 The 
sketch of the feely, presented as a dystopia-within-a-dystopia in parody of 
the play within A Midsummer Night’s Dream, is also a sort of satirically 
subverted Gesamtkunstwerk: the stimulation of one sense does not affect 
the others, but on the contrary remains a mere ‘special’ effect. It is laden with 
several layers of meaning, but all of these are ironic, a product not of the 
work itself but rather of the narrator’s voice. The final layer of irony is the 
relation of the feely to realism. On the surface it adheres to an incredibly 
detailed realism (“every hair of the bear reproduced”) yet it is a formulaic 
narrative built upon a ludicrously contrived scenario (a concussion “knock[s] 
all the negro’s conditioning into a cocked hat. He develop[s] for the Beta 
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blonde an exclusive and maniacal passion” and takes her hostage in a 
helicopter). This reflects with perfect mimesis the World State itself, in which 
the citizens lack self-reflexive cognition (the “meaning”) of the physical 
manifestation of their emotions. 
 
Psychologies 
 
The lack of emotional literacy of the Brave New Worlders is surely due to the 
success of their emotional and intellectual conditioning. Only Helmoltz 
Watson, an intellectual giant who is actively resisting his conditioning, can 
begin to reflect upon his emotions. Watson gets into trouble when he 
produces “Rhymes in Moral Propaganda and Advertisement” – a crudely 
rhythmic lyric still bearing in the jolly bounce of the rhyme scheme the very 
conditioning that he seeks to escape. The lyric nevertheless strives for affect, 
and begins to structure his interior reflections into a poetic form.90 For the 
rest of the citizens of the World State, the emotional range is severely limited 
to narrow, moderate states of physical sensation which cannot be interpreted 
to mean anything. 
 
The psychologist William James, who was concerned with the physicality of 
emotions, argued that “emotional brain-processes not only resemble the 
ordinary sensorial brain-processes but in very truth are nothing but such 
brain-processes variously combined.” In James’s famous example, we do 
not see the bear, feel fear and run; we see the bear, tremble and 
consequently feel fear. He believed that the “cognitive” perception of 
environmental phenomena is secondary to the bodily states of perception.91 
Only after we tremble do we rationalise flight to be the best cause of action. 
In Huxley’s fictional society (leaving aside the fact that there is little for 
citizens to actually fear inside the World State), intellectual passions, 
rationalised reactions and cognitive perceptions are almost entirely 
eliminated. Psychological conditioning and the restriction of feeling were 
central to Huxley’s novel from its very conception. In the early stages of 
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writing, Huxley told his friend Sydney Schiff that his aim was to “make a 
comprehensible picture of the psychology based on quite different first 
principles from ours.”92 His success on this score was that in the 
revolutionised, libidinal economy of the novel, psychological conditioning 
limits emotional feeling to physical sensations alone, and restricts the 
breadth and depth of these sensations to a narrow, moderate band through 
techniques such as the “violent passion surrogate”. 
 
The moderation and tempering of emotional excess is a key component of 
the power which the World State holds over individuals. This emotional 
restriction is achieved in part by the destruction of family structures, which 
are described as being full of “misery…every kind of perversion… madness 
and suicide” – in other words, the markers of tragedy. The World Controller 
charges Freud with being “the first to reveal the[se] appalling dangers of 
family life,” and insinuates that he advocated the dissolution of family 
structures.93 It would be easy to concur with Adorno, therefore, that Huxley 
has a “complete misunderstanding” of Freud and hence treats the 
psychoanalyst “rather shabbily”.94 Adorno mistakes Huxley’s purpose, 
however. Huxley’s reduction of Freud’s whole body of work to an anti-
familial, crude and permissive hedonism can be viewed more productively as 
a commentary on the processes of history in general, than as evidence of 
Huxley’s lack of understanding of, or engagement with, Freud’s thought.95 
Indeed, it would be just as feasible to make the case that Huxley treats 
Henry Ford shabbily: he is presented as the founding father and consumerist 
saviour of the World State, in which “ending is better than mending”. Yet 
Ford proclaimed in his own autobiography that he wanted “the man who 
buys one of our products never to have to buy another”, and, in further 
contrast to Huxley’s wholly urbanized future World State, that “the modern 
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city has been prodigal, it is to-day bankrupt, and to-morrow it will cease to 
be.”96 That Ford would not have liked Huxley’s dystopian World State (or 
even recognised his own ideas within it) is beside the point of Huxley’s 
satire. As with Freud, it is not Henry Ford himself, but the public image of 
Henry Ford, his ideas as digested by the wider world, which Huxley attacks. 
In this sense, Ford stands for mass production on a mechanized assembly 
line, and for all the multinational companies then revolutionizing production, 
business practice, and consumerism. 
 
Moreover Firchow finds evidence that although Huxley attacks Freud 
somewhat unmercifully, he does so only after careful assessment: 
[For Freud] achieving positive happiness seems impossible in the universe as 
presently arranged; the best man can hope for is to avoid unhappiness. Of the 
various means of realizing this end, "the most interesting . . . are those which 
seek to influence our own organism [i.e., by chemical means]. In the last 
analysis, all suffering is nothing else than sensation; it only exists insofar as we 
feel it, and we only feel it in consequence of certain ways in which our organism 
is regulated." 
Here Freud comes very close to the mechanist position of someone like 
Watson and even closer to the position of Mustapha Mond in Brave New 
World.97 
 
To a vitalist and a self-confessed aesthete like Huxley, the idea that suffering 
is nothing but mechanically explicable physical sensations would be 
anathema. Huxley’s aesthetic and moral positions rely heavily on the idea of 
feeling. Hence the suggestion that the final end of psychological study will be 
to “free” mankind from the extremities of these human emotions would be 
profoundly disturbing to him. From his point of view, such a world would be 
one in which, as John Savage points out, “nothing costs enough.”98 
Firchow’s reading of Freud, and the reading of Freud that he assigns to 
Huxley, perhaps needs the addition of some careful qualifiers. Freud is not 
quite the straightforward mechanist that Firchow reads him as in this context. 
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Far from him denying the existence of feeling (as opposed to sensation) he 
merely asserts that, 
It is not easy to deal scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their 
physiological signs. Where this is not possible… nothing remains but to fall back 
on the ideational content which is most readily associated with the feeling.99 
 
For Freud, these physical symptoms are interesting not because they explain 
feelings, but because “a feeling can only be a source of energy if it is itself 
the expression of a strong need.”100 Hence, as Firchow rightly points out, 
Huxley’s World State is a society which does not know feeling because it 
does not know need. But the social problems elucidated in Civilisation and its 
Discontents (1930) and the transformation of the psyche in Brave New World 
overlap slightly differently to the way in which Firchow contends. Suffering, 
Freud contends, comes from three sources: “from our own body” in pain and 
anxiety, “from [forces in] the external world”, and “from our relations with 
other men. The suffering which comes from this last source is perhaps more 
painful to us than any other.”101 While the first of these has been all but 
eliminated in Huxley’s World State, and the second reduced to a minimum 
through conditioning, even such “neo-Pavlovian” and “hypnopaedic” methods 
as Brave New World has access to cannot eliminate this final source. As 
argued above, many of the characters’ psyches show dangerous signs of 
imminent breakdown or near collapse. Thus whilst the pleasure principle is 
no longer transformed into the “more modest reality principle” at every 
juncture, the most heavily indoctrinated Brave New Worlders do in fact still 
expend more energy on avoiding suffering than on obtaining pleasure.102 
Huxley, as Firchow argues, does use Freud to “trace the consequences (as 
Huxley wrote to his father, of all people) ‘of the abolition of the family and all 
the Freudian 'complexes' for which family relationships are responsible.’”103 
But the presence of “soma holidays” seems to indicate that social suffering 
has not vanished: humanity still expresses a “need” to negate suffering 
through intoxication. 
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The development of soma points more generally to the fact that happiness 
and suffering in the World State are treated as problems not of, say, art, 
ethics or philosophy, but rather of science. This is a dramatic epistemological 
claim relating to the possibilities of the application of scientific knowledge, 
and in this area Firchow is indeed correct that Freud’s attempt to deal with 
happiness “scientifically” puts him closer to the behaviorist psychologist John 
B. Watson than either of them would have liked to see themselves. 
 
Watson, for his part, dismissed Freudian psychology as a form of 
“introspective” psychology devoid of any merit since it did not approach the 
subject from a quantifiable, logico-experimental “scientific” angle. 
Reductively, Watson saw the physical symptoms of emotions, which James 
had taken to be only the primary, non-cognitive manifestation of emotions, to 
constitute emotions in their entirety. He was interested only in quantifiable 
behavioural responses to external stimuli, therefore regarding consciousness 
as “neither a definite nor a useable concept” for the psychologist.104 
Behaviorism, believed Watson, was 
An attempt to do one thing – to apply to the experimental study of man the same 
kind of procedure and the same language of description that many research 
men had found useful for so many years in the study of animals lower than man. 
We believed then, as we do now, that man is an animal different from other 
animals only in the types of behavior he displays.105 
 
Watson attempted to do something on the level of individual behaviour which 
is comparable to that which Vilfredo Pareto had endeavoured to do on the 
sociological level. Both were trying to breakdown the boundaries between a 
human science and the natural sciences, by subjecting their analysis of the 
human (as social individual or as socio-political actor respectively) to what 
they perceived as the rigours of a natural science method. Because of this 
similarity, Huxley is able to satirise them both with the same weapons. The 
torture of eight-month-old babies by electric shock and sirens is one such 
example: 
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Books and loud noises, flowers and electric shocks – already in the infant mind 
these couples were compromisingly linked; and after two hundred repetitions of 
the same or a similar lesson would be wedded indissolubly. What man has 
joined, nature is powerless to put asunder. 
“They’ll grow with what the psychologists used to call an ‘instinctive’ hatred of 
books and flowers. Reflexes unalterably conditioned,” [said the director.]106 
 
Whilst the terminology of “instinctive hatred” is drawn straight from John B. 
Watson, the “high economic policy” behind the treatment, as well as the 
endorsement of the use of force, is more likely a satire of Pareto’s theories. 
 
Yet it is immediately apparent in Watson’s work in particular that the use of 
scientific discourse – the “language of description that many research men 
had found useful” – is as important to the author as using the scientific 
method itself. Watson is keen to appeal to businessmen as well as parents in 
his book, to use it as a platform to promote a new way of life, a “scientific” 
route to well-being by producing identikit individuals moulded to neatly fit the 
roles to which society assigns them. Watson candidly points out that the 
primary use of his science is control: “It is the business of behavioristic 
psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity.”107 He 
furthermore argues against free speech and the right of workers to unionise. 
 
Huxley saw the political implications of the application of Watsonian 
behaviorism on a mass scale. Such psychological manipulation would play 
into the hands of the most authoritarian leaders. Behaviorism could well 
become a propaganda weapon as potentially epoch-changing and 
destructive as any other in the ideologies of soviet Communism, Fascism or 
National Socialism. 
 
An intelligent and perceptive reader such as Huxley could not fail to notice 
that Watson’s ‘scientific’ rhetoric was his primary method of shirking 
awkward questions about the viability of his ‘science’, which effectively 
reduced the complexity of a human being’s psychological make-up to 
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107 Watson, Behaviorism, 11. 
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outwardly observable phenomena, and then judged the success of 
attempted psychological conditioning purely on the narrow basis of the 
immediately observable changes affected. A healthy individual, to the 
Watsonian psychologist, is one who can be easily induced to do exactly as 
the psychologist desires. But this is also an exact definition of power – as 
Steven Lukes memorably put it, “A may exercise power over B by getting 
him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him 
by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.”108 Watson’s 
behaviorism is nothing less than an attempt to make psychological control 
into a science. For this reason, John Gray argues, Isaiah Berlin’s concept of 
“negative liberty”, as “choice among alternatives or options that is unimpeded 
by others” cannot be applied to “the majority of the inhabitants of Brave New 
World”, as such freedom could have no “application to human beings who 
had been so conditioned that actions actually available to them could not be 
perceived by them as options.”109 Arendt’s psychological truism, that “the will 
to power and the will to submission are interconnected,” cuts both ways in 
relation to Watson’s behaviorism.110 At the zenith of his attempt – and made 
all the more interesting by its ambiguous utopian longing – Watson argued 
that: 
The universe will change if you bring up your children, not in the freedom of the 
libertine, but in behavioristic freedom – a freedom which we cannot even picture 
in words, so little do we know of it. Will not these children in turn, with their 
better ways of living and thinking, replace us as society and in turn bring up their 
children in a still more scientific way, until the world finally becomes a place fit 
for human habitation?111 
 
                                            
108 Lukes, Power: A Radical View 23.  Lukes then comments “One does not have to go to 
the lengths of talking about Brave New World, or the world of B.F. Skinner to see this: 
thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms.” 
109 John Gray, Berlin (London: Fontana, 1995), 15 emphasis in original. This is a contentious 
reading – Berlin’s definition of liberty does not require an individual to have perfect 
knowledge of options or presuppose the existence of a single rational choice – indeed, he 
argues that any “rationalist” design to force people to use their reason “correctly” is “to deny 
their human essence”. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958) 34-
7, 22. 
110 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Orlando, Fl: Harcourt, 1969), 40. For Arendt, in contrast to 
Steven Lukes, the unchecked control of the citizenry without their informed consent by 
means of psychological manipulation would be an extreme example of violence rather than 
power, which for her implies acting “in concert” within a group structure (44). 
111 Watson, Behaviorism 303-4. 
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Watson could therefore be seen as a stronger influence on the socio-political 
make up of Brave New World than any other, whether Communist or 
capitalist.112 Huxley could see the awesome potential of such a science if 
widely adopted, and in Brave New World Helmholtz Watson is named after 
the behaviorist. 
 
Fool’s Gold 
 
Writing in May 1930, Huxley pointed to the (as he saw it), 
Obvious tendency, all over the western world, to follow the lead of Russia – not 
through any desire to imitate the Soviets but because circumstances are 
rendering it increasingly necessary for all States to guard against the dangers of 
insurgent individualism. Human standardisation will become a political 
necessity. 
Psychologists having shown the enormous importance in every human 
existence of the first years of childhood, the State will obviously try to get hold of 
its victims as soon as possible.113 
 
The brutal logic of the attempt to get hold of the “victim” as soon as possible 
could ultimately end only when the State succeeded in gaining control over 
the child before it became a living being – that is, at the very moment of 
conception itself – for psychological conditioning. Only then, in the circular 
economic reasoning of the World State, could the World Controllers ensure 
the preservation of the exact socio-economic class make-up of society and 
cater for the socio-economic needs of Brave New World society. Watsonian 
psychology, directed towards economic imperatives, is behind the treatment 
embryos receive in the hatchery detailed in the first chapter of Brave New 
World, starved of oxygen and injected with alcohol. The second logical 
conclusion of the widespread success of Watsonian psychology, then, would 
be a much more controllable and suggestible population, a society where 
power relations became more hidden and insidious. As Huxley described it in 
his 1946 preface, 
                                            
112 Remarkably, given their otherwise entirely antithetical worldviews, Watson’s concept of “a 
freedom which we cannot even picture in words” here seems superficially very close to 
Adorno’s view of utopian longing as striving towards the unknown. 
113 Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley 49. 
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A really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful 
executive of political bosses and their army of managers control a population of 
slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude.114 
 
Huxley thereby anticipated Lukes’s belief that the “supreme exercise of 
power” consisted of avoiding conflict and ensuring compliance by actually 
controlling the substance of thoughts and desires.115 The entire mechanisms 
of social production of human beings in the novel are geared to this purpose. 
Not only do the hatcheries counteract the waste built into capitalist 
production – that commodities (including, from a Marxian perspective, 
workers) are produced for profit rather than to satisfy social needs in the first 
instance – but they create human beings with no desires or needs beyond 
that which the State provides. Watsonian psychology therefore negates 
desire and need in Huxley’s dystopia. Huxley looked askance at a possible 
state monopoly on the production of human beings. In a cheerful, reductive 
comment that is surely laced with irony, The Director of the London Hatchery 
says, “that is the secret of happiness and virtue – liking what you’ve got to 
do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their unescapable social 
destiny.”116 
 
This comment hints at how we may usefully apply Adorno’s critique to Brave 
New World and still move beyond his specific criticism that Brave New World 
hypostatizes barbaric happiness and high culture into a false binary 
opposition. Watsonian conditioning transforms Brave New Worlders into 
laboratory rats, making conditioned responses to the regular external stimuli 
that those who manage their lives provide (and it is most significant here that 
Mustapha Mond, the World Controller, is an ex-biologist). The conditioning 
externalizes and collectivizes the super-ego – or, more accurately, the 
conditioning itself becomes the super-ego – and thereby the super-ego 
within the individual is stunted in its development. Watsonian conditioning 
constantly encourages the id to pursue its desires, to dominate the psyche, 
but regular “violent passion surrogates” prevent the violence of the id from 
                                            
114 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 11. 
115 Lukes, Power: A Radical View 23. 
116 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 26. 
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growing beyond that which is easily externally controlled by the State. 
Trapped between the monstrous misshapen id and the bombardments of the 
externalised super-ego, the ego stands little chance of successfully asserting 
the identity of the individual qua individual. In this complex, the externalized 
super-ego dictates to the id how to desire as much as what to desire.117 The 
World State creates the happiness which becomes the gilded chains upon 
the citizen. In so doing, it binds and horribly misshapes the psyches of its 
citizens, meticulously pruning them like bonsai trees so that it is no wonder 
that the main characters all appear to demonstrate, as Adorno puts it, 
“subjective derangement.”118 Brave New World demonstrates Rousseau’s 
dictum that 
Nothing can be more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for 
slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire of escaping from 
them: they love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses loved their brutish 
condition.119 
 
The love of servitude, of the happiness which is manifestly false, traps the 
population in their condition – a condition made all the more brutish by the 
juxtaposition with the penitent religious rites and quasi-traditional family 
morality of the economically backward Savage Reservation. Genuine 
creativity – only half-realised by Helmholtz Watson in his poems – much less 
the genuine individualities of fully-developed psyches, is not only impossible 
under such conditions but the very antithesis of them. For Aldous Huxley, 
culture is, and can only be the result of, the unrestricted free-thinking powers 
of creative individuals. It is nothing short of the symbolic expression of 
human freedom itself. In this sense, the systemic false happiness of the 
World State not only makes culture impossible in practice; it stands in 
genuine opposition to any individual who is psychologically able to produce 
such works. The issue is not that Helmholtz Watson sees through the false 
                                            
117 Compare with Žižek’s comment that “cinema teaches us how to desire” made in The 
Pervert's Guide to Cinema, dir. Sophie Fiennes, written & perf. Slavov Žižek, Television 
Broadcast, Channel 4 Television Corporation, 2006. 
118 Adorno, Prisms 112. 
119 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract, trans. G.D.H. Cole (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2003), 3. Rousseau is alluded to in Brave New World, through reference to a half-
remembered former acquaintance of Lenina’s called “Jean-Jacques Habibullah”. Huxley, 
Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited, 87. 
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happiness of the World State, but that he chooses a path of individual self-
development. Any such path is antithetical to the false happiness, and hence 
the gilded chains, of the World State. 
 
The chains of Brave New World are hammered out from the “black 
amalgam” – to return to Raymond Williams’s phrase – of the historical 
context of the early 1930s. Huxley forged together into a future fictional 
society the confusion of political extremities, nascent totalitarianism, 
American consumerism, Paretian (non-)logical action, scientism, 
warmongering and psychological conditioning of his time. The twisted, 
contradictory result shone like fool’s gold. This is the nature of the false, 
cheap, shiny happiness that gilded the chains which enslave the population 
of the World State in Brave New World. 
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Questions of the Self: Nature, Rationality and 
Metaphysics in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
 
If the World State of Brave New World relied on making its citizens love their 
servitude, George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four took a rather more direct 
and confrontational approach to power relations. To the Inner Party 
functionary O’Brien, obedience to the State’s demands is not in itself 
enough, for “Unless [a man] is suffering, how can you be sure that he is 
obeying your will and not his own? Power is inflicting pain and humiliation.”1 
The bleak violence of Orwell’s dystopian vision has led to polarised critical 
debate. This chapter begins by exploring the different ways in which the text 
has been critically assessed and appropriated. Its importance to the 
discipline of utopian studies is complicated – being both a canonical text and 
a stubborn, provocative thorn that has led to a variety of polemical critical 
responses.    
 
Picking up on the post-Enlightenment themes already discussed in previous 
chapters, the treatment of rationality, nature and metaphysics in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four will be focused upon here in particular. From its opening lines, 
Orwell’s text associates the representation of a disquieting combination of 
poor, inefficient living conditions with an overbearing political expression of 
rationalism. This is a grey, concrete urban landscape but, unlike Brave New 
World, it is far from sterile or clean. Amid the dirt and wreckage of wartime 
conditions, nature creeps into the city of London through the cracks opened 
up by decay, an action that is mirrored in Winston Smith’s own body. Julia, 
by contrast, is allied to a sense of the natural through her youth, femininity 
and sexuality. As feminist readings have shown, her character seems the 
product of a patriarchal gaze, and shows Orwell to have some rather 
conservative prejudices. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the political beliefs Orwell 
expresses in Nineteen Eighty-Four are strongly allied to what he termed 
                                            
1 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 279. 
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“democratic Socialism”. His conception of socialism was characterised by 
fervent opposition to imperialism, to hierarchical Party discipline, and to the 
subsuming of humanist values to revolutionary ends.2 Consistent with these 
beliefs, Nineteen Eighty-Four is also a bureaucratic nightmare, in which 
rationality becomes absurdly and menacingly instrumentalised. The effect is 
to extend Orwell’s critique of Fascist and Communist totalitarianism to cover 
all instrumental rationality – including James Burnham’s theory of 
“Managerial Revolution”, and the liberal idea of progress. Oceania’s peculiar 
claim is to combine such instrumental rationality with a political movement 
based upon maintaining a furious level of entirely irrational hatred among the 
population, which is manipulated towards any end the State desires. Citizens 
are made to feel alienated not just from their peers, but from the very 
physicality of their own being. The physical torture of Winston Smith is just 
as much an attack on his epistemological beliefs and moral autonomy as is 
O’Brien’s ruthless questioning. This chapter therefore draws to a close by 
considering moral affect and rationality as intertwining, key parts of a model 
of self. It is the very reliance upon instrumental rationality and irrational 
hatred that create the cracks in Oceania’s system of power, which in turn 
point toward a very real possibility of its future downfall. 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Problem of Genre 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four has been both appropriated by scholars of all political 
persuasions, and denounced from across the political spectrum:3 to the 
Marxist Isaac Deutscher it was a gift to right-wing reactionary Cold-War 
politicians, “a cry from the abyss of despair” made by a “simple-minded 
anarchist”.4 For the British cultural materialist Raymond Williams it was a 
                                            
2 Orwell identified himself as a “democratic Socialist” throughout his later life, declaring in a 
1946 essay, for example, “Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been 
written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic Socialism, as I 
understand it.” Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 18, 319. 
3 An excellent summary of these trends over the first twenty-five years of Nineteen Eighty-
Four’s publication history is provided in Valerie J. Simms, "A Reconsideration of Orwell's 
1984: The Moral Implications of Despair," Ethics 84 (1974). 
4 Isaac Deutscher, "1984 - The Mysticism of Cruelty," from Russia in Transition (New York: 
Coward McCann, 1957) 230-45, Rpt. in Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984, ed. 
Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 29-40, here 29, 35, 38. 
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bourgeois “putropia” (although he later gave a more generous and subtle 
critique of the novel).5 Frankfurt School scholar Eric Fromm believed that it 
expressed “the powerlessness and hopelessness of modern man,” in 
accordance with Frankfurt School critiques of modernity.6 To Lionel Trilling 
“the exposition of the mystique of power is the heart and essence of Orwell’s 
book”, and as such it is written in the spirit of liberal politics, for despite 
Orwell’s “radical” political beliefs, he remained a common-sense English 
empiricist.7 At another extreme, to Philip Goldstein the reception of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four apparently demonstrates that the novel supported neo-
conservativism in the 1990s against more radical post-modernist literary 
critique.8 It is the fate of Nineteen Eighty-Four to remain a literary hot potato 
even twenty-five years after the date in which the novel is set has passed. In 
criticism of the text, aesthetic and political judgements continue to be almost 
impossible to disentangle.  
 
Such polarization affects how the novel is placed generically. Whether the 
novel is viewed as a satire, a fantasy, a “negative utopia”, a “utopia in 
reverse”, an anti-utopia, a dystopia, a “critical dystopia” or some combination 
of these is both dependent upon the critic’s orientation and directly affects 
the reading which the critic takes. Yet the fact that Nineteen Eighty-Four has 
been so often appraised or condemned on more-or-less overtly political 
rather than aesthetic grounds need not necessarily lead one to reject out of 
hand all such criticism – after all, Orwell himself in the essay Why I write 
commented 
                                            
5 Williams, "Science Fiction," During the later critique in Raymond Williams, Orwell 
(Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1971) he aptly comments “it would be easy but pointless to start 
a quarrel over Orwell’s inheritance” (85). On Williams’s changing attitude towards Orwell, 
see above 34 n. 63; and see Milner, "Utopia and Science Fiction in Raymond Williams". 
6 Eric Fromm, Afterword, Nineteen Eighty-Four, by George Orwell, Centennial ed. (New 
York: Plume, 2003), 327. Carey also notes similarities between scholars of the Frankfurt 
Institute for Social Research and Orwell’s protagonist. This is explored below in chapter 6, 
265-7. Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses, 43. 
7 Lionel Trilling, "Orwell on the Future," The New Yorker, 18 June 1949, 74-7, Rpt. in 
Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971), 24-8; Irving Howe, "1984: History as Nightmare," From Politics and the 
Novel (New York: Horizon, 1957) 235-51, Rpt. in Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984, 
ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 41-53, here 26, 24. 
8 Philip Goldstein, "Orwell as a (Neo)conservative: The Reception of 1984," Journal of the 
Midwest Modern Language Association 33.1 (2000). 
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When I sit down to write a book, I do  not say to myself, 'I am going to produce 
a work of art'. I write it  because there is some lie that I want to expose, some 
fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a 
hearing. But I  could not do the work of writing a book, or even a long 
magazine article,  if it were not also an aesthetic experience.9 
 
Politically motivated artistic work can, from this perspective, encourage and 
even consciously motivate political responses. For Nineteen Eighty-Four this 
is especially the case, as it is set in a near future London physically very 
similar to the bombed-out postwar city Orwell himself knew. In this narrative 
national politics and identity have been subsumed within the larger 
ideological framework of Oceania, but while the names of “England” and 
“Britain” which Winston Smith remembers from his childhood have been 
replaced by the satirically utilitarian “Airstrip One”, “London, he felt fairly 
certain, had always been called London.” The reader’s attention is 
repeatedly drawn to the similarities between the war-beaten capital of 
rationing and reconstruction in 1949, and the fictional year of 1984.10 
 
This identification should not be over-extended, however. While Maria 
Varsam correctly contends that dystopian fictions draw upon past and 
present trends in empirical reality and extrapolate them into the future, she 
overlooks the radical imaginative and satirical elements that also 
characterise dystopias.11 Varsam maintains that by being able to identify the 
past as the protagonist describes it with historical narratives already known 
to us as readers, we begin to trust the protagonist more. From this 
perspective, history serves a purpose in bringing the reader to a point where 
he or she regards the protagonist’s view of the dystopian society as the most 
reliable within a multiplicity of voices, which is key to the text being received 
as dystopian.12 A logical consequence is that to challenge the protagonist’s 
viewpoint is to question the generic status of a text as ‘dystopian’. For 
example, feminist criticisms of the text such as those of Chris Ferns and 
                                            
9 Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 12, 319. 
10 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 34. 
11 Maria Varsam, "Concrete Dystopia: Slavery and Its Others," Dark Horizons: Science 
Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination, eds. Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 208-10. 
12 Varsam, "Concrete Dystopia," 205. 
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Marxist criticisms such as those of Raymond Williams both see certain 
already marginalised groups within social reality (women and workers) as 
further oppressed in Nineteen Eighty-Four as much by the protagonist’s 
beliefs as by the State. Far from offering a radical critique, they both argue 
(for different reasons) that the novel supports the existing 
patriarchal/bourgeois order, that it accepts and desires the past, 
demonstrating nostalgia for a time when male middle-class dominance was 
unchallenged.13 The predictive warning of Orwell’s novel, from these points 
of view, accepts oppression of women/the working class as inevitable and 
even natural. Such approaches therefore contend that it is unsuccessful as a 
novel, being far too anchored in the inequalities of the past/present in its 
underlying assumptions. If, as Varsam suggests, the reader must trust the 
protagonist’s viewpoint as reliable, it is deeply problematic that Winston is 
presented at the start of the novel as horrendously misogynistic: 
He disliked nearly all women, and especially the young and pretty ones. It was 
always the women, and above all the young ones, who were the most bigoted 
adherents of the Party, the swallowers of slogans, the amateur spies and 
nosers-out of unorthodoxy.14 
 
By identifying young pretty women with the orthodoxy of the Party, Winston 
can justify his hatred of women (which would seem more likely to stem from 
guilt and resentment surrounding the disappearance of his mother when he 
was a child). Through this identification, Winston is able to turn his fantasy of 
raping and murdering a pretty girl (whom he does not yet know as Julia) into 
a political act against the Party. In this way he justifies his aggressive 
instincts to himself and enjoys the fantasy without guilt, despite 
understanding that the real reason for this particular aggression is that “he 
wanted to go to bed with her and would never do so.” Can someone who 
deceives himself as to the nature of his misogynistic prejudices in order to 
experience as “vivid, beautiful hallucinations” fantasies of slitting a woman’s 
throat “at the moment of climax” while raping her, be regarded as a 
                                            
13 Ferns, Narrating Utopia 123-4, 129; Williams, Orwell 78-9, 81. 
14 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 12. 
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trustworthy source in his views of other characters and the world around 
him?15  
 
Orwell chooses to narrate in the third person, not directly through Winston, 
allowing him to distance himself from the views of his protagonist, and 
permiting a multiplicity of voices to develop. None of these voices are entirely 
likeable or virtuous – even Julia tacitly agrees to commit atrocities like 
throwing sulphuric acid in the face of a child if it aids opposition to the Party. 
Indeed, the very idea of an infallible saintly figure would run counter to 
Orwell’s opposition to doctrines that claimed a monopoly on truth such as 
those of totalitarian regimes. 
 
The criticisms of feminists and socialists point to an issue at the intersection 
of politics, history and genre. If they were wholly justified, it would also go 
some way to explain why (mainly male) liberal commentators have been the 
most vocal champions of the novel. These criticisms should thus lead us to 
reflect on the place of marginalised individuals and groups in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four precisely because it is a politically committed novel, written by 
an overtly socialist writer, about the potential for disaster when power 
relations are allowed to develop unchecked and unquestioned, without a 
politically active citizenry fighting for socially progressive and egalitarian 
ideals. Even from a liberal or conservative perspective there remains an 
interesting question about the relation between avowed authorial intent (to 
write a politically committed novel, from a “democratic Socialist” perspective) 
and the outcome (in which more right-wing, bourgeois and/or patriarchal 
opinions have been read into the novel). However, viewing the book as a 
social and political critique, written in the post-Enlightenment tradition, allows 
the ideational content of the text, as an example of material culture from a 
specific historical context, to be explored. 
 
Literary Context 
 
                                            
15 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 17 emphasis added. 
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Dystopias, as near-future novels, inherently have a predictive aspect.16 This 
is combined with a socially critical role, mingling satire, serious critique of the 
author’s present. Structurally, therefore, a dystopian text may offer some 
account of how society has moved from the author’s contemporary world to 
the near-future radically altered one. As discussed in chapter one, the 
othering into the future can be termed “prolepsis”, while the backward 
glances filling-in details of the future-as-past are “analepses” (and therefore 
the dystopian anachronic combination may be termed “proleptic-analepses”). 
One point at which politics, narrative strategy and genre intersect with 
reference to interpretations of Nineteen Eighty-Four is the question of 
whether the text is “open” or “closed”: whether it is merely a stark warning to 
prepare for a coming deluge written by an ill and broken man, or whether it 
offers prophetic hope that disaster may yet be mercifully averted – as when, 
for example, the citizens of Ninevah heed Jonah’s warning and atone.17 
 
The former position has become far harder to maintain since the publication 
of an openly hopeful dystopian novel (a “critical dystopia” in the terminology 
of Tom Moylan) – Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale.18 At the close of 
this novel there is an appendix unequivocally stating that Gilead, her fictional 
feminist dystopia, was a specific historic phenomenon that had been 
overthrown.19 Atwood consciously draws parallels between her novel and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. For her, there is hope in Nineteen Eighty-Four: “The 
                                            
16 Huxley saw this function as important. In his reply to Orwell to thank him for his gift of a 
copy of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Aldous Huxley maintained that the future of Nineteen Eighty-
Four was more likely to “modulate” into the scenario of Brave New World (“Letter to George 
Orwell (E. H. Blair), 21 October 1949” Huxley, Letters of Aldous Huxley, 604-5, here 605).  
Notwithstanding this, Huxley had recently published Ape and Essence (New York: Harper, 
1948), a novel about a post-Bomb future society of brutal sadism and cruelty. Orwell, 
meanwhile, thought that Brave New World was the novel that contained an unsustainable 
social order. See below, 163 n. 26. 
17 The Argument that Orwell’s last book represented the despair “of a dying man” has been 
advanced numerous times, including by John Strachey, The Strangled Cry: and Other 
Unparliamentary Papers (London: Bodley Head, 1962), 29, Rpt. in Twentieth Century 
Interpretations of 1984, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 54-
61, here 59; and more recently (and less subtly) by John J. Ross, "Tuberculosis, 
Bronchiectasis, and Infertility: What Ailed George Orwell?," Clinical Infectious Diseases 41 
(2005) and Robert McCrum, "The Masterpiece That Killed George Orwell," Observer 10 May 
2009. Online ed. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/may/10/1984-george-
orwell?INTCMP=SRCH>, 29 May 2011. The Deluge is forewarned in Genesis 6:17. God 
spares Nineveh in the Book of Jonah 3:10. 
18 See Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, chapter 6, “The Critical Dystopia”. 
19 Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (London: Vintage, 1996) 311-24. 
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Principles of Newspeak” appendix, she argues, is written in the past tense as 
if it were a scholarly text from a different, future society, much like it is in her 
own work.20 There certainly was literary precedence for Orwell to make such 
a move – he had read Jack London’s novel The Iron Heel (1908), a novel in 
which a socialist revolution is brutally crushed by an oligarchy, which used a 
similar device. This novel is presented as the edited diary of a female activist 
and revolutionary leader from a society in the far future after the final 
destruction of the oligarchy. Footnotes from the “editor” provide this literal 
subtext throughout. As with Nineteen Eighty-Four, the novel ends with the 
complete crushing of rebellion (although it finishes with the capture, not the 
conversion of the rebels). The proleptic references in the footnotes – to the 
ultimate success of the Revolution at a time after the point at which the text 
ends – make it impossible to argue that The Iron Heel is not an ‘open’ text, 
ultimately looking beyond the catastrophic to a positive future. Nineteen 
Eighty-Four borrows the title image of The Iron Heel for the key, often cited, 
phrase “If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a 
human face – for ever.”21 
 
The Iron Heel had a significant role within a literary tradition of near-future 
writing that Orwell consciously wrote within. Other literary texts that were 
central to this frame of reference included Zamyatin’s We and Huxley’s 
Brave New World.22 Orwell also drew – perhaps more satirically – on some 
ideas that Wells put forwards in several of his novels. Thus, in his 1941 
essay “Wells, Hitler and the World State”, Orwell stated, “a crude book like 
The Iron Heel… is a truer prophecy of the future than either Brave New 
World or [H. G. Wells’s] The Shape of Things to Come.”23 
 
                                            
20 Margaret Atwood, "Orwell and Me," Guardian 16 June 2003, Sec. G2. Online ed., 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/jun/16/georgeorwell.artsfeatures>, 29 May 2011. 
21 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 280. In The Iron Heel, a member of the “Oligarchs” warns, 
“We will grind you revolutionists down under our heel, and we shall walk upon your faces.  
The world is ours, we are its lords, and ours it shall remain.” Jack London, London: Novels 
and Social Writings (New York: Literary Classics of the US, 1982) 384. 
22 On the influence of Zamyatin’s We, see Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 16, 99; Gleb Struve, 
Russian Literature Under Lenin and Stalin, 1917-1953 (Norman, OK: U of Oklahoma P, 
1971) 50. The fact that Orwell sent a copy of Nineteen Eighty-Four to Aldous Huxley on its 
publication suggests he was conscious of some similarities with Brave New World. 
23 Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 12, 540. 
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This last book, published in 1933, was written as a proleptic-analeptic history 
of the years 1930-2105 from the year 2107. Like London and Huxley, Wells 
here imagines that things will get far worse before they improve – he sees 
the Wall Street Crash of 1929 as a decisive date in the history of credit from 
which the world would never recover, sliding through war and pestilence to a 
point in the 1950s where the state system has completely collapsed, the 
global population is halved and subsistence living is the norm. The surviving 
scattered aviation and shipping industries come to the rescue, keeping the 
rudiments of international trade going and eventually they gain enough 
power via their combined monopoly of the means of transport and 
communication to establish a benign world dictatorship. Over a couple of 
generations, remaining believers in nationalism and partisan or religious 
ideologies are wiped out or converted to the ideology of the Modern State 
and eventually the dictatorship withers away – its ruling council being 
sensible and disinterested enough to realise that its work is done – leaving 
humanity in the hands of capable bureaucratic administrators. 
 
Orwell confessed to having adored Wells’s fiction as a child, but saw him as 
naïve and old-fashioned in his outlook and politics after World War I.24 “The 
object of power is power” and, for Orwell, the dictatorship of any powerful, 
organised, administrative group was unlikely in the extreme to vote itself out 
of existence.25 Moreover, in direct contrast to The Shape of Things to Come, 
war in Orwell’s novel leads not to state bankruptcy but to a sort of 
nationalised economic stasis, in which the wealth generated within the state 
is taken from a population who are purposefully made to endure low living 
standards and used up in unproductive warfare. While both men’s 
understanding of economics appears limited here, Orwell’s political point is 
that hate, fear, war and tyranny can be just as self-sustaining as any other 
political motivation and that politics founded upon such deep-seated 
                                            
24 Despite this criticism of Wells, Wyndham Lewis assessed Nineteen Eighty-Four as being 
“Wellsian in form, Wellsian in the style of writing, Wellsian in the colourlessness and 
anonymity of the personae.” Wyndham Lewis, "Climax and Change," The Writer and the 
Absolute (London: Methuen, 1952), 189-93 (here 189-90), Rpt. in Twentieth Century 
Interpretations of 1984, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 105-
9 (here 106). 
25 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 276. 
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emotional values are more likely to succeed in their aims than politics 
founded on the values of coolly disinterested ‘rational’ decision-making.26 
 
Like Huxley – whose Brave New World and Ape and Essence were both set 
in futures that follow apocalyptic wars – Orwell evidently saw something 
powerful in the eschatological elements of Wells’s novels of the future, but 
he denied that such conflict would in any likelihood produce a more 
enlightened and reasonable humanity as its result: 
For forty or fifty years past, M[ess]rs. H. G. Wells and others have been 
warning us that man is in danger of destroying himself with his own weapons, 
leaving the ants or some other gregarious species to take over. Anyone who 
has seen the ruined cities of Germany will find this notion at least thinkable. 
Nevertheless, looking at the world as a whole, the drift for many decades has 
been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery. We may be 
heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the 
slave empires of antiquity.27 
 
To Orwell, the redemptive quality of the Wellsian apocalypse, whereby the 
(self-) destruction of humankind is validated post-hoc as a step towards a 
rational and enlightened world-state society, does not in the end negate the 
then dominant post-Enlightenment view of history in which Western 
dominance and the cause of ‘progress’ were seen as going hand in hand. 
For Orwell, modern history seemed rather to reflect a violent system of 
power politics, empire building and the destructive use of technology. 
 
                                            
26 In his 1946 review of Zamyatin’s We, Orwell argued that in Huxley’s Brave New World 
“[t]here is no power hunger, no sadism, no hardness of any kind. Those at the top have no 
strong motive for staying at the top… life has become so pointless that it is difficult to believe 
that such a society could endure.” Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 18, 14. 
27 Orwell, Complete Works, vol. 17, 321. 
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A Rationalist World Perverted 
 
On one level, then, Nineteen Eighty-Four is about the betrayal of late-
Victorian and Edwardian ideas of utopia, revealing what lies hidden in the 
smoke and mirrors of modern political life. Yet at the same time it is not an 
anti-utopia, and it draws upon the corruption of an image of the past which 
itself has utopian aspects. Orwell reconstitutes London as a dystopian space 
but it is a space which is not so very far removed from his contemporary 
reality. This is made clear from the first paragraph: 
It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen. Winston 
Smith, his chin nuzzled into his breast in an effort to escape the vile wind, 
slipped quickly through the glass doors of Victory Mansions, though not quickly 
enough to prevent a swirl of gritty dust from entering with him. 
The hallway smelt of boiled cabbage and old rag mats.28 
 
“Victory Mansions” can be read as a cruel joke, an ironic and satirical stab at 
life in postwar Britain, a period “experienced for the most part as a 
continuation of suffering, deprivation and anxiety, and the landscape of 
Britain changed little.”29 Here “mansions”, a term that could connote the 
traditional typically grand, prosperous and sturdy homes of the landed gentry 
and upper classes, is used as a derisive metonym for a run-down tenement 
block. So much for victory in Europe and Japan: we are immediately aware 
of the drabness, grit and dust of postwar Britain, the smells of bland soggy 
food and disrepair. Meanwhile, Winston Smith is characterised as an 
individual man who feels uncomfortable in his world, caught up in a “vile 
wind”. His effort to escape the vileness of this outer world only results in 
entering the nauseating decrepit block of flats. 
 
This first paragraph also alerts readers to the intellectual background of the 
critical project which Orwell undertakes in the novel: “the clocks were striking 
thirteen.” This alienating phrase arrests the flow of prose before it can even 
begin. It may only seem on first glance to be a slightly clumsy method of 
                                            
28 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 3. 
29 Patricia Waugh, "The Historical Context of Post-War British Literature," in The Post-War 
British Literature Handbook, ed. Katharine Cockin and Jago Morrison (London: Continuum, 
2010) 38. 
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alerting the reader to the future setting of the novel, but the apparent ease 
with which such a reading can arise is instructive: Orwell is playing here with 
a basic assumption that the future is a place of greater rationality and order 
than the present, which frequently underpins imaginative/fictional writing set 
in the future. The use of “thirteen” also suggests to the reader that technical 
or military interests are of primary importance to the society in which the 
novel is set and that an industrial drive towards efficiency and the minimising 
of the risk of human error are highly valued. Ironically, despite this rationalist 
approach, “thirteen” also resonates with the reader (if not characters within 
the novel) as an unlucky number. In the future world of Nineteen Eighty-
Four, the traditional, local and idiosyncratic measurements of time and 
space, weights and measures, have gone. The replacement of pints with 
litres is later dwelt upon too, the amount of beer served in “prole” pubs being 
seen by the old man Winston talks to as an imposition unsuited to the needs 
of the human beings using the system: “‘A ’alf-litre ain’t enough. It don’t 
satisfy. And a ‘ole litre’s too much. It sets my bladder running. Let alone the 
price.’”30 
 
In this rationalist, future world the character entering the first scene shares in 
what is purported to be the aim of humankind since the beginning of urban 
living: he is attempting to escape from “vile” nature into a human-controlled 
atmosphere. As far as man has come in the quest to control nature since 
Francis Bacon declared this to be a worthy challenge for him, the first human 
we encounter in the time of “thirteen” is no better off than a human of the 
remote past: he is still at nature’s mercy. From the first paragraph, a limit is 
placed on Oceania’s power: that of nature. This hints at the chaos and 
inefficiency of Oceanian society. The Party regularly exposes the population 
to the vileness of (its own skewed conception of) nature, permitting them to 
feel the worst effects of nature’s powers only in order to draw their adoration 
as a bastion against the natural world, as the only agent capable of hoisting 
mankind away from the foul odours of decay, weather, and the shortages of 
basic commodities necessary for human life, from shelter and food to 
                                            
30 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 92. 
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healthcare. This manoeuvre gives the population a feeling of being removed 
from nature, yet they remain in fear of being at its mercy. The separation of 
man from nature is in itself a theme stretching back to the earliest days of 
human history. Nevertheless, as suggested in chapter one, a critical turning 
point for this relationship was the Enlightenment during which the separation 
of man from nature became part of a much larger and more ambitious quest 
to subsume nature, to raise man above the reach of its dangers altogether. 
In Oceania this project is twisted back upon itself. In perfect synchronisation 
with the principles of Newspeak and doublethink the Party offers to provide 
that which it never will – namely the means by which the individual may 
escape nature and gain security through the totalising power of the Party. 
But just as the Party believes that only by making someone physically suffer 
can one be sure the person is obeying the torturer’s will and not her or his 
own, so too it believes that only through engineering a constant privation of 
needs (for which it is responsible) can the Party make these “guarantees” it 
refuses to fulfil. 
 
Conceptions of Nature 
 
While the Party is able to engineer and manipulate basic human needs, and 
while the Party is far crueller than any natural phenomenon anyone living on 
the temperate British Isles is likely to experience, nature still stands as a 
power against the Party which it is not able to subsume. To the rulers of 
Oceania, nature is the controlled decay of life in Airstrip One. Winston 
wonders to himself: 
Were there always these vistas of rotting nineteenth-century houses, their 
sides shored up with baulks of timber, their windows patched with cardboard 
and their roofs with corrugated iron, their crazy garden walls sagging in all 
directions? And the bombed sites where the plaster dust swirled in the air and 
the willowherb straggled over the heaps of rubble; and the places where the 
bombs had cleared a larger patch and there had spring up sordid colonies of 
wooden dwellings like chicken-houses?31 
 
                                            
31 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 5. 
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Nature for the Party is damp rot and infestations, mould, leaks and cold 
drafts under ill-fitting doors. People are made to live like chickens, crowded 
together in makeshift “sordid colonies” and constantly (re-)producing for the 
benefit of their masters. In contrast to this is the Ministry of Truth, “startlingly 
different from any other object in sight”, a vast blank pyramid bearing 
testament to the power and the modernity of the regime: the very antithesis 
of the decay and corruption of the surrounding streets of London.32 
 
This decay extends to Winston himself, who suffers from a varicose ulcer 
impairing his mobility and rough skin caused by the “cold of the winter that 
had just ended.” Pia Maria Ahlbäck argues that the body is an impediment 
that the State must overcome to control the human mind. “However, the fact 
that the body will die, and the mind with it (no matter what Oceania 
legislates), is evidence of the fact that it has been alive, separately and 
individually.”33 No matter what the Party does to the body, and how it alters 
the ways in which people (mis)conceive reality, it has existed. The body, as 
part of nature, must exist whether 2 + 2 = 4 or 5 or any other number. The 
bodies of others can be “disappeared”, their physical being removed as 
easily as the airbrushing of a photograph or the burning of a letter. Yet 
inasmuch as the Party needs human matter on which to inflict pain, an 
instrument on which torture may be carried out, they require something that 
must be taken out of nature in order for it to be branded with the mark of 
Oceania. A part of the victim must remain “natural” for him or her to 
experience the true horror and trauma of torture as a monstrously “unnatural” 
thing to happen to him or her. 
 
Ironically, in Marxist terms, it is only through the body that man can separate 
himself from nature, or rather it is through man’s relationship with his body 
that nature can be seen as something exterior. In a dense passage in the 
1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx links alienated labour 
with man’s relationship to nature, and specifically what he terms “inorganic 
                                            
32 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 5. 
33 Pia Maria Ahlbäck, Energy, Heterotopia, Dystopia: George Orwell, Michel Foucault and 
the Twentieth Century Environmental Imagination (Åbo: Åbo Akademi UP, 2001) 119. 
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nature.”34 This arresting, unexplained phrase seems to mean that which is 
neither human nor a product of human creation, including “plants, animals, 
stones, air, light, etc.” It is the nature that man is conscious of as nature, and 
from which he physically lives: 
The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which 
makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means of life and 
(2) as the matter, the object and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man’s 
inorganic body, that is to say nature in so far as it is not the human body.35 
 
Marx, a truly post-Enlightenment thinker, makes mankind lord and master of 
the earth. Mankind is only able to be master through his universality: through 
the ability of the individual to see himself and his own activities within the 
social body as being representative of such activity in general; to form 
generalisations from the particular (himself) to the world at large. The 
individual’s relationship to nature (the particular to the general) is here a 
metonym for the relationship of the whole of mankind to nature (the universal 
to the general). This is clearly philosophically problematic – not least 
because “nature” is such a vast, unordered ‘thing’, and is as historically, 
geographically and socially specific as the experience of reality itself. Indeed, 
to see nature as a ‘thing’ in this way, rather than a vast constellation of 
interconnected and constantly evolving ecosystems, life processes and 
physical environments is to reify it. 
 
Marx argued that animals are at one with their vital activity: a bird building its 
nest is simply being a bird. Being ‘nest-builder’ is part of what makes it ‘bird’ 
– it is what it does. Only mankind, according to Marx, can separate himself 
from his vital activity. Mankind makes his labour an object of his own 
consciousness and thereby separates himself from what he does to remain 
alive, to satisfy his physical needs and to remain a physical part of nature.36 
It is one of the many paradoxes of Oceanian ideology that the citizen should 
                                            
34 Karl Marx, Early Writings trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, The Pelican 
Marx Library, ed. Lucio Colletti (Harmondsworth & London: Penguin & New Left Review, 
1975), 327-30, here 327. 
35 Marx, Early Writings 328. 
36 This is what Popper refers to as a “dualism” in Marx – a view that the thinking mind 
conceives of itself as a different type or form of matter from that of the body. See above, 50, 
n. 105; and Popper, The Open Society, vol. 2, 102. 
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believe that nature is something entirely separate and exterior to him/herself 
and the Oceanian state, yet at the same time understand that his or her own 
body is part of nature, to the limited extent that there are “natural” and 
“unnatural” things that can happen to it. The Party’s plan to “abolish the 
orgasm” is a plan to make the population view sexual pleasure as alien and 
unnatural, as much as to eradicate any bonds of loyalty outside the 
relationship between the atomized individual and Big Brother.37 
 
Julia as “Rebel From the Waist Downwards” 
 
Orwell’s conceptions of the terms “natural” and “unnatural” are problematic, 
however. The construction of the character of Julia is value-laden, and while 
hinting at revolutionary promise it fails in the end to escape reinforcing a 
conservative, patriarchal view of femininity. 
 
Julia appears to be sexually liberated, and through her own sexuality is an 
erudite analyst of the social role of sexuality in Oceania: her opinions, for 
example, on the absurdity of public hate are closely tied to her highly 
developed sexuality. She comments sardonically that “all this marching up 
and down and cheering and waving flags is simply sex gone sour.”38 The sex 
instinct is indeed the “driving force” used to keep “the fear, the hatred and 
the lunatic credulity which the Party need[s] in its members… at the right 
pitch.”39 As Chris Ferns notes, 
It is the instinctual, spontaneous, uncontrollable quality of sexual desire that 
makes it a threat to officially imposed conformity, and indeed part of Julia’s 
appeal to Winston lies precisely in her promiscuity, which he sees as 
representing a breach in the ‘wall of virtue’ which the state has tried to erect.40 
 
Harnessing the power of sex drives is then a double strike at the heart of 
individuality and autonomy: it protects the Party against individuals forming 
emotional bonds with each other that, like familial bonds, could be a source 
of loyalty outside the Party. Moreover, it robs the individual of the capacity for 
                                            
37 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 280. 
38 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 139. 
39 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 140. 
40 Ferns, Narrating Utopia 123-4. 
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a particular type of spontaneous action and in so doing creates a tension and 
frustration that needs an outlet for release – provided in the form of mass 
hate. 
 
Yet Julia courts the danger of illicit liaisons not because she believes that 
“hope lies in the proles” but because she derives pleasure from performing 
traditional female roles. What begins as “an anarchic, carnivalesque 
celebration of desire,” settles into something far more “conventional”.41 Their 
relationship begins with a spontaneous expression of lust and rebellion, 
when sex is “a political act” and Winston’s desire for Julia is stimulated by 
her corruption. By the time of their arrest they have settled into the 
conventionality of their love nest and “in the end, what is opposed to the 
massive tyranny of the state is little more than a bourgeois domestic idyll, a 
brief, fragile dream of quasi-marital bliss.”42 Julia is transformed from the 
“only truly free individual” in Oceania into a domesticated and motherly 
housewife – cooking, protecting Winston from the outside world and re-
defining her identity in terms of patriarchal norms and desire: “With just a few 
dabs of colour in the right places she had become not only very much 
prettier, but, above all, far more feminine.” Julia purchases the “very same 
scent” which an old whore Winston once visited wore, although “at the 
moment it did not seem to matter.” Julia’s dream extends also to clothes, 
constructing a new ‘individual’ identity for herself entirely out of the markers 
of gender conformity in Orwell’s own society: “I’ll wear silk stockings and 
high-heeled shoes! In this room I’m going to be a woman, not a Party 
comrade!’” she exclaims. While the scent and the clandestine nature of their 
activities links their relationship with the corrupting, spontaneous desire of 
their early courtship, the reminder of the whore also suggests that she is 
mapping the co-ordinates of Winston’s escape fantasy rather than her own. 
Only now she has taken on a more “feminine” appearance can Winston 
                                            
41 Ferns, Narrating Utopia 123. 
42 Ferns, Narrating Utopia 124. The extent to which this is a “bourgeois” domestic ideal is 
questionable: it could also be read as a romanticised ideal of a working class interior, as 
presented in George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (London: Penguin, 1987) 106-7. 
  Stock 171     
 
finally uncover the “pale and meagre” body of which he is ashamed in front 
of her.43 
 
This transformation leads feminist Chris Ferns to castigate Orwell for falling 
into the same trap as Zamyatin – that of opposing “to the monstrous sexual 
conformity of the dystopian state a purportedly ‘natural’ sexuality which is in 
fact no less socially constructed.”44 Certainly there are stereotypical aspects 
of Julia as the ‘love-interest’ character of a mid-twentieth century male-
authored novel. It remains significant, however, that Julia’s transformation 
into socially constructed gender roles of the past are strongly linked to a 
particular space in the novel, and as such are a product of place as much as 
of time. The room at Mr. Charrington’s “was a world, a pocket of the past 
where extinct animals could walk.” It is strongly reminiscent of scenes in 
Orwell’s novels of the 1930s like Keep The Aspidistra Flying: 
There was a large, low, broken-backed bed with a ragged patchwork quilt… a 
deal table ringed by dynasties of teapots; a rickety kitchen chair… The bare 
floorboards had never been stained but were dark with dirt. In the cracks in the 
pink wallpaper dwelt multitudes of bugs…45 
 
Mr. Charrington’s room, a non-dystopian space within the dystopian 
framework of Nineteen Eighty-Four, is just as shabby and insect-ridden. As 
such it is no more of a realistic or positive alternative to the outer dystopian 
setting than is “Malpais”, the New Mexico ‘Savage’ reservation in Brave New 
World. The nostalgia of Orwell’s pre-War working class interior is 
ambivalently marked by social prejudice and tempered by the poverty of 
threadbare, bug-infested sheets and rats that hide in the corner. This couple 
“are the dead”, ghosts from a forgotten world who can only be happy in the 
past as long as the present remains hidden. The scene is reflexive and self-
critical. The gender roles as well as the entire social basis of this scene’s 
1930s values are questioned.46 Winston and Julia are as much accomplices 
                                            
43 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 149. 
44 Ferns, Narrating Utopia 124. 
45 George Orwell, Keep The Aspidistra Flying (London: Penguin, 2000) 231. 
46 Such self-critique is typical of Orwell. His character Gordon Comstock, for example, 
realises in his filthy attic that the “other world, the world of money and success, is always so 
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in the Oceanian order as the British were reliant on the impoverishment and 
exploitation of Africans and Asians in the pre-War British Empire for their 
own (comparatively) high standard of living – a point that Orwell emphasized 
too in The Road to Wigan Pier.47 This is brought home to them when Julia 
“vaguely” states, “there’s been a lot of tea about lately. They’ve captured 
India, or something,” a comment that brushes over the human cost involved 
in the production of this commodity.48 Julia’s femininity, while of a nostalgic 
male fantasy construction, is similarly ambivalent. ‘Whore’, ‘mistress’ and 
‘wife’ are the only antiquated identities Julia can conjure from the nostalgic 
past of Mr. Charrington’s spare bedroom. But the whole of their rebellion is 
meaningless and doomed precisely because they oppose the State armed 
with nothing but the unreliable tools of memory and nostalgia. If, as Patricia 
Waugh suggests, “only the past, symbolized in the glass paperweight, 
seems to hold out any vision of the social good”, then the transformation of 
Julia points to the fact that salvation cannot be found in a rose-tinted vision 
of the past because such a vision holds no power against the modern 
state.49 “The Principles of Newspeak” appendix, written in the past tense, 
points to the death of the Oceanian world-system but the rest of the novel 
demonstrates that, if there is a way out, it is not by looking backwards 
towards what seemed in the immediate postwar era as the extinct tenets of 
liberal capitalism in its pre-war form. 
 
Orwell and contemporary Political Thinking 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four seeks to critique these notions of nostalgia without 
becoming oppressively didactic. While the sense of imperialist guilt is 
tangible, Orwell studiously avoids the moral pedagogy of, for example, H. G. 
Wells. Before the War, Wells posited that when humankind finally exhausted 
                                                                                                                           
strangely near. You don't escape it merely by taking refuge in dirt and misery.” Orwell, Keep 
The Aspidistra Flying 245. 
47 “Under the capitalist system, in order that England may live in comparative comfort, a 
hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation – an evil state of affairs, but you 
acquiesce in it every time you step into a taxi or eat a plate of strawberries and cream.” 
Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier 148. 
48 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 148. 
49 Waugh, "The Historical Context of Post-War British Literature," 39. 
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all available war materials and the breakdown of the international credit 
system made the mass production of further war materials impossible, 
humanity might finally turn to rational means of governance and thereby 
attain enlightened global rule. Even in the 1930s Orwell had found such an 
attitude to be jejune and Edwardian.50 Somewhat darker visions of war and 
continuing inequality seemed more in keeping with the context of world 
events with which Orwell had lived the whole of his adult life. He believed 
that it was not tenable to take the righteous position of Wells without first 
recognising that the English middle class to which they both belonged was 
one of the intransigent problems in the way of a more humanitarian world 
developing. Hence the protagonists of Orwell’s fiction are frequently 
consciously trapped inside social and cultural structures which rely on the 
exploitation of others, but which they are powerless to alter or escape: 
Winston Smith finds himself on what he regards as morally the wrong side of 
the social structure just as Gordon Comstock does in Keep the Aspidistra 
Flying (1936) and Flory in Burmese Days (1934). In a passage reflecting 
Orwell’s own stated views on the British Empire, the narrator of Burmese 
Days comments that the world of the pukka sahib is 
a stifling, stultifying world in which to live. It is a world in which every word and 
every thought is censored… Everyone is free in England; we sell our souls in 
public and buy them back in private, among our friends. But even friendship 
can hardly exist when every white man is a cog in the wheels of despotism.51 
 
The burden of guilt as a result of being on the side of the exploiters is a 
deadening weight that Flory must carry entirely alone, and which eventually 
proves too much for him. Publicly exposed for flouting the pukka sahib code, 
he commits suicide. The same loneliness haunts Winston until he finds Julia. 
As a member of the fifteen per cent of the population who are Party 
members, and despite the poor living conditions he must endure, Winston is 
part of the exploitative class. As a Party member, Winston romanticises the 
proles and adopts their lifestyle with Julia in a room above a junk shop. 
Ironically, his own class must suffer the terror imposed daily by the Party 
                                            
50 See Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier 179-81, 188-93 passim. 
51 George Orwell, Burmese Days (London: Penguin, 2009) 69. 
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whereas the proles are ‘paid off’ with the deadening products of mass 
culture: mechanically written pornography, literature and music, watery beer 
and a fraudulent lottery. While the presence of these puerile cultural forms 
does not occupy as central a position in the narrative of Nineteen Eighty-
Four as it does in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, they are an important 
but easily overlooked aspect of the text. As the Party slogan has it, “proles 
and animals are free.” It is in keeping with the ideology of the Party that this 
is the freedom of working animals under a heavy yoke. 
 
For Winston, guilt cuts both ways: he is both horribly exploited and part of 
the mechanism oppressing the proles. His own standard of living is lower 
than some sections of the working class before World War II. Indeed, were it 
not for the fact that he is employed in a skilled and perversely creative office 
job, one could argue that he is ‘proletarianized’ in accordance with Marx’s 
prediction that more and more of the middle class would be drawn into the 
ranks of the proletariat as machine production grew and capital was 
concentrated in fewer hands. For Orwell, the closeness of the interests of the 
lower-middle class and the upper-working class was a recurring theme, 
leading him to declare, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, in The Road to Wigan 
Pier that “we of the sinking middle-class… have nothing to lose but our 
aitches.”52 In Nineteen Eighty-Four Party membership formalises the 
separation between workers and bourgeoisie, reinforcing their differences. 
Like all of Oceania’s unspoken rules, it is a line that it is treacherous to cross. 
 
This formal separation performs an ironic reflection on the ideas of James 
Burnham, whose work The Managerial Revolution (1940) Orwell critiqued on 
several occasions, most notably the essays “You and the Atom Bomb” and 
“James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution” (later reprinted as “Second 
Thoughts on James Burnham”). Burnham had argued that Marx’s prediction 
that capital would be concentrated into progressively fewer hands which 
would in turn lead to “proletarianization” of the lower bourgeoisie had been 
incorrect. On the contrary, 
                                            
52 Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier 215. 
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The last seventy-five years have seen the growth of the so-called ‘new middle 
class’, the salaried executives and engineers and managers and accountants 
and bureaucrats and the rest, who do not fit without distortion into either the 
‘capitalist’ or ‘worker’ category.53 
 
Burnham held that Marx had inherited a model of the structure of businesses 
from early economists like Adam Smith, in which an all-powerful owner-
supervisor-director ran a mill or factory from the gangway above the shop 
floor. By the twentieth century, more complex models requiring greater 
technical expertise had superseded this model. The state too had grown in 
its reach and its responsibilities, requiring a vastly enlarged bureaucracy. 
Arguing against the privileged locus of the proletariat within Marxist theory, 
Burnham contended that it was in fact managers, bureaucrats, salaried 
executives and the like who represented a real universal class on the edge 
of power. Indeed, the “Managerial Revolution” had already begun: Burnham 
dates it “somewhat arbitrarily” as beginning with World War I, and suggests 
that it will be complete within fifty years of that date – by the mid ‘sixties.54 It 
is unlikely to be a coincidence that the consolidation of Ingsoc power in 
Oceania also dates from this time. The specific agent of change, in 
Burnham’s theory as well as in Orwell’s novel, is industrial global war. 
Burnham claimed that “the war of 1914 was the last great war of capitalist 
society; the war of 1939 is the first great war of managerial society.”55 He 
saw no reason why the rule of the managers would necessarily be 
benevolent or humanitarian. Given that Stalinist Communism and Nazism 
represented the two most developed forms of managerial ideology, a 
managerial state was likely to be overwhelmingly huge, dominating and 
powerful. Orwell cribbed Burnham’s specific prediction that managerial 
ideologies would split the world into three vast superstates. In 1940, 
Burnham had predicted that these would centre around the US, Japan and 
Germany. By October 1945, Orwell could plainly see that this would not be 
the case – Russia was more likely to dominate the European landmass, 
while China and not Japan held the balance of power in East Asia. In 1946, 
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Burnham changed his mind too, arguing that only two superpowers, the US 
and the USSR, could compete for world domination. But Orwell, who had 
begun work on Nineteen Eighty-Four at least as early as 1943, continued to 
split the world between three superpowers in his novel.56 He argued in 1945 
that Burnham’s central thesis had been unaffected by the outcome of the 
war: 
More and more obviously the surface of the earth is being parceled off into 
three great empires, each self-contained and cut off from contact with the 
outer world, and each ruled, under one disguise or another, by a self-elected 
oligarchy. The haggling as to where the frontiers are to be drawn is still going 
on, and will continue for some years, and the third of the three super-States—
East Asia, dominated by China—is still potential rather than actual. But the 
general drift is unmistakable, and every scientific discovery of recent years has 
accelerated it.57 
  
In production terms, the atom bomb was the most undemocratic weapon in 
the history of warfare – giving sudden and overwhelming power to a handful 
of states that would be denied to all others. Orwell immediately saw that this 
presented an opportunity for those in power in these most affluent countries 
to affect a system whereby the nuclear nations would exist in a permanent 
“cold war.”58 Large-scale conflict between these states would be impossible, 
but the quest for both human and natural resources would lead to smaller, 
localised wars. These superstates, Burnham predicted, would fight over 
“what parts and how much of the rest of the world are going to be ruled by 
each of the three strategic centres.”59 Despite the emerging Cold War, 
Orwell believed this earlier prediction to be more pertinent and terrifying than 
Burnham’s thesis as revised in The Struggle For the World (1946): post-
Hiroshima, Orwell felt that Burnham’s 1940 work only needed to be updated 
with an assessment of the ideological implications of such a world system in 
a nuclear age. After all, in 1940 Burnham himself had argued,  
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The ideologies expressing the social role and interests of the managers (like 
the great ideologies of the past an indispensable part of the struggle for 
power) have not yet been fully worked out, any more than were the bourgeois 
ideologies in the period of transition to capitalism.60 
 
While Orwell could not accept many of Burnham’s arguments, his broad 
brushstrokes seem to have appeared startling and realistic enough for Orwell 
to engage with them. One of the tasks that Orwell took up with Nineteen 
Eighty-Four was to critically and imaginatively answer these ideological and 
political questions. This attention to Burnham’s ideas helps to explain why 
Orwell inserted an experimental section into part II of the novel, supposedly 
taken from a political pamphlet written by Emmanuel Goldstein, but for which 
O’Brien later claims authorship (although he could of course be lying). The 
extract from The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism is in part a 
satirical yet serious and more or less direct engagement with some of 
Burnham’s ideas: 
The new aristocracy was made up for the most part of bureaucrats, scientists, 
technicians, trade-union organisers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, 
journalists and professional politicians. These people, whose origins lay in the 
salaried middle class and the upper grades of the working class, had been 
shaped and brought together by the barren world of monopoly industry and 
centralised government.61 
 
This is precisely the group of technically-skilled professionals that Burnham 
had in mind when he spoke of the “so-called ‘new middle class.’”62 
Goldstein’s text paints this class as less concerned with the luxurious 
trappings of power and more concerned with the wielding of power itself. 
This partially accords with Hannah Arendt’s conception of the totalitarian 
“mass man.” However, for Arendt this “mass man” was at base the product 
of the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, comprised of groups who were the 
socio-economic descendents of the early ruthlessly exploitative bourgeois 
class that originally led the totalitarian movements. The followers, 
meanwhile, were made up from politically apathetic and socially conformist 
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elements. Ultimately the leading selfish groups had withered, leaving only a 
ruthlessly driven mass conformism.63 While Burnham saw the potential for 
this class to be authoritarian in power, he did not see the potential for radical 
novelty in their rule: tyranny is reified in his account of power into an 
essentially ahistorical, unchanging phenomenon. What distinguishes 
totalitarianism from former examples of dictatorship for Burnham is  
the number of facets of life subject to the impact of the dictatorial rule. It is not 
merely political actions, in the narrower sense, that are involved; nearly every 
side of life, business and art and science and education and religion and 
recreation and morality are not merely influenced by but directly subjected to 
the totalitarian regime.64 
 
To subject the whole of life to dictatorial rule in this way requires the 
instruments of modern technology – telescreens are just one extrapolation of 
the sort of high level of surveillance required by a totalitarian movement over 
every area of life. As Goldstein/O’Brien puts it in The Theory and Practice of 
Oligarchical Collectivism “with the development of television, and the 
technical advance which made it possible to receive and transmit 
simultaneously on the same instrument, private life came to an end.”65 In this 
area Burnham is inconsistent. While he stresses the novel aspect of total 
surveillance and technology within totalitarianism, emphasising that 
totalitarian ideologies are managerial ideologies which herald a completely 
new organisation of society, at the same time he argues that “totalitarianism 
is not so startling an innovation as many spokesmen of the moment try to 
make it appear. Lies, cruelty, terrorism, brutality are, after all, normal, not 
exceptional, ingredients of human history.”66 This latter point may be true, 
but it overlooks revolutionary aspects of totalitarianism, including (but not 
limited to) the subversion of reality to maintain ideological consistency at all 
costs; the constant terror and purges and their accompanying bureaucracy; 
the widespread use of concentration camps to intern not the enemy but large 
sections of the totalitarian-ruled country’s own civilian population and the 
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mobilisation of the masses. Burnham’s conception of totalitarianism is then 
historically specific (in a way in which Karl Popper’s, for example, is often 
not) but it is not dynamic.67 His lack of insight into the true nature of 
totalitarianism prevented him from seeing that totalitarianism can only remain 
stable by constant expansion and ruthless exploitation. To suggest, as 
Burnham did, that “with the consolidation of the structure of managerial 
society, its dictatorial phase (totalitarianism) will change into a democratic 
phase” is to misunderstand the meaning of totalitarianism.68 Only through a 
complete overthrow of the power of the totalitarian movement and a radical 
ideological shift could a totalitarian state become a democracy. Using rather 
Burnham-like phrasing (particularly the reduction of political possibilities to a 
small number of defined factors, which appear comprehensive but in reality 
may not be so) Goldstein/O’Brien argues: 
There are only four ways in which a ruling group can fall from power. Either it 
is conquered from without, or it governs so inefficiently that the masses are 
stirred to revolt, or it allows a strong and discontented Middle group to come 
into being, or it loses its own self-confidence and willingness to govern. These 
causes do not operate singly, and as a rule all four of them are present in 
some degree. A ruling class which could guard against all of them would 
remain in power permanently.69 
 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four the Party is, for the time being, guarding against all 
four of these dangers successfully. It is a monumental and continual effort, 
which shows in the heavy lines on O’Brien’s face. Just as Brave New World 
critiques Pareto’s conception of the “circulation of elites”, Nineteen Eighty-
Four resists the idea of progress as an ideological premise.70 This includes 
the (Post-)Enlightenment conception of Progress, in both Hegelian and 
Marxist forms, as well as liberal capitalist notions which tie increases in 
material conditions to increases in mental and physical wellbeing. Not only 
did such conceptions sit uneasily with Orwell’s empiricist streak, but he felt 
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that they were somehow morally as well as intellectually false. As he put it in 
his 1945 essay “Catastrophic Gradualism”: 
it is logical to condone tyranny and massacre if one assumes that progress is 
inevitable. If each epoch is as a matter of course better than the last, then any 
crime or any folly that pushes the historical process forward can be justified.71 
 
Such justifications are examples of what Adorno referred to as “subsumptive 
reasoning” or “instrumental rationality”.72 In Oceania, every action is done in 
the name of the Party and its mute figurehead Big Brother, but the ideology 
of Ingsoc shares similarities with that of the Oligarchy in Jack London’s The 
Iron Heel – albeit used to keep a different class in power. It is the ideology of 
the continual, brutal use of power to inflict suffering. Goldstein and the 
armies of the two other superstates are the only objects with which to fill the 
void of belief which is the necessary facilitator of loyalty to the Party. The 
terrible bleakness that many readers have found in the novel relates, in part, 
to the apparent success of this partial vacuum, to the idea that 
undifferentiated hate could successfully usurp politics. O’Brien’s commitment 
to the gross paradox of what could be termed an anti-political ideology is 
terrifying precisely because it is truly authentic and unwavering. As Richard 
Rorty boldly puts it, Orwell “does not view O’Brien as crazy, misguided, 
seduced by a mistaken theory, or blind to the moral facts. He simply views 
him as dangerous and as possible.”73 
 
O’Brien’s very persuasiveness is testament to the power that Orwell saw in 
the “intellectual implications” of totalitarianism.74 The scale and immediacy of 
the danger, as Orwell saw it, has not always been appreciated. Alex 
Zwerdling, for example, in what is generally a sympathetic account of the 
novel, objected, “If the purpose of Orwell’s book is to make people able to 
resist totalitarianism by exposing its nature and methods, the utter defeat of 
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his hero is hardly apt to strengthen their resolve.”75 But if the meagre powers 
of a single anonymous desk clerk like Winston Smith were able to rise 
successfully against the might of O’Brien and Oceania, then the danger that 
they present would not appear so real or prescient. 
 
Such criticism strips Orwell of the firm political stance from which he 
consciously wrote. He was a committed “democratic Socialist” and time and 
again he wrote to provoke and persuade people to rally behind causes of the 
Left. “He took his stand among those who were to the Left or on the Left of 
the Labour Party: fiercely egalitarian, libertarian and democratic, by 
Continental comparisons, surprisingly untheoretical, a congregation of 
secular evangelists.”76 His empirical, “common sense” socialism was 
founded not upon dialectical materialism, but upon deeply held humanistic 
values, although as his biographer Bernard Crick acknowledged, “many of 
his prejudices were conservative.”77 Like Michel de Montaigne (as Stephen 
Toulmin describes him), Orwell’s was “the modest skepticism of those who 
respect everyone’s right to opinions arrived at by honest reflection on first-
hand experience.”78 Orwell reserved his wrath for those whom he believed 
were actively dishonest (such as Stalinists) or did not have first-hand 
experience on which to reflect (as with his notorious criticism in the essay 
“Inside the Whale” of W. H. Auden’s poem “Spain” for seeming to condone 
“necessary murders”).79 Orwell believed that while armed conflict (which he 
distinguished from murder) could be justified, political ends could not be 
reached unless the means too were just. 
 
This, then, was one reason that Orwell opposed all historical meta-
narratives, including the liberal-Enlightenment idea that material progress 
was an inevitability, the Communist idea that the “success” of the Soviet 
Union paved the way for an eventual and inevitable world socialist revolution, 
the Fascist belief that history was a war of races, and James Burnham’s 
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picture of a “managerial” revolution and dictatorship of technocrats. The 
empirical evidence of reality, of events which each of these narratives had 
been unable to predict except through spurious post hoc justification, was 
sufficient proof for him of their intellectual poverty. 
 
Furthermore, Orwell believed that science and technology in and of 
themselves could not hold the answers. He understood “the idea that 
science means a way of looking at the world, and not simply a body of 
knowledge” and could see that “a mere training in one or more of the exact 
sciences, even combined with very high gifts, is no guarantee of a humane 
or sceptical outlook.” For example, “a number of German scientists [had] 
swallowed the monstrosity of ‘racial science’.”80 The opinions Orwell 
expressed in his journalism in the years when he was working on the 
manuscript of Nineteen Eighty-Four thus share similarities with Horkheimer’s 
(essentially Nietzschean) view that “The objective progress of science and its 
application, technology, do not justify the current idea that science is 
destructive only when perverted and necessarily constructive when 
adequately understood.”81  Science as it stood predicated no set of ethical 
values. Orwell categorically opposed any political worldview, such as Soviet 
Communism, which viewed itself as “scientific” in these terms. Not only did 
he disavow their scientific claims, but also the harnessing of science for non-
scientific ends. O’Brien’s – and indeed Winston’s – manipulation of history 
demonstrates that the structuring of the past into historical narrative on the 
one hand and prediction of the future on the other are structurally two quite 
different exercises. Finding a pattern in the relations between continuity and 
discontinuity in the past does not imply that one is capable of extrapolating 
such trends scientifically. Indeed, to accept that science has a history of 
progress and achievement inevitably invites a negative comparison with 
social and political “progress”. As Adorno puts it, fully conscious of the self-
contradiction of asserting a universal history while simultaneously denying 
the notion of universal history, 
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it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history 
and unites it… No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, 
but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. It ends in the 
total menace which organized mankind poses to organized men… History is 
the unity of continuity and discontinuity. Society stays alive, not despite its 
antagonism, but by means of it. 82 
 
This critique of Hegel denies that a universal meaning is written upon or 
discoverable within “History” that will reveal its future end. The totalitarian, 
Burnhamite and liberal ideologies of the twentieth century, which were 
structured around historical grand narratives (albeit that the liberal narrative 
of “progress” was not professed as “law” in the way that the totalitarians 
professed their ideologies), aim towards achieving a final synthesis ending 
the antagonisms of historical change and creating a stable future. Yet given 
the past propensity to move towards ever greater destruction – “from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb” – such theories had until then served only 
catastrophic failure. 
 
Although characteristically hyperbolic, Adorno’s teleological image may still 
be useful when we hold it up against dystopian fiction. In it, we see how 
dystopia is not so much a direct opposition to utopia, but rather an ironic 
commentary on it. Nineteen Eighty-Four denies the universal history offered 
by Soviet Communism by showing a future in which the past as we have 
already experienced it is reconstrued to fit into a mostly – but not wholly – 
different teleology. But it is not, as Deutscher, Williams and other critics 
would have it, only Soviet Communism which is attacked through this 
reconstruction of a universal history. The success of the text as satire is its 
ability to hold up a particular example such as Soviet Communism as an 
exemplar of the more general idea of destiny which is also common to the 
liberal, Enlightenment idea of progress, the Nazi ideal of the master race, 
and James Burnham’s prediction of a global managerial revolution. The 
satirical element of dystopian critique therefore functions by presenting the 
present othered into the near-future. Hence Nineteen Eighty-Four can be 
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read as a critique of the industrial modern state in all its permutations from a 
point in the near future following the total collapse of the nation-state into a 
post-industrial power bloc system of lawless total war. 
 
Critical investigation of the modern state through the self-reflexive movement 
of othering forwards (prolepsis) in order to look backwards (analepsis) is a 
common technique to dystopian fiction. As such, Orwell merely “reacted to 
the sense of an omnipresent menace, felt by many of his contemporaries, in 
a peculiarly obsessive way.”83 Experiences of contemporary politics left him 
feeling distrustful of all political classes, in every country. Politics and 
“ordinary common sense” had for him been undermined by the “cult of 
‘realism,’ with its inherent tendency to assume that the dishonest course is 
always the best one.”84 This, Orwell believed, had been central to 
international relations since before the start of World War I. 
 
When, for instance, the very same British Conservative politicians who 
Orwell accused of defending Mussolini during the 1920s and 1930s attacked 
him as a war criminal in 1943, Orwell put it down to them acting in their class 
interest: “[i]n their clumsy way they were playing the game of Machiavelli, of 
‘political realism,’ of ‘anything is right which advances the cause of the Party’ 
– the Party in this case, of course, being the Conservative Party.”85 Although 
Orwell is to an extent attacking straw men here, it is instructive to note how 
this satire works. He essentially accuses Conservatives of behaving like well-
disciplined and fully indoctrinated members of the Communist Party. Arthur 
Koestler, later reflecting on his days in the Communist Party in the 1930s, 
neatly summarised Communist discipline thus: 
I learnt to distrust my mechanistic preoccupation with facts and to regard the 
world around me in the light of dialectic interpretation… Both morally and 
logically, the Party was infallible: morally, because its aims were right, that is, 
                                            
83 Malcolm Smith, "George Orwell, War and Politics in the 1930s," Literature and History 6 
(1980), 221. 
84 Orwell, Collected Works, vol. 16, 106. 
85 Orwell, Collected Works, vol. 15, 295 emphasis added. Orwell’s quotations are not all 
entirely accurate here, and he seems rather unfair on Duff Cooper in particular, who had 
described Hitler and Mussolini as having similar “mentalities” during his resignation speech 
in the Commons, given in protest over Munich. Hansard Commons, 3 Oct. 1938, vol. 339 c. 
33. 
  Stock 185     
 
in accord with the Dialectic of History, and these aims justified all means; 
logically, because the Party was the vanguard of the proletariat, and the 
proletariat the embodiment of the active principle in History.86 
 
By distrusting “facts” and empirical “reality”, Koestler moved from an 
adherent of Leninism into a fully indoctrinated member of the Communist 
Party. The logic was brutally simple and deceptively consistent: the 
Communist Party is the Revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. Therefore, 
they always act in the ultimate revolutionary interests of the proletariat, even 
when it appears they are doing the opposite: whatever is best for the 
Communist Party is best for the workers in the long-term. By identifying the 
Conservative Party with the interests of the ruling class, Orwell draws an 
analogy with the Communists – thus castigating both as disreputable and 
dishonest. 
 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Realism again turns into farce in the war between 
the three global power blocs of Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia: during a 
“Hate Week” rally against the enemy Eurasia, Oceania swaps sides. The 
orator, “without pausing in his speech” or “even breaking the syntax” 
immediately switches the names of those he is angrily denouncing: 
Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. 
Oceania was at war with Eastasia! The next moment there was a tremendous 
commotion. The banners and posters with which the square was decorated 
were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces on them. It was 
sabotage!87 
 
The crowd tearing down these posters are of course the very same people 
who had put them up, a fact they work busily to forget. If the Party is 
infallible, reality must represent doctrine. If a gap appears between the two, it 
is reality that must adjust to the consistency of Ingsoc ideology, and the 
Party can “twist reality into whatever shape they choose.”88 This element of 
Oceanian society mirrors Orwell’s experience of the manipulation of the 
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internecine Spanish Republican struggle by Communists: “The peculiarity of 
the totalitarian state is that though it controls thought, it doesn’t fix it… It 
declares itself infallible, and at the same time it attacks the very concept of 
objective truth.”89 Stephen Ingle even forthrightly claims that Orwell was “so 
shaken… by his experiences in Spain that he devoted the rest of his creative 
life to painting pictures of a state that had torn the concept of truth from the 
fabric of social discourse.” Hence, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, “Arendt’s worst 
fear was realised, for the very nature of truth as a concept had 
disappeared.”90 Oceania is in direct accord with Arendt’s view of 
totalitarianism as a system that “destroys individuality… [by] depriv[ing] 
people of any fixed reality by which they might orient themselves.”91 Sudden 
and often oppositional change is more or less constant. Normalising such a 
state of flux inhibits resistance and prevents any but ideologically pure 
values from becoming deep-seated. The effects of this run deep. Thought 
control in Oceania is not limited to state control over what constitutes, at any 
given moment, the officially-sanctioned “truth”: as well as telling the 
population what to think, there is a sinister domination of affectivity, with the 
Party telling people how to feel and towards whom. 
 
Mass Hate 
 
At a practical level, the episode during Hate Week in which the regime 
changes the identity of the foreign power that Oceania is at war with many 
hundreds miles away at short notice is not a remarkable exercise of power 
for a state with a monopoly on the means of communication and travel. The 
speed with which this change is accepted as “true” might shock us, as might 
the “wave of understanding” that changes in the present have changed the 
“facts” of the past. The idea that the crowd as a single mass would uniformly 
and simultaneously comprehend the error as “sabotage” is certainly 
unnerving, perhaps even uncanny. But these aspects of the change are not 
truly terrifying. The full farcical horror of the response to Oceania switching 
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allies in the war resides in the speed at which hate is once more picked up: 
within four minutes of the announcement “the feral roars of rage were again 
bursting from the crowd. The Hate continued exactly as before, except that 
the target had been changed.”92 The ground is now littered with torn banners 
and posters, the square unadorned: such make-up is superfluous glitter for 
the furious crowd. The discarding of these pictures demonstrates that no real 
target is needed for hate, that it is “an abstract, undirected emotion which 
could be switched from one object to another like the flame of a blowlamp” 
because of the daily practice the citizens receive during the “Two Minutes 
Hate.”93 Its only prerequisite is that there is a target – whoever, whatever or 
wherever that should be. It is a controllable means whose only real end is 
the maintenance of its own paranoid hysteria. The manufactured hate of 
Oceania’s population is, in other words, a self-propagating creation, whose 
true nature is underlined by the capitalization of the word “Hate”, turning this 
emotion into a self-sustaining force. 
 
According to Hannah Arendt, one of the attractions of the totalitarian 
movements of the ‘twenties and ‘thirties was their dropping of any pretence 
to the respectability of bourgeois mores and values. These were 
ostentatiously violent movements, publicly whipping up hate: 
The propaganda of totalitarian movements which precede and accompany 
totalitarian regimes is invariably as frank as it is mendacious, and would-be 
totalitarian rulers usually start their careers by boasting of their past crimes 
and carefully outlining their future ones. The Nazis ‘were convinced that evil-
doing in our time has a morbid force of attraction.’94 
 
Arendt is here citing Franz Borkenau’s The Totalitarian Enemy, a book which 
Orwell himself had reviewed for Time and Tide (4 May 1940), as support for 
the arrogant public swagger of the Nazis’ criminality. Orwell, summarising 
Borkenau’s argument, tellingly writes, 
As for the hate-campaigns in which totalitarian régimes ceaselessly indulge, 
they are real enough while they last, but are simply dictated by the needs of 
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the moment… almost anyone can figure as Public Enemy No. 1. Hatred can 
be turned in any direction at a moment’s notice, like a plumber’s blow-flame.95   
 
The recurrence of the image of the blowlamp of hatred in Nineteen Eighty-
Four shows that Orwell’s early recognition that hatred could be produced, 
inflamed, sustained, controlled and directed by totalitarian movements was 
an enduring concern. Totalitarian movements selected targets against which 
to express hatred in order to rouse violent support for themselves. The aim 
of such hysterical anger was simply to further the ends of the totalitarian 
movement. 
 
To do this required a variety of tactics. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Party 
members undergo a daily propaganda exercise (the Two Minutes’ Hate). 
War is kept continually in the consciousness of Party members by any 
means possible. Telescreens continually announce the production figures for 
war materials and report from the fronts. Social pressure to participate on the 
home front is constant – indeed, Julia persuades Winston to volunteer in a 
munitions factory for one evening a week to detract suspicions away from 
their rebellion. Furthermore, they live with the daily terror of rocket attacks. If, 
as Julia suspects and as the narrator also obliquely alludes, the government 
is actually launching these attacks against its own civilians then it is only to 
provoke anger. It can serve no purpose in entrenching solidarity as the 
population is already atomized and isolated. Each death is, at bottom, that of 
a potential informant and enemy: in Oceania there are no friends or ties of 
kin. Winston’s reaction to the human hand severed at the wrist which he 
finds in the road after a nearby blast is typical:  
he kicked the thing into the gutter, and then, to avoid the crowd, turned down a 
side-street to the right. Within three or four minutes he was out of the area 
which the bomb had affected, and the sordid swarming life of the streets was 
going on as though nothing had happened.96 
 
The seemingly random victims that the blasts choose merely underline the 
fact that no one is safe in any quarter. Three or four minutes’ walk away, 
                                            
95 Orwell, Collected Works, vol. 12, 159 emphasis added. 
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however, it is business as usual (which is not to say that the explosion was 
unheard, its meaning unknown). For the narrator, there is something clearly 
immoral, something “sordid” about the lack of concern that the populace 
shows here. But the lack of concern also points to the complete isolation and 
alienation of the whole population, including Winston Smith. The severed 
hand is after all dehumanised by him, seen like a plaster moulding, a 
unhuman “thing” – the small piece of discarded life which is more disgusting 
than horrifying. The citizens of Oceania may in fact be more terrified of the 
potential consequences of getting involved, of helping out in a situation 
whose existence may very soon be denied, than wholly unconcerned.  
 
The continual changing of history is another source of creation for the energy 
needed for mass hatred. The effort required to suppress memories is itself a 
violence perpetuated upon the self. The continual suppression of old 
memories and re-inscribing of new ones ensures not only a complicit 
population, but one with a high degree of frustration, primed for destructive 
behaviour. 
 
The pressure of these mental gymnastics is greatly enhanced by the social 
dimension in which they must take place (more accurately, perhaps, this 
dimension should be termed asocial, as social connections among Party 
members are barely permitted in Oceania). When O’Brien alludes to Syme, a 
disappeared unperson, under the gaze of a telescreen, he hints at the 
boundaries of which citizens in Airstrip One must beware, to stay within the 
reality created by the regime. Each of these tactical boundaries, reinforcing 
aggressivity and alienation, combines with the sense of individual isolation 
that runs through the novel. The Party slogan “Big Brother is Watching You”, 
for instance, works on several levels. The friendly, avuncular aspect of Big 
Brother – a figure to look up to and to be inspired by – infantilises the citizen, 
who seeks in the attentive Big Brother approval and legitimisation for his 
actions. By constantly performing in front of the hidden Big Brother through 
the surveillance system of Oceania, the Party member hopes to win 
acceptance. Such acceptance is in reality the hollow prize of surviving one 
more day without having been subjected to the terrors of the Ministry of Love 
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(terrors which, on the flip side, are the price to pay for failure to perform 
according to the standards of Oceanian conformity). Inasmuch, however, as 
there is a hidden threat also lurking in the slogan, the poster does not 
attempt to rouse support through propaganda or genuine love for the Party 
or even Big Brother, but rather through terror. Indeed, in Arendtian terms, 
propaganda is entirely absent from Oceania. As with totalitarian movements, 
the Party does “not actually propagate but indoctrinate.” This difference is 
important – the masses of Airstrip One do not need to be convinced of the 
purity of Ingsoc ideology, merely shown the overwhelming power to which 
they must inevitably submit. Such indoctrination “inevitably coupled with 
terror, increases with the strength of the movement’s or the totalitarian 
government’s isolation and security from outside interference.”97 In Oceania 
then, where the outside world is cut off entirely, the conditions for total 
indoctrination and merciless terror have been perfected. In a world in which 
the appearance of reality must match a pre-written but constantly shifting 
plan, and where surveillance is absolute, the individual’s ability to display 
venomous hatred on command must be good enough to convince Big 
Brother of the completeness of her or his indoctrination. In a situation where 
everyone is a potential enemy or informant, it must also appear indisputable 
to the individual’s peers. Notwithstanding this, putting oneself beyond 
suspicion is impossible – even for O’Brien. Fear of failure to produce a 
convincing appearance of hatred powerfully motivates the affectation of 
emotions: to all intents, Party doctrine here succeeds in affecting reality. 
Even Julia, who claims to be close to laughing during the Two Minutes Hate, 
seems so caught up in hatred that while her claim may incite “envy” in 
Winston, it carries with it the air of uncertain braggadocio.98 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, Totalitarianism and the Modern State 
 
There is, however, an element of fantastic absurdity in the Two Minutes’ 
Hate. In a satirical move, its description in the first pages of the novel 
immediately follows, and is juxtaposed with, Winston’s diary account of his 
                                            
97 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 344. 
98 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 160, cf. 16. 
  Stock 191     
 
previous evening’s trip to the cinema, in which a film depicting the killing of 
refugees in boats by Oceania helicopter gunships is greeted with “shout[s] of 
laughter” by Party members (it is unclear whether this is a “news” film or a 
work of fiction). The two experiences are tightly linked: “It was, he now 
realised, because of this other incident [the Two Minutes’ Hate] that he had 
suddenly decided to come home and begin the diary today.”99 In both scenes 
Winston is part of an emotionally manipulated group audience observing 
war-related propaganda, and the status of “truth” and “fiction” constantly 
shifts. The Two Minutes’ Hate utilises every cheap cinematic propaganda 
trick possible to rouse enmity. But lest this seem too fantastical, the previous 
night’s cinema experience reminds the reader that propaganda and 
indoctrination take many forms. War films in Britain during World War II, such 
as British Pathé’s coverage of the bombing of Dresden – which seems to 
joke about the destruction caused by the R.A.F. and US Air Force – could be 
just as dehumanizing.100 As Zwerdling notes, Orwell’s “use of fantasy is 
deliberately rationed, and within the fantastic framework there is a good deal 
of realistic observation.”101 The scene is then at once satirical and sobering. 
It is the first attempt of the novel to provide a critique of the ambivalent 
relationship between totalitarianism and the modern state in which the 
potential for new totalitarian forms frequently lurks and must be in every 
instance vigilantly resisted. In other words, there are clear and important 
differences between the totalitarianism of the 1930s and ‘40s as described 
by German émigré theorists such as Arendt, Adorno and Horkheimer, who 
had lived through the Nazi rise to power, and the fictional superstate of 
Oceania. 
 
The critique of the modern state reaches its apotheosis in Part III of the 
novel, when O’Brien tortures Winston Smith in the Ministry of Love. As 
Deutscher points out, there is a similar scene in both Huxley’s Brave New 
World and Zamyatin’s We – the ultimate source of inspiration can be 
ascribed to the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers 
                                            
99 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 10, 11. 
100 Dresden Bombed to Atoms, first broadcast 22 February 1945, British Pathé Newsreel 
Archive, <http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=13192>, 13 February 2011. 
101 Zwerdling, "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy," 93. 
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Karamazov.102 Where it differs from these other texts, however, is that 
O’Brien is no leader – merely an inner Party functionary. Big Brother is a 
symbol who unlike Zamyatin’s Benefactor or Huxley’s World Controller is 
nowhere given his own voice. He may not even be a living individual. Indeed, 
the hollow personality cult surrounding this silent poster boy demonstrates 
that Nineteen Eighty-Four goes far beyond Nazi or Stalinist totalitarianism. 
Critics like Peter Firchow, who see the whole text as a direct allegory of 
extant, particularly Russian, totalitarianism, are bringing presuppositions to 
the text which may be ultimately unhelpful.103 
 
In some ways Oceania has gone beyond totalitarian methods and aims; in 
other ways it is less arbitrary.104 Orwell implies this difference directly when 
O’Brien says, “in the twentieth century, there were the totalitarians, as they 
were called.”105 He uses these societies as contrasting examples to his own. 
The totalitarians, according to O’Brien, allowed martyrs to be made of their 
enemies. They did not control the past in its totality. These were their 
weaknesses. Oceania makes every confession true – everyone who goes 
through Winston’s ordeal believes in their guilt and the infallibility of the Party 
by the end of it. The radical power of the Party is to break down the 
personality, and then rebuild it, cast it anew. “The command of the old 
despotisms was ‘Thou shalt not’. The command of the totalitarians was 
‘Thou shalt’. Our command is ‘Thou art’.”106 
 
Oceania’s ontological power of destruction and re-creation – its ability to 
command “Thou art” – rests on its control of history and its control of 
language. Newspeak is a language created by the Party to try to prevent 
                                            
102 Deutscher, "1984 - The Mysticism of Cruelty," 32; on Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor as a 
source of dystopian narrative and imagery, see Kumar, Utopia and anti-Utopia in Modern 
Times, 120-2. 
103 Firchow argues that the reaction of the Soviet government to the text, which denounced 
Orwell as if he had provided a sequel to Animal Farm that attempted to provide the same 
criticisms in a different way, is proof (post hoc) that Nineteen Eighty-Four is just such an 
attack on Russia. This seems to put the cart before the horse. See Firchow, Modern Utopian 
Fictions from H. G. Wells to Iris Murdoch, 114 n. 20. 
104 Hence Irving Howe terms Nineteen Eighty-Four a “post-totalitarian” world, of 
“totalitarianism after its world triumph.” Howe, "1984: History as Nightmare," 53. 
105 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 266. See also O’Brien’s comment, “The German Nazis and 
the Russian Communists came very close to us in their methods…” (276). 
106 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 267. 
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dissent from orthodoxy by cutting out the ability to formulate unorthodox 
opinions verbally. This is a means of psychological terror and, in contrast to 
the totalitarian regimes that merely burnt subversive books, requires the 
translation (i.e. butchering) of all pre-Newspeak literature into new, censored 
versions, so that the possibility of subversive interpretation is lost. A 
consequence is that while both Oceania and the Arendtian description of 
totalitarianism entail “a system of ubiquitous spying, where everybody may 
be a police agent and each individual feels himself under constant 
surveillance…” the attempted occlusion by means of Newspeak of the 
ambiguities of language implies that no longer can “every word becom[e] 
equivocal and subject to retrospective ‘interpretation’.”107 
 
Under a totalitarian regime, Arendt argues, the secret police “are no longer 
concerned with knowing what is going on in the heads of future victims (most 
of the time they ignore who these victims will be)”.108 None of the victims in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is chosen randomly or because of their class, ethnicity 
or other social grouping as in totalitarianism. Syme, for example, the theorist 
and writer of the Newspeak Dictionary, is “too intelligent” and creative for his 
own good.109 Parsons, a most enthusiastic Party worker, is arrested on the 
evidence of his young child for talking subversively in his sleep. As for 
knowing what is going on in their victims’ heads, O’Brien is aware almost 
before Winston himself what his answers will be. “You are thinking…” is his 
repeated dictate. 
 
Although the terror is not random, neither is the persecution logical. Winston 
Smith’s only physical acts against the Party are making love to Julia and 
keeping a secret diary. His rebellion is the anonymous intellectual revolt of 
an extremely unimportant bureaucrat. Yet O’Brien claims to have been 
tracking Winston for seven years. The lack of anonymity of this low-level 
desk clerk, the personal and planned nature of Winston’s victimisation, 
                                            
107 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 431. 
108 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 426. 
109 The case of Symes actually demonstrates a trait shared by totalitarianism as Arendt 
describes the phenomenon: brilliance is not tolerated for long, mediocrity being by far 
preferable. See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 339. 
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distinguishes the torture of Nineteen Eighty-Four from that of texts about 
totalitarian terrors such as the interrogation of the former Party grandee in 
Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, or the forgotten Siberian Gulag of 
Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. 
 
Orwell’s critique of historical processes suggests that totalitarianism is not 
static, that it must evolve and morph significantly in its approach to really 
gain total domination. The text also suggests that totalitarianism is a 
historically contingent form of society whose origins can be traced back to 
the Enlightenment and beyond, but whose movement is by its very nature 
irrational and volatile. Totalitarianism does not develop out of any ontological 
necessity – be it laws of Nature or of History – and neither will Oceania. But 
both are possible futures, and this is Orwell’s warning: it could happen 
anywhere. The potential exists in the nature of the modern state. Orwell’s 
call to arms, his moral, as he put it in a press release for the US, is “don’t let 
it happen.  It depends on you.”110 
 
Nature, the Body and the Self 
 
Such ‘unnatural’ mutations of the modern state would entail what Huxley 
had, with reference to Brave New World, termed a “really revolutionary 
revolution” – that is, a complete transformation of the notion of selfhood.111 In 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Party’s actions throughout are intended to prevent 
the citizen from forming a coherent identity based around a stable model of 
self. The identity which the citizen of Oceania is permitted is fragmented, 
uncertain, frantically anxious and always frightened. The body is itself 
something alien to the self, something which in its very ‘naturalness’ is 
somehow slightly revolting. It is pressed into the minds of the Outer Party 
members every morning during the “Physical Jerks”, a daily series of 
exercises they are required to practice under the watchful eye of the 
telescreen, while “wearing… the look of grim enjoyment which was 
                                            
110 Quoted in Crick, George Orwell: A Life 395. The press release was dictated to, and 
edited by, Fredric Warburg. 
111 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 8-9. 
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considered proper.”112 The purpose of these exercises, as the instructress 
makes clear by reference to the hardships endured by Oceanian troops 
fighting “on the Malabar front”, is to demonstrate to people like Winston their 
physical inadequacy. Only the conscious mind, which can choose to 
consciously submit to the will of the Party, is capable of purity. Like these 
exertions, physical torture forces the Oceanian victim to recognise the body 
as a central part of his or her self, to recognise that “nothing in the world [is] 
so bad as physical pain.”113 In a sense, in Oceania physical pain is criminal, 
or at least proof positive of guilt; as an overwhelming physical sensation it 
demonstrates to the individual that they have failed to live up to the 
standards that the Party expects of them. In singling out a person’s 
individuality, pain inherently contains an added humiliation in a society where 
even to feel as an individual, distinct from the mass, is both criminal and a 
vice. 
 
Ahlbäck regards the body as a reminder of the natural in Nineteen Eighty-
Four and a representative metonym for nature. “The Oceanian fiction of 
limitless expansion means at least an explicit war against physically living 
human bodies.”114 In her reading, the body is a symbol of the ‘real’ beyond 
the Party’s control, which they wish to tame. Oceania’s power is condemned 
to remain incomplete, because “the body lives and resists through its pure 
crying existence, however tortured.”115 The difficulty with this approach is 
that it implies that the Party is an agent operating within rational parameters 
for its own self-interest, and moving towards a final and attainable goal. This 
seems contrary to its concern with maintaining an abysmal social stasis of 
oppression. Indeed, to maintain its iron grip on power, Ingsoc must perform a 
careful balancing act between the need for expansion in order to sustain the 
Party as a movement on the one hand, and on the other the requirement for 
human fuel, victims to spend in the brutal exercise of power. The body is a 
conduit for attacking the mind, and its preservation as the one site in which 
something outside of the Party remains in the individual has as much use to 
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Party ideology as complete control of the whole organism would. The fact 
that bodies exist is not an “irritant” to the Party – on the contrary, it 
demonstrates on behalf of the Party to the individual that he or she is flawed, 
guilty, and therefore deserving of punishment, humiliation and torture. 
 
Furthermore, physical pain demonstrates to the individual that there is 
something physically wrong with them. This is imperative for the Party to be 
able to able to show them that they are sick. The attack on Winston’s faculty 
of reasoning in Part III of the novel is two-pronged: O’Brien seeks to show 
Winston that his model of self, so intimately tied up with his faculty of 
reasoning (in accordance with the post-Enlightenment tradition) is faulty. But 
he also wishes to convince Winston that he is ill, that his mistreatment is for 
his own good: “I am taking trouble with you, Winston… because you are 
worth trouble… You are mentally deranged. You suffer from a defective 
memory… Fortunately it is curable.”116 The physical mistreatment is itself the 
litmus test for this argument. Physical mistreatment proves, in Oceanian 
terms, that Winston is ill and enables Winston to believe this. But 
mistreatment is also a cause of the breakdown in Winston’s ability to reason. 
Pain literally prevents him from reasoning. It is the “surgery” which excises 
the “deranged” faculties within him. The use of violence against Winston is a 
viciously circular process. 
 
Torture and Philosophy 
 
The torture of Winston Smith is imperative to breaking down his personality, 
but severe physical mistreatment is not enough by itself to affect the change 
that the Party desires. It is part of a much longer process. After his arrest, 
Winston is first kept in a cell through which various other characters pass, 
each of them condemned for the same crime – “there is only one offence” as 
the newspeak poet Ampleforth puts it. The sycophant Party activist Parsons 
asks him rhetorically “You don’t think the Party would arrest an innocent 
man, do you?” Guilt is assured. Winston is made aware that everyone is 
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culpable, from a drunken prole woman who tells him “I might be your mother” 
to a “skull-faced” victim of starvation whose humanity has deserted him.117 
There is something appalling in the physicality of these visitors: the drunken 
woman falls on top of Winston, vomits on the floor, pulls him towards her 
“breathing beer and vomit into his face.” Parsons defecates “loudly and 
abundantly.” The starving man’s overly-large eyes appear “filled with a 
murderous, unappeasable hatred of somebody or something.”118 Winston 
must first begin to associate himself with these people, both as someone 
who is guilty and as something dirty, decaying and offensive to his own 
sensibilities. Only then does his physical torture begin. The mistreatment 
which the text skirts over, at the hands of lower-level functionaries, prepares 
Winston by humiliating him and making him feel a certain way about his 
physical self, to make it easier for O’Brien to undertake the real interrogation. 
 
The dialogue between Winston and O’Brien in these torture scenes focuses 
on metaphysical questions: the nature of memory, reality, and belief, models 
of rationality, and the limits and plasticity of that slippery phrase “human 
nature.” This is Orwell’s turn to self, to questions of how to cope with the loss 
of autonomy engendered in a modern world of terror. Orwell explores the 
links between historical changes in philosophical modelling of the self and 
the implications of a modern ideology that undermines the very notion of 
selfhood. Using the multiplicity of voices which the novel form permits, he 
probes this question from several angles. 
 
If The Origins of Totalitarianism was Hannah Arendt’s attempt to understand 
how Europe could give birth to the Enlightenment and the Rights of Man as 
well as a “brutally murderous” form of politics like totalitarianism, then 
Nineteen Eighty-Four seems to ask the Arendtian question:119 ‘Why does the 
Enlightenment tradition have no answer to O’Brien?’ or, put another way, 
why is Winston so easily defeated by his arguments – that “[w]hatever he 
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said, the swift answer crushed him like a bludgeon”?120 The novel’s answer 
is only partially Arendtian: we can read in the conversion of Winston from 
rebel to penitent the repression of spontaneous action into socially controlled 
behaviour. This for Arendt was part of the modern human condition.121 But 
by juxtaposing the concrete physical torture of Winston with abstract anti-
philosophical argument by a character well-versed in rationalist philosophy, 
Orwell links physical domination with domination in the conceptual realm – a 
more Adornian move. Richard Rorty argues that, “Like Nietzsche, O’Brien 
regards the whole idea of being ‘answered,’ of exchanging ideas, of 
reasoning together, as a symptom of weakness…”122 This belies the time 
and trouble O’Brien is willing to take with Winston. O’Brien is a new type of 
man from a truly transformed society for whom metaphysical questions about 
the self are simply irrelevant: “All this”, O’Brien says of their metaphysical 
discussion “is a digression.”123 
 
Yet O’Brien is perfectly willing to explore questions of truth and subjectivity, 
just so long as they take place within parameters that he rigidly controls. 
O’Brien structures these debates as if they were exchanges between 
oppositional epistemological viewpoints, when in fact he will only have 
discussions on his own terms. Put crudely, O’Brien offers an 
instrumentalized rationalist epistemology that is able to consume Winston’s 
empirical understanding of the world: Oceania is not as it appears, but as the 
logic of Ingsoc ideology dictates. This, as explored above, involves the 
disappearance of the very concept of truth as we understand it. 
 
The process of conceptual domination begins to break down Winston from 
the moment that he asserts his existence as a thinking being. Descartes’s 
cogito ergo sum here becomes (in Winston’s words): “I think I exist… I am 
conscious of my own identity.”124 But since he entered the Ministry of Love 
Winston has no identity in the sense he intends. Nor has he recourse to 
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causality – to an “ergo”. His power of reason, his ability as an individual to 
frame questions in terms of causality, has come into doubt: interrogation and 
torture have affected him so severely he almost takes O’Brien at his word. 
O’Brien dominates Winston’s mind to such an extent that the Cartesian 
introspective construction of the self is displaced and it is O’Brien who 
becomes the first referent by whom Winston may begin to reconstruct his 
identity. For O’Brien and the Party “Power… creates reality, it creates truth” – 
a position that “can be said to be an extreme form of philosophical idealism.” 
Whether or not this is philosophically tenable is irrelevant to O’Brien’s aims – 
all that really matters to him is the radically pragmatist goal that Winston 
should construct his identity on O’Brien’s own terms.125 O’Brien therefore 
shows him that as he frequently leaps to conclusions that are not in 
accordance with Ingsoc ideology, Winston’s powers of reason must be 
dangerously unreliable. Winston knows, for example, that O’Brien’s 
statement “‘you do not exist’, contain[s] a logical absurdity”, but as he knows 
he could not win such an argument, “what use was it to say so?”126 
 
Likewise, O’Brien cautions Winston against empiricism as his senses may 
very well deceive him (the Cartesian “evil demon” here being the “sickness” 
which O’Brien asserts Winston is suffering from).127 Not heeding his warning, 
Winston continues to press O’Brien by recourse to materialism: “I was born, 
and I shall die. I have arms and legs. I occupy a particular point in space. No 
other solid object can occupy the same point simultaneously. In that sense”, 
he asks O’Brien, “does Big Brother exist?” Winston frantically grasps here at 
the discourse of the physical sciences, empirical Newtonian physics, matter 
and motion. These accounts of reality, so easily taken for granted, are again 
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defeated – not by oppositional theses but by virtue of being irrelevant: “It is of 
no importance. He exists”, replies O’Brien.128 
 
For Rorty, this breaking apart of Winston’s faculty of reason, the tearing up of 
his ability to construct a “coherent web of belief and desire” is the central 
purpose of this torture. The only reason for getting Winston to believe that 2 
+ 2 = 5 is because Winston himself has picked on 2 + 2 = 4 as symbolic. 
Breaking this apart means that he can “no longer justify [him]self to 
[him]self.” Without this ability to rationalize, Winston is “forced to realize that 
he has become incoherent, realize that he is no longer able to use a 
language or be a self.”129 The symbolically invested idea is like a lever-point 
that allows O’Brien to break open Winston completely. To Rorty, “it is the 
sound of the tearing, not the result of the putting together, that is the object 
of the exercise. It is the breaking that matters. The putting together is just an 
extra fillip.”130 Rorty is correct that at the subjective level, the symbolism with 
which Winston invests “2 + 2 = 4” means that to make him disbelieve this 
has profound and far-reaching consequences. However, the “object of the 
exercise” is not simply to break Winston. Were this the case, it could be done 
in far more impersonal surroundings – such as, for example, the labour 
camps which are mentioned at the start of Part III. Furthermore, Winston’s 
interrogation by O’Brien is not immediate, but the end of a process of weeks 
or months of previous mistreatment and torture, interrogation and 
assimilation into the prison world of Miniluv. 
 
The ultimate act of power to which O’Brien aspires is not just to break his 
captive but for Winston to thank him for destroying him and then offering him 
a means of redemption, by allowing him to constantly debase and humiliate 
himself. It is not just that the old thoughts are now impossible, but that the 
new thoughts are what the Party puts there, and nothing more. As O’Brien 
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insists, “we shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with 
ourselves.”131 The breaking and re-moulding of Winston is one of only a very 
few avenues for creativity left in Oceania. O’Brien sees himself as a sculptor, 
a morbid type of ‘artist’, who sculpts not from wood or stone but from human 
beings, and who believes that “even though men suffer and die in the 
process, they are lifted by it to a height to which they could never have risen 
without [his] coercive – but creative – violation of their lives.”132 If he is able 
to practice “doublethink” – to simultaneously hold two contradictory beliefs – 
to the extent which he claims he can when he drops a photograph in an 
incinerator and immediately denies that it ever existed, then he is a 
remarkable creator indeed. O’Brien also claims to be author of the 
‘Emmanuel Goldstein’ text The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical 
Collectivism in which he presents a cogent and coherent anti-Ingsoc account 
of the development of Oceania and the three super-states’ world order. 
O’Brien entirely understands Winston’s opposition – but it is irrelevant to the 
concrete reality of physical torture in the Ministry of Love. It is not so much 
that the state of play has shifted, but rather that O’Brien is playing an 
altogether different and more terrifying game. 
 
O’Brien’s ‘creative’ work as torturer is comparable to that of the eponymous 
villain of H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), who explains to 
the narrator visiting his island that “these creatures you have seen are 
animals carven and wrought into new shapes. To that – to the study of the 
plasticity of living forms – my life has been devoted.”133 Not only does 
Moreau transform the animals physically, breaking their bodies, and then go 
on to transform them into new, human shapes with re-moulded brains, he 
then completes (so he believes) the ultimate act of power: he gives them “the 
Law” – a catechism with which he tries to impose on them a new moral and 
ethical consciousness, a whole belief structure. Similarly, O’Brien breaks 
Winston’s body, and in the ultimate act of power he gets inside Winston’s 
psyche and transforms his whole consciousness, his personality, his 
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132 Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 35. 
133 H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, ed. Patrick Parrinder (London: Penguin, 2005) 
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individuality, that which makes him human. At the same time, he sets up a 
new Law, “an agency within him to watch over [the individual’s dangerous 
desire] like a garrison in a conquered city” as Freud described the super-ego 
in Civilisation and its Discontents.134 Ahlbäck’s analysis of O’Brien’s actions 
in this section of the novel stresses his conformity to the figure of the 
Lacanian Father.135 The Law (as the Lacanian Nom du père) can be seen in 
action in the novel’s final scene: “He pushed the picture out of his mind. It 
was a fake memory. He was troubled by false memories occasionally. They 
did not matter so long as one knew them for what they were.”136 
 
The fact that the Inner Party can bring Winston back to the memory of his 
betrayal just by playing “under the Chestnut tree/I sold you and you sold me” 
and thereby humiliate him is not the final end for which he is tortured. The 
tears in Winston’s eyes seem to suggest instead that he has been made to 
feel genuinely grateful for this humiliation. He sees himself as a born-again 
Christian sees himself through the eyes of a vengeful God and a ‘fire-and-
brimstone’ preacher. He has been reconstituted as a masochist – whereas 
he previously felt sorry for himself, for the Victory Gin and varicose veins, the 
boredom and daily humiliations, he is now thankful for precisely these very 
attacks and pains he is made to suffer. 
 
Hope for the Future? 
 
To pose the question of whether Winston’s conversion means that Nineteen 
Eighty-Four is a despairing or an ultimately hopeful novel is to approach it 
with an agenda already set, to come to it having pre-made a decision of what 
it should do as a political novel to conform to our own anxieties or hopes 
about the future. To present this as an either/or choice may be ultimately 
unhelpful. Orwell wrote many essays, several pamphlets and three book-
                                            
134 Freud, "Civilisation and its Discontents," 124. This occurs similarly in Zamyatin’s We: see 
above, 104. 
135 “Winston’s body in the uncouthly fatherlike O’Brien’s mirror is a trace… Winston is 
overcome by sorrow for his tortured body, he can hardly recognize himself. He starts crying 
out of pity for his body. In Lacanian terms this is the mirror of a sadistic symbolic order, the 
mad Law of a mad Father.” Ahlbäck, Energy, Heterotopia, Dystopia 118 +ff. 
136 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 309. 
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length documentaries. Had he wished to present a single predictive 
viewpoint on the future of world history, he was amply capable of doing so 
using the skills of a seasoned journalist and his varied lived experience. In 
Williams’s words, 
Orwell [was] much more than a passive figure in this dominant structure of 
feeling. He shared it, but he tried to transcend it… He was the writer who put 
himself out, who kept going and taking part, and who learned to write as a 
function of this precise exploration.137 
 
He chose to write an experimental dystopian novel, stretching the capacities 
and traditional limits of the form through the inclusion of Goldstein’s text and 
“The Principles of Newspeak” appendix. As such, one should assume that he 
wished to make use of the unique advantages that the novel form permits. 
The first edition of the book made a point of this on the dust jacket cover, on 
which, over the top of the number ‘1984’ written in light green on an emerald 
background were the words in white, 
nineteen eighty-four 
a novel 
Only in subsequent editions was the second line removed. 
 
A principal advantage of using the novel form for any political writer is the 
ability to present a multiplicity of voices. The third person omniscient narrator 
enables Orwell to mingle satire, social commentary and critiques of a variety 
of political ideologies as well as a warning about the future. In this warning 
was both despair and hope. There was despair for the complicated path of 
history that had led from the Enlightenment promise of a future founded on 
peace and reason to the Nazi death camps, and seemed to be heading only 
towards further terrors. Despair too that the postwar world had replaced 
many of the problems which had led to war with new, and potentially even 
more dangerous ones. Yet even in this despair there was, implicitly, hope in 
the notion that this fictional world was after all only one possible world, that in 
history as in the novel there are a multiplicity of voices and potentials. 
Despite the presentation of the future as containing an inherent potential for 
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evil, Nineteen Eighty-Four, as a dystopian fiction, expresses hope and 
reassurance that a future is worth fighting for. 
 
It is for this reason that some critics like Ahlbäck have looked for the utopian 
potential in Nineteen Eighty-Four.138 At the very least, in provoking the 
discussion about whether Nineteen Eighty-Four is an open or closed text, 
Orwell has successfully roused generations of his readers into an argument 
about their own attitudes towards the future and what sort of world we can or 
should try to achieve, as well as what sort of society we can and should 
avoid creating. The novel thus prompts its readers to look for the cracks in 
the Oceanian regime, to find our own way to challenge O’Brien and the 
Party. Winston fails so that we as readers can do better. The choice for the 
active, politically-minded reader is, then, between accepting Nineteen Eighty-
Four as a despairing text, or, renouncing quietism, to look for hope in even 
its darkest passages. Once this choice is wagered, finding a route out of 
Oceania is by no means impossible: Ingsoc is after all riddled with 
contradictions. 
 
The seeds of destruction of Oceania are in fact contained within the seeming 
strength of its total domination because, paradoxically, of its need for victims 
and for terror. The system in Oceania is based not on total world dominance 
but on total war; conquest of the world is only the justification for conquest of 
the individual, represented by Winston and Julia. Oceania is wholly 
dependent upon an ‘other’ to function. As O’Brien puts it “Goldstein and his 
heresies will live for ever.”139 But Goldstein is not the only ‘other’: Winston 
Smith, Julia, the prisoners of war hanged in Trafalgar Square, the cheap 
African and Indian labourers over whom the power blocs fight, the ignored 
proles who are not Party members – all these are others. Williams condemns 
Orwell for making the proles and the “coolies” passive.140 But their very 
passivity – or rather their latency – could also be the Sword of Damocles that 
makes the text an open, hopeful one. 
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These others, these outsiders, are the pillars on which the power of Oceania 
is dependent, a power which must constantly expand or else fail: 
Since power is essentially only a means to an end a community based solely 
on power must decay in the calm of order and stability; its complete security 
reveals that it is built on sand. Only by acquiring more power can it guarantee 
the status quo; only by constantly extending its authority and only through the 
process of power accumulation can it remain stable.141 
 
The problem for Oceania is that the world is finite. If it burns too brightly it will 
run out of human fuel. If the adoption of Newspeak is successful, O’Briens of 
the future will find no more victims with subversive thoughts. But if Goldstein 
is, as O’Brien assures us, to live forever, then the language of dissent, the 
possibility of betrayal, the meaning of the word “sabotage” and “counter-
revolution” must always be widely known too. The open-ended nature of the 
dark history of Oceania mirrors the mood and experience of the postwar 
climate. Nineteen Eighty-Four as a dystopia should be conceived as dealing 
with an emerging world, as negotiating shifting sands and a future that was 
terrifyingly uncertain where dark spectres new and old loomed and hope 
flickered, a small but still bright light. 
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“Life in All its Forms is Strife”: John Wyndham, 
Dystopianism and Science Fiction 
 
LIFE IN ALL ITS FORMS IS STRIFE; THE BETTER MATCHED THE OPPONENTS, THE 
HARDER THE STRUGGLE. 
–JOHN WYNDHAM 
The Kraken Wakes (1953) 
 
Beginning with his 1951 breakthrough novel The Day of the Triffids, John 
Wyndham began to take the dystopian novel in a new direction, emphasising 
afresh the genre’s strong links to the fantastic premises and transformations 
of science fiction. The fact that he was so overtly inspired by H. G. Wells’s 
scientific romances helped him win over an unusually large readership for 
science fiction in Britain.1 Huxley and Orwell had turned to Wells’s later 
utopias principally as targets for criticism and satire. In contrast, Wyndham 
looked appreciatively toward Wells’s earlier work. Nevertheless, what links 
Wyndham to Huxley and Orwell is his specific “attention to social and 
political critique.” Wyndham’s fiction seems to back up M. Keith Booker’s 
belief that such critique marks dystopia out from the more general category 
of science fiction, placing it closer to “projects of social and cultural critics.”2 
This is not to suggest, however, that dystopia and SF are wholly separable. 
Just as, say, Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre is no less gothic for being a 
Bildungsroman, so The Day of the Triffids can be productively read as both 
an apocalyptic SF novel and dystopian fiction. Indeed, one characteristic 
difference separating literary utopias and dystopias is that while utopias 
represent “an older high cultural tradition of writing to which some (but 
actually very little) generic SF can be allied”,3 dystopias are more closely 
aligned to generic SF, which Luckhurst describes as 
a literature of technologically saturated societies. A genre that can therefore 
emerge only relatively late in modernity, it is a popular literature that concerns 
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the impact of Mechanism (to use the older term for technology) on cultural life 
and human subjectivity…4 
 
Several of Wyndham’s novels engage with “the impact of Mechanism” 
through a kind of via negativa, by taking the social structures of Mechanism 
away. The role of technology is highlighted by the gradual removal of its 
trappings, especially modern technocratic specialisation. This may occur 
through the breakdown of society (as in The Day of the Triffids or The 
Kraken Wakes (1953)) or through the radical transformation of social 
relations so that they more closely resemble those of a non-scientific age 
before the colonisation of ‘nature’ through scientific technologies took place 
(as in The Chrysalids (1955)). The dystopian elements of these novels work 
along a similar logic: rather than pit individuals against the might of the 
modern state, in The Day of the Triffids individuals are pitted against the 
power of nature. Diverging from the earlier dystopias discussed in previous 
chapters, critique in Wyndham’s novels veers more towards the social than 
the political (in its formal, institutional terms). Thus whilst L.J. Hurst is to 
some extent correct when he posits that, like Nineteen Eighty-Four, the main 
theme of The Day of the Triffids is “permanent horror”, and that “[t]he two 
novels are about the logical consequences of irrationality”, there are two 
important caveats.5 Firstly, the endings of both novels, far from being 
despairing, offer some hope (however tentative) in humankind’s ability to 
form non-oppressive societies (however geographically and temporally 
limited). Whilst, in Barry Langford’s words, The Day of the Triffids seems 
“caught between nostalgia for a lost world of dubious merits and scepticism 
about what may replace it”, the Isle of Wight provides a space for a 
community founded on a humanistic model of rationality.6 Secondly, 
although Orwell’s novel focuses on the terror of power relations that are 
expressly political in nature, The Day of the Triffids, by collapsing the 
hegemonic locus of power – the modern state – focuses to a greater extent 
on the varying success and failure of attempts by people to organise 
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themselves socially when, as it were, stumbling blocks are placed before the 
blind. 
 
Dystopian themes are, then, more diffuse in The Day of the Triffids and 
Wyndham’s second (published) postwar novel The Kraken Wakes, both of 
which may be termed ‘apocalyptic-dystopias’ (a term that will be explored 
below). But The Chrysalids makes more straightforward use of a dystopian 
structure as well as clearly signalled dystopic themes. It is here that the Cold 
War and socio-biological themes that characterise his fiction of this period 
most closely and lucidly intertwine. 
 
John Wyndham has received remarkably scant attention from literary 
scholars considering both his long-term influence on Anglo-American SF and 
his wide readership. This chapter begins by endeavouring to picking apart 
one of the reasons for this – namely that in Billion Year Spree, Brian Aldiss 
(who was also the author of Wyndham’s entry in the Dictionary of National 
Biography)7 dubbed him the “master of the cosy catastrophe” – a charge 
from which Wyndham’s work has never escaped. This will make it possible 
to re-position Wyndham in the critical field and to examine his work in the 
postwar context – particularly the interrelations of apocalyptic and dystopian 
themes. The importance of war and the figure of the atomic bomb (which is 
rarely named but which can often be found lurking in the background of his 
fiction) will be emphasised. A further defining element of Wyndham’s postwar 
fiction is the central importance of gender relations and sexual politics, which 
ties The Chrysalids firmly into the dystopian genre. Turning to more esoteric 
and religious themes, the continuing impact of (post-)Enlightenment thought 
on dystopian fiction, particularly with regards to the image of the walking 
carnivorous eponymous plants of The Day of the Triffids will be considered. 
This chapter draws to a close by mapping Wyndham’s work as the dystopian 
thought of a liberal Utopian. 
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Cosy Catastrophes 
 
In Billion Year Spree, Brian Aldiss describes Wyndham's novels as “cosy 
catastrophes”, and with dismissive elitism, claims that both The Day of the 
Triffids and The Kraken Wakes “were totally devoid of ideas but read 
smoothly, and thus reached a maximum audience, who enjoyed cosy 
disasters.” What Aldiss means is unclear, however, as in seeming direct 
contradiction he then asserts that these novels’ popularity rests on inter-
related social concerns they embody: “either… the collapse of the British 
Empire, or the back-to-nature movement, or a general feeling that 
industrialisation had gone too far, or all three.”8 
 
Owen Webster's article “John Wyndham as Novelist of Ideas”, is not directly 
concerned with refuting Aldiss’s claim, but nevertheless does so by default. It 
is, Webster argues, “the spectacle and symbolic power of chaos through 
blindness, worked out logically and remorselessly, that elevates [Triffids] to 
the status of a novel of ideas.”9 One such episode, for him, is the chaining of 
the sighted protagonist Bill Masen to a scavenging gang of blind people by a 
humanitarian agitator (Coker): “Here, though virtually unexplored, is one of 
the key issues of our time: the strange ties that exist between opposing 
elements – master and servant, oppressor and oppressed.” The scene 
recalls for Webster the relationship “more potently developed... with Pozzo 
and Lucky in Beckett's Waiting for Godot”,10 (or indeed, one could add, the 
social analysis of Odysseus and the Sirens made by Horkheimer and Adorno 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment).11 Despite his intentions to get away from the 
gang of blind scavengers, Masen is daily bonded further to them by pity (the 
“trick” Coker has played on him he therefore terms “holding the baby”). While 
Masen, unlike Odysseus, quickly breaks the physical bonds put on him by 
Coker's men through his cunning, the social bonds grow ever tighter and he 
attempts to organize scavenging systematically. In an act presented in 
                                            
8 Brian W. Aldiss, Billion Year Spree: The History of Science Fiction (London: Weidenfeld, 
1973), 294. 
9 Owen Webster, "John Wyndham as Novelist of Ideas," SF Commentary 44/45 (1975), 44. 
10 Webster, "John Wyndham as Novelist of Ideas," 45. 
11 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 32-6. 
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patriarchal terms as both courageous and pathetic, a nameless eighteen-
year old virgin offers her body to Masen on condition he stays with the 
group.12 This provokes an unusually emotional reaction from Masen; he 
cannot “stand the reproach of her. She was not just herself – she was 
thousands upon thousands of young lives destroyed…”13 Appalled by her 
desperate offer he resolves to stay, but when a mysterious fatal virus takes 
hold of the blind in his care he helps the young woman only so far as to give 
her the means to kill herself. As C.N. Manlove puts it, “it is a case of Bill 
paying his last respects to a moral code fast disappearing with society; or in 
practical terms, since he quickly escapes scot free, of having his moral cake 
and eating it.”14 
 
Jo Walton fiercely criticises the placing of Masen as bourgeois master over 
the blind masses. She strips the term “cosy catastrophe” of Aldiss’s cultural 
elitism (that of an SF aficionado towards the mainstream). Re-
conceptualising the phrase so that “cosy” essentially becomes a metonym 
for “bourgeois”, Walton uses it to charge John Wyndham with class snobbery 
and social elitism. In “Who Survives the Cosy Catastrophe?” Walton's 
answer to the question her title proposes is that it is 
Almost inevitably nice middle-class white men. They're usually well educated. 
They may not have a university degree, but they all have A-levels. They 
usually went to minor public schools, or a good grammar school. They're never 
rich or titled, but they never grew up in a council house either. They're 
practical, often scientists, inevitably secular agnostics.15 
 
While Walton does not establish a connection between public school and 
“cosy” environments here, it is true that the heroes of Wyndham’s novels 
(who, like Aldiss, Walton uses as an exemplar) were all secular, agnostic 
scientists. Yet this is also true of a fairly large amount of SF – particularly in 
the historical context of the postwar period. Indeed, whilst more 
comprehensive than Aldiss’s briefer summary, Walton’s extensive exposition 
                                            
12 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 114, 123-5. 
13 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 124. 
14 C. N. Manlove, "Everything's Slipping Away: John Wyndham's The Day of The Triffids," 
Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 4 (1991) 40-1. 
15 Jo Walton, "Who Survives the Cosy Catastrophe?," Foundation 93 (2005) 36. 
  Stock 211     
  
of six characteristics she finds in the “cosy catastrophe” also has limitations. 
Thus while her first observation that this is a British genre dating from 1951 
to 1977 and whose writers arrived at adulthood before World War II is an 
interesting one, she does not pursue this further. One conclusion it is 
possible to draw, however, is that the experience of war as a mass 
phenomenon was an important concern of the genre. 
 
Secondly, Walton argues, “a cosy catastrophe need have no worries about 
plausibility... the disasters are always treated absolutely seriously, however 
campy and nonsensical they may seem when looked at out of their 
context.”16 The same statement could be made about any number of non-
naturalist literary works from Homer’s Iliad onwards, and in any case, as 
Suvin points out, SF stands outside of, and in opposition to, “naturalistic or 
empiricist literary genres.”17 Similarly, Kingsley Amis argued in his early 
study of science fiction that versimilitude is not a necessary characteristic of 
the environment in SF prose, but rather is seen in “the human effects of 
spectacular changes in our environment, changes either deliberately willed 
or involuntarily suffered.”18 If Walton’s assessment of Bill Masen being a 
bourgeois man behaving in a typically bourgeois fashion throughout is 
correct, then on this scale of values The Day of the Triffids is enormously 
successful. Moreover, by concentrating on the so-called cosy catastrophe as 
a middle class, “unrealistic” genre, Walton fails to examine the more radical 
aspects of Wyndham's novels. As Robert Wymer has shown, Wyndham is 
far from being a “safe” author.19 He was certainly a thoroughly middle-class 
SF writer who consciously wrote in what he saw as the tradition of Wells, and 
as such the fantastic elements in Wyndham's texts follow logical patterns of 
behaviour. But these patterns point to the truly radical aspect of his work: 
Wyndham’s fearless engagement with theories of evolution and biological 
competition (discussed in detail below).  As a middle class liberal, with one 
eye particularly on the events of World War II, he questioned the role and 
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limits of ethical action. If all creatures must on some level engage with the 
struggle for survival within the natural economy, then forever lurking behind 
the traumatic experience of war is the thorny question of whether liberal 
humanist values are viable in a world apparently governed more by forces of 
nature than by the political creeds of man. 
 
Walton’s third critical characteristic is that, “nothing really nasty happens... 
The cosy catastrophe, while killing off ninety percent of humanity, does it 
without dwelling too much on the painful details.”20 It is true that neither 
suicides in the opening of The Day of the Triffids, nor subsequently the dead 
who litter the cities, are morbidly dwelt on although, as Hurst points out, “The 
[supposedly] “decent” narrator actually goes around killing people and 
helping people to kill themselves.”21 Whilst conservatively-written, these 
novels are not, Walton admits, politically conservative: the survivors are 
“upbeat about the possibility of building a better world from the ashes of the 
old” rather than looking back to a golden age. This being so, Walton’s fourth 
point is that “despite being written during the Cold War, nuclear wars are 
quite specifically a banned topic”, an argument that excludes all 
metaphorical or allegorical content and in Wyndham’s case is questionable 
even on the narrow, literal level.22 Interestingly, Wyndham did once attempt 
to write a nuclear war novel – three drafts of the opening chapter survive in 
his archive.23 The reason for his lack of success with such projects is 
revealed in an unpublished review article he wrote entitled “Science Fiction 
and Armageddon”: 
The H-bomb, in spite of its dramatic qualities and emotion-rousing factor [sic] 
cannot make a satisfactory protagonist. Indeed, how could it? - It is a thing, and 
stories are not about things, they are about people... 
Moreover, it is either so devastating in operation that all is destroyed, leaving 
nothing more to be said; or it turns out to be not quite devastating, in which 
                                            
20 Walton, "Who Survives the Cosy Catastrophe?," 34. 
21 Hurst, "We Are The Dead," 4. 
22 Walton, "Who Survives the Cosy Catastrophe?," 34-5. 
23 John Wyndham, Atom Bomb Fragment Ms. 7/2/13. The John Wyndham Collection, U of 
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case the author finds his warning has deteriorated into a modified success 
story about how-we-beat-the-bomb, and so defeated his intention.24 
 
Wyndham’s solution to this problem is to sublimate the Bomb, so that 
commentary upon it is allegorical. In both The Day of the Triffids and The 
Kraken Wakes disaster comes ultimately from the skies, and the 
consequences of the disasters are clearly analogous to the potential 
consequences of nuclear disaster. Indeed, through the deployment of covert 
nuclear references the author attempts to construct a greater air of 
plausibility: the epigraph from Tennyson at the start of The Kraken Wakes, 
for instance, ends “…fire shall heat the deep;/Then once by men and angels 
to be seen,/In roaring he shall rise and on the surface die.” Such epical 
Victorian imagery takes on a new significance when one considers that it 
was published only a few months after Britain’s first underwater atomic test 
in October 1952. Phyllis’s observation on the opening page of “Phase One” 
reinforces this subtext: “‘Mars is looking pretty angry to-night, isn’t he? I hope 
it isn’t an omen[.]’” But the “omen” she observes is a different harbinger of 
war: five red points (an allusion perhaps to the Soviet star) descend from the 
heavens to the horizon, each “a brilliantly red light as seen in a fairly thick 
fog so that there is a strong halation”. As they hit the water, Mike the narrator 
reports, “A great burst of steam shot up in a pink plume. Then, swiftly, there 
was a lower, wider spread of steam which had lost the pink tinge, and was 
simply a white cloud in the moonlight.”25 In The Day of the Triffids, the green 
shooting stars which make the night sky “almost as light as day” (and which, 
as Moore points out, drawing on David Ketterer, are an ironic reversal of the 
reason-bringing celestial phenomena of Wells’s In the Days of the Comet) 
are handled with similar imagery.26 These obvious nuclear analogies lend 
credibility to phenomena that, as Walton herself makes clear, would be 
unbelievable outside of an SF context. Likewise, there is plenty of 
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commentary about the Bomb in The Chrysalids, but it is couched in religious 
terms of “Badlands” and “Tribulations”. Hence it can be argued that the very 
“taboo” (in Walton's view) on naming the Bomb serves to maintain the force 
of the Bomb as a figure in the texts. 
 
Walton's next criterion for the genre is that it normally has a narrow focus on 
a small group of individuals as opposed to the “broad spread” she claims are 
usually associated with horror and disaster fiction (although she does not 
substantiate the latter half of this claim). Her final contention is that “cosy 
catastrophes” spend “hardly any time on the catastrophe itself. They ideally 
begin, like Wyndham's [The] Day of the Triffids[,] with the survivor waking up 
unharmed on the day after the disaster.”27 This is really only the logical 
outcome of her third characteristic, however. It should be noted though that 
in Walton's exemplar The Day of the Triffids, it is the triffids as 
biological/evolutionary competitors (to which a large portion of the novel is 
devoted) that prove the greatest threat to humanity, rather than the more 
briefly explored mass blindness catastrophe. Walton seems to have 
conflated the precipitous breakdown of the state in the face of the blindness 
catastrophe with the ultimate break up of civil society and return to a state of 
nature. The latter is the result of more long-term processes. 
 
Wyndham, Apocalypse and Postwar Science Fiction 
 
While there are problems with Walton’s specific generic characteristics, this 
is not to deny there is a generic quality to Wyndham’s works. Reasons for 
this include his literary debt to Wells, his desire for commercial success, and 
his pre-War background as a short story writer for American SF pulps. After 
the War, despite his ever-increasing disapproval of the term “science fiction” 
and a strong prejudice against certain strands of SF writing, he remained a 
prolific reader of the genre. Hence, to grasp the narrative strategies and 
formal frameworks of Wyndham’s postwar dystopian fiction it must be read 
within the wider context of science fiction of the period. Whilst his writing 
style is unique, the fears and concerns that he expresses, as well as some of 
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the figures and images he uses, are very much of his time in SF. Wyndham’s 
mutants and aliens from this period (and even the terrestrial origins of flying 
saucers in Plan For Chaos) are standard SF figures. Monsters, mutants, 
aliens and a variety of humans, flora and fauna exposed to radioactivity or 
radioactive fallout are defining tropes in postwar science fiction. Often, they 
were an easy way to make the fantastic believable to audiences in a secular, 
scientific era. 
 
Wyndham felt that the “hard” science fiction stories of (for example) Arthur C. 
Clark and Isaac Asimov could appeal only to an audience initiated into its 
technical vocabulary.28 He summed up such idea-centred texts as “scientists 
at play.”29 Nevertheless, the “logical extrapolation” of Wyndham’s approach 
mirrored the insistence of John W. Campbell Jr., US editor of Astounding 
Science Fiction, that scientific laws be fully acknowledged in the stories he 
published. In a rare interview in 1961 Wyndham commented, 
The critics crashed down on The Day of the Triffids. They invoked Wells’s 
ruling that readers could only be asked to accept one fantastic thing. ‘I got 
fairly lambasted by the better-read. But, do you see, neither [the theme of 
“mobile vegetables” nor universal blindness] would work on its own.’30 
 
Wyndham’s reference here acknowledges Wells’s influence upon him as the 
father of the generic tradition within which he saw his work. He followed 
Wells critically, rather than slavishly, in particular utilising a technique he 
termed “logical fantasy”, or the “logical” extrapolation of a fantastic premise. 
Far removed as triffids, alien sea-monsters, telepathic mutant children and 
cloned Nazis in flying saucers are from reality, the (threatening) figures in 
Wyndham’s fiction do not behave fantastically; their extrapolation from the 
original imaginative genesis is logical. Wyndham therefore saw his work as 
“logical fantasy” rather than “science fiction”. The premises of his postwar 
novels are all questions beginning “What would happen if…” which 
                                            
28 John Wyndham, “'M.B.L' - Notes for a Talk,” Ms. 5/3/2. The John Wyndham Collection, U 
of Liverpool. 
29 John Wyndham, “Questionnaire for Kingsley Amis,” Ms. 11/5/3. The John Wyndham 
Collection, U of Liverpool. 
30 'Pooter', "Talking to John Wyndham," Times Saturday Review 16 March 1968. Tearsheet 
held as item 9/2/1, The John Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
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Wyndham believed marked him out as a social dreamer and a disciple of 
Wells rather than an adventurer writing in the wake of Jules Verne.31 Hence, 
for example, ‘what would happen if, instead of the Nazi threat ending in 
1945, their scientists had developed cloning techniques to produce the 
master race of which Hitler had dreamed?’ (Plan for Chaos) Or ‘What would 
happen if 99.9 per cent of the population were suddenly blinded? (The Day 
of the Triffids). In the case of The Chrysalids, Wyndham later insisted that his 
main question was not ‘What would the human world look like ten 
generations after a nuclear war?’ But rather “if human evolution is not a dead 
end, homo superior must one day turn up; how is he going to be received 
when he does?”32 
 
This strategy of following an idea through a logical chain of events, while 
shared by many of Wells’s literary descendents, is indeed a very pure strain 
in Wyndham’s fiction. His correspondence with readers shows that this was 
indeed a criterion on which he wished his fiction to be judged: “I’ve always 
found the taking to pieces to be a part of the game: if it comes to pieces too 
badly, it should prove salutary for the author – if it doesn’t come to pieces at 
all, he can consider himself a miracle worker, or at least abnormal…”33 
 
Whilst Wyndham would by no means wish to be seen as prophesising, the 
frequent presence of catastrophic and apocalyptic events in his dystopian 
fiction should be taken seriously. Indeed, Wyndham’s postwar fiction can 
best be described as apocalyptic-dystopian. The “dystopian” label here 
draws attention to the specifically modern, twentieth-century nature of the 
apocalypse while at the same time pointing to the nature of the modern state 
and modern warfare as the focus of the socio-political critique of the novel. 
The term apocalypse, meanwhile, is “derived from the Greek apokalupsis; 
                                            
31 “Verne asked himself: what excitement can we get out of this invention? Wells enquired: 
what effect, if it could come about, would this state of affairs have on people?” John 
Wyndham, “Wells v. S-F,” Unpublished article. Ts. 5/2/9. The John Wyndham Collection, U 
of Liverpool, 1-2. In the Ms. “Questionnaire for Kingsley Amis,” Wyndham claimed that 
“Wellsian” SF is “what I mainly attempt” (1). 
32 John Wyndham, “‘Sunday Pictorial' – Rough” Ms. (Draft #1 of 2). 5/3/8. The John 
Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
33 John Wyndham, Letter to Mrs. Margaret Lowe, 22 Oct. 1951. CC. 12/1/3. The John 
Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
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the roots being apo (away from) and kalupto (concealment)” and in its 
modern conception draws on both Jewish and Christian traditions. While it is 
a difficult term to define precisely, “apocalypse should not be thought of as 
merely a synonym for chaos or disaster or cataclysmic upheaval; more 
properly we should think of disclosure, unveiling and revelation.”34 
 
Thus full-scale nuclear war would not necessarily be apocalyptic: if total, 
putting an end to human life as such, it would indeed foreclose any 
possibility of a revelatory message or meaning. By shutting off the possibility 
of reflection or the future practice of history it would carry no critical meaning, 
only destruction. For writers like Wyndham to make meaning out of the threat 
it had leave a possibility for hope to remain in the world, the Bomb’s threat 
had to be ‘minimised’ as one-less-than-total and in some insane and minimal 
way renewal could not be ruled out. The human element of chance must still 
be put in play. 
 
The apocalyptic conceptualising of the Bomb did not detract however from 
the fact that it was a real threat and felt as such. Frank Kermode’s assertion 
that “it would be childish to argue, in a discussion of how people behave 
under eschatological threat, that nuclear bombs are more real than armies in 
the sky”, misses the point of most “Bomb fiction”, and especially that of John 
Wyndham.35 In eschatological myth, the process of apocalypse is directly 
controlled by divine power: human reaction is fated, and salvation only exists 
for the subject who turns away from the world and towards the power of God 
as a humble and obedient servant to do His will. On this score, however, 
Wyndham’s fiction is closer to being an epic: it is the struggle of a hero or 
group of survivors to adapt to the surrounding uncontrolled and competing 
forces of nature which determines their eventual salvation through their will 
and their various abilities. Thus, in The Day of the Triffids, Bill Masen and 
Josella Playton’s adopted daughter Susan shows a natural instinct for 
                                            
34 Philip Neil Best, "Apocalypticism in the Fiction of William S. Burroughs, J.G. Ballard and 
Thomas Pynchon," PhD, Durham University, 1998, 5. 
35 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1967) 95. This comment is specifically and comprehensively refuted in Best, 
"Apocalypticism," 26-9. 
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survival from the moment Masen meets her. Ever since she narrowly 
avoided being stung by one, “she had been very careful about the things 
[Triffids], and on further expeditions had taught [her younger brother] Tommy 
to be careful about them too.” But Tommy had been too small to see the 
triffid lurking over the garden wall which struck him dead. Susan “had tried 
half a dozen times to get to him, but each time, however careful she was, 
she had seen the top of the triffid tremble and stir slightly…”36 Through her 
caution, intelligence and intuition, Susan is ideally capable of adapting to the 
new triffid-dominated world. As she grows up to become one of the many 
strong female characters who populate Wyndham’s postwar fiction, Susan 
takes an instrumental, social scientific attitude towards the study of triffid 
behaviour (ostensibly linked back to the death of Tommy). “I always watch 
them. I hate them,” she tells Masen.37 Far from turning away from the world, 
for the human qua subject to survive she must become more concerned with 
herself and her relationship to the surrounding physical world. 
 
Moreover, as Jacques Derrida pointed out there is an important sense in 
which nuclear war is entirely unprecedented: it is “fabulously textual”, a “non-
event” in the sense of never having occurred.38 But unlike Kermode’s 
“armies in the sky” this “fantasy, or phantasm” to which modern literature 
properly belongs (and not, Derrida provocatively argues, the other way 
round) is at the same time conditioned by the rhetoric of previous wars, of 
“techno-military” discourse and traditional power politics: 
Between the Trojan War and nuclear war, technical preparation has 
progressed prodigiously, but the psychagogic [sic] and discursive schemas, 
the mental structures and the structures of intersubjective calculus in game 
theory have not budged.39 
                                            
36 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 180. 
37 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 201. 
38 Derrida, writing in the 1980s, has in mind here the exchange of hundred-megaton Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missiles in what could be termed (with due reference to Stanley 
Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)) a 
“doomsday” scenario. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not precedents for this as from the 
bomber’s point of view they represent “tactical” strikes. There can be nothing tactical about a 
“doomsday” scenario. If there are no survivors then everyone loses, as again Dr. 
Strangelove demonstrates eloquently. 
39 Jacques Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven 
Missives)," Diacritics 14.2 (1984), 23, 24. 
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For Derrida, it is vitally important that the ahistorical nature of such political 
discourse does not cloud our judgement as to the uniqueness of the 
concrete historical situation. The danger is that the very fact that there are 
such similarities,  
could make us stand blind and deaf alongside that which cuts through the 
assimilating resemblance of discourses (for example of the apocalyptic or 
bimillenarist type), through the analogy of techno-military situations, strategic 
arrangements, with all their wagers, their last-resort calculations, on the ‘brink,’ 
their use of chance and risk factors, their mimetic resource to upping the ante, 
and so on- blind and deaf, then, alongside what would be absolutely unique.40 
 
Total nuclear war carries the possibility of being precisely non-apocalyptic in 
the sense that it is simply an end to the “archive” of human “symbolic 
content”, rendering any attempt to assimilate or “soften” the blow – as 
cultures do with individual deaths – impossible. In Daniel Pick’s words, 
“whilst it can be anticipated according to the terms of our current language 
and memory, its actual occurrence would overrun and obliterate the very 
possibility of its own retrospective representation.”41 The critical struggle for 
literature is thus to maintain the apocalyptic revelation of “its own truth” while 
understanding that its own destruction would be “un-symbolisable” and 
“unassimilable”, and with no symbolic referents possible it would therefore be 
without proportion.42  
 
Radioactivity was the greatest gift science ever bequeathed to science 
fiction, the unknown ‘x’ which could account for any premise. The 
transformation of something supposedly ‘natural’ into an ‘unnatural’ monster, 
ripping through societal barriers and monstrously intruding upon life was 
explicable simply by reference to the transformative magic of radioactivity – 
from the fallout responsible for the mutants and telepaths of The Chrysalids, 
to the radioactive treatment by which zygotes are repeatedly split by Nazi 
                                            
40 Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now," 21. 
41 Pick, War Machine 7-8. 
42 Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now," 27. 
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scientists in Plan for Chaos to create the race of herren Volk of the mad 
‘Mother’. 
 
In a natural world considered to be tamed and understood by science, 
radioactive transformation enabled figures of postwar SF to become 
dangerous. Radioactivity is the trope par excellence for establishing a 
convincing threat in SF of the mid-twentieth century. For instance, in The 
Thing From Another World (1951), a film adaptation of John Campbell’s story 
“Who Goes there?” directed by Christian Nyby, a scientist reveals that the 
invader’s cellular make-up closely resembles a carrot.43 Yet the blood-
sucking invader is not supposed to be an object of ridicule. Scientists track 
his approach using a Geiger counter. The counter’s beat, like a steadily 
increasing heart rate, matches the growing fear and unease of the 
characters at the North Pole base. Their fear is believable precisely because 
of the inclusion of the radioactive element – a fear of an unseen, deadly 
atmospheric poison that could be released anywhere and at any time, with 
the potential to infect not only the current population, but generations to 
come. As Jon Turney puts it, “in the prolonged controversies about the 
dangers of radioactive fallout of the 1940s and 1950s, two fearful possibilities 
loomed large. One was an increase in cancer after exposure to radiation, the 
other the prospect of mutations.”44 But these dangers were themselves only 
part of the story. In the background of radiation, as it were, other dangers 
scurried amid the shadows connected by all sorts of cultural signifiers. While 
Turney is to an extent correct he does present a simplified situation: the 
fecundity of radioactively transformed figures in postwar SF suggests a more 
complex relationship with social fears and anxieties of the Cold War, 
invasion, changing social and gender roles and the aftermath of World War 
II. 
 
                                            
43 The Thing From Another World, writ. John W. Campbell Jr. and Charles Lederer, dir. 
Christian Nyby, RKO: 1951. 
44 Jon Turney, Frankenstein's Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1998) 127. 
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The Aftermath of World War II 
 
The end of WWII was a hard time for John Wyndham, both politically and 
personally. Aged forty at conscription, he participated as an NCO in the 
Royal Signal Corps in the D-Day landings. Wyndham found military life 
extremely lonely and mostly boring. His letters to his partner Grace Wilson 
from this period, along with his brother Vivian’s remembrances, indicate that 
he was continually homesick, lovesick and depressed.45 He felt little sense of 
camaraderie, but had to keep his negative feelings to himself, informing 
Wilson, 
You’ll have to go on reading me into these arid letters which look so impersonal 
that I sometimes hate to send them. What else can there be? This that writes 
them and sends them is not me. It’s a kind of abridged version – abridged of all 
but the extravert part. The introvert must be kept away – he is dangerous and 
bloody unhappy + hasn’t any place here […] So you can see me feeding [sic] 
(quite well) and looking after the extravert in order to keep a habitation going. 
But it isn’t really alive.46 
 
By turning his life into a narrative, Wyndham finds a method to ‘abridge’ his 
character, to forge a hard shell which, he believes, protects the “introvert” 
within. While it would be reductive to view Wyndham’s character Masen in 
The Day of The Triffids as a mere authorial self-image, he does confront the 
dying city of London with a similar attitude: “‘you’ve got to grow a hide,’ I told 
myself. ‘Got to. It’s either that or stay permanently drunk.’”47 
 
It was not just army life that Wyndham felt negatively about, however. The 
1945 General Election campaign on which he held fairly cynical views took 
place while he was still in occupied Europe. Wyndham’s letters to Grace 
Wilson confirm that he favoured “Liberalism” (whether this was the Liberal 
National Party or the Liberal Party is unclear) although he held out no real 
                                            
45 Wyndham’s wartime letters to Grace Wilson are held in The John Wyndham Collection, 
University of Liverpool Library. The manuscript “[My Brother] John Wyndham: A Memoir” by 
Vivian Beynon Harris, edited by David Ketterer, appeared in Foundation 75 (1999), 5-50. 
46 John Wyndham, Letter to Grace Wilson, 29 July 1944. Ms. 10/21/10. The John Wyndham 
Collection, U of Liverpool. 
47 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 69. 
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hope of a turnaround in Liberal election fortunes.48 The Labour landslide 
significantly changed the country to which he returned, and seemed to 
suggest that the whole political landscape had shifted to the left. “Wartime 
unity” lingered in the “sense of solidarity across the spectrum of class and 
social groups… a deeply shared sense of threat and emotional horror arising 
from experiences such as the Blitz.”49 Moving forward, it was incumbent 
upon politicians to redress wartime falls in living standards, and so “a 
distinctive ideology of welfare-capitalism was propagated… The rights to be 
guaranteed by the state entered the rhetoric of politicians across the 
spectrum.”50 To Alan Sinfield, “The [W]ar exemplified (though not without 
contest) a pattern of state intervention and popular co-operation to organize 
production for a common purpose.” Indeed, the avowed aim of the Labour 
Party in their 1945 manifesto, was “the establishment of the Socialist 
Commonwealth of Great Britain.”51 The far left also did relatively well in the 
1945 election. The left-of-labour ILP (Independent Labour Party, – of which 
George Orwell had been a pre-War member) won three seats returning an 
average of 35.2 percent of the vote across the five seats in which their 
candidates stood, while the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) won 
two seats and had nine deposits returned, averaging 14.6 percent of the vote 
in the twenty-one seats it contested.52 By 1950, despite the Communist Party 
fielding a hundred candidates, neither of these parties won any seats, and 
the Labour Party’s majority was slashed to five (although this was partly due 
to the Conservative-favouring Redistribution of Seats Act 1949; Labour 
returned a popular majority of 1.5million). Nevertheless, the sudden and 
dramatic swing to the left of 1945 – even if then followed by a smaller sway 
back to the right – demonstrated to middle class liberals like Wyndham the 
mass appeal of which socialism was capable, as well as hinting at the 
potential for the rise of an even more radical left, to which he was strongly 
                                            
48 John Wyndham, Letter to Grace Wilson, 6 Nov. 1944. Ms. 10/24/2 The John Wyndham 
Collection, U of Liverpool. 
49 Waugh, "The Historical Context of Post-War British Literature," 35. 
50 Alan Sinfield, Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989), 16 emphasis in original. 
51 Sinfield, Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain, 1, 15. 
52 Matthew Leeke, UK Election Statistics: 1945-2000 (Westminster: House of Commons 
Library, 2003), 9. 
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opposed. For some members of the governing elite, social justice was the 
price to pay for preventing revolutionary unrest at the War’s close.53 
 
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had ended the War in a phenomenally 
powerful position and set about consolidating her influence over the Eastern 
Bloc. Competition with the US for economic and political dominance was 
inevitable. But the US was now a nuclear power, raising the stakes 
considerably. To quote The Day of the Triffids, “From 6 August 1945, the 
margin of survival has narrowed appallingly.”54 With the success of the first 
Soviet atomic test in August 1949, the spectre of Communism and the risks 
involved in confronting it did indeed haunt Western Europe. By 1950, when 
Wyndham was completing Triffids, nuclear weapons were indissolubly linked 
with the Cold War. When Britain became a nuclear power in 1952 it lent 
weight to the belief, maintained in the mainstream British press, that despite 
the break-up of her empire, Britain was still a world power and an important 
international actor, if not quite a superpower on the scale of the USSR or the 
USA. In Wyndham’s 1959 space-set novel The Outward Urge, Britain’s 
neurosis about being a declining power persists even during a Cold War race 
to establish moon bases in the mid twenty-first century with the threat to 
“prestige” of failing to build a British base being sufficient to drive policy.55 
 
Wyndham, in common with so many SF writers, remained anxiously 
obsessed by the Bomb in his fiction. Yet he was still prone at other times to 
deny the fears that the Bomb provoked on the grounds of its utility to the 
peaceful resolution of problems by political actors who were rationally self-
interested. As late as 1962, he suggested that the Bomb 
Could remain a stabilizing factor – and very likely be good for us. The 
presence of an Omnipotence [sic] powerful enough to curb selfish ambitions is 
                                            
53 Sinfield, Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain 10. 
54 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 96. 
55 John Wyndham and Lucas Parkes, The Outward Urge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), 
64. “John Wyndham” and “Lucas Parkes” were in fact one individual, John Wyndham Lucas 
Parkes Beynon Harris. Ostensibly, the decision to market the book as written by a 
partnership was because of a dramatic change in style and content away from the previous 
novels of the 1951-1957 period. 
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not necessarily a bad thing – as the Children of Israel had to be reminded from 
time to time.56 
 
Although within ten months such ideas came widely under attack as a result 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this was not an especially idiosyncratic view for 
the postwar era in general. After the announcement that the Soviet Union 
had successfully tested a nuclear warhead The Times leader column had 
suggested that the availability of such a powerful weapon to both sides could 
ensure a more stable peace if handled correctly.57    
 
Wyndham’s attitude toward the Bomb was then contradictory and anxious. 
Outwardly, he projected a liberal stance affirming the possibility of states 
adhering to the rule of international law and working through institutional 
mechanisms to ensure peace. Yet this was only a possibility because of the 
illiberal power of the Bomb to act as Leviathan. In The Kraken Wakes Russia 
accuses the West in their every public statement of being “capitalistic 
warmongers”, too quick to use atomic weapons against the undersea threat. 
Concomitantly, their ironic declarations that the USSR will “fight unswervingly 
for Peace with all the weapons it possessed, except germs” becomes a 
running joke.58 Wyndham’s satire of Russian bellicose propaganda seems to 
point towards him having nagging realist doubts about international 
governance of the sort displayed by commentators like E. H. Carr. Looking 
back to the interwar period, Carr had argued that international relations was 
a field in which power trumped moral concerns and as such any international 
governance was in effect the enforcing of the will of dominant nations: “To 
internationalize government in any real sense means to internationalize 
power; and international government is, in effect, government by that state 
which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing.”59 
Whether such states supply economic or military power, or else power over 
opinion, they are following realist doctrine and rationally acting in their own 
                                            
56 Wyndham, “‘Sunday Pictorial' – Rough” Ms. (Draft #1 of 2) 7-8. 
57 "The Bomb” Editorial. Times 24 September 1949, 5, col. B. 
58 Wyndham, The Kraken Wakes 53, 52. 
59 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 100. 
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national self-interest. In The Kraken Wakes, the arrival of the underwater 
“xenobath” threat makes international actors begin to think about acting for 
the common interest of all, but when the Russian delegation withdraws from 
an international conference to deal with the threat following a spate of 
accusations and counter-accusations the narrator comments that there is a 
“reassuring ring of normality” about the proceedings.60 
 
The distrust between the great powers in The Kraken Wakes is symptomatic 
of nervous anxiety about the Bomb in a world where annihilating another 
country could potentially be the rationally self-interested thing to do, 
providing the state in question could find a way to do so without endangering 
its own population. In the mid-fifties behaviourist and realist theories of 
Political Science, propounded by the likes of Hans J. Morgenthau, made 
ambitious claims about the potential of their approaches to “forecast” 
behaviour.61 Especially ascendant in America, these theories were premised 
upon the idea that international actors are “game players”, trying rationally to 
secure their self-interest whether they are pursuing co-operation or acting in 
competition.62 Thus in any given scenario, 
The strategies chosen are based on rational calculation. Rational actors, 
according to game theorists, (1) evaluate outcomes, (2) produce a preference 
ranking, and then (3) choose the best option available. These are the essential 
elements of rationality.63 
 
The risks of such narrow “game based” rationality are high: if a nuclear state 
viewed International Relations in terms of “games”, and at the same time 
placed her self-interests above all else, then there would be a temptation to 
try to cheat or to find an alternate strategy that exists ‘off the board’. If 
                                            
60 Wyndham, The Kraken Wakes 106. 
61 John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," 
International Security 17.3 (1992) 7-9. 
62 The CIA, infamously, took the goal of “forecasting” behaviour to its darkest conclusion in 
the 1950s, commissioning research into “behavioral modification” that would include torture, 
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Modification,” 95th Cong., 1st sess.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
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Wyndham’s postwar fiction was premised upon questions that began ‘what 
would happen if…’ then the ultimate ‘what if’ that constantly intruded into his 
fiction was the escalation of the Cold War, the ultimate social nightmare 
being the effects of nuclear conflict. 
 
Purity and Dirt 
 
In the US the threat of Communism was felt differently to the UK: fears of 
Soviet expansionism, conspiracy and subversion provided justification for the 
Marshall Aid Plan to the public and to Congress at a time when the direct 
threat of Communism on the US mainland was in reality low.64 As Shapiro 
notes, 
the United States did its damnedest to convince itself that it possessed a 
secret, and this secret made the country feel unique and more secure. Almost 
paradoxically, the considerable effort required to maintain the nation’s ‘secret’ 
and security seemed to enflame latent fears of insecurity and jeopardize 
individual identity and personal freedoms.65 
 
After the first successful Soviet nuclear test in 1949, such anxieties became 
common themes in cultural production. Issues of identity were mingled with 
nuclear fears at the heart of US Cold War paranoia. One relevant example 
can be found in the featuring of brainwashing and alien identity thefts in SF 
movies of the 1950s and early 1960s such as Invasion From Mars (1953) 
and Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956). As with The Day of The Triffids, 
the threat in Invasion of the Body Snatchers derives from seedpods carrying 
the potential for subversion and terror imminently within them (in this case in 
the shape of body doubles).66 In Hollywood SF-horror, these characters 
typically became automata, with monotone voices and wide, unblinking eyes 
focused somewhere beyond the camera in the middle distance. They were 
depicted as incapable of individual, rational thought or the capacity to show 
‘real’ emotions such as familial love. Their aim was to integrate themselves 
                                            
64 Sinfield, Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain 95, 94. 
65 Jerome K. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2002) 53. 
66 Invasion of the Body Snatchers, writ. Daniel Mainwaring, story by Jack Finney, dir. Don 
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into American life, but their failure to uphold American values showed them 
to be unAmerican. 
 
The alien invader threats of Hollywood dovetailed perfectly with Government 
discourse. In 1957, Warner Brothers produced a Department of Defense 
propaganda film for the US armed forces, directly supervised by Jack 
Warner himself, entitled Red Nightmare.67 The nightmare, in which a 
complacent citizen awakes to find himself in Communist America, draws 
many parallels with SF ‘brainwashing’ films like Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers and uses the idiom of the alien-possessed American to 
demonstrate what the take over and break-up of the American family 
structure by the godless unfree Russian doctrine of Communism would look 
like. The film’s message is that American freedoms must not be taken for 
granted or Communism will prevail. Only through strict observation of social 
codes of behaviour is the task of watching for infiltration by a nervous, wide-
eyed communist impostor possible. Yet the price of freedom is not merely 
vigilance: the dutiful American citizen is free to do what he likes, as long as 
what he likes doing involves conforming to existing cultural and social codes 
and aggressively preventing anyone from acting “differently”. He is free to go 
to church, watch television, eat his wife’s home cooking and enjoy his 
children’s unquestioning obedience – in short, free to live according to a 
strict patriarchal order. The prevention of the spread of Communism, then, 
relies upon what Zygmunt Bauman terms “the Dream of Purity”: “a vision of 
order – that is, of a situation in which each thing is in its rightful place and 
nowhere else.” Anything that does not conform to such an order is thus 
impure, dirty. In fact Bauman, following anthropologist Mary Douglas, defines 
dirt as disorder.68 
 
A preoccupation with purity is central to John Wyndham’s 1955 novel The 
Chrysalids. Set a thousand years after a nuclear holocaust wrecks the 
                                            
67 Red Nightmare dir. George Waggner, Warner Bros., 1962. The film seems to have been 
produced by Warner Bros. for the Defense Department in 1957 under the working title 
Freedom and You to be screened to the Armed Forces before wider broadcast in 1962. It 
was also known as The Commies Are Coming! The Commies Are Coming! 
68 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity, 1997) 6, 7. 
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northern hemisphere, the novel’s protagonist-narrator is a teenager called 
David who lives in the small, subsistence farming community of Waknuk, in 
Labrador.69 Genetic mutation is relatively common, and the community 
wages an unrelenting war against it, an obsessive dream in which religious 
salvation is closely tied to the ability to rid one’s whole environment of 
contamination by disorder. Mutant livestock and crops are destroyed; 
children born with even a slight deviation from a tightly proscribed norm are 
sterilised and cast out or else killed. David is one of a group of youngsters 
with a new, unseen mutation – he is a telepath.   
 
According to Bauman’s schema,  
‘Order’ means a regular, stable environment for our action; a world in which 
the probabilities of events are not distributed at random, but arranged in a 
strict hierarchy – so that certain events are highly likely to occur, others are 
less probable, some others virtually impossible. Only such an environment do 
we understand.70 
 
Waknuk, a society at an early modern stage of technological development, 
knows almost nothing about what occurred before the holocaust they term 
“the Tribulations.” The community’s religious “knowledge” is linked to fears 
for survival in a brutal realm of nature. Their catechism “Blessed is the norm” 
is an essentially Baconian call in which the known is controllable, and 
therefore blessed, in a chaotic, largely unknowable world. 
 
The uncontrollable elements around Waknuk are the bands of “fringes” 
people – those with various birth defects who live as best they can in the 
backcountry where everything is deviational, unique. They are perpetually at 
war with the puritan communities. These people are Strangers, the dirt that 
reminds the puritans of the filth of nature which surrounds them and the 
possibility that their own children will be declared impure. 
                                            
69 It may be significant that The Chrysalids was set in North America rather than southern 
England, as Wyndham’s previous two novels had been, but as a “logical fantasy” there was 
also a practical reason: Wyndham needed a location remote enough that global nuclear 
conflict would leave moderate effects, but still lying within the Anglophone area of the West 
in order to explore and critique ideas of normality and heterodoxy. 
70 Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents 7. 
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Waknuk is othered as a dystopic “no-place” by the similarities between the 
authoritarian form of the post-Christian religion practised there and the New 
England Puritanism of the first American settlers in the early modern period. 
Indeed, the similarities are so marked that more than one critic has mistaken 
the setting for New England.71 Moreover, as Wymer has pointed out, there 
are also significant similarities between The Chrysalids and Arthur Miller’s 
1953 play The Crucible, set during the 1692 Salem Witch Trials and highly 
satirical of the investigations of The House UnAmerican Activities 
Committee.72 In Miller’s play, ambiguity surrounds the causes of some 
events: the line between malicious behaviour and the (attempted) 
deployment of the supernatural is never made quite clear. Nevertheless, it 
quickly becomes apparent where the audience’s sympathies should lie. The 
Chrysalids, however, is more morally ambivalent. As Robert Wymer points 
out, the reader “remain[s] in basic sympathy with David, who has 
consistently provided the novel’s narrative viewpoint. However, the 
possibilities for such an inversion are clearly present…”73 When David’s 
childhood friend Sophie is forcibly sterilised and banished as a deviant for 
having six toes we are encouraged to have “liberal sympathy” for her plight 
as a minority in an authoritarian society. Yet Wymer argues that the group of 
telepaths themselves become increasingly intolerant. By the climax it is 
apparent that the narrative is no longer about toleration of minorities but a 
fight to the death between different “species”, a conflict that is hardened in 
the mind of the “Sealand” woman who comes to rescue them: 
‘In loyalty to their kind they cannot tolerate our rise; in loyalty to our kind, we 
cannot tolerate their obstruction.’ 
…‘They are alert, completely aware of the danger to their species. They can 
see quite well that if it is to survive they have not only to preserve it from 
deterioration, but they must protect it from the even more serious threat of the 
superior variant.’74 
                                            
71 Examples include Aldiss, Billion Year Spree, 294; and Everett Franklin Bleiler, "John 
Wyndham 1903-1969," Science Fiction Writers: Critical Studies of the Major Authors from 
the Early Nineteenth Century to the Present Day, ed. J. Scarborough (New York: Scribner, 
1982) 221. 
72 Wymer, "How 'Safe' is John Wyndham?" 29. 
73 Wymer, "How 'Safe' is John Wyndham?" 34. 
74 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 196. 
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The brutal struggle for survival is hereby given a sinister edge in the 
celebration of the telepaths as a “superior variant”, which for Wymer “echoes 
the rationalisations offered by Hitler” for the murder of the Polish 
intelligentsia.75 For a student of Wells like John Wyndham, writing in the 
postwar era, the question of evolutionary struggle in the aftermath of the 
destruction caused by a radical, and perverted, social Darwinism was one 
that could never be left alone – from the late 1940s he returned to it 
repeatedly. It is also a question that despite his recurrent attentions 
Wyndham could never fully and satisfactorily answer. Notwithstanding the 
discourse of “species” and “variants”, the Sealand woman’s argument is not 
Darwinian. A teleological idea is implicit in her argument about “superiority”. 
Tellingly, she chooses the phrase “superior variant” rather than, for instance, 
‘better adapted for survival.’ According to Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
“there can be no goal toward which evolution is striving.”76 Variants cannot 
be “superior”, only better adapted to survive in a given environment. As T. H. 
Huxley put it, “what is ‘fittest’ depends upon the conditions.”77 The 
Chrysalids, by contrast, seems to follow novelist Katherine Burdekin’s 
proposition that “the life you are yourself is all life… Everything that is 
something must want to be itself before every other form of life.”78 This 
applies to the non-telepaths as much as the telepaths. They see themselves 
as made in God’s image, and are therefore superior to the “blasphemous” 
telepaths. Wyndham seems ambivalent on the question of whether the 
telepaths, with their hive-like minds and sense of racial self-satisfaction, are 
in any real sense ‘superior’. Hence picking up on textual hints that the 
Sealand society itself may someday ossify, Wymer asks “Is the arrogance 
and ruthlessness of the Sealand woman any real ethical advance on the 
religious bigotry of Waknuk?”79 
 
                                            
75 Wymer, "How 'Safe' is John Wyndham?" 31. 
76 Bowler, Evolution 6. 
77 From T. H. Huxley, “Evolution and Ethics” (1893) in Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst, 
eds., The Fin de Siècle: a Reader in Cultural History, c.1880-1900 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2000) 238. 
78 Katherine Burdekin, Swastika Night (New York: Feminist P, 1985) 106-7. 
79 Wymer, "How 'Safe' is John Wyndham?" 33. 
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The bigotry of Waknuk at least conforms to an ethics in its demands. The 
foundationalist belief structure of their religion allows them to assess 
situations according to moral precepts. All the actions of the community 
under the patriarchal authority of David’s father follow a moral sense of 
purpose which, however disagreeable, is internally consistent. The Sealand 
woman, in contrast, motivated only by what is in itself an exceptional mission 
to save David’s precociously able younger sister Petra, blurs moral lines. 
When David finds out that his father is with the band of fighters on their way 
to attack the Fringes people in whose village they are sheltering, he is 
caught in a moral quandary: 
‘Purity…’ I said. ‘The will of the Lord. Honour thy father… Am I supposed to 
forgive him! Or to try to kill him?’ 
… ‘Let him be,’ came the severe, clear pattern from the Sealand woman. 
‘Your work is to survive. Neither his kind, nor his kind of thinking will survive 
long…’80 
 
The bleak social Darwinism that she preaches to David, Rosalind and Petra 
has the imperative only to survive. Rather than face David’s difficult ethical 
dilemma, she commands him to avoid the process of ethical decision-making 
entirely. The irony is that in going with the Sealand woman to the city over 
the ocean where the air is full with telepathic communication like the 
“buzzing of a hive of bees”, and thereby opening himself up to the life of the 
mind-race, he must forsake the ethical autonomy which accompanied the 
privacy of his mind that he had previously enjoyed when under the yolk of 
Waknuk orthodoxy. Indeed, during the final attack on the Fringes people by 
his father’s militia, David is compelled to hide away from taking any action by 
the new voice in his head, a voice originating god-like from the sky. The 
mission of the Sealand woman is not merely to rescue the telepaths, but to 
impose upon them a new moral code from above (in every sense). 
Unsurprisingly, they are irked by her supercilious attitude. The Sealand 
woman forces her domineering demands into the telepaths’ conscious 
thoughts, not like a superego developed organically in negotiating the social 
world, but rather imposed upon their psyches by an Other. She literally 
                                            
80 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 182. 
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paralyses the existing warring patriarchal order by dispersing constricting 
plastic strands from her aeroplane over the battlefield. She may furthermore 
be seen as representing David’s inability to resolve Oedipal issues 
surrounding his “detached and disapproving,” emotionally distant mother.81 
 
This difference between the community of the Sealand woman and the 
community of Waknuk is underlined by the respective ways they each deal 
with difference. According to Bauman’s schema, drawing in turn on the work 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss, there are two ways by which communities like 
Waknuk or Sealand with strongly-held beliefs in an ideal of purity can deal 
with the threat of variation from the norm (which here is effectively 
synonymous with disorder). The first is the anthropophagic route, whereby 
the strangers in their midst are swallowed up, “digested” and made 
indistinguishable from the norm. In Sealand, “everybody… wants to make 
[thought-pictures], and people who can’t do it much work hard to get better at 
it.”82 The Labradorean immigrants will all undergo such training to assimilate 
into Sealand society. The alternative is the anthropoemic route, whereby the 
strangers are “vomited” out, thus “banishing them from the limits of the 
orderly world and barring them from all communication with those inside.”83 
Waknuk adopts this route for both physical deviations such as the six-toed 
child Sophie, and the mental deviations of the telepaths. For Waknuk the 
anthropophagic route is simply not an option; it would be much like the Nazis 
attempting to solve “the Jewish question” (which for them was exclusively a 
matter of their extraneous notion of “race”) through the implementation of 
forced baptism. Nazism was concerned not with souls (as in the Catholic 
Inquisition) but with blood.  The so-called “Final Solution” was, if Arendt’s 
literal interpretation of ideology as “the logic of an idea” is correct, the only 
“solution.”84 The adherence to such a perverse logic is one reason she 
termed the genocide radical evil. Couched in the discourse of survival, 
assimilation cannot be considered. The watchword by which the religious in 
                                            
81 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 53-4. 
82 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 145. 
83 Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents 18. 
84 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 469. Arendt analyses the way that this 
interpretation of “ideology” was played out under totalitarianism on 470-3. See also above, 
187-8, 190 and 193-4 on this theme. 
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this community live is purity. Just as Jews (or Communists or homosexuals 
for that matter) did not necessarily carry a visible marker until they had a 
patch sewn on to their clothing or were tattooed with a number, so telepathy 
is already an invisible difference, one which can neither be exorcised nor 
assimilated. The process of searching for these deviants is hence 
necessarily a process of unmasking, of looking for a reality behind a mask – 
much like the systemic hunt for Communists in America under the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations. While the Waknuk orthodoxy must look for 
evidence and attempt to implicate conspirators through the confessions of 
those they already hold, the Sealand woman is able to discern who to kill 
through lack of evidence: she simply coats everyone in sight with constricting 
plastic threads and then sprays a solvent antidote on to those individuals 
who are able to communicate with her telepathically to stop them from 
suffocating. Anyone not able (or not willing) to produce the evidence of this 
ability dies. Even the telepaths cannot refuse her.85 
 
The Sealand woman is able to kill so easily because she believes in a 
culturally constructed idea that a racial boundary exists between telepaths 
and non-telepaths. This is contrary to evidence. The telepaths all come from 
non-telepath backgrounds; from families who have all passed the purity test. 
Furthermore, as a result of the gender imbalance in the group (five females 
to three males), one of the telepaths, Anne, chooses to marry a non-telepath. 
Despite his lack of telepathic ability, she is sufficiently in love to choose him 
over the telepath group – with whom she refuses to communicate any 
longer, eventually betraying them before killing herself. The Waknuk 
telepaths represent an evolutionary jump, but there is no reason to suppose 
that they could not mate successfully with a non-telepath. The impediments 
are mental and cultural: mental because the telepaths all feel a lot closer to 
each other than David claims they ever could to a non-telepath (although 
again, Anne’s love disputes this claim), cultural because their reasoning is 
the necessity of keeping their mutation a secret from their families.86 David’s 
Uncle Axel, who sides with the telepaths and even murders Anne’s husband 
                                            
85 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 188-93 passim. 
86 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 92, 94. 
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in an effort to protect their identities, is both a non-telepath and a non-threat 
to them. 
 
Gender in Wyndham’s Fiction 
 
The character Axel, who quietly does not accept the established order and is 
covertly subversive, serves to indicate that Katherine Burdekin’s 1937 
dystopian novel Swastika Night may be an inspiration for The Chrysalids. 
Swastika Night is set in the far future in a world split between the empires of 
Germany and Japan. With a few exceptions necessary for maintaining 
control of a worldwide empire, including aeroplanes and radios, technology 
has regressed to the level of the early modern period. Echoing Richard 
Jefferies’s 1885 novel After London Or Wild England, the strict social 
hierarchy is both feudal and racial (with the latter developed and updated by 
the growth of Nazism). But while Jefferies’s novel valorises Christian virtues, 
in Swastika Night only Christians are below women, who according to the 
official “Hitlerian” religion are unclean “non-humans.” The only form of love 
permitted is Athenian-derived homosexuality. The official religion, a cult of 
masculinity, has borrowed much from Catholicism as well as some aspects 
of other Abrahamic religions. An intense, threatening feeling – far darker 
than anything in The Chrysalids – is palpable throughout. Wyndham had 
read Swastika Night and early drafts of what would become The Chrysalids 
suggest that it worked an influence upon him, particularly in some of the 
social elements of his imagined society.87 Both texts deal with resistance 
within an insular society based on an extreme and puritan perversion of 
Christianity in a post-cataclysmic world war and, while society in Wyndham’s 
text is violently patriarchal, in Burdekin’s novel it is violently misogynistic. 
Both texts involve a severe future technological and social regression from 
an enlightened ideal and in both cases this regression is due to the socio-
political actions of the present, turning Enlightenment values upon their 
heads. The overcoming of religious superstition in favour of humanist reason 
is instrumentalised to create a belief system that is capable of indoctrinating 
                                            
87 In John Wyndham, "Roar of Rockets," John O'London's Weekly April 2 1954, he calls 
Swastika Night “remarkably perceptive”. 
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and controlling the whole population. Science and engineering, put to military 
use, have created the means by which the authors’ contemporary society 
can destroy itself. The binding force by which these post-catastrophic 
dystopic societies are maintained, however, is not precisely religious belief 
qua faith, but rather the strict separation of the pure from the unclean, of that 
which is in its rightful and proper place from disorder and dirtiness. The 
paradox of German society in Swastika Night is that while the cult of blood 
and masculinity exist there can be no “men” in Germany (in the sense of “a 
mentally independent creature who thinks for himself and believes in himself, 
and who knows that no other creature that walks on the earth is superior to 
himself in anything he can’t alter”).88 The telepaths in The Chrysalids occupy 
exactly this position, and it is for this reason that they are persecuted. 
 
Yet whereas female characters in Burdekin’s novel are stripped of their 
humanity and agency to demonstrate the logical ends of Nazi misogyny, in 
Wyndham’s novel they are given agency to decisively influence and shape 
the narrative. In an odd turn of phrase, David Ketterer asserts that, 
“Wyndham was a feminist (albeit of a rather dated romantic kind) and 
females often have starring roles in his [SF]”. Wyndham does indeed seem 
to have a positive yet oddly “romantic” view of women when his postwar 
fiction is considered as a whole. There are plenty of female principal 
characters in his fiction, but only in the story Consider Her ways (1956) is the 
narrator a woman. In the “Facts of Life Sextet”, as Ketterer terms 
Wyndham’s major postwar works, the female leads are usually the romantic 
interests of the narrator (the exception being Trouble with Lichen, which is 
narrated in the third person). However, many of these women are more 
intelligent and independent than the male narrators. They are generally 
endowed with a calm sense of authority, empirically-generated knowledge, 
common sense and powers of reason which enable them to make decisions 
that often get the hero-narrator out of trouble. They are also healthily cynical 
in their outlook, but in a way that acknowledges humanitarian concerns in a 
more “traditional”, “feminine” manner. Josella Playton, for example, is upset 
                                            
88 Burdekin, Swastika Night, 28 emphasis in original. 
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by the scene in which shots are fired over the heads of the blind protestors in 
Malet Street outside the University. But when she and Bill Masen are each 
chained to a separate band of blind people to look after by Coker, Bill has to 
await a chance crisis to get himself free of the shackles, while Josella, more 
logical and cynical, gives her group a simple ultimatum: take off her 
handcuffs or “find themselves drinking prussic acid or eating cyanide of 
potassium on her recommendation.”89 
 
Plan for Chaos, written in the late 1940s but first published only in 2009, has 
a more ambivalent attitude towards women and female sexuality. In this 
novel, Wyndham experimented with a more hardboiled, film noir style of 
narration, and the fear of matriarchy and expression of a certain dangerous 
type of female sexuality is typical for this (not always brilliantly emulated) 
Chandleresque feel. It should be noted that even here, where the Nazi 
“mother” to five hundred identical “twins” is most theatrically diabolical, the 
narrator’s consanguineous fiancée Freda is elevated as a heroine far more 
capable, mature and practical than the hapless narrator himself. This 
position is cemented by the character Josella Playton in The Day of the 
Triffids (1951), and by The Kraken Wakes (1953) the narrator, Mike, is 
married to a woman far more capable and intelligent than he is.  
 
David Ketterer links Josella Playton to the triffids through the repetition of the 
verb “tethered” in order to describe both how Bill finds her (“tethered” to a 
blind man who is beating her) and how the triffids in nurseries are “tethered” 
to the ground. He describes her as John Wyndham’s “idealized” fantasy 
woman, with Bill Masen standing for Wyndham himself. But to reductively 
read Masen as Wyndham’s fictionalized self-image seems odd considering 
Masen’s ruthless selfishness. This narrow psychological methodology leads 
Ketterer to further argue that in The Day of the Triffids, The Kraken Wakes, 
The Chrysalids and The Midwich Cuckoos (1957) John Wyndham expresses 
successively a “fear of women, female sexuality, and sexual relations.” In 
                                            
89 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 191. Hubble notes that neither “can extricate 
themselves in the ruthless manner” of Michael Beadley’s followers however. Nick Hubble, 
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this schema, “the triffid is an illegitimate offspring of wayward sexuality”, and 
its funnel-like stinging head, which Bill Masen’s father lifts him up to look 
inside as a child is “an image of the vagina dentata.”90 The explicit cultural 
link between flowers and female sexuality has a long history, successively 
embellished through the Enlightenment science of comparative anatomy in 
materialist texts like La Mettrie’s (1751) L’Homme Plante (Man a Plant). But 
if, as Ketterer suggests, the real horror of the rise of the triffids for 
Wyndham/Masen lies in their parallel with female sexuality, then it is strange 
that relations between Mason and other characters do not in turn parallel this 
fear. Indeed, Bill Masen is not excessively scared by Josella Playton’s well-
developed sexuality. Manlove notes that on their first meeting Masen is “not 
interested in her character”, seeing Playton in utilitarian terms as “a mass of 
fragments, all of them physical.” There are sexual overtones (“her clothes, or 
the remnants of them, were good quality”), but “his general view is that the 
equipment for good practical work is there.”91 Bill Mason possesses the 
ruthlessness of a hard-boiled detective from the genre fiction Wyndham had 
previously attempted, but here Wyndham is playing more reflexively and 
metafictionally with the genre’s expectations, so that after Playton cleans 
herself up he comments, “She approximated now to the film director’s idea of 
the heroine after a rough-house, rather than the genuine thing.”92 Hence 
when Josella explains her book “Sex is my Adventure” to him he quickly 
recovers. She initiates physical contact with him and it is from this point on 
that her character becomes less of a patriarchal stereotype of a young 
affluent woman. The next morning, 
she had an air of self-possession which was hard to associate with the 
frightened figure of the night before… I have no idea how I expected to find 
her dressed… but the practicality of her choice was by no means the only 
impression I received as I saw her.93 
 
Mason’s physical attraction to Playton is smuggled in under an observation 
of her “practicality”, but it is not merely her ability to be an object of lust 
                                            
90 David Ketterer, "John Wyndham: The Facts of Life Sextet," A Companion to Science 
Fiction, (Blackwell, 2005). 
91 Manlove, "Everything's Slipping Away," 42; Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 52. 
92 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 52. 
93 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 80. 
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adapted to living in a post-catastrophic world to which Mason is attracted. 
Indeed, he first notices her “self-possession” (in contrast to the more 
ambivalent description of her “frightened figure of the night before”), and 
without Playton’s self-assured intelligence and independence, the character 
would lack depth. This would make it considerably difficult for Wyndham to 
maintain Masen’s long search to be reunited with her as a credible plot 
device. 
 
This ambivalence is maintained when, using a lecture delivered to a hapless 
young woman by Coker at Tynsham Manor, Wyndham calls for female 
independence based upon education and reason, and argues for a greater 
female presence in the workplace. The lecture is, however, as much a swipe 
at contemporary SF writing as at societal ills.94 Coker aggressively accuses 
women in general of having had “a vested interest in playing the part of 
parasites” and implores this particular female, who has been mending 
clothes by candlelight, to be more mechanically minded. The woman of the 
future must still mend clothes (there is no suggestion he must learn to do 
this), but she should do so by electric light from a generator she has herself 
fixed. Equality, to paraphrase Lenin, here equals sewing power plus 
electrification. 
 
Notwithstanding such patriarchal oversights, Wyndham’s message for 
science fiction is that female characters should do more than simply play the 
part of the beautiful daughter of the scientist. As noted above, Masen and 
Playton’s adopted daughter is sensible, practical and headstrong from her 
first introduction. She develops the skills of a social scientist in her triffid-
monitoring capacities – a role she takes on for and by herself, showing 
maturity and self-reliance. That she does this out of hatred for triffids is 
evidence that she achieves precisely the sort of virtues which Coker 
demands of women in a post-catastrophic world, where “we’ll all have to 
learn not simply what we like, but as much as we can about running a 
                                            
94 Hubble aptly describes Coker as “a mixture of lower-class origins and progressive 
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community and supporting it.”95 The blindness catastrophe has given the 
survivors an opportunity to build a new community if only they can break free 
from the conventions and double standards of the old. Real, practical 
equality in gender relations is a key foundation for the establishment of a 
successful participatory and democratic liberal utopia. 
 
At a time when the scientist’s daughter was still a stock figure of SF, the 
careful characterization of strong and independent women in the foreground 
of Wyndham’s postwar fiction was a significant development for SF in 
general, and particularly for SF which strove for a large, mainstream 
readership. 
 
In The Chrysalids, for instance, it is almost entirely female characters that 
drive the whole plot: Sophie, the six-toed girl whom David protects, provides 
the first narrative impetus; the developing telepathic relationship between 
David and Rosalind the next narrative turn. Sophie’s “deformity” is 
discovered and her family flee. David’s Aunt Harriet attempts to switch his 
sister Petra with her own baby to prevent it from being declared a 
“blasphemy”; when she fails she commits suicide. Petra’s commanding 
telepathic abilities are awakened and the subsequent chapter deals with the 
telepath Anne’s decision to marry a “norm.” Petra’s distress signal causes 
the telepaths to meet face-to-face together for the first time (significantly it is 
the more resourceful and practical Rosalind who shoots the wild animal 
attacking Petra’s pony with bow and arrow while David has yet to cock his 
gun). The arrest of two of the telepaths, Sally and Katherine, increases the 
tempo. As they escape, Rosalind kills a man who she finds stalking them 
while David is sleeping. At this point, Petra establishes contact with the 
Sealand woman, and from here on the woman’s approach figures largely in 
the narrative; while David, Rosalind and Petra are taken hostage by the 
fringes people. Sophie re-emerges to free them from captivity after it is 
hinted at that Rosalind is in imminent danger of being raped. Finally, 
following the battle between the Fringes people and the Puritans, it is the 
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intervention of the Sealand woman that brings about the denouement of the 
novel. While women are subjugated and frequently suffer terrible violence at 
the hands of this patriarchal society, the structure of the novel works to 
oppose these forces by demonstrating women’s powers as agents to drive 
the narrative forwards. If the telepaths have a privileged form of knowledge 
that undermines the religious basis of Waknuk society, then the women of 
this society have powers of praxis that work counter to the hegemonic 
patriarchal order too. 
 
Scientology, Scientism and Satire 
 
The telepaths’ claim to a privileged form of knowledge that undermines the 
(religious) foundations of the society in which they grew up suggests 
allegorical content. To a certain extent both Wymer and Webster interpret 
The Chrysalids in terms of the rhetoric and paranoia surrounding the 
Communist threat to 1950s America, as previously indicated. However, there 
is also some evidence for less immediately obvious allegorical content at the 
level of the SF genre. 
 
It took Wyndham a long time to achieve literary success. His first 
publications in the early 1930s were short stories, appearing in US SF “Pulp” 
magazines including Galaxy Science Fiction, Amazing Science Fiction and 
Future Science Fiction. He also wrote detective fiction, and while he had 
early novels in both genres published, he eventually gave up his attempts to 
write the latter after his breakthrough with The Day of the Triffids. By the mid-
1950s, Wyndham was well connected in American SF circles. His US agent 
was for some years Frederick Pohl, who was himself a talented writer (his 
dystopian novel The Space Merchants (1953), written with C.M. Kornbluth, is 
of particular note). After years of selling stories to the Pulps, Wyndham had a 
good knowledge of them, despite persistently claiming to dislike both the 
label “science fiction”, and all “hard” SF of the type written by Isaac Asimov 
and published by John W. Campbell Jr. 
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Campbell, for all his editorial insistence upon scientific plausibility, began in 
1945 to express an interest in ideas of psychology and parapsychology 
through his editorship of Astounding.96 There, he published parapsychology 
stories by the likes of A.E. van Vogt and Henry Kuttner, whose ‘baldy’ series 
of short stories (published in Astounding using the penname "Lewis 
Padgett"), were later collated into the novel Mutant.97 In them Kuttner 
describes a “decentralized” post-bomb North America where a strain of 
humanity has become bald and developed telepathy, within a “human” (i.e. 
non-telepath dominated) world. It is a narrative in which assimilation is pitted 
against the urge for biological dominance and reason against paranoia; it 
anticipates The Chrysalids in a number of ways. For Edward James, both 
texts are “not so much about the post-nuclear holocaust world as, in the 
tradition of Van Vogt’s Slan, about the ways in which ordinary people react to 
those who are different and/or superior.”98 Campbell was also responsible for 
publishing a long article by L. Ron Hubbard entitled “Dianetics: A New 
Science of the Mind” in May 1950, the ideas of which would eventually lead 
directly to the creation of the Church of Scientology in 1954. Albert Berger, 
citing Barry Malzberg, claims that Campbell was in fact “co-creator” of the 
idea, and remained supportive of Hubbard, albeit not uncritically, for well 
over a year as the writer developed and publicized his “auditing” 
techniques.99 
 
Berger contextualizes the early stages of the Dianetics movement with 
reference to the belief, commonly held by the editor and many of the writers 
and readership of Astounding alike, that the development of science and 
technology was the driving force of history yet human irrationality prevented 
social and political progress from matching the pace of technological change. 
                                            
96 Albert I. Berger, "Towards a Science of the Nuclear Mind: Science-Fiction Origins of 
Dianetics," Science Fiction Studies 16 (1989) 130. The OED defines parapsychology as 
“The field of study that deals with paranormal phenomena in psychology.” OED Online, Mar. 
2011. Oxford UP, <http://oed.com/view/Entry/137614?redirectedFrom= parapsychology>, 1 
June 2011. The discipline was founded by J.B. Rhine at Duke University, with his text Extra-
Sensory Perception (1934). For Rhine, the term “parapsychology” was only a “‘temporary 
subdivision’” from the field of psychology. Roger Luckhurst, The Invention of Telepathy: 
1870-1901 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002) 252-3. 
97 Henry Kuttner, Mutant (Feltham: Hamlyn, 1979) first published in the US 1953. 
98 James, Science Fiction in the 20th Century 92. 
99 Berger, "Towards a Science of the Nuclear Mind," 125. 
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Increases in the destructive capabilities of war-making technology were, from 
this view, a reflection of human irrationality overruling scientific progress. 
This problem was a well-established theme in science fiction, dating back at 
least to early novels of H. G. Wells like The War in the Air (1908). After 
Hiroshima, however, the disjuncture was so acute as to necessitate a 
complete re-appraisal. Hence, during the next few months, “Campbell and 
many of his readers [grew] increasingly angry at the scandalously low level 
of Congressional debate on the creation of a permanent atomic energy 
establishment.”100 They believed that the development of nuclear weapons 
pointed not to fundamental problems with the social or economic role of 
science, but to a failure of politics and law. Dianetics was one way of dealing 
with this problem, although by no means everyone who saw the problem in 
this light believed Dianetics to be the solution: 
Nuclear energy had been a metaphor in SF for the most powerful of new 
technologies that could move history forward. Now, not only had the quantum 
leap of progress not materialized, but in the absence of that social 
transformation called for in the script, technology posed a serious threat to the 
continuation of civilization itself.101 
 
To John Wyndham (for whom such “progress” would have entailed the 
ascendancy of liberalism) nuclear weapons seemed to threaten civilisation. 
Without the subjection of nuclear armaments to international control under 
democratic checks and balances, they could serve to be the means of 
dramatically increasing both the chances of international conflict and the 
deadliness of its result. Yet as discussed above, he held out little hope for 
the survival of liberalism in the postwar era. 
 
Berger argues that in a situation where destructive technological advances 
and poltical hatred went hand in hand, “regardless of the spirit in which he 
created it, Hubbard's “solution” was the creation of a mechanism for reducing 
the irrationality.”102 By turning the question about human irrationality into a 
medical-psychological question of post-traumatic stress and dysfunction, 
                                            
100 Berger, "Towards a Science of the Nuclear Mind," 131. 
101 Berger, "Towards a Science of the Nuclear Mind," 134. 
102 Berger, "Towards a Science of the Nuclear Mind," 135. 
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Hubbard aimed to use a rationalized system to overcome the flaws of human 
irrationality. 
 
However, the discourse employed in L. Ron Hubbard’s system of Dianetics 
clearly places more emphasis on scientific rhetoric than on scientific method, 
and as such was analogous to the “hard” SF which Wyndham so disliked. 
Hubbard proposed, for instance, that the human mind is split between 
“analytical” and “reactive” parts, and that 
While the analytical mind is accurate, rational, and logical—a ‘flawless 
computer’—the reactive mind is the repository of a variety of memory traces or 
what Hubbard calls engrams. Consisting primarily of moments of pain, 
unconsciousness or emotional loss, these engrams are burned into the 
reactive mind and cause us a variety of problems in the present, ranging from 
neurosis to physical illness and insanity.103 
 
These ideas perhaps recall Freud’s analysis of the memory as being like a 
“mystic-writing pad.”104 Building on his work in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud argued in a 1924 article that “our mental apparatus” is like a 
pad that  
provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again, 
like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been written, like an 
ordinary paper pad… The layer which receives the stimuli… forms no 
permanent traces; the foundations of memory come about in other, adjoining 
systems.105 
 
Just as Freud hoped that the neurotic patient could be cured by bringing 
repressed (childhood) traumas into the conscious mind and talking through 
them, through the “auditing” process of dianetics, the “pre-Clear” patient 
 
can erase these painful engrams, by regressing to the original painful event 
and reliving it, thereby clearing it from his/her reactive mind… once all the 
                                            
103 Hugh B. Urban, "Fair Game: Secrecy, Security, and the Church of Scientology in Cold 
War America," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 (2006), 365. 
104 The official website of the Church of Scientology claims that L. Ron Hubbard was 
introduced to Freudian psychoanalysis as a teenager by an American naval officer who had 
studied under Freud in Vienna. Who Was L. Ron Hubbard?, 2010, The Church of 
Scientology, <http://www.scientology.org/faq/scientology-founder/who-was-
lronhubbard.html>, 24 August 2010. 
105 Sigmund Freud, "A Note Upon The Mystic Writing Pad," in Works, vol. 19, 230. 
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engrams have been removed, the patient achieves the state called ‘Clear.’ As 
Hubbard claims, the Clear individual experiences himself/herself and the world 
in a radically new way, achieving a variety of intellectual and physical benefits, 
ranging from increased IQ to optimum health and vitality… Eventually, 
Hubbard and his students would make even more remarkable claims for the 
Clear state[,]… such as the ability to communicate telepathically, to see 
through walls, even to re-arrange molecules to fix appliances like broken 
coffee makers and air-conditioners.106 
 
What begins here as a somewhat flawed reading of Freudian psychoanalysis 
eventually comes full circle. Beginning with an SF problem – the gap 
between technological change and social progress – Hubbard moved 
beyond SF to propose a practical solution utilizing a vulgarized Freudian 
view of memory. It should be noted too that while Freud had an 
“unenthusiastic and ambivalent” relationship with telepathy and the occult, he 
also insisted that “[psychoa]nalysts are at bottom incorrigible mechanists and 
materialists.”107 If one accepts that there are Nietzschean overtones to 
Hubbard’s concept of “engrams”, the inconsistency of this position quickly 
becomes apparent. While for Freud the permanence of all memory traces – 
not merely traumas – indicates that there is a fundamental link between 
unconscious memory, mental health and the very formation of identity itself, 
“engrams” stem only from moments of pain. Contemporary trauma theory 
now tends to view trauma as “an event or experience which overwhelms the 
individual and resists language and representation”,108 but in the 1950s 
Hubbard believed that “engrams” could be eradicated from the unconscious 
mind by bringing them into the conscious mind. As such “engrams” are 
perhaps analogous to Nietzsche’s concept of the development of “bad 
conscience”, in which “something is branded in, so that it stays in the 
memory.” In human “prehistory”, Nietzsche claimed, mankind “guessed” that 
“only that which hurts incessantly is ‘remembered’.”109 Primitive though this 
means is, the greater the cruelty, the greater the affect was believed to be. 
                                            
106 Urban, "Fair Game," 365. 
107 Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy," in Works, vol. 18, 181, 179. On 
Freud’s changing relationship with telepathy, see Luckhurst, The Invention of Telepathy, 
270-5. 
108 Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2004) 3. 
109 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals II§3, 42. 
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For Hubbard, the repression of such pain is precisely what creates engrams, 
and by becoming aware of these memories, one can remove their affect. 
Nietzsche, however, believed that not only is forgetting an “active” process 
but that, constituted as “selective remembering [it is] the recognition that not 
all past forms of knowledge and not all experiences are beneficial for present 
and future life.”110 
 
Turning ever further towards the fantastic, esoteric and mythical, in 1954 
Hubbard founded the Church of Scientology, which placed less emphasis on 
achieving “the state of Clear and optimal mental health in this lifetime” and 
focused instead on what he called the “Thetan” or eternal, spiritual soul of 
man. Not only engrams from this lifetime, but the lives of scientologists’ 
previous incarnations now had to be “audited”, for the ultimate “liberation of 
the Thetan from its bondage to the world of matter, space, energy, and 
time.”111 
 
On the surface, Scientology promises a schema of spiritual enlightenment 
fitting with the mid-twentieth century historiographical view of the 
Enlightenment, which Hans-Georg Gadamer referred to as “the schema of 
the conquest of mythos by logos.”112 Yet the meaning of “logos” is stretched 
by its almost tautological incorporation into the word “Scientology”. Indeed, 
Dianetics conforms to what Vilfredo Pareto termed “non-logical” action: 
subjectively logical but objectively illogical.113 Furthermore, Scientology also 
creates its own esoteric truths, its religious narratives. In both of these 
respects, drawing parallels with the Frankfurt School conception of the 
Enlightenment, Scientology thus “reverts to mythology”.114 
 
There are obvious parallels here with the mutant-Christianity at the centre of 
Wyndham’s novel The Chrysalids. The “Offences”, those animals or plants 
which do not conform to the “norm” for their type (“that is to say, d[o] not look 
                                            
110 Peter Ramadanovic, "From Haunting to Trauma: Nietzsche's Active Forgetting and 
Blanchot's Writing of the Disaster," Postmodern Culture 11.2 (2001) §1. 
111 Urban, "Fair Game," 366. 
112 Gadamer, "The Historicity of Understanding," 258. See also above, 89. 
113 On Pareto and Aldous Huxley, see above, 134-8. 
114 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xvi. See above, 53, 55. 
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like their parents, or parent-plants”) are ritually burned or slaughtered by 
David’s father like an engram brought to the surface. As “deviations” from the 
norm they are unassimilable. The prevalence of offences on a person’s farm 
is read as being in indirect proportion to their closeness to God, for “THE 
NORM IS THE WILL OF GOD” while “THE DEVIL IS THE FATHER OF DEVIATION”.115 The 
community patriarchs, like David’s father, ultimately decide what the “norm” 
is, however, so that a power hierarchy based around esoteric knowledge is 
inevitable. Unlike Abraham in the Bible, David’s father’s attempts to kill his 
son are not driven by a message from an angel. In a society that believes 
“only the image of God is Man” he needs invoke no holier messenger than 
himself. Waknuk Mutant-Christianity, like Scientology, is about the potential 
of Man to be God if he can only realize his dream of purity. As Zamyatin had 
earlier put it, “Our gods are here, below, with us… the gods have become 
like us.  Ergo, we have become as gods.”116 
 
While there are no direct textual references to Scientology in the novel, it 
certainly existed at the crosshairs of two of John Wyndham’s pet hates: the 
“hard” science fiction of John W. Campbell Jr., Isaac Asimov and others 
which he felt insisted on technical vocabulary that rendered it opaque to the 
non-initiated, and established religion – particularly anything to do with 
esotericism, mysticism, a monopoly claim on truth and a rigid power 
structure enforced through ritual and spiritual law.117 If Scientology were an 
object of satire for Wyndham in The Chrysalids, then the fact that those with 
telepathic abilities (which Hubbard claimed could be reached through 
dianetics) are themselves persecuted by religious fundamentalists would be 
an ironic stab in the direction of the founders of the Church of Scientology 
and their demonstrable non-abilities. 
 
Religion and Enlightenment in The Day of the Triffids 
                                            
115 Wyndham, The Chrysalids 18. 
116 Zamyatin, We 69. 
117 Hence, when his friend Biff Barker’s daughter converted to Catholicism and entered a 
convent, Wyndham wrote her out of his will. David Ketterer, "'A part of the ... family [?]': John 
Wyndham's The Midwich Cuckoos as Estranged Autobiography," Learning From Other 
Worlds: Estrangement, Cognition and the Politics of Science Fiction and Utopia, ed. Patrick 
Parrinder (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2000) 162. 
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Wyndham was a thorough secularist. Indeed, he once described himself as 
“so shocked and nauseated” by his first communion after Confirmation into 
the Church of England at the age of fourteen that he had “never been since.” 
Nor did he have any time for the strict Wesleyan Methodism of his maternal 
grandparents. In his typically understated way, Wyndham said of religions 
“power tends to corrupt them. [I h]ave a suspicion that they may be the 
Achilles’ heel of humanity.”118 
 
Nevertheless, he could also see that the power of religious narrative lay 
beyond merely the mysterious or esoteric, and it was perhaps because of 
this very suspicion that religious imagery and narrative frameworks appear 
throughout his postwar works. Wyndham was particularly interested in the 
idea of enlightenment in both the apocalyptic-religious sense and the 
historical sense. Fusing spiritual enlightenment and the Age of 
Enlightenment together, Wyndham attempted to explicate the power 
relations and ideological beliefs implicit in both. Thus the characters in The 
Day of the Triffids and The Kraken Wakes no less than The Chrysalids can 
be split both between categories of an Elect and the Condemned as well as 
between a liberal enlightened elite and the masses. 
 
Indeed, Koppenfels makes clear that these need not even be mutually 
exclusive readings.119 Catastrophe in these works is signalled in the 
heavens, and while only The Chrysalids makes continual direct reference to 
Revelations through the invocation of “the Tribulations”, in The Day of the 
Triffids the narrative framework can be seen as a path of redemption.120 In 
Koppenfels’s words, “since the sun of reason appears as the secular avatar 
of the all-seeing divine eye, blinding is the appropriate sanction for an act of 
                                            
118 John Wyndham, Correspondence between John Wyndham and Sam Moskowitz. 
Questionnaire and Response. Ms. 11/5/4. The John Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
119 See W. V. Koppenfels, "These Irritant Bodies: Blinding and Blindness in Dystopia (A 
Powerful Parable Found in the Narratives of Cyrano de Bergerac, Swift, Wells, Wyndham, 
and Saramago)," Cambridge Quarterly 33 (2004). 
120 “…These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and 
made them white in the blood of the Lamb.” (Revelations 7:14.) It is significant that the many 
beasts of the book of Revelations – including the seven-horned, seven-eyed Lamb – would 
immediately be declared mutants and destroyed in Waknuk under their strain of Christianity. 
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defiance of its authority.”121 Masen begins the novel stricken by temporary 
blindness, awaking in “isolation and helplessness” on a hospital ward with 
bandaged eyes.122 With the social structures of hospital care removed, 
Masen’s first act of autonomy is to remove his bandage. By contrast, the 
“isolated incoherent individuals” around him remain helpless.123 Masen 
journeys through London, witnessing the despair of the blinded, observing 
the decay of the city and its reclamation by nature, realising that “the 
metropolis has become a necropolis.”124 Inebriation and suicide are frequent 
responses to the crisis, while religious repentance is conspicuous by its 
absence. 
 
By the time Masen leaves London during the virulent pandemic, it is clear 
that only the liberal enlightened elite (in both the philosophical sense and in 
the sense of response to the stimulus of light) or elect few can survive this 
apocalypse. Those who cling to the derelict values of the old society, like 
Miss Durrant who attempts to build a “clean, decent community with 
standards – Christian standards” at Tynsham Manor, fail to recognise that 
the contingency and fragility of such standards and values have been 
exposed.125 The unavoidable didactic message is that only the liberal 
elect/elite are capable of both the empirical sense experience of sight, from 
which they can continue to gain new knowledge, and the liberal reason by 
which they may adapt as a species-being to new circumstances and survive. 
 
It is with relief that Masen finally finds his way to Shirnings Farm, and 
receives temporary redemption, while his new “family” builds up production 
on the farm and strengthens it as a civilised bulwark against the intrusion of 
the triffids. But as in the Book of Revelations there comes a second period of 
strife, beginning with the mass attacks of the triffids and ending ultimately 
with the final showdown between good and evil; light and (pre-
Enlightenment, medieval) darkness; liberal reason and hopeless self-
                                            
121 Koppenfels, "These Irritant Bodies," 156. 
122 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 5. 
123 Manlove, "Everything's Slipping Away," 47. 
124 Koppenfels, "These Irritant Bodies," 168. 
125 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 144. 
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deceiving Realpolitik. The Isle of Wight, then, is the New Jerusalem from 
which the new world order of Enlightenment and reason shall eventually 
spread. The text is revealed to be against the current developmental path of 
science, but not against either science as such or scientific methodology. 
These remain redeemable in spite of the destructive, irresponsible and 
immoral uses to which they have been put in developing the blindness-
causing satellites and the triffids. Indeed, Masen prophesizes a return to the 
mainland which he describes as a “great crusade to drive the triffids back 
and back with ceaseless destruction” – the goal of the enlightened elect 
thereby given both religious and military meaning. 
 
Evolutionary Theory and the Triffids 
 
The militarization of the triffid threat draws upon the power of the image of 
the seedpod, which, (as discussed above) was used frequently in the 1950s 
to represent the atomic bomb’s power. The seedpod here becomes a 
terrifying symbol of imminent hidden potential for alien invader threats. Like a 
Communist cell a seed may lie dormant for a long period before growing into 
a menace.126 The seed is a traditional pastoral symbol of renewal and 
growth, but when exposed to radiation its springtime imagery can be 
perverted or mutated into something more subversively sinister, like the 
murderous body doubles of Invasion of the Body Snatchers. From the time of 
the first atomic explosions in 1945 governmental, scientific and some media 
discourse had presented atomic weapons as unlocking a hidden secret of 
nature (in the sense of the non-human universe), an awesome and powerful 
new world. The Bomb used, in President Truman’s words, “the basic power 
of the universe.”127 Significantly, the analeptic tale in which the worldwide 
spread of the deadly triffid plants is related occurs in a chapter which opens 
with a history of the successful launching of satellite atomic and biological 
weapons, an “unknown number of menaces up there over your head, quietly 
                                            
126 Such was the hope of the German Communist Party in 1932, when ahead even of 
Hitler’s election victory they formed into “Groups of Five” by which no one would be able to 
give up more than five others if arrested. See Arthur Koestler, “Utopia” in Crossman, ed., 
The God That Failed 59, 63-4. 
127 "Basic Power of the Universe: How the Bomb Was Made, Mr. Truman's Account," Times 
7 August 1945, 4, Col. C. 
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circling and circling until someone should arrange for them to drop”.128 The 
triffids, in parallel, are released into the atmosphere when a plane carrying a 
stolen box of seeds from a Soviet laboratory is shot down. Interestingly, in 
the first publication of the novel (as an abridged serialization) in the 
American Colliers magazine under the title Revolt of the Triffids, the plants 
are created not through genetic modification in the Soviet Union, but by 
intergalactic intrigue. In the Colliers version, set further in the future, large 
financial interests (“what in older times would have been called monopolies”) 
have conquered the solar system by space rockets, driven less “by the fact 
that men could live on the planets than they were in the wealth the planets 
produced.”129 This colonialist economic exploitation of nearby planets proves 
ill fated. Among other valuable vegetable matter, triffids are discovered 
growing wild on Venus by an Argentinean plantation owner.  It is an oil 
magnate, “Artic & European”, which shoots down a rocket full of triffid seeds 
in the earth’s atmosphere, in contrast to the Soviet Union plotline in the 
British edition. 
 
This difference has important implications regarding Wyndham’s attitude 
towards evolutionary theory. While the Venus version does demonstrate the 
sort of “Huxleyanism” which Matthew Moore points to as at the heart of the 
“Wyndham strategy”, the British text is more ambiguous.130 Here, the 
arguments of Darwin and T. H. Huxley about geographical adaptation are 
mingled with notions of sudden evolutionary jumps – which Darwin, but not 
Huxley, rejected. To use “Huxleyanism” as a way of distinguishing between 
merely the purely “scientific” theory of Darwin (which he himself saw as 
                                            
128 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 20. 
129 John Wyndham, "The Revolt of the Triffids," Colliers 6 January 1951, 64. While the 
Colliers text is set in the far future, Ketterer argues that the novel version of The Day of the 
Triffids is set in 1976 in his introduction to the hardback academic text of John Wyndham, 
Plan for Chaos, eds. David Ketterer and Andy Sawyer (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2009). He 
reasons that many textual hints in Plan for Chaos point to it being intended as a prequel to 
The Day of the Triffids. Futhermore, Wyndham once attempted to write a sequel to the 
latter, of which two fragments exist in the John Wyndham Collection (7/1/10 and 7/2/5). In 
these fragments, which are set on a remote Pacific island in 2006, the blindness-causing 
comets occurred exactly thirty years earlier. An updated version of this introduction is 
available online: David Ketterer, The Revised and Updated Introduction to Plan for Chaos by 
John Wyndham, 2010, Blog, <http://sfhubbub.blogspot.com/2009/11/revised-and-updated-
introduction-to.html>, 3 February 2010. 
130 Moore, "A Critical Study of John Wyndham's Major Works," Chapter 1 passim. 
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having social implications) and the “philosophical” arguments of Huxley is to 
brush over this, among other important differences between the two.131 
 
In the British text triffids have in someway been produced, as a new species, 
in the Soviet Union: 
a cleavage of methods and views had caused biology there, under a man 
called Lysenko, to take a different course. It, too, then succumbed to the 
endemic secrecy [of the USSR]. The lines it had taken were unknown, and 
thought to be unsound – but it was anybody’s guess whether very successful, 
very silly, or very queer things were happening there – if not all three at 
once.132 
 
The reference to Lysenko is telling. Having shot to fame in the Soviet Union 
in the late 1920s, his position was cemented by his “discovery of the 
‘vernalization’ of wheat, a process in which the seeds are frozen so that they 
will germinate earlier the next spring.” Lysenko was politically astute and 
ruthless in maintaining his position as an authority on biological research in 
the USSR.133 But while in the West the 1930s saw the rise of the “Modern 
Synthesis” of Mendelian genetics and Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, in 
Russia there were worries that the inherent competitiveness of Darwinism 
could be viewed as somehow undermining the “scientific” status of Marxism. 
Lysenko therefore based his approach on the late-Enlightenment French 
evolutionist J.B. Lamarck, who believed that organisms could induce more 
rapid evolution by passing on to their offspring their own acquired 
characteristics such as improved physical strength. Modern genetics rules 
out the possibility of this theory, but until the 1950s Lamarckism was still used 
as a basis for scientific research in the USSR. 
 
Yet Wyndham makes it clear that such a process is not the exclusive means 
by which the “very queer” Lysenkian triffids come into being. In the words of 
the character Umberto, 
                                            
131 See Ernst Myar, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern 
Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991) 37, 46. 
132 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 23. 
133 Bowler, Evolution 246. 
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I do not say that there is no sunflower there at all. I do not say there is no 
turnip there.  I do not say that there is no nettle, or even no orchid there. But I 
do say that if they were all fathers to it they would none of them know their 
child. I do not think it would please them greatly, either.134 
 
Lysenko is here painted as a latter-day Dr. Moreau, with the triffids serving to 
demonstrate the plasticity of (plant) life. Domesticated crops are mixed with 
stinging weeds and exotic wild flowers. The effect is only slightly sinister, but 
nevertheless beyond the ken of 1950s science. This illegitimate wild child is 
alarming when compared to its more conservative forebears. Moreover, the 
fact that “none of them would know their child” (significantly the first of many 
anthropomorphic comments about triffids in the novel) also suggests a 
saltation, or evolutionary leap, artificially induced by Soviet science. 
 
This move plays on postwar fears of radiation, but it builds too on the 
“Modern Synthesis” in biology, a phrase coined by Julian Huxley in 1942 to 
describe the meeting of Neo-Darwinism and Mendelian genetics in 
evolutionary theory. According to Peter Bowler, saltation theories posit that 
“occasionally individuals may be born so different from their parents that they 
count as a new species – critics call this possibility the theory of the ‘hopeful 
monster’.”135  This idea was rejected by Darwin, on the grounds that “[s]ince 
we see no evidence of species being formed by sudden saltations today, we 
may not invoke such discontinuities in the past.”136 However, this was a moot 
point for Darwin’s so-called “bulldog” T. H. Huxley, who always had problems 
accepting natural selection – the part of Darwin’s theory that has survived 
most intact to the present day.137 On these grounds, Wyndham’s approach 
does appear to be Huxleyan. 
 
Moore goes even further though, insisting that Wyndham’s “Huxleyan” 
interpretation of Darwin, used to explore evolutionary and survivalist themes, 
is accessed exclusively through H. G. Wells, a student of Huxley’s during the 
                                            
134 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 24. 
135 Bowler, Evolution 5. 
136 Bowler, Evolution 9-10. 
137 Bowler, Evolution 184. 
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mid-1880s. It is true that Wells held Huxleyan views during the late-Victorian 
and Edwardian eras. A clear statement of such beliefs can, for example, be 
found in A Modern Utopia (1905):  
The way of nature… is to kill the weaker and the sillier, to crush them, to 
starve them, to overwhelm them, using the stronger and more cunning as her 
weapon. But man is the unnatural animal, the rebel child of Nature… In the 
Modern Utopia he will have set himself to change the ancient law. No longer 
will it be that failures must suffer and perish lest their breed increase, but the 
breed of failure must not increase, lest they suffer and perish, and the race 
with them.138 
 
But it is immediately clear that the blind “masses” in The Day of the Triffids, 
who are at an extreme biological disadvantage, differ markedly from these 
Utopian “failures”: there is no suggestion in The Day of the Triffids that the 
children of the blind will also be blind. Indeed, Dr. Vorless makes quite clear 
with his plan for polygamy between sighted men and blind women that the 
contrary should be the case. 
 
Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that Wyndham was not aware of 
the Modern Synthesis. Not only had he at one time directly studied heredity 
during his abortive attempt to become a rare-breed sheep farmer, but he 
took an active interest in science that went beyond merely accessing it 
through the science fiction of writers like Wells who had been students of 
science. 
 
Even Wells, whose contact with T. H. Huxley occurred some sixty-five years 
before The Day of the Triffids was published, changed his opinions from the 
Huxleyan views he had expressed in early scientific romances like The Time 
Traveller (1894-5). In the 1930s, in collaboration with his zoologist son 
George P. Wells and the biologist Julian Huxley (T. H. Huxley’s grandson and 
brother to Aldous) – who were both far better informed than he about recent 
biological science – he co-wrote and edited the nine volume series The 
Science of Life. It was Julian Huxley who twelve years later wrote The 
Modern Synthesis, popularizing the evolutionary position from which biology 
                                            
138 Wells, A Modern Utopia 96. 
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developed into today’s biosciences. It is at least very likely that a post-
Wellsian author with sufficiently active an interest in the natural sciences to 
be a regular attendee of meetings of the British Interplanetary Society would 
also be acquainted with more modern biological principles than those 
featured in the early novels of Wells. 
 
Moreover, while the triffids are created in an ambiguous and shady manner 
compatible with both Huxleyan evolutionary theory and Lysenko’s approach 
to biological research, the manner in which they behave suggests an 
understanding of the Modern Synthesis. “Natural selection does not positively 
produce anything. It only eliminates, or tends to eliminate, whatever is not 
competitive”, and as such it seems to underpin the success of the triffids in 
their war against humanity.139 Thus, while the triffids are not produced 
through a selective breeding program but rather constitute a saltation, their 
victory is possible because without sight humanity is no longer biologically 
competitive. As humanity is constituted socially, the break down of the social 
order additionally weakens the competitiveness of the remaining humans, 
who (as personified in Masen) are atomized and monstrously self-interested 
without the framework of society to hold them in check. It is Masen’s “ruthless 
practicality and his careful selfishness” that make him so adaptable to a post 
catastrophe world.140 
 
The Image of the Triffids 
 
In both The Revolt of the Triffids and The Day of the Triffids the airborne 
spread of triffid seeds encapsulate not only socio-biological fears, but also 
prescient worries about satellite weapons and invasion anxieties. Masen 
speculates: 
When the fragments [of the plane] began their long, long fall towards the sea 
they left behind them something which looked at first like a white vapour. 
 It was not vapour. It was a cloud of seeds, floating, so infinitely light they 
were, even in the rarefied air. Millions of gossamer-slung triffid seeds, free 
now to drift wherever the winds of the world should take them… 
                                            
139 Anthony Flew, Darwinian Evolution, ed. Justin Wintle (London: Paladin, 1984) 25. 
140 Manlove, "Everything's Slipping Away," 49. 
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 It might be weeks, perhaps months, before they would sink to earth at last, 
many of them thousands of miles from their starting place.141 
 
The deadly threat of nuclear and biological weapons hovering in space is 
thereby transformed into the deadly drift of fallout-like seeds from the upper 
atmosphere, global and indiscriminate. The seeds, as discussed above, are 
imminent; the threat they contain may be realised in diseases and deformities 
only years after they land. As they are scattered across the world and take 
root, they grow into a new threat, which can be read not merely as Cold War 
fears of the enemy within but a whole constellation of social anxieties, 
including the invasion fears engendered by the previous war. Significantly, in 
this context, John Wyndham lived out the Blitz in Bloomsbury, frequently on 
fire watch and narrowly escaping explosions on more than one occasion.142 
 
The first triffid plants, Masen recalls, with their lashing poisonous stings, 
appeared “odd and somehow foreign.”143 They walk in a lurching, goosestep 
like fashion.144 But triffids are far from human: more properly they are a 
product of human creation. They represent a biological mutation writ large, 
an evolutionary saltation through human intervention. The floating seeds 
recall the threat of radioactive fallout, but the threat they carry is already, 
imminently, both mutated and threatening of mutation. The success of 
creating the triffids through tapping into the basic process of biological 
change (evolution) is hereby linked to the tapping into the “basic power of the 
universe” (atomic power), and in both cases human limitations look to have 
fatal consequences. The triffids, as well as being invaders, are then an 
interesting metaphor for nuclear disaster, for as Turney puts it  
Mere physical destruction is rather dull…[and] can only have a limited grip on 
the imagination. What grips is a change in the conditions of life, and what 
                                            
141 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 27 emphasis added. 
142 Evidence for this appears on numerous occasions in Wyndham’s many wartime letters to 
Grace Wilson from this period, held in the John Wyndham Collection, University of 
Liverpool. In his letter of 25 September 1940, for instance (10/1/12), Wyndham reports that 
he has been temporarily moved out of his room in the Penn Club because of a burst gas 
main and a time bomb and has taken refuge in a nearby shelter in Bloomsbury Square. 
143 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids, 27 emphasis in original. 
144 In this context, “The book’s ‘Dunkirk’ is the successful evacuation to the Isle of Wight”.  
Manlove, "Everything's Slipping Away," 33. 
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would change the conditions of life more than a change in the forms of life 
itself?145 
 
Human creation places triffids within the natural economy. In doing so the 
triffids, like a critical nuclear reaction, become animated by their own force, 
alienated from human understanding and weaponised. In dealing with triffids 
humanity approaches a part of the natural economy that is on some basic 
level incomprehensible, a biological rival with a very different life cycle which 
also has the potential to be a vast economic resource. 
 
As a threatening image, then, to adapt Iago’s words, the triffid is the green 
eyeless “monster, which doth mock the meat it feeds on”, precisely because 
its meat is also its uncomprehending creator. This relation cuts both ways: 
just as triffids can feed upon decomposing corpses, humans can use them as 
“cattle feed” or even, in desperation, boil and mash them for their own 
nutrition (as Torrence instructs the Shirnings Farm group to use them). The 
battle against triffids is a battle against nature, which having been 
transformed by man now stands over him once again: as with The Chysalids, 
humankind has returned to living in early-modern frontier societies of 
bounded polities built to keep nature out.146 
 
In this constellation, the triffids occupy an ambivalent position. As usurpers, 
they evoke the invasion threats of both German and (in turn) Soviet armies 
overrunning the British Isles, without being a simple allegory. At the novel’s 
climax, Torrence tries to impose an apparently regressive feudal order upon 
the Shirnings. Dennis declares, 
I’m suddenly feeling quite kindly towards the triffids. Without their intervention I 
suppose there would have been a whole lot more of this kind of thing by now. 
If they are the one factor that can stop serfdom coming back, then good luck to 
’em.147 
 
                                            
145 Turney, Frankenstein's Footsteps, 127. 
146 On the relationship between nature and Enlightenment, see above, 47-55.  
147 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids, 230. 
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Politically, the triffids tie together a nexus of fears about authoritarian 
government – both of the past and of the present. To the liberal proponents 
of this view – put most forcefully in Friedrich Hayek’s critique of Communism 
The Road to Serfdom (1944) – differentiating between an economic and 
philosophical theory of history and the contents of medieval history was 
unimportant. In their interpretation, authoritarian government belongs to the 
past, liberal democracy and “the Open Society” (to use Karl Popper’s 
phrase) to the future. Bill Masen happily leaves Torrence and his men to be 
killed and eaten by the triffids not only because their pugnacious attitude 
threatens the “family” unit, but also because their demand that living 
conditions be universally reduced to the lowest common denominator are 
incompatible with Masen’s liberal conception of society. Torrence’s 
nationalistic feudal order – whose raison d’être is ostensibly to give succour 
to as many of the blind survivors as possible – is aligned with the triffids and 
will rely upon them for survival. He offers a compound of impersonal 
bureaucratic decision, brutal dictatorship and a battle for survival against the 
triffids, with one hand tied by the provision of barren survival for so many of 
the blinded. Torrence, from Masen and his “family’s” point of view, is stuck in 
the old world: obsessed with an immediately far too ambitious plan to save 
the blind masses and the militarism of the nation-state system. In contrast, 
for Masen himself the blindness and ascendancy of the triffids was an 
apocalypse in its true sense (as suggested by Philip Best), revealing the 
possibility of a better order.148 With their technological superiority 
(represented by the scientific approach to battling triffids at a research 
laboratory and their use of a helicopter) the Isle of Wight commune is an 
enlightened liberal elite without ties to the restrictive superstition of religious 
rules and with a voluntary code of government. It is presented as being held 
together not through a sense of communal identity but rather through rational 
self-interest. This is the value to which the novel finally points, through the 
exploration of dystopic alternatives. Wyndham’s dystopic world exists at the 
interstice of the state of nature and an enfeebled, chest-puffing, early-
modern Leviathan. 
                                            
148 Best, "Apocalypticism," 5. 
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The Dystopian Thought of a Liberal Utopian 
 
Wyndham claimed that in an earlier draft of Triffids he had attempted the 
more openly Utopian project of writing about life on the Isle of Wight. He later 
rejected this move because, as he put it in a letter to a fan, it “looked like a 
pill of preaching hidden among the rest.”149 Wyndham, concerned with the 
fluency and readability of his novel (and wanting to steer clear of the literary 
shortcomings of the later Wells) wished to avoid producing “a very dull bog of 
sociological dissertations” at all costs – which was also the very reason his 
attempts to produce a sequel never got far.150 
 
While Wyndham’s oeuvre is clearly of Wellsian descent – a point on which 
he himself was clear – the utopian content of his work is necessarily more 
subtle. Indeed, one reason for the prevalence of catastrophe and negativity 
in Wyndham’s work may be the negative influence of the later Wells’s 
utopias and their highly didactic tone. Yet Wyndham was a firm (if sometimes 
despairing) believer in the English liberal tradition that stretched back 
through the social reforms of Asquith and Lloyd George and ultimately as far 
as J.S. Mill. There is evidence of Wyndham’s belief in a liberal teleology of 
progress in all his fiction. Indeed, the catastrophic disasters that befall the 
world in The Day of the Triffids, The Kraken Wakes, The Outward Urge and 
The Chrysalids are all chances for renewal and the revealing of the path to a 
better organized, more productive and socially cohesive society and in this 
sense Wyndham is a dystopian-apocalypse writing utopist. 
 
The most utopian of his novels from the 1950s is The Outward Urge. It is 
also stylistically the weakest, imitative of Wells’s The Shape of Things to 
Come (1933) and the starry adventures of Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First 
Men (1930). In the novel, Wyndham imagines that following the construction 
of space stations in the 1990s, the USSR, the US and the British establish 
                                            
149 John Wyndham, Letter to Adam Kelso, Esq., 14 Apr. 1954. CC. 12/22/8 The John 
Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
150 John Wyndham, Letter to Mr. and Mrs. Miller of Transvaal, South Africa, 20 Nov. 1951. 
CC. 12/2/4 The John Wyndham Collection, U of Liverpool. 
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military moon bases by 2020. In 2044 nuclear war breaks out, rendering 
most of the northern hemisphere uninhabitable. Brazilian hegemony, with 
Australian rivalry, ensues. Brazil claims that “space is a province of Brazil”, 
but after a disastrous first Martian landing does little to exploit it beyond 
annexing the space stations circling earth and the remaining ex-British moon 
base. It falls to private enterprise to overthrow Brazilian interplanetary 
dominance. Space, the novel preaches, should be conquered not by 
competitive states seeking military advantage or imperial prestige, but by 
beneficent “privateers” for the good of humanity.151 Rather than entities in 
space being annexed for one nation or another, at the climax Brazilian 
extraterrestrial supremacy is successfully usurped by an Australian of 
Brazilian descent, who announces “Space will declare itself an independent 
territory – if the word ‘territory’ is valid in the circumstances.”152 The raison 
d’être of (the human exploration of) “Space” (now capitalized due to its status 
as a sovereign power) is no less than its systematic exploitation – just as it 
was in the Collier’s text of Revolt of the Triffids. The space race is even 
explicitly compared with Pope Alexander VI’s dividing up of the New World 
between Portugal and Spain.153 The point of space exploration is financial 
gain; and despite romanticising the desire to explore space, once “out there” 
the protagonists (all successive male descendents of the Troon family) 
proceed primarily to look for natural resources with economic value. Even 
the Troons’s rosy-eyed views of the heavens mask ruthlessly self-interested 
and atomistic conceptions of humanity. When quizzed on their motivation for 
exploration, they each invoke the final lines of Rupert Brooke’s poem “The 
Jolly Company”: 
… for all the night 
I heard their thin gnat-voices cry 
Star to faint star across the sky.154 
 
The “outward urge” to which the novel’s title alludes is a deep psychic 
longing to be at one with the lonely stars of the poem in the unlimited 
                                            
151 Wyndham and Parkes, The Outward Urge 137. 
152 Wyndham and Parkes, The Outward Urge 167. 
153 Wyndham and Parkes, The Outward Urge 147. 
154 These lines are quoted in full on page 11, and subsequently referred to throughout the 
text. 
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vastness of space, to be a lone patriarchal adventurer of the final frontier: 
singularly dedicated, rational and emotionally untouchable. This is then a 
sort of cosmic synecdoche for the human condition, where every man 
remains, “In his lone obscure distress/Each walketh in a wilderness”, cut off 
from all other men.155 
 
However, it is more properly through each male descendent of the Troon 
line’s lack of relationship with his father that he is cut off from humanity. A 
recurring theme is the death of Troon characters leaving behind unborn or 
infant sons, condemned to live in the shadow of their fathers until they in turn 
take to space exploration. It is colonialist traders who claim to explore space 
‘for its own sake’ or for the sake of ‘science’, whilst exploiting uninhabited 
areas (and hence doing so guiltlessly), who finally put these Oedipal 
anxieties to rest. Their ascendancy ends international conflict and 
establishes the liberal utopia of “Space” as a non-territorial, internationalist 
body acting simultaneously as the world’s policeman. 
 
David Ketterer’s analyses of Wyndham often fall back on biographical and 
psychological explanation.156 The absent fathers which he finds in all of 
Wyndham’s other postwar novels feature in The Outward Urge even more 
keenly. In each generation there is a breakdown of authority and an increase 
in anxious uncertainty followed by a rite of passage in which the son 
becomes an autonomous man. Ketterer is most likely correct that the sharply 
felt absence of Wyndham’s father from 1911 (when he was eight) had an 
effect upon narrative strategies in his fiction. More significant to this study, 
however, is the political and religious impact of fatherlessness in the novels. 
Put another way, the psychological question of what fatherlessness in the 
novels says about Wyndham is in the end a question of authorial intent. But 
                                            
155 Rupert Brooke, "The Jolly Company," The Poetical Works: Edited by Geoffrey Keynes, 
Literature Online (London: Faber, 1970). “Male condition” would be more accurate here: this 
is Wyndham’s only post-World War II novel in without a strong female central role. Brooke’s 
description of atomized humanity shares interesting parallels with Hannah Arendt’s 
description of the Boers, thinly dispersed across the Transvaal at the turn of the century. 
See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, chapter 7 “Race and Bureaucracy”. 
156 See, for example, Ketterer, "The Midwich Cuckoos as Estranged Autobiography," 153; 
Ketterer, "John Wyndham: The Facts of Life Sextet". 
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it can also be looked at politically, in terms of the relations and interplay 
between form, narrative and the social and economic forces working within 
human ecology in the novels.157 
 
In these terms, the most overt effect is that it allows the central protagonists 
to “be their own man”. As Susan Sontag noted, “The lure of such generalized 
disaster as a fantasy is that it releases one from normal obligations.”158 Bill 
Masen, protagonist-narrator of The Day of the Triffids, sums up his 
immediate feelings about his life now that a global pandemic of blindness 
has just caused the end of the socio-political order as he knew it thus: 
I suppose that had I had any relative or close attachments to mourn I should 
have felt suicidally derelict at that moment. But what had seemed at times a 
rather empty existence turned out now to be lucky. My mother and father were 
dead, my one attempt to marry had miscarried some years before, and there 
was no particular person dependent on me… All the old problems, the stale 
ones, both personal and general, had been solved by one mighty slash…  I 
was emerging as my own master, and no longer a cog. It might well be a world 
of horrors and dangers that I should have to face, but I could take my own 
steps to deal with it – I would no longer be shoved hither and thither by forces 
and interests that I neither understood nor cared about.159 
 
The note of irony is that he will in future live in battle against the triffids: a 
force in which he has an abiding care and interest, if not ever quite full 
comprehension. Masen can be glad that he has no parents or dependents to 
mourn or look after, but this was his position before the disaster. What has 
changed, giving him a sense of release, is the breakdown of societal 
obstructions and impediments to his will, including the State, social mores 
and the socio-economic order. He is indeed in the upper echelons of the new 
socio-economic hierarchy based solely on his abilities as a sighted hunter-
gatherer/scavenger; not only master of his own life but freed from the 
responsibilities of the postwar settlement and the burden of care for others 
within society. Without the state or religious institutions his moral compass is 
                                            
157 Webster, "John Wyndham as Novelist of Ideas," 41. 
158 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays, 1st Picador USA ed. (New York: 
Picador, 2001), 215. 
159 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids, 47-8 emphasis added. 
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guided – in his own mind – not by the internalisation of a traditional code 
handed down by his father but rather by the force of his own (liberal) reason. 
The complex of emotions that Masen feels at his newly-found autonomy is 
most revealing in the fact that it links together a lack of family ties to an 
absence of all authority: parental, the State, and religion. The utopian aspect 
of the novel lies in Masen’s rejection of absolute autonomy to become a co-
operative and co-dependent member of a new “family”, one that bonds 
together and remains together through intellectual exchange and the shared 
values of liberal reason as opposed to the traditional obligatory hierarchies of 
the patriarchal family. 
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Looking Back at the Future 
 
 
PROGRESS AND DOOM ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME MEDAL 
 
-HANNAH ARENDT 
 Preface to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
 
We 
Eternally enamored two times two 
Eternally united in the passionate four 
Most ardent lovers in the world– 
Inseparable two times two…1 
 
 
Brave New World 
Bottle of mine, it’s you I’ve always wanted! 
Bottle of mine, why was I ever decanted? 
 Skies are blue inside of you, 
 The weather’s always fine; 
For 
There ain’t no Bottle in all the world 
Like that dear little Bottle of mine.2 
 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four 
It was only an ‘opeless fancy, 
It passed like an Ipril dye, 
But a look an’ a word an’ the dreams they stirred 
They ‘ave stolen my ‘eart awye! 
[…] 
They sye that time ‘eals all things, 
They sye you can always forget; 
But the smiles an’ the tears acrorss the years 
They twist my ‘eart-strings yet!3 
 
 
The Day of The Triffids 
My love’s locked up in a Frigidaire 
And my heart’s in a deep-freeze pack. 
She’s gone with a guy, I’d not know where, 
But she wrote that she’d never come back. 
Now she don’t care for me no more 
I’m just a one-man frozen store, 
 And it ain’t nice 
 To be on ice 
With my love locked up in a Frigidaire, 
And my heart in a deep-freeze pack.4 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Zamyatin, We 66. 
2 Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited 79. 
3 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 145 and 148; 227. 
4 Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids 51-2. 
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The epigraph of Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian 
Imagination (2003), edited by Raffaela Baccolini and Tom Moylan, is a 
translation of Bertolt Brecht’s short poem, “Motto”: 
In the dark times 
Will there also be singing? 
Yes, there will also be singing 
About the dark times5 
 
None of the book’s contributors actually make specific reference to singing in 
dystopia in their analyses. Nevertheless, it remains an oddly prevalent 
activity in the texts that have been examined in this thesis. Mathematics and 
sex, test-tube reproduction and infantile hedonism, hopeless and forgotten 
dreams and fancies, personal loss and consumer technology: the song lyrics 
of dystopias can pointedly emphasise some of their central themes. The 
ostentatiously trite and even comically tedious nature of the lyrics, 
meanwhile, serves to underline their deployment as satirical commentary on 
both (events occurring in) the narrative as a whole, as well as song in 
contemporary popular culture. In clear parody, lazy clichés of commercially 
produced songs litter these verses so thoroughly that they start to blend into 
each other (“My love’s locked up…/Eternally enamoured…/It’s you I’ve 
always wanted…/Twist my ‘eart-strings yet…”). Indeed, Orwell’s verse, in its 
simulated Cockney accent, refers directly to the integral role of the cliché in 
this machine-produced “prolefeed” with the repetition in verse two of the self-
reflexive example “they sye”. 
 
In Orwell’s text, the ideological content of the song, reflecting the conditions 
of its production by the Party, is somehow mitigated by the “valiant figure in 
the yard” who “sang it so tunefully as to turn the dreadful rubbish into an 
almost pleasant sound” while pegging up washing on a line.6 As Richard 
Hoggart suggested in a discussion of the popularity of “Tin Pan Alley” songs, 
when “the people… have taken [a song] on their own terms… it is not for 
                                            
5 Baccolini and Moylan, eds., Dark Horizons v. 
6 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 229, 145. 
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them as poor a thing as it might have been.”7 Moreover, the placement of the 
song in the text is itself significant; Winston Smith feels “mystical reverence” 
for the woman “singing alone and spontaneously” but the song she sings is 
in fact a re-telling of his own story. Beginning on “a bright cold day in April”, 
his affair with Julia is – as they both know – an “‘opeless fancy”.8 In the 
Ministry of Love O’Brien teaches Winston that you can indeed “always 
forget”. Furthermore, in the final scene we are told that Winston realised his 
“‘eart-strings” belonged to Big Brother when “[t]wo gin-scented tears trickled 
down the sides of his nose”.9 
 
Orwell invokes an affective response to a re-production of machine-produced 
song and uses this both to satirise the commercially-driven culture industry 
and to reflect upon the narrative. For John Carey, “the impasse at which 
Winston arrives [i]s essentially the same” as that of the Frankfurt School 
theorists Horkheimer and Adorno; an elitism which “regarded the masses as 
dupes, seduced by capitalism’s equivalent of Prolefeed.” Carey argues that 
for Orwell and the Frankfurt School alike, only “the individual can appreciate 
‘high’ culture – and mass civilization threatens to obliterate the individual.”10 
Carey’s opposition of “high” modernism and “mass culture” hypostatizes 
what was in effect a more complex picture: plenty of mass-market 
magazines “were liberally peppered” with work both by and about 
modernists. Indeed, between them Gent Magazine and Escapade published 
pieces by the likes of Faulkner, John O’Hara, Jean Paul Sartre, Jack 
Kerouac, S.J. Perelman, William Soroyan and Somerset Maugham. Other 
modernist writers including Joyce, Henry Miller, DeMaupassant and D.H. 
Lawrence also published in mass-market periodicals.11 Furthermore, Orwell 
himself owed his success to selling to the mass market: Nineteen Eighty-
Four was “select[ed] by the American Book of the Month Club despite 
[Orwell’s] refusal to remove the long extracts from The Theory and Practice 
                                            
7 Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958) 162. 
8 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 3. 
9 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 311. 
10 Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses 43. 
11 David M. Earle, Re-Covering Modernism: Pulps, Paperbacks and the Prejudice of Form, 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) 1. 
  Stock 266     
 
of Oligarchical Collectivism.”12 This does, though, point to the American 
Book of the Month Club viewing Goldstein’s text as outside the norms or 
expectations of mass-market fiction. 
 
A case can be made for Carey’s view that Orwell’s last novel may be 
essentially regarded as modernist. But what links Orwell to the modernist 
movement is not merely a propensity to denigrate mass society and culture. 
In a typically modernist fashion, Orwell mingles “high brow” intellectual 
discourse, such as the extract from a text on Political Economy, with texts 
from commercial art and mass culture like the lyrics of the song the 
washerwoman sings in the yard behind Charrington’s shop. 
 
For Patricia Rae, “Charrington is to Winston Smith as [T. S.] Eliot is to 
Orwell: a prospective solution to a deficit of history.”13 In his junk shop, 
Winston’s concerns with memory, time and history are mapped onto physical 
objects. Among the “miscellaneous rubbish” of the past, Winston sees 
“lacquered snuff-boxes, agate brooches and the like – which looked as 
though they might include something interesting.”14 In Rae’s allegorical 
reading,  
The fragmentary state of the junk shop’s contents… and the nostalgia they 
evoke, suggests a possible parallel between the shop and the text of The 
Waste Land, another ‘heap of broken images’ inspiring its reader to view the 
present in the light of a nobler past.15 
 
What David Trotter, borrowing from D.H. Lawrence, terms the “friability of 
actual life”, was demonstrated by Zamyatin in the fracturing of D-503’s sense 
of self, and by Huxley in the fracturing of narrative into contrapuntal 
fragments. Here, Orwell domesticates this friability of modernity in a space 
evoking “ancestral memory.”16 But what seems authentic is later revealed, 
                                            
12 Taylor, Orwell: The Life 408. 
13 Patricia Rae, "Mr. Charrington's Junk Shop: T. S. Eliot and Modernist Poetics in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four," Twentieth Century Literature 43 (1997) 200. 
14 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 98. 
15 Rae, "Mr. Charrington's Junk Shop," 202. 
16 David Trotter, Paranoid Modernism: Literary Modernism, Psychosis, and the 
Professionalization of English Society (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), 2; Orwell, Nineteen 
Eighty-Four 100. 
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like the engraving hanging over the telescreen, to be a façade as fragile as 
the coral paperweight smashed on the floor when Winston and Julia are 
arrested.  “[H]ow small it always was!” Winston reflects.17 
 
Modernist tropes and themes are common in dystopian fiction of this period. 
The critique of religious themes, for example, which in Orwell’s novel occurs 
implicitly through the character of O’Brien as a priestly father figure, achieves 
more explicit expansion in Wyndham’s 1955 novel The Chrysalids in its 
mutated puritan Christianity. Similarly, the situating of this narrative a 
thousand years after a nuclear holocaust in a distant future that mirrors the 
distant past tacitly engages with questions arising from the implications of 
writing within the scientific paradigm of modernity. In Zamyatin’s We, 
meanwhile, this is made even clearer with the ironic inversion of the image of 
Prometheus in the poetry of the One State. Here, rather than being confined 
by chains to a rock as punishment for stealing fire from the gods to give to 
mankind, Prometheus, now representing mankind, “unfrees” humanity by 
imposing law upon nature (through natural sciences) and man (through the 
modern state): “He harnessed fire in the machine, in steel,/And bound chaos 
in the chains of Law.”18 
 
These dystopias, then, have interrelated aesthetic and socio-political 
significance: they are allied to literary modernism, while as a mode of critique 
they are reactions to both the everyday realities of specific modern 
conditions, and more broadly to the modern condition of their epoch. Their 
ability to perform these critical functions stems from a common approach to 
narrative strategy. As argued in chapter one, at the level of the narrative arc, 
dystopias of this period project forwards into the future – a strategy which, 
following Genette, can be termed prolepsis.19 Within this “storyworld”, 
however, the narrative often uses analepses (flashbacks) to examine the 
                                            
17 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 232. For Patricia Waugh, “the paperweight stands too as an 
image of the novel, the book we are holding, and it also represents the importance of touch 
and of the tacit in a rationalized and bureaucratized world of newness, symbolizing the need 
to feel, to cradle something from the past, in one’s hands.” Waugh, "The Historical Context 
of Post-War British Literature," 39. 
18 Zamyatin, We 47. 
19 Genette, Narrative Discourse 40. 
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author’s present and even their own near future.20 As discussed in chapter 
three, during the contrapuntal narrative in chapter three of Brave New World, 
in which the narrative flicks between different scenes with increasing rapidity, 
Mustapha Mond, the World Controller, gives some students a history 
lesson.21 By skipping not only between subjects, but between discourses 
(from the banality of sexual gossip to the absurd presentation of an 
authoritative scientific account of terror), Huxley gives the reader just enough 
information to piece together an idea of how the World State of Brave New 
World came into being. There are glimpses of increasing disorder, war, 
economic collapse – crises of unprecedented proportions. None of this is 
fleshed out: we do not find out, for example, who the belligerents were in the 
Nine Years’ War, or why anthrax was used against civilians. The solidity of 
dystopian storyworlds, in which a future world is, Sargent insists, “described 
in considerable detail” seems to gesture towards the predictive texts of H. G. 
Wells, J. B. S. Haldane and others, models of futurology which would prove 
important to the nascent subgenre of what John Wyndham termed “hard” 
science fiction.22 However, the ambiguous content of the proleptic-analeptic 
manoeuvre of dystopian fiction, in which the gap between (the author’s 
contemporary) “now” and (the future) “then” is clouded and obscure, points 
to a deeper, subtler engagement with the processes of history. 
 
This engagement drew together strands from both socio-political and 
cultural-intellectual history. While, for example, Zamyatin made post-
Revolutionary trends in sexual behaviour subject to satire through an 
extrapolation into a future setting, these trends were also tracked backwards 
through history, hinting perhaps towards Kant’s views of marriage, but more 
generally to the questioning of sexual norms from the Enlightenment 
onwards. The questioning of these norms, which can be readily observed not 
only in the libertine pornographic fringes of Enlightenment thought (in 
writings of the Marquis de Sade, the Marquis d’Argens, and John Cleland, for 
example) but also in the thought of more mainstream thinkers like Denis 
                                            
20 Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative 130. 
21 See above, 137-8 and 140-1. 
22 Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited," 9. 
  Stock 269     
 
Diderot, re-appeared at the turn of the twentieth century in the work of H. G. 
Wells. There is a clear line separating gratuitous pornography like Cleland’s 
Fanny Hill or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure from Diderot, who had 
declared in the Encyclopédie that “everyone is more or less sensual. Those 
who preach [otherwise are] bilious men who should be shut up in a 
madhouse…”23 Diderot was also interested in wider scientific questions 
surrounding reproduction and biology. It was this latter area, far more than 
the advocacy of free love, which held H. G. Wells’s interest throughout his 
literary career. 
 
This was also the case for Aldous Huxley, for whom satire of sexual mores 
and codes of behaviour was not only an end in itself but also a way into 
discussing questions of reproduction and the morality of eugenics. In his test 
tube future, the desirability of distant possibilities of science are critically 
questioned by being placed within a “utopia” whose very utopian status is 
constantly, satirically undermined. Huxley consciously positioned his text as 
(in part) responding to Wells’s utopias, and more widely to the utopian 
literary tradition, while re-assessing post-Enlightenment values to do with 
“improving” human nature. Brave New World is an extraordinarily clear 
example of the capabilities of the proleptic-analeptic structural manoeuvre in 
modernistic dystopias to critique, satirise, problematise and question in a 
sustained and literary manner. 
 
From the sixteenth century, semiotician Louis Marin argues, utopia appeared 
as an imaginative space beyond the limit of the horizon. “Utopia is the infinite 
work of the imagination’s power of figuration”, he writes, and as such, the 
“utopian representation always takes the figure, the form of a map.”24 Marin 
restricts his analysis to More’s seminal text, without engaging with the 
implications of the change in meaning that, he asserts, occurred through the 
admission into eighteenth-century dictionaries of “utopia” not as a “toponym” 
but as “a common noun”. The results of this change were important: 
                                            
23 Denis Diderot “Voluptueux”, Encyclopédie, vol. 27, 446-7, quoted in Mason, The 
Irresistible Diderot 124. 
24 Louis Marin, "The Frontiers of Utopia," Utopias and the Millenium eds. Krishan Kumar and 
Stephan Bann (London: Reaktion, 1993), 8, 12, 13. 
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increasing knowledge of the world’s geography began to restrict the extent to 
which the island of Utopia could be othered in geographical space as beyond 
the oceanic horizon (when maps detailing the content of the space beyond 
the physical horizon were easily obtainable). But more forceful than this 
process, as Bloch and Adorno concurred, the Enlightenment had provided 
writers of literary utopias in the West with a narrative of progress and social 
evolution that enabled them to conceive of utopia as a transformative 
creative possibility for their own future.25 
 
The binding of utopia to the ideals of the Enlightenment also tied it to the 
Enlightenment’s failures and misuses. Just as the injustices of colonialism, 
and later imperialism, were justified by reference to the “enlightening” of 
colonial/imperial subjects, so too would the dubious concepts of the “Law of 
Nature” and the “Law of History” be invoked in order to radically transform 
societies towards dreams of purity and “perfection”. From the Enlightenment 
onwards, the inherent dangers of utopia were amplified. In his discussion of 
what he termed “utopian engineering”, Karl Popper argued that “[t]he Utopian 
attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint of society as a whole, is 
one which demands a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is 
likely to lead to dictatorship…”26 
 
Popper here approaches the problem of power relations within the 
framework of utopian visions. As critiques of these visions, this issue has 
been central in the development of literary dystopias too. Within the 
psychological topography of dystopian fiction, the limits and lengths to which 
relations of domination and power could be stretched were systematically 
explored. Responding to the darkest moments of the early-mid twentieth 
century, “radical evil” (as Arendt termed it) was mapped onto a fictional 
future so that both contemporary history and the ideological projections of 
totalitarian movements could be better understood.27 But dystopia does more 
                                            
25 Bloch, "Something's Missing," 5. See above, 29. 
26 Popper, The Open Society, vol. 1, 159. This analysis rests on a problematic conflation of 
utopianism with visions of an “ideal” or perfect state rather than “radically better.” Against 
Popper, see Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited," 24-28. 
27 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 459. 
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than simply create a plausible setting. Dystopia, it is worth re-stating, is not 
only a bad place, but one where bad things happen in the life of a central 
character or group of characters.  The proleptic-analeptic manoeuvres of the 
dystopias examined in this thesis are not only a way of critically assessing 
history and the utopian literary tradition, but often a device for characterising 
the speaker(s)/(fictional) writer(s) of this future history, and for helping to 
structure the narrative. 
 
The importance of proleptic-analepses as a multifaceted tool is observable in 
the critiques of Wellsian utopian ideals that are present in all of the dystopian 
fictions that have been examined in depth in earlier chapters. Wells is (at 
times crudely) taken as representative of a tradition of literary utopias in 
which Enlightenment rationalism is extrapolated from being the 
epistemological basis for scientific, mathematic and metaphysical 
investigation, to being the ideological basis for a projected future society. 
This leads to a situation in which a model of the “good society” is reduced to 
a projection of a “rational” society, grossly distorting the values of freedom 
and happiness. In Zamyatin’s We, one way in which this is addressed is 
through the reification of a (false) dichotomy between happiness and 
freedom into static, polar opposites. As the poet R-13 puts it, 
Those two, in paradise, were given a choice: happiness without freedom, or 
freedom without happiness. There was no third alternative. Those idiots chose 
freedom, and what came of it? Of course, for ages afterward they longed for 
the chains. The chains – you understand? That’s what world sorrow was 
about.28 
 
For Zamyatin, in contrast, to be human is to be free, and unlike the Mephi 
community beyond the Green Wall, “those two, in paradise” were not fulfilling 
their human potential: in Sartrean terms, “man is freedom.”29 The positing of 
freedom against happiness is thus a false dichotomy – neither is fully 
possible without the other. In the One State, what is termed “happiness” is a 
mere absence of privation. The values of the One State, then, seem fairly 
                                            
28 Zamyatin, We 61. 
29 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 
1948) 34 emphasis in original. 
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close to those put forward by Karl Popper, for whom the choice is between 
the “piecemeal” approach, which he inconsistently characterises as “a 
systematic fight against suffering and injustice and war”, and that of the 
“utopian engineer”, who commits violent acts in the name of a distant end of 
universal happiness.30 In a footnote, Popper refines his position by disputing 
the validity or applicability of the utilitarian ‘greatest happiness’ principle. 
There is, as he sees it, “no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or 
between pain and pleasure.” Moreover, it would be morally untenable to 
count one person’s happiness or pleasure against another’s suffering or 
pain.31 However, elsewhere Popper argued “that freedom is more important 
than equality.”32 This rests on an acknowledgement that freedom (as he 
conceives it) may actually entail inequality, but that this is a price worth 
paying. But if inequality causes suffering, then an insoluble contradiction of 
values emerges. 
 
Part of the problem that Popper shares with the utilitarianism he rejects is 
that both positions are underpinned by a strong belief in the power of 
scientific thought, as “problem-solving”, to undertake not just tasks related to 
natural sciences, but also to human and social sciences. As noted in chapter 
one, according to Stephan Toulmin’s rather grand historical narrative, such a 
path was typical of the fate of philosophy in modernity, which from its earliest 
days saw a change in both the style and content of philosophical debate, 
reflecting a shift from a practical model to a theoretical conception of 
philosophy, in which “nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless, 
general, and universal theories.”33 
 
In the post-Baconian world, as they journeyed toward the rise of the scientific 
paradigm, “the natural sciences… moved in a zigzag, alternating the 
rationalist methods of Newton’s mathematics and the empiricist methods of 
                                            
30 Popper, The Open Society, vol. 1, 158 emphasis added. 
31 Popper, The Open Society, vol. 1, 284-5. 
32 Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 
1992) 36. 
33 Toulmin, Cosmopolis 35. See above, 48. 
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Bacon’s naturalism.”34 Both methods ultimately had the same end: the 
presentation of “clear and distinct” ideas, whose truthfulness was evident in 
their very clarity and distinctiveness. By the twentieth century, this elevation 
of the value of particular types of truth claims and the rhetoric surrounding 
them had become a dominant cultural norm. 
 
As critiques of both cultural norms and the processes of Enlightenment as 
they were embedded in history, dystopian fictions were well positioned to 
question assumptions of the scientific age. Indeed, one of the most obvious 
targets for dystopian satire and cultural criticism was that post-Enlightenment 
social and political values, which were often couched in the rhetoric of the 
scientific era, were at odds with the applied science and technology of an 
age of industrial warfare. 
 
For Orwell, to refuse to grapple with these issues was to pursue a course of 
quietism that to him seemed unsustainable intellectually in an age of “fear, 
tyranny, and regimentation.” In an essay on Henry Miller, whom he 
characterised as talented, but whose refusal to engage with politics disturbed 
him, Orwell wrote, 
To say ‘I accept’ in an age like our own is to say that you accept 
concentration-camps, rubber truncheons, Hitler, Stalin, bombs, aeroplanes, 
tinned food, machine-guns, putsches, purges, slogans, Bedaux belts, gas-
masks, submarines, spies, provocateurs, press-censorship, secret prisons, 
aspirins, Hollywood films and political murders. Not only those things, of 
course, but those things among others.35 
  
This rhetoric of consumerism, dictatorship, mass society, realpolitik and 
militarism was the reality with which dystopian fiction grappled. It is the 
language of emotional manipulation and the creation of desires, of ceaseless 
change and static conditions, of analgesics and intolerable suffering – all 
targets of satire or criticism in dystopian novels of the period. Mass 
production and the regimentation of modern life are conceived of together, 
as mutually reinforcing. 
                                            
34 Toulmin, Cosmopolis 105. 
35 Orwell, Collected Works, vol. 12, 91 emphasis in original. 
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Dystopian fiction from circa 1920 to 1960 had “a particular quality of social 
experience and relationship, historically distinct from other particular 
qualities, which gives the sense of a generation or of a period.”36 These 
novels therefore formed part of what Williams terms a “structure of feeling”, 
existing in a space in which the full meaning and significance of lived social 
experience was not yet analysable in historical terms. Within the context of 
this particular structure of feeling, which stretched from the end of World War 
I up to the social upheavals around the start of the 1960s, this thesis has 
sought to demonstrate that dystopian fictions mapped social change as it 
emerged in a number of important ways. 
 
One of the most important new social experiences of this period was that of 
modern, global, industrial warfare. The contentious end of the Great War had 
hinted that scores were not settled and more conflict was to come. The War 
also showed that the line between civilian targets and the front line of conflict 
could be rapidly eroded. War was an agent of change, helping to bring about 
the conditions for the Bolshevik Revolution, for example. It was also a mass 
experience that left indelible marks in the social and cultural spheres, not 
merely through the ruins of cities, but in the changing attitudes and values of 
whole populations too. The exploration of these themes was deeply 
important to dystopian fictions. Whilst in the case of John Wyndham’s 
postwar work there is a cathartic element to his presentation of invasion 
themes, in The Day of the Triffids there is also a properly apocalyptic sense 
of unveiling and revealing. The world in Wyndham’s postwar works is forever 
changed by devestating upheavals. But through these transformations, new 
ways of life and social exchange are manifest in a process not only of 
cataclysmic ending and horrific, unnatural disasters, but also of renewal. 
 
Yet even amid sea monsters and walking venomous plants, the powerful 
figure that truly haunts these narratives is in fact real and empirically 
existent: the elephant in the room is the atomic bomb. In the postwar era, the 
                                            
36 Williams, Marxism and Literature, 131. 
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Bomb was a key trope in the narrative structures of dystopias. It formed part 
of a worldview that reflected shifts in attitudes towards developments across 
the sciences in the mid-twentieth century, from the Modern Synthesis in 
biology to the evolution of technologies of surveillance. Alexander Aldridge 
goes as far as to argue that it is the scientific worldview which brings many 
dystopias into generic close proximity. Thus, Zamyatin’s We may be 
characterised as being 
not merely a satire on excessive rationality as critics sometimes suggest, nor 
an anti-scientific or even anti-technological statement. Rather, Zamiatin 
assumes that a specifically outmoded scientific ideal has formed the mythos of 
a culture, that that particular scientific mythos manifests itself in everything 
from architectural regularity to regulated sexual behavior.37 
 
While the Enlightenment was characterised by Gadamer (as noted above in 
chapters two and four) as engendering “the conquest of mythos by logos”, in 
dystopian fiction mythos may be reasserted as a hypostatized rationality.38 
This path was traced by Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, for whom “Enlightenment reverts to mythology” when science 
is elevated from the methods of a research community to a worldview and 
ideological basis for an entire society.39 
 
Science in dystopian fictions is intimately tied up with political structures and 
power relations. Indeed, it is political relations that form the basis of critique 
in these novels, the trunk from which the boughs of science, war and other 
concerns grow. As Arendt put it, “never have we depended so much on 
political forces that cannot be trusted to follow the rules of common sense 
and self-interest – forces that look like sheer insanity, if judged by the 
standards of other centuries.”40 Goldstein’s text in Nineteen Eighty-Four 
likewise summarises the situation from the 1930s onwards as being most 
desperate: 
                                            
37 Alexandra Aldridge, The Scientific World View in Dystopia (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research 
P, 1984), 37. 
38 Gadamer, "The Historicity of Understanding," 258. See above, 89 and 245. 
39 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment xvi.  See above, 53-5 and 245. 
40 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism vii. 
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…by the fourth decade of the twentieth century all the main currents of political 
thought were authoritarian. The earthly paradise had been discredited at 
exactly the moment when it became realisable. Every new political theory, by 
whatever name it called itself, led back to hierarchy and regimentation…41 
 
Zamyatin wrote We at a time when he perceived that the Russian Revolution 
which he had originally backed was also set on a dangerous course back 
toward “hierarchy and regimentation.” This set the trend for dystopian fiction. 
Huxley, for example, subsequently extrapolated forward in Brave New World 
some of the processes of consumer capitalism that he had observed at their 
zenith in America, where he identified “a revaluation of values, a radical 
alteration (for the worse) of established standards.”42 In John Wyndham’s 
dystopian novels in contrast, even where they began to move away from the 
model of dystopian narrative that centres on the power of the modern state, 
this brought into focus the reach of regimentation in modern life precisely by 
the ability of such regimental orders to persist during the collapse of the state 
itself. For Wyndham, it seems the “earthly paradise”, sketched by his 
predecessor H. G. Wells, is unrealisable perhaps because of its totalised 
aspect, attempting to govern every human being in the world, imposing 
universal order. The utopian enclaves that are scattered around his works 
represent a turn away from the universal and global, towards the local and 
particular. 
 
However, as argued in chapter five, in Wyndham’s fictional worlds it is 
characters with strong, coherent identities and a sense of rugged autonomy 
like Bill Masen (The Day of the Triffids), Phyllis Watson (The Kraken Wakes) 
and Rosalind (The Chrysalids) who not only survive, but thrive in the face of 
social upheaval. These characters are able to resist regimenting social 
pressures. As a group, it is significant that while the political persuasions of 
their authors differ markedly, dystopian novels in the mid-twentieth century 
tended to promote the claims of individual liberty against the advancing 
power and reach of the modern state. As modernistic texts, many of these 
                                            
41 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 213. 
42 Quoted in Murray, Aldous Huxley 184. 
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novels called into question the notion of a stable sense of self – Zamyatin’s 
D-503 is an especially prominent example of the fracturing and alienating 
impact of modernity on models of subjecthood. 
 
Question marks remain, though, over the status of women in Zamyatin’s text: 
it is never made clear whether I-330 is merely a femme fatale or a 
revolutionary leader betrayed by D-503’s worst instincts. In Brave New World 
gender roles are similarly ambiguous: while patriarchy is continually 
presented as natural and inevitable, there are hints at the damage which 
enforced promiscuity does to Lenina Crowne. On the other hand, economic 
gender inequality is lower than in 1930s Britain. Even in Wyndham’s novels, 
where women are frequently presented as more intelligent, resourceful and 
practical than men, they are also presumed to continue to undertake 
traditional female gender roles. This very ambivalence throughout dystopian 
fictions reflects changing cultural and social attitudes towards women, which 
have moved at a far from uniform pace. 
 
Dystopian Legacies 
 
These are just a few of the ways in which dystopian fiction from 1920-1960 
mapped social change and formed part of a structure of feeling. Due to their 
multifaceted, often intelligent and exploratory approach to issues surrounding 
the mass experience of war, scientific developments, politics, cultural 
changes, moral autonomy and gender relations, dystopias are important 
cultural historical documents. They are in addition significant literary works: 
all are novels of ideas that engaged with trends in modernism as well as 
marking milestones in the emergence of the new genre of science fiction, 
while also responding to the rich utopian literary tradition. 
 
The legacies of dystopian fiction from this period can be split – for analytical 
purposes – between the critical and the literary. As interventions at a time of 
profound political and social crises, dystopias were influential in providing a 
timely alternative means by which to think about the world. In other words, 
dystopian fiction offered a way of reshaping the epistemological basis of 
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critique from within the post-Enlightenment tradition. Dystopian novels 
demonstrated some of the limits of rationalist and empiricist investigative 
techniques by providing a space for the inclusion of affective enquiry. 
Beginning from a critical stance which withheld from a post-Enlightenment 
liberal or socialist teleological belief in progress, dystopian fiction considered 
the implications for the slippery ideological notion of “world history”. They 
questioned whether the social, political and cultural changes that 
accompanied developments in scientific and technical knowledge could be 
considered improvements. Dystopian fiction asked its readers to consider 
why, just at the moment when utopian transformations that might eliminate 
inequality and injustice seemed technically possible, such political, social 
and cultural change seemed to slip further from grasp. 
 
In thinking through such questions, dystopian fictions were also highly 
influential as criticism. As part of a structure of feeling, deeply embedded 
within the history of their time, they mapped social and cultural change. Yet 
they were also influential in actively changing attitudes and marking 
expectations. Most obviously, the language of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
continues to this day to mark popular media across the political spectrum, 
with the term “Orwellian” as a heading above a set of “newspeak” words that 
are now well-worn clichés.43 But more subtly, and in a more varied and 
                                            
43 In the week of 7-13 March 2011 alone, for example, the term “Orwellian” appeared in the 
online editions of the Daily Mail (twice), the Mirror, Metro, the Guardian, the Observer and 
the Times. The articles, all retrieved on 15 March 2011, are as follows: Bill Neely, “Rebels 
Hold Off Gaddafi Forces in His Own Backyard,” Daily Mail, 8 March 2011, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1363985/Libya-No-10-hangs-William-Hague-dry-
SAS-humiliation-desert.html>; “Tory Bid to Stop Soup Runs for Homeless 'Because it 
Encourages Them to Live on the Streets',” Daily Mail, 10 March 2011, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1364973/Tory-bid-stop-soup-runs-homeless-
encourages-life-streets.html>; Paul Routledge, “Cameron's Pensions Axeman Lord Hutton 
Drops Us in It,” Mirror, 11 March 2011, <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/columnists/ 
routledge/2011/03/11/cameron-s-pensions-axeman-lord-hutton-drops-us-in-it-115875-
22980714/>; Fred Attewill, “Hacking Alert on Google Phones as Apps Deleted Without User 
Knowledge,” Metro, 8 March 2011, <http://www.metro.co.uk/tech/857573-hacking-alert-on-
google-phones-as-apps-deleted-without-user-knowledge>; Peter Beaumont, “Libya Regime 
Treating Journalists Like Idiots – But Ones Who Are Useful to Them,” Guardian, 8 March 
2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/08/libya-regime-ill-treats-foreign-
journalists? INTCMP=SRCH>; Sarah Churchwell, “A Visit from the Goon Squad by Jennifer 
Egan,” Review, Observer, 13 March 2011, Sec. The New Review, <http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/books/2011/mar/13/jennifer-egan-visit-goon-squad?INTCMP=SRCH>; and Tom 
Whipple, “Are We Heading for a Chocolate Calamity?” Times, 11 March 2011, 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/life/families/article2942017. ece>. 
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complex manner, dystopian fiction contributed to debates about 
developments in science; social Darwinism; modern industrial warfare and 
the military-industrial complex; political movements across the spectrum 
including Communism, Fascism, social democracy and consumer capitalism; 
and last, but by no means least, theories and literary visions of utopia. 
 
On the literary front, meanwhile, dystopias were important landmarks in the 
development of the science fiction genre. While John Wyndham showed one 
very English way in which the dystopian trajectory could be taken in the 
1950s by tracing the footsteps of Wells, the US was developing its own 
dystopian tradition, through novels like Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano (1952), 
Frederik Pohl and C.M. Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants (1953) and Ray 
Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 (1954), texts which investigated regimented 
futures of corporatism and conspicuous consumption. In Britain, meanwhile, 
the end of the 1950s saw the rise of new science fiction writers who sought 
to break away from the shadow of H. G. Wells and his dystopian 
descendants. For some, like Brian Aldiss, this meant not only refusing to 
acknowledge a debt to writers like John Wyndham, but also to strategies of 
radical estrangement where landscapes, social orders and even the 
appearance of “people” became utterly unrecognisable in any contemporary 
terms (as in his Hothouse (1962)). The narrative strategy of proleptic-
analepses, which so characterised dystopian fictions from 1920 to 1960, is 
mostly absent from the liminal, dark spaces of alterity in J.G. Ballard’s early 
fiction, which exist in a far more dream-like psychological sphere. Feminist 
texts like Doris Lessing’s Memoirs of a Survivor (1974), meanwhile, marked 
an important new phase in which the frequently patriarchal assumptions of 
SF and dystopian genres were critiqued from within the tradition. 
 
The blackened, poisonous pastures of dystopia, strewn with the debris of the 
twentieth century – empty tins and bullet casings, newsprint, broken radios 
and shards of glass – are walked again. Newly scattered detritus is brought 
into focus. Dystopia continues to haunt the future, tracking the limits and 
horizons the most culturally prevalent fears and pressing anxieties. The 
“New Maps of Hell” to which Kingsley Amis referred in his early criticism of 
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the science fiction genre persistently return as a means for inscribing political 
and critical thought into literary works, continually revaluing the values of 
modernity.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
44 Amis, New Maps of Hell. 
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